Opinion
2013-03-15
In the Matter of LILLIANNA G. Erie County Department of Social Services, Petitioner–Respondent; Orena G., Respondent–Appellant.
David J. Pajak, Alden, for Respondent–Appellant. Joseph T. Jarzembek, Buffalo, for Petitioner–Respondent.
David J. Pajak, Alden, for Respondent–Appellant. Joseph T. Jarzembek, Buffalo, for Petitioner–Respondent.
David C. Schopp, Attorney for the Child, The Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., Buffalo (Charles D. Halvorsen of Counsel), for Lillianna G.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., FAHEY, SCONIERS, VALENTINO, AND WHALEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
In this proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384–b, respondent mother appeals from an order that, inter alia, terminated her parental rights with respect to the subject child and ordered that the child be freed for adoption. Contrary to the mother's contention, petitioner established “by clear and convincing evidence that it made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the relationship between [the mother] and the child” ( Matter of Ja–Nathan F., 309 A.D.2d 1152, 1152, 764 N.Y.S.2d 894;seeSocial Services Law § 384–b[3][g][i]; [7][a]; see generally Matter of Star Leslie W., 63 N.Y.2d 136, 142, 481 N.Y.S.2d 26, 470 N.E.2d 824).Furthermore, “Family Court properly determined that the child is a neglected child based upon the derivative evidence that [three] of the mother's other children were determined to be neglected children ..., including the evidence that [the mother] had failed to address the mental health issues that led to those neglect determinations and the placement of the custody of those children” in a foster home ( Matter of Sophia M.G.–K. [Tracy G.–K.], 84 A.D.3d 1746, 1746–1747, 922 N.Y.S.2d 907 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).
Contrary to the mother's further contention, the court properly denied her request for a suspended judgment. A suspended judgment, as provided for in section 633 of the Family Court Act, “is a brief grace period designed to prepare the parent to be reunited with the child” ( Matter of Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d 299, 311, 590 N.Y.S.2d 60, 604 N.E.2d 122;see Matter of Baron C., 101 A.D.3d 1622, 1622, 957 N.Y.S.2d 522;see also Matter of Ada M.R., 306 A.D.2d 920, 920–921, 760 N.Y.S.2d 802,lv. denied100 N.Y.2d 509, 766 N.Y.S.2d 162, 798 N.E.2d 346). “The court's assessment that [the mother] was not likely to change [her] behavior is entitled to great deference” ( Matter of Philip D., 266 A.D.2d 909, 909, 698 N.Y.S.2d 139;see Matter of Jane H. [Susan H.], 85 A.D.3d 1586, 1587, 924 N.Y.S.2d 885,lv. denied17 N.Y.3d 709, 2011 WL 4089830).
We have considered the mother's remaining contentions and conclude that they are without merit.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.