Opinion
Case No. 03-2362-JWL
March 19, 2004
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff Janice Emerson brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of the decision of defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security, to deny her application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. According to plaintiff, defendant's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. In response to plaintiffs motion for judgment, defendant filed a motion to reverse and remand the case to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g), apparently conceding that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence and requesting that the ALJ be given another opportunity to "fully evaluate" plaintiffs application. Defendant further represents that, upon receipt of this court's order reversing and remanding the case, the Appeals Council will direct the ALJ to hold a supplemental hearing, to obtain updated medical records, and to correct each of the errors claimed by plaintiff in her motion for judgment. In response to defendant's motion, plaintiff urges that additional fact finding would serve no useful purpose, that the record fully supports a determination that plaintiff is disabled, and that the court should thus reverse and remand the case for an immediate award of benefits.
As it is undisputed, then, that this case should be reversed, the only question before this court is whether to remand for further administrative proceedings or to remand for an immediate award of benefits-a question that is within this court's discretion. See Ragland v. Shalala, 992 F.2d 1056, 1060 (10th Cir. 1993) ("When a decision of the Secretary is reversed on appeal, it is within this court's discretion to remand either for further administrative proceedings or for an immediate award of benefits."). Where remand for additional fact-finding would serve no useful purpose, the court may order an immediate award. Sorenson v. Bowen, 888 F.2d 706, 713 (10th Cir. 1989). However, courts in this district generally have declined to order an immediate award of benefits where the ALJ has made minimal findings that are not supported by adequate evaluation of the evidence in the record. See, e.g., Higgins v. Barnhard, 294 F. Supp.2d 1206, 1215 (D. Kan. 2003). Moreover, the Tenth Circuit has held that remand for additional fact finding is generally required where, as here, the ALJ never determined whether the plaintiff could perform sedentary work. See Dollar v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 530, 534 (10th Cir. 1987).
After reviewing the record in this case, the court is unable to say that remand for additional proceedings would serve no useful purpose. There has been no proper consideration of the opinions of plaintiff's treating physicians and there have been no findings regarding the weight to be afforded those opinions-including a Medical Source Statement completed by one of plaintiff's treating physicians after the ALJ issued his decision in this case. Moreover, in light of the ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff could perform her past relevant work in the light to medium work classification (and, thus, his failure to proceed to Step 5 of the sequential analysis), there have been no findings concerning whether plaintiff could perform sedentary work and, if so, whether any jobs exist in the national economy that plaintiff could perform. Moreover, even assuming that plaintiff could perform sedentary work, there have been no findings regarding the transferability of plaintiffs skills such that the court could determine whether the Medical-Vocational Guidelines would direct a conclusion that plaintiff is disabled. For these reasons, the court concludes that remand for additional proceedings is more appropriate than an immediate award of benefits. See, e.g., Bell v. Barnhart, 2002 WL 31178223, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 30, 2002) (the Commissioner and not the court should have the opportunity to make the Step 5 determination in the first instance).
This case, then, is reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g). Upon receiving this court's order, the Appeals Council is directed to remand this case, with all deliberate speed, to an ALJ and to direct the ALJ to hold a supplemental administrative hearing, to obtain updated medical records, to fully evaluate plaintiff's fibromyalgia regardless of whether objective medical evidence exists to support plaintiffs allegations, to consider the combined effect of plaintiffs impairments, to fully evaluate the opinions of plaintiffs treating physicians and to explain the weight given to those opinions and the reasons for giving such weight to those opinions, to fully evaluate plaintiffs subjective complaints, to evaluate plaintiffs credibility in a manner that comports with the pertinent regulations and Tenth Circuit precedent, to reevaluate plaintiffs residual functional capacity, to conduct a Step Five analysis, and to ensure that plaintiff has a full and fair administrative hearing without arbitrary time constraints placed upon that hearing. Finally, to address plaintiff's claim that the ALJ in this case maintains a bias against individuals alleging disability as a result of fibromyalgia (plaintiff's primary allegation here), the court will further direct that the case be assigned to a different ALJ on remand.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (doc. #11) is denied to the extent she seeks an immediate award of benefits and is otherwise granted. Defendant's motion to reverse and remand and for entry of final judgment (doc. #15) is granted; the decision of the Commissioner is hereby reversed and the case is remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings as described in this opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.