Opinion
Case No. 6:16-cv-01994-AA
07-21-2017
CONRAD R. ENGWEILER, Plaintiff, v. MITCH MORROW, et al., Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER :
Plaintiff, a former inmate appearing pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against fourteen individual employees of the Oregon Department of Corrections (ODOC). Plaintiff alleges violations of his constitutional rights and civil conspiracy based on defendants' alleged deprivation of earned-time credits that should have been applied to plaintiff's term of incarceration. Plaintiff contends that he should have been released from prison on July 17, 2012, and, due to defendants' actions, he was not released until October 16, 2014. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages.
Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's claims on grounds they are barred by the relevant statute of limitations. I agree and find that plaintiff's claims accrued more than two years before he filed suit. Accordingly, defendants' motion is granted and this case is dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
For purposes of this motion, the facts alleged in plaintiff's First Amended Complaint are accepted as true and construed in his favor. Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).
In 1990, plaintiff committed aggravated murder when he was fifteen years old. He was tried as an adult and ultimately received an indeterminate sentence of life imprisonment. Am. Compl. ¶ 22 (ECF No. 19). At the time, the Oregon Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (the Board) established the actual duration of imprisonment and the release date of a juvenile sentenced to an indeterminate life sentence for aggravated murder, State ex rel. Engweiler v. Felton, 350 Or. 592, 607, 260 P.3d 448 (2011). In June 1999, the Board held a prison term hearing and effectively established a 480-month prison term for plaintiff. State ex rel. Engweiler v. Cook, 340 Or. 373, 375-76, 133 P.3d 904 (2006). The Board did not set a release date.
Prior to 1989, the Board determined the "actual term of imprisonment" and the release date of "most felony offenders" pursuant to the indeterminate sentencing scheme. Engweiler v. Felton, 350 Or. at 598, 607, 260 P.3d 448. In 1989, the Oregon Legislature replaced the indeterminate sentencing scheme with a "guidelines" scheme requiring trial judges to impose determinate, presumptive sentences according to relevant guildelines factors. Id. at 598, 260 P.3d 448. Nonetheless, juvenile offenders such as plaintiff who committed aggravated murder between 1989 and 1995 continued to receive indeterminate life sentences. Id.
During 2000 and 2001, plaintiff requested that ODOC adjust his prison term based on credits earned for good behavior, known as earned-time credits (ETC). ODOC representatives responded that they were not responsible for calculating plaintiff's prison term or release date, and that plaintiff should direct his concerns to the Board. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26-28.
In October 2001, plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus compelling ODOC to apply his ETC and reduce his calculated prison term. Am. Compl. ¶ 30. In 2006, the Oregon Supreme Court held that plaintiff was entitled to a reduction in his term of incarceration based on his ETC. Am. Compl. ¶ 35; see Engweiler v. Cook, 340 Or. at 378, 380, 133 P.3d 904 (ODOC's "duty to reduce the 'term of incarceration' is mandatory for each inmate who meets the criteria for such reductions elsewhere described in ORS 421.121" and is applicable to plaintiff). However, the Court concluded that it could not compel ODOC to calculate plaintiff's ETC, because the Board had not set plaintiff's release date and his actual "term of incarceration." Id. at 383-84, 133 P.3d 904.
Plaintiff subsequently brought a mandamus action to compel the Board to conduct a parole hearing and set his release date. In 2011, the Oregon Supreme Court held that Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.120(1)(a) required the Board to conduct a parole hearing for plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶ 53; Engweiler v. Felton, 350 Or. at 628, 260 P.3d 448. The Court nonetheless found that plaintiff was not entitled to the remedy of mandamus and a release date, because the "board had no 'plain' legal duty to set a release date" under Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.120(4), the terms of which permitted the Board to not set a release date if it explains why it "has chosen not to do so." Id. at 629, 260 P.3d 448.
On March 20, 2012, the Board conducted a parole hearing and set a 336-month term of incarceration and a February 22, 2018 release date. Am. Compl. ¶ 55. Plaintiff maintains that if ODOC had calculated his ETC, the Board would have established a release date of July 17, 2012. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 69-70.
In July 2012, plaintiff informed defendants that his prison term had been miscalculated and filed a grievance seeking calculation of his ETC and a release date of July 17, 2012. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 72, 74-75, 80.
On August 9, 2012, ODOC informed plaintiff that his ETC would be 1,929.75 days if calculated. Am. Compl. ¶ 112.
On September 4, 2012, defendants responded to plaintiff's grievance. They stated that ODOC did not calculate ETC for inmates serving life sentences, and that the Board had established the definitive term of imprisonment and release date for plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶ 155.
Plaintiff then filed a state petition for habeas relief and asserted that "his earned-time credits function to advance his initial release date set by the board and that his new release date already has passed, effectively requiring his immediate release." Engweiler v. Persson, 354 Or. 549, 554, 316 P.3d 264 (2013) (en banc). In response, the ODOC officials asked the Oregon Supreme Court to revisit its 2006 decision in Engweiler v. Cook holding that plaintiff was entitled to ETC under Or. Rev. Stat. § 421.121. Id. at 559-60, 316 P.3d 264.
On December 12, 2013, the Oregon Supreme Court issued a decision and "declined to revisit" its earlier ruling. Id. at 563, 316 P.3d 264. The Court explained that it had "authoritatively decided that [plaintiff] is entitled to a reduction in a 'term of incarceration' based on appropriate institutional behavior - that is, earned time - under ORS 421.121(1)(a)," and that its conclusion "was a foundational element" of its earlier decision. Id. at 555, 558-59, 316 P.3d 264. The Court did not order plaintiff's immediate release, finding that the Board first must perform pre-release functions, including an interview of plaintiff to determine "his suitability for release." Id. at 563, 316 P.3d 264. The Court explained, "Even though the application of earned time credits appears to advance plaintiff's 'initial release date' to a date in the past, the board cannot 'schedule' his physical release for a date in the past. Thus, plaintiff's physical release necessarily will be scheduled for a future date" after the Board conducts a "prerelease interview." Id. at 566, 316 P.3d 264.
On or about December 15, 2013, plaintiff filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Plaintiff alleged claims similar to those in this action and sought application of his ETC and an order requiring his immediate release or an immediate pre-release hearing. See Engweiler v. Persson, No. 6:13-cv-02264-MC (ECF No. 12).
On February 4, 2014, the Board informed plaintiff that ODOC had provided a "calculated earned date" of July 18, 2012 and that plaintiff was "entitled to have his prison term, as established by the Board, reduced by earned-time credits under ORS 421.121." Am. Compl. ¶¶ 197, 199. The Board also indicated that plaintiff's prison term "was set at 336 months" and that his "calculated earned date on this term would be July 18, 2012."Id. ¶ 199. The Board scheduled plaintiff's pre-release interview for May 13, 2014. Id.
On September 2, 2014, the Board ordered plaintiff to be paroled as of that date and deferred parole for forty-five days pending completion of a release plan. Engweiler v. Persson, No. 6:13-cv-02264-MC (ECF No. 41).
On October 16, 2014, plaintiff was released from custody. Shortly thereafter, his federal habeas action was dismissed as moot. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 203-04.
On October 14, 2016, plaintiff filed this action. Defendants now move for dismissal.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts six claims for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his First Claim, plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his constitutional rights by intentionally failing to investigate and respond to plaintiff's ETC complaints, with the purpose of denying plaintiff his rights and retaliating against him. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 207-11. In his Second Claim, plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his procedural due process rights when denying him ETC. Id. ¶¶ 213-17. In his Third Claim, plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his substantive due process rights by arbitrarily and intentionally refusing to award plaintiff ETC as required by Oregon law. Id. ¶¶ 219-22. In his Fourth Claim, plaintiff alleges that defendant retaliated against him by refusing to calculate and apply his ETC, retroactively applying administrative rules, and interfering with his grievances due to his protected legal activity. Id. ¶¶ 224-30. In his Fifth Claim, plaintiff argues that defendants violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by retroactively applying administrative rules to deny him ETC. Id. ¶¶ 232-36. Finally, in his Sixth Claim, plaintiff alleges that defendants conspired to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights by retaliating against him and denying him ETC. Id. ¶¶ 238-39.
Defendants move for dismissal and argue that plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007) ("If the allegations . . . show that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim."). Defendants maintain that plaintiff knew of his injuries arising from defendants' alleged actions by December 12, 2013, more than two years before he filed suit.
In § 1983 cases, federal courts borrow state statutes of limitations for personal injury actions. Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d. 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). Oregon's statute of limitations for personal injuries is two years, and plaintiff had two years from the time his claims accrued in which to file suit. Sain v. City of Bend, 309 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568, 573 (9th Cir. 2012) ("A statute of limitations begins to run on the date on which the plaintiff's claim 'accrues.'"). To determine when plaintiff's § 1983 claims accrued, federal law applies. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff filed suit on October 14, 2016, meaning that the two-year time period preceding plaintiff's complaint constitutes the relevant limitations period. If plaintiff's claims accrued more than two years earlier - before October 14, 2014 - they are barred by the statute of limitations.
As iterated above, plaintiff's claims all arise from defendants' alleged failure to calculate and apply plaintiff's ETC to his term of incarceration. Plaintiff's allegations make clear that he knew of his alleged injuries by the summer or fall of 2012, if not earlier, given that he filed grievances and pursued relief in state court regarding defendants' denial of ETC. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 80, 123, 155, 177. In fact, plaintiff emphasizes that by March 20, 2012, when the Board established his release date and term of incarceration, "ODOC officials had a legal duty to apply ETC and reduce plaintiff's term of incarceration." Pl.'s Response at 3 (ECF No. 23); Am. Compl. ¶¶ 68-69. In any event, plaintiff certainly had reason to know of his injuries by December 13, 2013 - the date on which the Oregon Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff and reiterated that he was entitled to a reduction in his term of incarceration based on his ETC. Engweiler v. Persson, 354 Or. at 558-59, 563, 316 P.3d 264.
Plaintiff nonetheless argues that the accrual of his claims was deferred until October 16, 2014, the date of his release from prison. Plaintiff maintains that his ETC claims challenge the duration of his confinement and could not have accrued until he was released from custody and no longer confined. Accordingly, plaintiff maintains that his action is timely because it was filed within two years of his actual release from custody.
In so arguing, plaintiff relies on the rule articulated in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The Heck rule bars a § 1983 damages claim implicating the unconstitutionality or validity of a conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence was invalidated or the proceedings otherwise terminated in the plaintiff's favor. Id. at 486-87. More specifically, "a state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) - no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) - if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration." Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).
The Supreme Court has applied the Heck rule to claims challenging the constitutionality of prison disciplinary proceedings resulting in the deprivation of good-time credits. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-47 (1997); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973). The Supreme Court reasons that claims implicating the restoration of good-time credits remain "within the core of habeas corpus in attacking the very duration of [] physical confinement itself." Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487-88; Balisok, 520 U.S. at 646-47. Consequently, a § 1983 claim challenging a conviction or sentence or the deprivation of good time credits does not accrue until and unless the relevant conviction, sentence, or decision has been reversed or invalidated. Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890, 895-96 (9th Cir. 2014).
I agree that plaintiff's claims implicate the validity of ODOC's ETC decisions and by extension the duration of his confinement. Plaintiff alleges that he would have been entitled to an earlier release date - and a shorter duration of confinement - if defendants had awarded him ETC when his initial release date was established. Accordingly, plaintiff's claims challenging ODOC's deprivation of ETC were barred and could not accrue until ODOC's decision was invalidated. Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2002) (Heck applies to claims seeking damages for unconstitutional deprivation of good-time credits).
However, the Heck bar was lifted on December 12, 2013, when the Oregon Supreme Court reaffirmed its 2006 decision and invalidated ODOC's refusal to calculate plaintiff's ETC. Engweiler v. Persson, 354 Or. at 568-69, 316 P.3d 264 ("Because we have adhered to that prior construction of the statute, DOC's rules pertaining to earned time credits cannot stand between plaintiff and his release on parole."). As plaintiff himself alleges: "The Oregon Supreme Court in Engweiler III found undisputed that ODOC had calculated 1,929.75 days of credit and that his adjusted July 17, 2012 release date had passed...The Oregon Supreme Court in Engweiler III concluded that ODOC's rules and policies could not be used to deny Plaintiff ETC or release." Am. Compl. ¶¶ 183-84. Accordingly, as of December 12, 2013, plaintiff could have filed his § 1983 claims against defendants without implicating the validity of ODOC's decision denying ETC; the Oregon Supreme Court already had deemed the deprivation of ETC invalid. See Rosales-Martinez, 753 F.3d at 896 (finding that claims challenging unlawful conduct during prosecution of the plaintiff accrued on the date that the state court vacated his convictions).
Plaintiff disagrees and argues that the Oregon Supreme Court's decision on December 12, 2013 does not meet Heck's favorable termination requirement, because the Court did not grant plaintiff's immediate release or require ODOC to calculate his ETC to establish a July 17, 2012 release date, Plaintiff thus maintains that the decision did not invalidate the basis for his confinement and Heck continued to bar his claims until his release from custody. Pl.'s Response at 11-12 & n.7. Plaintiff's analysis is incorrect.
Plaintiff also argues that even though he never obtained a favorable termination of the challenged ETC decision, he meets the Heck exception allowing former prisoners to pursue claims relating to the loss of good time credits if they were unable to obtain habeas relief before their release from confinement. See Nonnette, 316 F.3d at 877-78. The Heck exception has no application in this case. As explained below, plaintiff obtained relief from the Oregon Supreme Court - the invalidation of ODOC's ETC decision and the calculation of his ETC - before he was released.
Heck bars § 1983 claims challenging a conviction, sentence or disciplinary decision only until the challenged action has been "declared invalid by a state tribunal" or "called into question" by a federal court's issuance of habeas relief. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Significantly, plaintiff's § 1983 claims challenge ODOC's denial of ETC, and the Oregon Supreme Court - a state tribunal - held that ODOC had no basis to deny or withhold plaintiff's ETC. Even though the Oregon Supreme Court did not order plaintiff's immediate release, it invalidated the basis for ODOC's withholding of ETC and effectively required ODOC to calculate plaintiff's ETC. Therefore, plaintiff's obtained a favorable resolution of his ETC complaints.
In fact, on February 4, 2014, the Board informed plaintiff that ODOC had calculated plaintiff's ETC and a release date of July 18, 2012. Am Comp. ¶ 197. Based on the ETC calculation and plaintiff's new release date, the Board scheduled a pre-release interview for May 2014 and ultimately ordered plaintiff to be paroled in September 2014. Had the Oregon Supreme Court not invalidated ODOC's ETC decision, plaintiff would have remained subject to the February 22, 2018 release date established by the Board in 2012. Therefore, the Oregon Supreme Court's decision ultimately provided plaintiff with the relief he sought from ODOC - the calculation of his ETC. The fact that the Oregon Supreme Court could not and did not order plaintiff's immediate release "because the board ha[d] not yet performed its prerelease functions" is immaterial. Engweiler v. Persson, 354 Or. at 551, 316 P.3d 264. The fact remains that the underlying decision challenged by his § 1983 claims - ODOC's denial of ETC - was invalidated by the Oregon Supreme Court on December 12, 2013.
Plaintiff asserts no challenge to the Board's pre-release procedures.
Plaintiff also argues that his claims are not barred because defendants took retaliatory action against him after the Oregon Supreme Court's decision as part of a continuing violation of his rights. Plaintiff alleges that ODOC officials refused to "apply" his ETC, denied him due process regarding their ETC decisions, and promulgated a new policy to support the denial of ETC. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 189, 191, 194, 215; Pl.'s Response at 14-16. However, it is undisputed that on February 4, 2014 plaintiff was informed that ODOC had provided the Board with plaintiff's ETC calculation. Plaintiff does not allege that defendants took any action, continuing or otherwise, after February 4, 2014. Without question, plaintiff could have filed suit at that time and sought damages arising from ODOC's denial of ETC without implicating the validity of ODOC's ETC decisions.
I find this argument to be one of semantics rather than substance; regardless of whether ODOC "calculated" rather than "applied" his ETC, it provided the Board with an ETC calculated release date, which led the Board to begin pre-release proceedings. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 197, 199. --------
In sum, plaintiff's claims accrued and the statute of limitations began to run more than two years before he filed suit. Accordingly, plaintiff's claims are time-barred.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 22) is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED. IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 21st day of July, 2017.
/s/_________
Ann Aiken
United States District Judge