Summary
In Episcopal Parish v. Kinney (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 199, 201, 12 O.O.3d 197, 198, 389 N.E.2d 847, 848, we adopted Justice Stern's concurring opinion in White Cross Hosp. Assn. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 199, 203, 67 O.O.2d 224, 226, 311 N.E.2d 862, 864, wherein he stated that as regards R.C. 5709.
Summary of this case from True Christianity Evangelism v. ZainoOpinion
No. 78-1397
Decided May 23, 1979.
Taxation — Real estate — Exemptions — Charitable institutions — Religious institution not includable, when.
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals.
The appellant, Episcopal Parish of Christ Church, Glendale, is an Ohio non-profit corporation and a duly constituted parish of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Southern Ohio.
The appellant owns and operates a church, parcels of real estate, and buildings which are adjacent to the church building. An exemption from taxation is sought for two parcels of land and the buildings thereon. These parcels are located in the Glendale taxing district of Hamilton County.
One parcel of real property consists of a piece of land upon which a rectory is situated. The rectory is the required living place for the rector of the parish and his family. The first floor of the rectory is presently tax exempt due to the fact that it is used by parish groups for worship, adult education, and other programs of the church. The second floor, however, serves as the residence for the rector and his family and is not presently exempt.
The second parcel of property for which an exemption from taxation is sought consists of a parcel of land upon which is situated the sexton's house. This house is provided rent free to the sexton and his family in addition to the sexton's salary. There are no church related activities taking place upon this particular parcel of realty; it is merely a residence for the sexton and his family.
The sexton, who is responsible for preparing the church for services, meetings, and special events, in addition to caring for the parish grounds, is required as a condition of his employment to reside in the house and to be on call 24 hours a day.
The Commissioner of Tax Equalization denied exemption and the Board of Tax Appeals affirmed.
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Strauss, Troy Ruehlmann Co., L.P.A., and Mr. Samuel M. Allen, for appellant.
Mr. William J. Brown, attorney general, and Mr. Larry J. Baisden, for appellee.
The appellant does not argue exemption from taxation under R.C. 5709.07 pertaining to schools, churches, and colleges. It has been well settled that the type property involved herein does not fall within the requirement of being used "* * * exclusively for public worship," as required by R.C. 5709.07 and its predecessors. Gerke v. Purcell (1884), 25 Ohio St. 229; New Haven Church of Missionary Baptist v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 53.
Instead, appellant claims exemption under R.C. 5709.121 as interpreted by this court in Cincinnati Nature Center v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 122. Appellant claims that, within the context of R.C. 5709.121(B), its property is "* * * used exclusively for charitable * * * purposes * * *," in that its use is "* * * in furtherance of or incidental to its charitable * * * purposes * * *."
In White Cross Hospital Assn. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 199, at page 203, Justice Stern, in a concurring opinion, delineated the relationship between R.C. 5709.12 and 5709.121 as follows:
"Initially, it is important to observe that, although R.C. 5709.121 purports to define the words used exclusively for `charitable' or `public' purposes, as those words are used in R.C. 5709.12, the definition is not all encompassing. R.C. 5709.12 states `* * * Real and tangible personal property belonging to institutions that is used exclusively for charitable purposes shall be exempt from taxation.' Thus, any institution, irrespective of its charitable or non-charitable character, may take advantage of a tax exemption if it is making exclusive charitable use of its property. See Wehrle Foundation v. Evatt (1943), 141 Ohio St. 467, 49 N.E.2d 52. The legislative definition of exclusive charitable use found in R.C. 5709.121, however, applies only to property `belonging to,' i. e., owned by, a charitable or educational institution, or the state or a political subdivision. The net effect of this is that R.C. 5709.121 has no application to noncharitable institutions seeking tax exemption under R.C. 5709.12. Hence, the first inquiry must be directed to the nature of the institution applying for an exemption. * * *." (Emphasis added in part.)
It is evident from the foregoing that appellant, as a religious institution, does not necessarily fall within that category defined as charitable institutions. Since appellant is seeking a tax exemption, it was incumbent upon it to carry the burden of proof before the board to establish its right to such exemption.
In reviewing decisions of the board, this court has repeatedly stated that it is not a trier of fact de novo, but that it is confined to its statutorily delineated duties (R.C. 5717.04) of determining whether the board's decision is "reasonable and lawful." Citizens Financial Corp. v. Porterfield (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 53; Buckeye Power v. Kosydar (1973), 35 Ohio St.2d 135; Cardinal Federal S. L. Assn. v. Bd. of Revision (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 13; Conalco v. Bd. of Revision (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 330; Alcoa v. Kosydar (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 477.
The decision of the board being neither unreasonable nor unlawful is hereby affirmed.
Decision affirmed.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., HERBERT, W. BROWN, P. BROWN, SWEENEY, LOCHER and HOLMES, JJ., concur.