Opinion
2012-12-20
Jane M. Myers, P.C., Central Islip (James E. Robinson of counsel), for appellants. Warshaw Burstein Cohen Schlesinger & Kuh, LLP, New York (Bruce H. Wiener of counsel), for respondent.
Jane M. Myers, P.C., Central Islip (James E. Robinson of counsel), for appellants. Warshaw Burstein Cohen Schlesinger & Kuh, LLP, New York (Bruce H. Wiener of counsel), for respondent.
Orders, Supreme Court, New York County (Judith J. Gische, J.), entered February 28, June 1, and June 14, 2011, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, decided defendants Thomas Cataldo and Cataldo Engineering, P.C.'s motion for a protective order upon a determination that plaintiff is entitled to damages incurred after the date of Thomas Cataldo's resignation from it arising from defendants' work for clients obtained before Cataldo's resignation, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Defendants are alleged to have incorporated a business which directly competed with plaintiff, engaging in a “double life” for a period of 17 months prior to resigning from the company. A faithless servant must account not only for profits attributable to clients poached from the principal, but for all profits ascribable to the wrongful diversion of business ( see Maritime Fish Prods. v. World–Wide Fish Prods., 100 A.D.2d 81, 89, 474 N.Y.S.2d 281 [1st Dept. 1984],appeal dismissed63 N.Y.2d 675 [1984] [noting that even if a faithless servant had first offered a diverted opportunity to the principal, he would not be free to take the business for himself or direct it to a competitor for his profit without the express consent and approval of his employer] ).
It is entirely possible, given the breadth and duration of the alleged deception, that defendants diverted corporate opportunities belonging to plaintiff principal, and that any lost profits ascribable thereto accrued after the date of Cataldo's resignation. Thus, it would be inappropriate to use the date of Cataldo's resignation as a cut-off date.
We have considered and rejected the parties' remaining contentions.
The Decision and Order of this Court entered herein on May 22, 2012 is hereby recalled and vacated ( see M—2931 decided simultaneously herewith).