Opinion
No. CV 09-5032525-S
January 28, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On August 26, 2009, the Enfield Police Union ("the Union") brought an application to vacate a July 31, 2009 arbitration award regarding a dispute between it and the Town of Enfield ("the Town") concerning the payment of unused vacation time that the Union claimed was due a police officer upon his retirement. The arbitration panel had concluded that the Town did not violate the collective bargaining agreement when it refused to pay the officer any "additional or unaccrued" vacation days upon his retirement.
The Union claims that the award should be vacated because: "a) The arbitrators exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them such that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter was not made. b) The arbitrators are guilty of misconduct by which the rights of the Union have been prejudiced. c) The award does not conform to the submission. d) The award is inconsistent with previous decision regarding the same issue." Application to Vacate Arbitration Award, Paragraph 12.
Memorandum of law were submitted by both parties and oral argument was heard by the court on December 16, 2009.
Standard of Review
The Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418. That statute provides: "(a) Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the land is situated or, when the court is not in session, any judge thereof, shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects: . . . (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made."
As our Appellate Court has stated: "Judicial review of arbitral decisions is narrowly confined . . . When the submission to an arbitrator is unrestricted . . . the resulting award is not subject to de novo review even for errors of law so long as the award conforms to the submission . . . Because we favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution . . . Where the submission does not otherwise state, the [arbitrator is] empowered to decide factual and legal questions and an award cannot be vacated on the grounds that the interpretation of the agreement by the [arbitrator] was erroneous. Courts will not review the evidence nor, where the submission is unrestricted, will they review the [arbitrator's] decision of the legal questions involved . . . Furthermore, in applying this general rule of deference to an arbitrator's award, [e]very reasonable presumption and intendment will be made in favor of the [arbitral] award and of the arbitrators' acts and proceedings . . . Our deference to arbitral awards is, however, not unlimited. General Statutes § [52-418(a)(4)] provides in relevant part that an arbitration award may be vacated if the [arbitrator has] exceeded [his] powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." (Citations, internal quotation marks and footnote omitted.) New Haven v. AFSCME, Council 15, Local 530, 106 Conn.App. 691, 696-8 (2008).
Therefore, in evaluating the parties' claims, it is important to remember the limited scope of the court's review. The purpose of judicial review is not to provide the parties with an opportunity to relitigate the same issues presented to the arbitrators.
Discussion
The issue presented to the arbitration panel was: ". . . did the Employer violate Article 9, Section 4B subsection c and d and Article 6 of the collective bargaining agreement when it refused to pay the grievant any `additional or unaccrued' vacation days upon retirement?" State of Connecticut, Department of Labor, State Board of Mediation and Arbitration, Arbitration Award, July 31, 2009, p. 1. On July 1, 2006 the grievant was advanced 30 days of vacation. The grievant retired on October 31, 2006 at which time he had used only 42 hours of vacation and had an additional 198 hours of vacation time he had not used. Id., p. 5. The collective bargaining agreement provides that at retirement, an employee "shall be compensated for any earned but unused vacation time as severance pay." Id., p. 2. The arbitrators determined that the Town did not violate the collective bargaining agreement by not paying the grievant any additional vacation time upon his retirement. The arbitrators determined that the grievant had not "earned" such time within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement. Id., p. 6. The arbitrators found that the language of the collective bargaining agreement suggested that an employee earns or accrues vacation time based on time of service. Id.
The exact amount claimed is not clear from the award because the award also references the grievant's claim as one for 160 hours of accrued vacation time. Id., p. 3.
The Union argues that the arbitrators' decision violates General Statutes § 52-418 by altering or modifying the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The Union claims that the panel defined "earned but unused" to mean that vacation time is accrued on a monthly basis despite the language of the collective bargaining agreement that vacation time is advanced, and despite the fact that the agreement specifically provides that sick leave, and not vacation time, accrues on a monthly basis. The Town argues that the award in this case is clearly "mutual, final and definite" within the meaning of General Statutes § 52-418.
The Union argues that the contract provides that "[t]he arbitrator(s) shall have no authority to add to, subtract from, or otherwise modify the terms of this agreement" and that the arbitrators' decision does just that. The Union cites Board of Education v. AFSCME, 195 Conn. 266 (1985) where the Court reiterated that: "[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice." (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Id., 273. The Union claims that by finding that vacation time accrues on a monthly basis the arbitrators effectively added a provision to the collective bargaining agreement. However, under this theory, any interpretation of the agreement not in tune with the Union's interpretation would be a "modification" and outside of the arbitrators' authority. Such an implicit narrowing of the arbitrators' authority would defeat the purpose of arbitration. Clearly the arbitrators were given the authority to interpret the collective bargaining agreement and that is exactly what they did. The fact alone that the Union, and even this court, may not agree with that interpretation is unavailing.
The issue submitted by the parties to the arbitrators involved the interpretation and application of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrators determined, pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, that the grievant was not entitled to the payment of severance vacation time. There is no basis under our law for the court to overturn that decision, even if the court believes that it is erroneous. Thus this court has no occasion to apply the rules of contract interpretation advanced by the Union. As our Supreme Court recently stated: "In determining whether an arbitrator has exceeded the authority granted under the contract, a court cannot base the decision on whether the court would have ordered the same relief, or whether or not the arbitrator correctly interpreted the contract. The court must instead focus on whether the [arbitrator] had authority to reach a certain issue, not whether that issue was correctly decided. Consequently, as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of authority, the award must be enforced. The arbitrator's decision cannot be overturned even if the court is convinced that the arbitrator committed serious error . . . In short, the question comes down to whether the arbitrator had the authority to reach the issue, not whether the issue was correctly decided. We reiterate that [w]here the submission does not otherwise state, the arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and legal questions and an award cannot be vacated on the grounds that . . . the interpretation of the agreement by the arbitrators was erroneous . . . As we have noted, as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of authority, the award must be enforced." (Internal quotation marks, citations and footnotes omitted.) Comprehensive Orthopaedics, LLC v. Axrmayer, 293 Conn. 748, 755-60 (2009). Here, it is undisputed that the arbitration panel had the authority to decide the issue it did.
The Union also points out that a panel of arbitrators, approximately seven months prior to the date of the award in this matter, ruled just the opposite regarding the interpretation of the same collective bargaining agreement. That is, the arbitrators held that vacation time was not awarded on an accrual basis but became fixed on July 1st and therefore the grievant there was entitled to severance payment at her retirement for all unused vacation days to which she had become entitled to on the July first prior to her retirement. The union, after the hearing by the arbitrators of the grievance in this matter, moved to reopen the hearing so that the arbitrators could consider the decision of the other panel. That motion was denied. In any event, our Supreme Court has held that: "in the absence of a specific contract provision to the contrary, an arbitrator is not bound to follow prior arbitration decisions, even in cases in which the grievances at issue involve the same parties and interpretation of the same contract provisions. Although an arbitrator may find well reasoned prior awards to be a compelling influence on his or her decision-making process, the arbitrator need not give such awards preclusive effect. Rather, the arbitrator should bring his or her own independent judgment to bear on the issue to be decided, using prior awards as the arbitrator sees fit, as it is the arbitrator's judgment for which the parties had bargained." Stratford v. International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998, 248 Conn. 108, 125 (1999).
Conclusion
"The party challenging the award bears the burden of producing evidence sufficient to invalidate or avoid it, and only upon a showing that it falls within the proscriptions of § 52-418 of the General Statutes, or procedurally violates the parties' agreement will the determination of an arbitrator be subject to judicial inquiry." (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgeport Firefighters Ass'n v. Bridgeport, 48 Conn.App. 667, 669-70 (1998). Here the Plaintiff has not met this burden.
The application to vacate the award is denied.