Opinion
Nos. WD 61755, WD 61771
August 26, 2003
Appeal from the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission.
Joseph K. Houts St. Joseph, Missouri, for appellant[s]-respondent[s].
Kimberley Cox Fournier, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, Missouri, for respondent[s]-appellant[s].
Before Hardwick, P.J., Breckenridge and Spinden, JJ.
The Treasurer of the State of Missouri, as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, appeals an award entered by the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission finding that Lana Elrod had a permanent partial disability and ordering the Second Injury Fund to pay benefits to her based upon its findings. On appeal, the Fund claims that the Commission erroneously found that the statute of limitations did not bar Ms. Elrod's claim and that various findings by the Commission were not supported by the evidence. Ms. Elrod cross-appeals, claiming that the Commission should have found that she had a permanent total disability. This court finds that Ms. Elrod's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Commission's award is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Commission with instructions to dismiss the claim.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On April 8, 1995, while working as a cook in a restaurant owned by the 36th Street Food and Drink Company in St. Joseph, Ms. Elrod slipped on some water on the floor and injured her left knee. On May 30, 1995, Ms. Elrod filed a claim for compensation with the Division of Workers' Compensation. Ms. Elrod did not file a claim against the Second Injury Fund at that time.
After conservative treatment on Ms. Elrod's left knee proved ineffective, an MRI was conducted, which revealed a tear in the medial meniscus. Arthroscopic surgery was performed on Ms. Elrod's knee on November 6, 1995. Following surgery, Ms. Elrod continued to have problems with her left knee and did not return to work.
In May 1996, Ms. Elrod's left knee locked, causing her to fall in a parking lot and further injure her left knee. A second MRI, performed after that fall, revealed an extension of the tear in the medial meniscus of her left knee. On November 14, 1997, a second arthroscopic surgery was performed on Ms. Elrod's knee. Ms. Elrod has been unemployed since that operation. Ms. Elrod's former employer, 36th Street Food and Drink Company, continued to provide treatment for her knee until at least April 23, 1998.
On November 3, 1998, Ms. Elrod filed her first amended claim with the Division of Workers' Compensation, in which she reasserted her claim against her employer and asserted a claim against the Fund for the first time. In her claim against the Fund, Ms. Elrod alleged that she had pre-existing injuries to her right ankle, right shin, and wrists, which combined with her current injury to her left knee to render her permanently and totally disabled. Ms. Elrod subsequently amended her claim to allege additional pre-existing disabilities resulting from her morbid obesity and diabetes.
On May 10, 2001, an administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing on Ms. Elrod's claim against the Fund. The ALJ found that Ms. Elrod's claim against the Fund was not barred by the statute of limitations contained in section 287.430. The ALJ also found that: (1) Ms. Elrod's pre-existing injury to her right ankle had resulted in a 12.5% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole; (2) the injury to her left knee had resulted in a 20% permanent partial disability at the level of the knee; (3) the simple sum of these two permanent partial disabilities warranted 159.5 weeks of compensation; (4) the condition of her right ankle, left knee, morbid obesity, and diabetes combined in such a manner that her permanent partial disability was significantly higher than the sum of the injuries to her ankle and knee; (5) the combination of these conditions resulted in Ms. Elrod being 81.875% permanently partially disabled to the body as a whole or 327.5 weeks; and (6) the difference between her actual disability and the sum of her ankle and knee injuries was 168 weeks worth of compensation. Based upon these findings, the ALJ ordered the Fund to pay Ms. Elrod 168 weeks worth of compensation for a total of $17,359.44. In addition, the ALJ ordered the Fund to pay Ms. Elrod temporary total disability benefits related to another job she held at the time of her knee injury totaling $5,967.50.
Prior to the hearing on her claim, Ms. Elrod and 36th Street Food and Drink Company entered into a settlement in which it was stipulated that Ms. Elrod's left knee injury had resulted in a permanent partial disability of twenty percent at the level of the knee.
All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2000, unless otherwise indicated.
Both Ms. Elrod and the Fund appealed the ALJ's decision to the Commission. Subsequently, the Commission entered its final award, finding that the statute of limitations did not bar Ms. Elrod's claim against the Fund, supplementing the ALJ's decision on that issue, and adopting the remainder of the ALJ's decision and award as the Commission's. Both parties appealed.
II. Standard of Review
On appeal, this court will not disturb the Commission's award unless the Commission acted without or beyond its power, the award was procured by fraud, the facts found do not support the award, or the award is not supported by sufficient competent evidence in the record. Section 287.495.1. To determine "whether the Commission could have reasonably made its findings and award upon consideration of all the evidence before it," this court uses a two-step process:
In the first step, the court examines the whole record, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the award, to determine if the record contains sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the award. If not, the Commission's award must be reversed. If there is competent and substantial evidence supporting the award, the court moves to the second step, where it views the evidence in the light most favorable to the award, but must consider all evidence in the record, including that which opposes or is unfavorable to the award, take account of the overall effect of all of the evidence, and determine whether the award is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
Davis v. Research Med. Ctr. , 903 S.W.2d 557, 571 (Mo.App. 1995).
In reviewing the Commission's award, this court cannot substitute its judgment regarding questions of fact for that of the Commission. Id . This court, however, is not bound by those findings of the Commission that are clearly the interpretation or application of law. Id . Thus, findings of the Commission interpreting or applying the law are not binding on this Court, and our review of such findings is de novo. See id .
III. The Fund's Appeal Claim against the Fund is Barred by Statute of Limitations
The Fund's first point on appeal is that the Commission erred in awarding Ms. Elrod benefits from the Fund because her claim was barred by the statute of limitations. If the statute of limitations barred Ms. Elrod's claim, the Commission did not have jurisdiction over the matter. Oberreiter v. Fullbright Trucking , 24 S.W.3d 727, 729 (Mo.App. 2000). "When a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot take any other action except its inherent power to dismiss." Id .
"The statute of limitations covering workers' compensation cases is set out in section 287.430." Otte v. Langley's Lawn Care, Inc. , 66 S.W.3d 64, 73 (Mo.App. 2001). That section provides:
Except for a claim for recovery filed against the second injury fund, no proceedings for compensation under this chapter shall be maintained unless a claim therefor is filed with the division within two years after the date of injury or death, or the last payment made under this chapter on account of the injury or death, except that if the report of the injury or death is not filed by the employer as required by section 287.380, the claim for compensation may be filed within three years after the date of injury, death, or last payment made under this chapter on account of the injury or death. . . . A claim against the second injury fund shall be filed within two years after the date of the injury or within one year after a claim is filed against an employer or insurer pursuant to this chapter, whichever is later. . . . The statute of limitations contained in this section is one of extinction and not of repose.
Section 287.430 (emphasis added). On appeal, the Fund contends that the Commission erroneously interpreted and applied section 287.430 in holding that the statute of limitations did not bar Ms. Elrod's claim against the Fund. It argues that the statute of limitations barred her claim because she "filed her claim more than two years after the date of injury and more than one year after the claim against the employer had been filed."
None of the facts relevant to determining whether the statute of limitations had run were disputed by the parties, and the Commission's decision was rendered solely upon its interpretation of section 287.430. As noted previously, this court reviews the Commission's interpretation of the law de novo. See Davis , 903 S.W.2d at 571 . "`The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words used in their plain and ordinary meaning.'" Clanton v. Teledyne Neosho , 960 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Mo.App. 1998) (citation omitted). "The provisions of a legislative act are not read in isolation but construed together and read in harmony with the entire act." State, Dep't of Soc. Servs., Div. of Aging v. Brookside Nursing Ctr., Inc. , 50 S.W.3d 273, 276 (Mo.banc 2001). "The issue is not whether a particular word in a statute, considered in isolation, is ambiguous, but whether the statute itself is ambiguous." J.B. Vending Co. v. Dir. of Revenue , 54 S.W.3d 183, 187 (Mo.banc 2001). Moreover, "the plain and unambiguous language of a statute cannot be made ambiguous by administrative interpretation and thereby given a meaning which is different from that expressed in a statute's clear and unambiguous language." Wolff Shoe Co. v. Dir. of Revenue , 762 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo.banc 1988). Statutory language is clear and unambiguous if it is "plain and clear to one of ordinary intelligence." Brookside Nursing , 50 S.W.3d at 276 .
The Commission interpreted the phrase "within one year after a claim is filed against an employer or insurer," as used in section 287.430, to allow a claimant to file a claim within one year of the filing of " any timely claim" against any employer or insurer. (Emphasis added). The Commission found that Ms. Elrod's amended claim against her employer, filed on November 3, 1998, was timely as to her employer because her employer had continued to make payments related to her claim until at least April 23, 1998. Thus, the Commission found that section 287.430 did not bar Ms. Elrod's claim against the Fund because it was filed within one year of the timely filing of her amended claim against her employer.
The Commission concluded that "the legislature surely did not intend to commence a limitations period on a claim" against the Fund until the claimant has a "reasonable expectancy" that his or her primary disability meets the statutory threshold for Fund liability. The Commission also found that section 287.430 was ambiguous as to what a "claim" meant and interpreted a "claim" to mean "any claim of any nature that would toll the statute of limitations on the primary claim." Additionally, the Commission stated that any claim against the Fund that was filed within the viable limitations period for the primary claim would be timely under section 287.430.
The Commission's finding that the statute of limitations for a claim against the Fund was not intended to begin running until the claimant has a "reasonable expectancy" that his or her primary disability met the statutory threshold for Fund liability wholly disregards the plain and clear language of section 287.430. None of the statutory language contained in section 287.430 reflects any intent by the legislature that the statute of limitations for a claim against the Fund does not begin to run until the claimant has a "reasonable expectancy" that the statutory threshold for Fund liability has been met. If the legislature meant to delay the running of the statute in that manner, it would have included language to that effect in the statute, as it did in section 287.063.3. In section 287.063.3, the legislature expressly delayed the running of the statute of limitations with regard to an occupational disease claim until the claimant's injury becomes "reasonably discoverable." Had the legislature intended for a similar provision to apply to a claim against the Fund, it would have so stated. Under the plain language of section 287.430, the only two events relevant to the running of the statute of limitations against the Fund are the occurrence of the work-related injury and the filing of a claim against an employer or insurer. Neither of these events is related to when the claimant develops a "reasonable expectancy" that his or her injury is sufficiently severe to establish Fund liability.
Section 287.430 expressly provides for two different potential limitations periods for filing a claim against the Fund, each of which has a different occurrence that triggers its running. The first limitations period begins running on the date of the work-related injury. A claimant is allowed two years from that date in which to file a claim against the Fund. The second limitations period is triggered by the filing of a claim against an employer or insurer. To fall within this limitations period, a claimant must file a claim against the Fund "within one year after a claim is filed against an employer or insurer." Section 287.430. A claim against the Fund is timely filed if it is filed within the later of these two limitations periods.
The Commission interpreted the statutory language related to the second limitations period to allow the one-year period to restart upon the filing of any amended claim against an employer or insurer. The plain language of the entire statute, however, does not allow for such an interpretation of the word "claim." In determining the legislature's intent as to the meaning of a word in the statute, "one must consider the meaning of a particular word in the context of the entire statute in which it appears." J.B. Vending Co. , 54 S.W.3d at 187 .
When referring to the statute of limitations period for a claim against an employer, the word "claim" is consistently used in section 287.430 to mean the primary claim filed by the claimant against the employer or insurer. In the first sentence, the statute provides that no workers' compensation proceedings may be maintained "unless a claim therefor is filed with the division within two years after the date of injury or death, or the last payment made under this chapter on account of the injury or death." Section 287.430. Where the employer fails to file the report of injury or death as required by section 287.380, the statute provides that "the claim for compensation may be filed within three years after the date of injury, death, or last payment made under this chapter on account of the injury or death." Section 287.430. The statute further provides that "[t]he filing of any form, report, receipt, or agreement, other than a claim for compensation, shall not toll the running of the periods of limitation provided in this section." Id.
These references to a "claim" against an employer or insurer clearly refer to the primary claim filed by the claimant and not to any subsequent amended claims. To ascribe a different meaning to the reference to a "claim" against an employer or insurer in the statute of limitations provision for a claim against the Fund would be ignoring the context of the entire statute. Moreover, from the context of the entire statute, if the legislature had intended for the one year period to run from the date of the "last claim" or "last timely claim" filed by a claimant, it would have included language to that effect, as it did in providing that the claimant would have two years from the "last payment made under this chapter on account of the injury or death" to file a claim against the employer.
Further contradicting the Commission's interpretation of section 287.430 is the fact that amended claims against an employer or insurer related to the same injury involved in the original claim are deemed to relate back to the date of the original filing. "Although workers' compensation is a creature of statute, many common law pleading principles apply, such as the rule that whenever a claim asserted in an amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading." Holaus v. William J. Zickell Co. , 958 S.W.2d 72, 79 (Mo.App. 1997) (citing Koerper Co. v. Unitel Int'l, Inc. , 739 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Mo. banc 1987)). Here, the claim asserted against Ms. Elrod's employer in the amended claim arose from the same occurrence as alleged in her original claim and, accordingly, is deemed to relate back to the date of the original claim.
The same cannot be said of Ms. Elrod's claim against the Fund. An employee's claim against the Fund is separate from a claim against the employer because "`the liability of the employer is a distinct issue from the liability of the Second Injury Fund.'" Tiller v. 166 Auto Auction , 65 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo.App. 2001) (citation omitted). As Ms. Elrod's claim against the Fund involved a party not included in the original claim, i.e., the Fund, it relied upon operative facts and occurrences not included in the original claim. For example, "in order for there to be Fund liability," Ms. Elrod had to prove that she had "a preexisting permanent partial disability of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to [her] employment or reemployment, and that such preexisting disability existed at the time the work-related injury was sustained." Loven v. Greene County , 63 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Mo.App. 2001). Moreover, an amendment adding a party against whom a claim is asserted does not relate back to the date of the original filing to toll the statute of limitations on that claim. State ex rel. Hilker v. Sweeney , 877 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Mo.banc 1994). Because the claim against the Fund contains issues distinct from the claim against the employer and adds a party to the lawsuit, it cannot be deemed to relate back to the date of the original filing.
Since Ms. Elrod's amended claim against her employer related back to the date of the filing of her primary claim, the statute of limitations must be deemed to have started running at that time. Accordingly, even if the filing of the amended claim were relevant to the running of the statute of limitations, Ms. Elrod's claim against the Fund would still have needed to be filed within one year of the date amended petition was deemed to have been filed, i.e., the date of the filing of her primary claim.
This court recognizes that its interpretation of section 287.430 is contrary to the Eastern District's interpretation of the statute in Kincade v. Treasurer of State of Missouri , 92 S.W.3d 310 (Mo.App. 2002). In Kincade , a claimant filed a claim against her employer in 1995, voluntarily dismissed that claim two years later, and filed a new claim against her employer and the Fund shortly thereafter, pursuant to 8 C.S.R. Section 50-2.050(12)(A) (1995). Id. at 311. In the course of finding that the claimant's claim against the Fund was not barred by the statute of limitations because it was filed within a year of the filing of the second claim, the Eastern District of this court explained that to hold the claimant to one year from the original claim filed against her employer would "impermissibly add language to the statute" and would be contrary to "the legislature's intent to extend benefits to the largest possible class." Id. at 312. Therefore, the court in Kincade stated, "We find the plain meaning of section 287.430 to mean claims against the Fund must be filed within a year of any timely claim against the employer." Id .
"Under the Commission's regulations, the dismissal of [Ms. Kincade's] application did not invalidate [her] eligibility unless the reapplication was not filed within the [statute of limitations] timeframes listed in section 287.430." Kincade , 92 S.W.3d at 312.
While this court agrees with Kincade that the workers' compensation statutes are to be liberally construed, the plain language of section 287.430 read as a whole and in the context of the workers' compensation act does not permit this interpretation. Nor was such an interpretation necessary to reach the conclusion that the second injury fund claim in Kincade was timely filed. It is consistent with the legislature's directive that workers' compensation statutes be liberally interpreted to apply the common law pleading principle that a dismissal of a pleading renders that pleading a nullity. See Holaus , 958 S.W.2d at 79. Under that principle, Ms. Kincaid's dismissal without prejudice of her primary claim against her employer rendered her primary claim a nullity. Therefore, the statute of limitations for her second injury fund claim did not run from the filing of the claim that was lawfully dismissed without prejudice. Ms. Kincade's refiling of her claim against her employer within the period permitted by section 287.430 constituted the primary claim that started the running of the statute of limitations for her claim against the second injury fund. She would have been barred from filing a claim against the second injury fund two years after the date of her injury or one year after the refiling of her primary claim against her employer, whichever was later.
This court's determination that the plain and ordinary language of section 287.430 compels the finding that the term "claim" means the primary claim would satisfy the Commission's concern that the statute of limitations for a claim against the Fund should never run before the viable limitations period for the primary claim. In fact, this court does not perceive any circumstance under our interpretation of section 287.430 where a claim against the Fund that was filed within the viable limitations period for the primary claim would be untimely under section 287.430. Therefore, this court declines to follow Kincade .
This opinion has been approved by the court en banc.
In this case, Ms. Elrod's injury occurred on April 8, 1995. As such, the first limitations period began to run on that date and expired two years later on April 8, 1997. Ms. Elrod filed a claim against her employer on May 30, 1995. The second limitations period began running on that date and expired one year later on May 30, 1996. The later of these two expiration dates was April 8, 1997. As of April 8, 1997, Ms. Elrod had not filed a claim against the Fund. Thus, under the plain language of section 287.430, the statute of limitations for filing her claim against the Fund has expired.
This court finds that the Commission misinterpreted and misapplied the law in finding that the statute of limitations contained in section 287.430 did not bar Ms. Elrod's claim against the Fund. Since the statute of limitations had run prior to the filing of Ms. Elrod's claim against the Fund, the Commission lacked jurisdiction over that claim. "`Like all administrative bodies, the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission has only such jurisdiction as is conferred upon it by statute.'" Clanton , 960 S.W.2d at 534 (citation omitted). Thus, Ms. Elrod's claim against the Fund should have been dismissed. As this issue is dispositive, this court does not need to address the parties' other points on appeal.
The award of the Commission is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Commission with instructions to dismiss the claim.
All concur.