Opinion
3:13-cv-00188-RCJ-VPC
03-27-2015
WILLIAM ENGLAND, Plaintiff, v. SHERYL FOSTER, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This Report and Recommendation is made to the Honorable Robert C. Jones, United States District Judge. The action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and LR IB 1-4. Before the court is defendants' motion for summary judgment (#52). Plaintiff opposed (#55), and defendants replied (#59). For the reasons stated below, the court recommends that the motion be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
William England ("plaintiff") is an inmate in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections ("NDOC") and is currently incarcerated at High Desert State Prison in Indian Springs, Nevada. The events precipitating this lawsuit occurred during a period of custody at Northern Nevada Correctional Center ("NNCC") in Carson City, Nevada. Proceeding pro se, plaintiff asserts claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, and also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Plaintiff is a Nation of Islam ("NOI") Muslim. NOI is a religious movement within Islam, and it shares some, but not all, of Islamic tenets and beliefs. As with other Muslims, plaintiff's religious practices include certain food restrictions as part of a halal diet. As plaintiff explains in his complaint, in lieu of an Islamic halal meal, NOI adherents may consume a Jewish kosher meal without running afoul of their religious beliefs: ". . . Kosher is allowed and comports with the Muslims diet when Halal is unavailable." (#6 at 6.)
A "halal" meal is one that is consistent with the requirements of Islamic dietary law. Among other requirements, halal entails particular methods of slaughter and religious blessings, and some outright avoidance of certain types of meat, such as pork. See generally Definition of Halal, Halal Monitoring Committee UK, www.halalhmc.org/DefinitionOfHalal.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
In June 2011, plaintiff requested that he be placed on the kosher meal list at NNCC to comply with halal requirements. His request was approved. Sometime in late July, plaintiff was notified by prison officials that he and other Muslim inmates would be removed from the kosher meal list. Moving forward, the kosher meal would be available only to Jewish inmates. NDOC officials removed non-Jewish inmates from the list due to the exploding costs of kosher meals across NDOC institutions: each kosher meal significantly exceeded the standard daily food budget for an individual inmate. Plaintiff was informed that he could request a vegetarian meal, however, and that meal respected all halal requirements. On several instances following July 2011, plaintiff grieved his removal from the kosher meal list, but each grievance was denied.
In 2012, the NDOC instituted the "common fare" meal, which had a lower cost than the then-existing kosher meal and complied with the faith requirements of several religious groups, including those of Jewish and Islamic faith. The common fare diet is kosher and complies with halal restrictions, although it is not specifically a halal meal. Defendants provided plaintiff and other inmates earlier removed from the kosher list with the option of receiving the common fare meal. Plaintiff apparently opted for the meal, but only for a brief period of time. In July 2012, he requested a halal meal or, apparently, return to the prior kosher meal list. NNCC Chaplain James Stogner denied plaintiff's request and informed him that the only religious diet available to him was common fare meal. Nevertheless, plaintiff continued to grieve the issue, as he believed that the NDOC was providing other inmates, including Christians and Jehovah's Witnesses, a kosher meal other than the common fare.
Also in July 2012, plaintiff submitted a grievance, which allegedly followed several prior requests, to effect inclusion of NOI tenets in the NDOC's Religious Practice Manual, which identifies permissible items and other accommodations for religious group members during their prison sentences. At that time, Islam, but not specifically NOI, was recognized in the Religious Practice Manual. Although plaintiff's grievance was denied at each level, the NDOC added NOI to the Religious Practice Manual in 2014.
Based upon these events, plaintiff brings three counts against NDOC Deputy Director Sheryl Foster, NNCC Associate Warden Lisa Walsh, NNCC Caseworker Shannon Moyle, and NNCC Chaplain James Stogner in their official and individual capacities, for their varying roles in implementing, authorizing, or approving policies or decisions related to these events. Plaintiff seeks injunctive, declaratory, and compensatory relief. First, plaintiff alleges that defendants' removal of his name from the kosher meal list in 2011 violated his rights to free exercise and equal protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and also imposed an unlawful burden on his religious exercise in violation of RLUIPA. Second, under the same constitutional and statutory provisions, plaintiff alleges that defendants' failure to provide him a halal meal or return him to the kosher meal list in 2012 violated his rights. Finally, again under the same sources of law, plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his rights by failing to recognize NOI in the Religious Practice Manual.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment allows the court to avoid unneeded trials. Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). The court properly grants summary judgment when the record discovered by the parties demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986). "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A dispute is "genuine" only where a sufficient evidentiary basis would allow a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. Id. "The amount of evidence necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough 'to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.'" Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)). Conclusory statements, speculative opinions, pleading allegations, or other assertions uncorroborated by facts are insufficient to establish a genuine dispute. Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll., 83 F.3d 1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1996).
Summary judgment proceeds in burden-shifting steps. When the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, it must support its motion "with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial." C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted). In contrast, a moving party who does not bear the burden of proof "need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case[,]" In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010), and such a party may additionally produce evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or defense, Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). Ultimately, the moving party must demonstrate, on the basis of authenticated evidence, that the record forecloses the possibility of a reasonable jury finding in favor of the nonmoving party as to disputed material facts. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). The court views all evidence and any inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2014).
Where the moving party meets its burden under Rule 56, the nonmoving party must "designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial. This burden is not a light one." In re Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (internal citation omitted). "The non-moving party must show more than the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence. . . . In fact, the non-moving party must come forth with evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party's favor." Id. (internal citations omitted). The nonmoving party may defeat the summary judgment motion only by setting forth specific facts that illustrate a genuine dispute that requires a factfinder's resolution. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Although the nonmoving party need not produce authenticated evidence, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), mere assertions, pleading allegations, and "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts" will not defeat a properly-supported summary judgment motion, Orr, 285 F.3d at 783.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Civil Rights Claims Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
42 U.S.C. § 1983 aims "to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights." Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000)). The statute "provides a federal cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of his federal rights[,]" Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999), and is "merely . . . the procedural device for enforcing substantive provisions of the Constitution and federal statutes," Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Claims under § 1983 require the plaintiff to allege (1) the violation of a federally-protected right by (2) a person or official who acts under the color of state law. Warner, 451 F.3d at 1067. To prevail, the plaintiff must allege and prove sufficient facts under each element of the underlying constitutional or statutory right.
In this case, defendants are each state prison officials acting within their respective capacities under state law. Plaintiff alleges violations of his constitutional rights. Therefore, he has satisfied § 1983's threshold requirements and the court proceeds to analysis of his constitutional and RLUIPA claims. However, the plaintiff's claims for compensatory damages against defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed under the sovereign immunity doctrine. Brown v. Oregon Dep't of Corrs., 751 F.3d 983, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)). Thus, the court will consider the § 1983 claims only to the extent that they seek declaratory and prospective injunctive relief, as well as damages against defendants in their individual capacities. See Thornton v. Brown, 757 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2013). As for the RLUIPA claims, the court will consider only declarative and injunctive relief, as the Ninth Circuit concluded in a recent decision that RLUIPA does not permit suits for money damages against state officials in their individual capacities. Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Sossamon v. Texas, — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658-61 (2011) (concluding that states and state officials are not liable for monetary damages under RLUIPA absent a state's waiver of sovereign immunity).
B. First Amendment and RLUIPA Claims
As the court will explain, plaintiff's First Amendment and RLUIPA claims turn on a similar consideration: whether plaintiff's religious exercise was burdened by the alleged events. Accordingly, it considers the claims together.
1. First Amendment
Inmates "retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion." O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (internal citation omitted). Thereunder, prisoners "have the right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good health that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion." McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987). To establish a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, the inmate must prove that defendants have burdened a sincerely held belief that is rooted in his religion. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008). The sincerity and basis for the proffered belief may require factual resolution by a jury. See Parks v. Brooks, 302 Fed. App'x 611, 612 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Lewis v. Skolnik, No. 2:09-cv-02393-KJD-GWF, 2013 WL 178116, at *4 (D. Nev. Jan. 16, 2013).
In ordinary circumstances, the state's infringement upon such a belief is sufficient to establish a constitutional violation, unless the government articulates and proves a compelling government interest. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963). Yet within the prison context, the government need not establish a compelling interest. Instead, the plaintiff must demonstrate that prison officials lacked reasonable justification for interfering with his religious exercises. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884. Courts consider four factors when assessing prison regulations for reasonableness. These are: (1) the presence of a valid, rational connection between the regulation and a stated penological goal; (2) whether alternative means of exercise remain available despite the regulation; (3) the extent of impact upon other inmates and prison staff of the prison's accommodation of the plaintiff's particular religious rite or practice; and (4) the availability of alternative regulations or rules. Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987)).
2. RLUIPA
In relevant part, RLUIPA proscribes the state from imposing "a substantial burden on the religious exercise . . ." of prisoners, "unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). To establish a RLUIPA violation, the plaintiff must allege and prove that prison officials have substantially burned his religious exercise. War soldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). More than a mere inconvenience, Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th Cir. 2002), a "substantial burden" is a regulation or other official action that "intentionally puts significant pressure on inmates . . . to abandon their religious beliefs[,]" Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 996. Upon the plaintiff's satisfaction of this burden, defendants avoid liability only by identifying a compelling governmental interest and demonstrating that the regulation or action was the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. Id. at 995.
3. Analysis
a. Counts I and II
In their motion for summary judgment, defendants argue that their various actions and decisions did not burden plaintiff's free exercise rights. First, as to the rescission of kosher meals in 2011, they argue that plaintiff cannot show a burden because the meatless alternative/vegetarian diet available to him complied with halal requirements. (#52 at 6-7; #52-2 at ¶ 6.) Second, as to plaintiff's 2012 request to return to the kosher meal (as it existed in 2011) or receive a separate halal meal, he cannot demonstrate a burden to his religious exercise because he was approved, but declined, the common fare diet. (#52 at 10-11; #52-2 at ¶ 5.) Similarly, defendants contend that the RLUIPA claims fail because plaintiff cannot establish he suffered a burden—let alone a substantial one. (Id. at 16-18.) In the event that the court finds that plaintiff's exercise was burdened, defendants also argue that legitimate penological objectives render the burdens constitutional under the factors set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). (#52 at 8-10, 11-12.)
In his opposition, plaintiff counters that there are genuine factual issues as to whether these actions burdened his religious exercise. Although he does not state or offer to provide evidence that can prove that he lacked halal-complaint meal options, he declares that he "is not a vegetarian or a vegan and [does] not [wish] to become one . . . ." (#55 at 11.) Plaintiff quotes extensively from Bilal v. Lehman, No. C04-2507-JLR-JPD, 2006 WL 3626781, at *7-9 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 2, 2006), recommendation rejected by 2006 WL 3626808 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2006), in support of his apparent position that absence of a halal meal, with halal meat, burdens his religious exercises. (#55 at 11-13.)
Defendants are entitled to summary judgement on the First Amendment and RLUIPA claims in counts I and II. The court accepts the apparent agreement of the parties that adherence to halal requirements is a sincerely held belief rooted in plaintiff's faith. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85. Nevertheless, the record establishes an absence of genuine dispute as to the food-related facts, and these facts demonstrate an absence of burden to plaintiff's religious exercises. Without a burden, plaintiff's First Amendment and RLUIPA claims necessarily fail.
The court notes, however, that defendants have introduced records that evidence plaintiff's repeated purchases of non-halal food items at the prison coffee shop, including summer sausage and pepperoni pizza. (#52 at 7-8; #52-1 at 11, 12, 19, 21-22, 24, 26, 28-29, 33, 34.) Although defendants argue that these purchases demonstrate that the meal options could not have burdened his religious exercises, since he evidently ate non-halal food on a regular basis, the court believes that this evidence more readily speaks to the sincerity of plaintiff's beliefs. Although plaintiff submits an affidavit, in which he states he does not eat these items (#55 at 17), he omits any explanation for defendants' contrary records. In any case, because the summary judgment record demonstrates alternative bases for decisions, the court acknowledges but sets aside this issue.
First, as to the count I allegations, plaintiff's religious exercise was not burdened when defendants removed his name from the kosher meal list in 2011. Defendants have introduced undisputed evidence that they offered plaintiff a meal option, albeit one without meat, that satisfied his religious dietary requirements. Plaintiff does not contest that the vegetarian meal satisfied the dictates of halal; instead, he merely expresses his dissatisfaction with vegetarianism. Neither his complaint nor his opposition expressly contend that halal meat was a required part of his diet. Moreover, defendants are not obligated to provide plaintiff a halal meal that also satisfies each of his dietary predilections. To the extent he relies on Bilal for the proposition that Muslims must receive a particular halal meal—that is, one with halal meat or other unmentioned requirements—the court is unpersuaded. It may well be that the Bilal plaintiff's religious exercises required meat, but as the court has observed, plaintiff has not articulated such an allegation in this case or provided evidence in support of such a conclusion. Accordingly, plaintiff's First Amendment and RLUIPA claims based on the 2011 events lack merit.
Second, defendants did not violate plaintiff's constitutional or statutory religious rights in 2012 when they declined to provide him an Islamic halal meal or provide him the 2011 kosher meal. Defendants have offered to prove that they implemented the kosher common fare diet and that, when they allowed plaintiff to choose that option, he ultimately declined it. Defendants are not liable for plaintiff's discretionary choices. Once again, defendants fulfilled all that the First Amendment demanded: in addition to the halal-complaint vegetarian option, plaintiff could choose a kosher meal—one that, per his repeated concessions, is permissible under Islamic dietary law. His belief that other inmates received something other than the common fare diet is entirely speculative and, in any case, does not alter the undisputed fact that he had several halal-complaint options available to him.
In the court's understanding, the common fare diet entirely replaced the prior kosher meal. Accordingly, no inmates continued to receive the meal that plaintiff apparently desired. Additionally, the court notes that plaintiff discusses an Islamic halal meal, but does not identify how this differs from a kosher meal. Although it is apparent from his papers that there is some sort of difference, plaintiff provides no basis for concluding that the difference is a meaningful one under Islamic dietary law.
Plaintiff submits in affidavit in which he states that, in his belief, the common fare meal is "illegal" and violates NOI tenets. (#55 at 17.) The position is curious, since he does not claim the meal is not kosher, and he does not identify any specific facets of the common fare menu that runs afoul of halal restrictions. Accepting his affidavit, his opposition nevertheless fails to evidence a burden: as with the first claim, he has not disputed that the halal-compliant vegetarian option remained available to him. That he would testify at trial that he "[does] not wish to become [vegetarian]" is wholly irrelevant: the issue is not whether plaintiff wants to eat a vegetarian meal, but instead whether the meal would violate his dietary restrictions. Because the summary judgment record demonstrates beyond dispute that defendants provided at least one acceptable dietary option in 2012, and likely two, plaintiff's count II contentions that his religious exercise was burdened necessarily fail.
For the purposes of argument, the court accepts plaintiff's statement as to his belief that the common fare meal is not halal compliant, however self-serving his affidavit may be. See Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., — F.3d —, 2015 WL 774633, at *2-4 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 2015). Yet, as the court explained above, the affidavit is devoid of any corroborating details that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the common fare meal is not kosher, as defendants have offered to prove. Assuming defendants would establish that fact, plaintiff's own repeated concessions as to the acceptability of a kosher meal would defeat the claim.
Alternatively, the court recommends that that defendants' motion be granted, as to the First Amendment claims in counts I and II, on the basis that any burdens their decisions imposed were lawful under Turner. On the basis of submitted evidence, defendants argue that they had reasonable justification—cost—for removing plaintiff from the kosher list in 2011 and instituting the common fare menu for Jewish and Muslim inmates (among others). The first factor is whether there is a rational connection between the regulation and goal. In 2007, only four inmates in Nevada requested kosher meals; by 2011, that sum grew to nearly 300. (#52 at 9.) There was a plainly significant cost difference between the mainline diet, at $2.40 per day, and the then-existing kosher meal, a pre-packaged meal that cost $15.12 per day. The growth of the kosher list thereby strained a tight prison food budget. Removing non-Jewish inmates from the kosher list and, soon thereafter, implementing the common fare menu, reduced the cost of the religious accommodation diets by about one third. (#52-5 at ¶¶ 12, 14.)
The second factor also weighs in defendants' favor. Here, the question is whether the regulation "denied all means of expression." Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 351-52 (1987)). Defendants have produced evidence that plaintiff was provided an alternative methods of exercising his faith beliefs. Turner, 482 U.S. at 85. Not only did plaintiff have halal-compliant meal options available to him, he also retained the ability to exercise his faith through group study, prayer, and the like. Hence, that he may not have been able to consume halal meat—to the extent that it was required—does not alter the outcome. The record shows that, whatever plaintiff's displeasure with his food choices, defendants did not prevent him from engaging in substantial religious activities.
The third factor, the impact upon other inmates and prison staff, Turner, 482 U.S. at 85, similarly justifies defendants' decision. Defendants argue that that the explosion of food costs would require absorption in the form of cuts elsewhere in the budget—whether that be staffing levels, staffing salaries or benefits, or other offerings to inmates in the form of services and rehabilitation programs. (#52 at 10.) Finally, the fourth factor, the presence of ready alternatives that impose only nominal costs, Turner, 482 U.S. at 85, resolves in defendants' favor. Rather than deny to plaintiff a diet that accommodates his religious requirements, they initially offered him the vegetarian option, and thereafter the common fare menu—an option that, despite cost savings, nevertheless taxed the prison budget to a far greater degree than the mainline diet. Accordingly, the balance of the Turner factors precludes First Amendment liability. Even if plaintiff's religious exercises were burdened, defendants acted with reasonable justification, and they are entitled to summary judgment on that basis.
b. Count III
Defendants move for summary judgment on the count III First Amendment and RLUIPA claims, which pertain to the non-inclusion of NOI in the NDOC Religious Practices Manual prior to 2014. Specifically, they argue that plaintiff has not shown that his exercise was burdened by the lack of recognition. On the basis of evidence, they argue that Islam was a recognized religion at all relevant times prior to 2014, and plaintiff was, therefore, able to pray, possess religious literature and effects, and participate in group worship and study. (#52 at 13; #52-2 at ¶ 7; #52-6 at 6.) Plaintiff counters NOI Muslims have "[their] own ways and personality" (#55 at 10), by which he intimates, though without other details or corroborating evidence, that the NDOC's failure to incorporate NOI into its religious accommodations impeded NOI's unique exercises. Relatedly, he contends that the NDOC's refusal to recognize NOI "purposefully interfered" with the growth of his faith. (Id. at 9.) Once again, he provides no greater details and omits evidentiary support.
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating, with specificity, how defendants interfered with his religious rights, yet the complaint lacks particular allegations as to how, precisely, defendants burdened his religious exercise by failing to include NOI in the Religious Practice Manual until 2014. Defendants have offered to introduce evidence that proves that plaintiff was able to partake in a wide variety of religious practices based on the inclusion of Islam, and plaintiff does not dispute that evidence. Instead, he offers only uncorroborated and conclusory statements that there are undescribed differences between NOI and mainstream Islamic practices. To defeat summary judgment, plaintiff must identify those differences, explain how defendants interfered with those exercises, and he is obligated to provide evidentiary support for the same. Because he has failed to do so, the summary judgment record precludes any reasonable jury from finding in plaintiff's favor. Therefore, the court recommends that defendants' motion be granted.
C. Equal Protection Claims
1. Standard
"The Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat all similarly situated people equally[,]" Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). The preliminary inquiry in an equal protection claim is identifying the plaintiff's relevant class, which is "comprised of similarly situated persons so that the factor motivating the alleged discrimination can be identified." Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation omitted). Then, "a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against him based upon his membership in a protected class." Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003). Because the claim requires proof of intentional discrimination, "[m]ere indifference" to the unequal effects on a particular class does not establish discriminatory intent. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005).
Within the prison context, the Constitution's equal protection guarantees do not entitle each religious group within a prison to "identical treatment and resources[,]" Hartmann v. Cal. Dep't of Corrs. and Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013). When differential treatment is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests under the Turner factors, no equal protection claim lies. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891. Although prisons must make "good faith accommodations" to all inmates to practice their religious beliefs, they satisfy this obligation where, whatever the differences between the groups, each inmate has a "reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith" during his term of incarceration. Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85.
2. Analysis
Defendants move for summary judgment on all three counts on the basis that the summary judgment record lacks evidence by which a jury could conclude that defendants acted with discriminatory intent (#52 at 19, 22), and also that plaintiff indisputably received reasonable opportunities to practice his faith. (Id. at 19-20, 21-22.) Further, defendants argue that the Turner factors preclude liability on the equal protection claims related to the prison food. (Id. at 20-21.) In his opposition, plaintiff does not address defendants' arguments and provide corroborated facts pertaining to the elements of an equal protection claim.
On the count II equal protection claim, defendants argue that it necessarily fails because they offered plaintiff a kosher meal—the common fare diet—and thus no differential treatment occurred. As the court explained in its analysis of the count II First Amendment and RLUIPA claims, however, it appears that plaintiff's belief is that the denial of the prior meal or the other meal he speculatively mentions violated his rights. To the extent that defendants are correct in their characterization of the claim, their argument is correct. Alternatively, the court above explains why the claim fails based upon its understanding of count II.
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The court recommends that defendants' motion be granted on the equal protection claims. First, defendants correctly point to an absence of evidence related to discriminatory intent, and plaintiff's opposition fails to identify any evidence in the record from which a jury could conclude that defendants intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his NOI beliefs. Although plaintiff broadly complains of differential treatment between Muslims and other faith groups (e.g. #6 at 9), Ninth Circuit precedent provides that such differences—and mere indifference thereto—is not constitutionally infirm. Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123; Thornton, 425 F.3d at 1167. Without more, no constitutional claim can prevail. Second, for the reasons explained in the analysis of the First Amendment and RLUIP A claims, it is readily apparent that defendants accommodated plaintiff's religious beliefs and allowed him a reasonable opportunity to exercise his faith. Freeman, 125 F.3d at 737. Plaintiff's opposition does not provide any basis for concluding otherwise.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court has reviewed the papers of the parties and all other papers, and for good causing appear, the court recommends that defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted. In short, the summary judgment record contains no basis for concluding that defendants violated plaintiff's religious exercises or equal protection rights. The court also notes that defendants argued for qualified immunity (#52 at 22-24), but the court does not analyze those arguments because it has concluded the claims fail on their merits.
The parties are advised:
1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) and Rule IB 3-2 of the Local Rules of Practice, the parties may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation within fourteen days of receipt. These objections should be entitled "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation" and should be accompanied by points and authorities for consideration by the District Court.
2. This Report and Recommendation is not an appealable order and any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment.
V. RECOMMENDATION
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that defendants' motion for summary judgment (#52) be GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Clerk ENTER JUDGMENT and close this case. DATED: March 27, 2015
/s/_________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE