Opinion
18 Civ. 2758(VB)(PED)
08-24-2021
ELOF HANSSON USA, INC., Plaintiff, v. EDGAR SANTIAGO and BOLIVAR ERNESTO INFANTE QUINONES, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
HONORABLE VINCENT L. BRICCETTI, United States District Judge:
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 28, 2018, plaintiff Elof Hansson USA, Inc. commenced this diversity action against Edgar Santiago ("Edgar") and Bolivar Ernesto Infante Quinones ("Bolivar") alleging claims, inter alia, for conversion and unjust enrichment. Dkt. #6. Plaintiff served Edgar with the Summons and Complaint on April 4, 2018 (Dkt. #7); Edgar filed an Answer on May 25, 2018. Dkt. #13. Plaintiff also initiated efforts to serve Bolivar at his place of business in Shanghai, China via the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 20 UST 361, TIAS No. 6638 (1969) ("Hague Convention"). Dkt. #105. On May 30, 2018, Your Honor extended plaintiffs time to serve Bolivar to August 28, 2018. Dkt. #17. Subsequently, Your Honor twice extended that deadline: on August 13, 2018 (extended to October 31, 2018) (Dkt. #22); and on October 11, 2018 (extended to December 31, 2018) (Dkt. #26).
On December 3, 2018, Your Honor referred this case to me for pretrial supervision. Dkt. #36. On December 13, 2018, 1 extended plaintiffs time to serve Bolivar to February 28, 2019, Dkt. #43, #45; 12/13/18 Minute Entry. On February 20, 2019, 1 extended that deadline to April 30, 2019. Dkt. #61.
Although the Chinese Central Authority (Ministry of Justice in Beijing) had confirmed in writing that it received plaintiffs service request and would serve Bolivar in Shanghai, plaintiff was uncertain of the timeline for completion of service. Dkt. #54.
On February 22, 2019, pursuant to a Stipulation (Dkt. #62-1) and Order granting leave to amend (Dkt. #63), plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint joining defendant Angela Santiago. Dkt. #64. Edgar and Angela Santiago filed their Answer to the Amended Complaint on March 22, 2019. Dkt. #74.
On April 17, 2019, 1 extended plaintiffs time to serve Bolivar to July 1, 2019. Dkt. #79. As plaintiff diligently continued efforts to effect service upon Bolivar (Dkt. #81, #95, #101), I extended time for service to August 30, 2019 (Dirt. #82), October 31, 2019 (Dkt. #97) and, finally, to December 31, 2019 (Dkt. #102). On November 20, 2019, the Clerk of the Court certified that plaintiff had made all reasonable efforts to serve Bolivar in China, pursuant to Article 15 of the Hague Convention, and issued a Certificate of Default as to Bolivar. Dkt. #105.
After the completion of discovery, plaintiff voluntarily withdrew its claims against Angela Santiago. Dkt. #113. On February 20, 2020, Your Honor scheduled a bench trial on plaintiffs claims against Edgar. Dkt. #114, #116 (adjourning bench trial to August 31, 2020). Your Honor conducted the bench trial on August 31 - September 3, 2020, and subsequently issued Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law (which were read into the record during a conference held on November 20, 2020). 8/31/20 - 9/3/20, 11/20/20 Minute Entries; Dkt. !46-l. On November 24, 2020, pursuant to Your Honor's Order dated November 23, 2020 (Dkt. #138), the Clerk of the Court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff against Edgar in the amount of $1,365,519.42 ($1,039,684.99 in damages plus $325,834.43 prejudgment interest) on plaintiffs claims for Violation of Duty of Fidelity and Undivided Loyalty (Count Two), Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Count Three), Faithless Servant (Count Four), Conversion (Counts Five, Six and Seven), Replevin (Count Nine) and Unjust Enrichment (Count Ten). Dkt. #139.
On December 31, 2020, plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment as to Bolivar. Dkt. #142 (motion), #143 (affirmation in support), #144-48 (affidavit of Jan Andreas Siberg), #149 (memorandum of law). On January 4, 2021, Your Honor issued an Order to Show Cause ("OSC"), directing Bolivar to appear on February 11, 2021 and show cause as to why a default judgment should not issue. Dkt. #151, The OSC specified a method for service upon Bolivar, pursuant to which plaintiff served Bolivar with a copy of the Order to Show Cause (together with the papers upon which it was granted) via email (infantebolivar(S).gmail.com). Dkt. #151, #153. On February 11, 2021, after Bolivar (or his representative) failed to appear at the show cause hearing, Your Honor referred this matter to me for a Report and Recommendation regarding plaintiffs motion for a default judgment and for an inquest as to the proper amount of damages. Dkt. #157, #158.
On March 8, 2021, 1 entered a Scheduling Order directing plaintiff to serve and file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law (concerning damages) by April 8, 2021 and directing Bolivar to submit any responsive materials within fourteen (14) days of service, Dkt. #159. On March 12, 2021, plaintiff filed proof of service of the Scheduling Order upon Bolivar via the email address designated in the OSC. Dkt. #160.
On April 8, 2021, plaintiff filed the requisite papers, including Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Dkt. #176), a Memorandum of Law (Dkt. #177), the supporting affidavit of Thomas Driscoll with attached exhibits (Dkt. #178), the supporting affidavit of William D. Hummell with attached exhibits (Dkt. #179) and the supporting affidavit of Jan Andreas Siberg with attached exhibits (Dkt. #18.0-81). Plaintiff also filed proof of service of all of these papers upon Bolivar via the email address designated in the OSC. Dkt. #182-84.
To date, Bolivar has not filed any opposition nor has he contacted the Court in any way. For the following reasons, 1 recommend that Your Honor grant the instant motion and enter judgment in favor of plaintiff against Bolivar in the amount of $643,684.99, plus prejudgment interest on that amount calculated at the New York statutory rate of 9% per annum, beginning June 2, 2017.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 establishes a two-step process for a plaintiff to obtain a default judgment." Harty v. Koutsourades, No. 20 Civ, 2779, 2021 WL 1299495, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2021). First, "[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default." Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). Second, absent circumstances m which the "plaintiffs claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation," Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a), the plaintiff "must apply to the court for a default judgment," Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2). "To determine whether a motion for default judgment is warranted, courts within this district consider three factors: (1) whether the defendant's default was willful; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense to plaintiffs claims; and (3) the level of prejudice the non-defaulting party would suffer as a result of the denial of the motion for default judgment." Campos v. Bkuk 3 Corp., No. 18 Civ. 4036, 2021 WL 3540243, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2021).
When a defendant defaults, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true, except those pertaining to the amount of damages. Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 83 n. 6, 84 (2d Cir. 2009); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(b)(6). "Nonetheless, even after default has been entered, district courts retain the discretion to require proof of necessary facts and need not agree that the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action." U.S. ex rel Nat. Dev. & Const. Corp. v. U.S. Env''t Universal Servs., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 730, 2014 WL 4652712, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2Ol4)(quotation and citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). In other words, because a defaulting defendant does not admit conclusions of law, Amer, Trans. Ins. Co. v. Bilyk, No. 19 Civ. 5171, 2021 WL 216673, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2021), the court "is also required to determine whether the [plaintiffs] allegations establish [the defendant's] liability as a matter of law." Finkel, 577 F.3d at 84. "A default, then, only establishes a defendant's liability if those allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action against the defendant." Taizhou Zhongneng Import and Export Co., LTD. v. Koutsobinas, 509 Fed.Appx. 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2013).
Similarly, a defendant's default does not constitute an admission of damages. Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers hoc. 2, Albany, N.Y.Pension Fund v. Moid ton Masonry & Const., LLC, 779 F.3d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 2015). On an inquest for damages, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof and must introduce admissible evidence to establish, with reasonable certainty, a basis for the amount of damages it seeks, House v. Kent Worldwide Mack Works, Inc., 359 Fed.Appx. 206, 207 (2d Cir. 2010); Yunjian Lin v. Grand Sichuan 74 St Inc., No. 15 Civ. 2950, 2020 WL 3072290, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2020). The plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences from the evidence it presents. House, 359 Fed.Appx. at 207.
III. FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiff Elof Hansson USA is based in Tarrytown, New York. Dkt. #64 (Am. Comp.) ¶ 2. Plaintiffs business includes selling steel products obtained from various sources, including manufacturers located in China. Id., ¶ 4. At all relevant times, Edgar worked for plaintiff in Tarrytown. Id. ¶ 7. From March 2009 to February 2011, Edgar was plaintiffs business controller. Id. ¶ 8. In February 2011, Edgar was promoted to Executive Vice President and division manager for the Building Materials Division (overseeing all transactions involving timber and steel products). Id. ¶ 9. In particular, the Building Materials Division was responsible for locating suppliers in the Americas, Asia and Europe from whom plaintiff would purchase steel products for resale to its customers around the world. Id. ¶ 41. Plaintiff sometimes used "sourcing agents" to locate suppliers in exchange for a sales commission, earned upon plaintiffs confirmation of a purchase order for resale of the sourced material. Dkt. #146-1 at 10.
Page numbers following citations to "Dkt. #__" reflect ECF pagination.
Don Metal SRL ("DM"), a Dominican Republic corporation, is the largest importer of steel products in the Dominican Republic. Dkt, #64 ¶ 39. In 2015, DM's general manager (Saury Mota) introduced Bolivar to Edgar. Id. ¶ 42. Edgar negotiated with Bolivar to have Bolivar act as a sourcing agent for plaintiff, tasked with finding and acquiring steel products in China. Id. ¶ 43; Dkt. #146-1 at 10-11. "Email negotiations in November 2015 between Edgar and Bolivar suggest Bolivar was to receive commission payments of $2.50 per metric ton of steel rod, and $3 per metric ton of steel strips and other steel products, that he sourced for Elof Hansson." Dkt. #146-1 at 11. DM and Bolivar discussed that he needed a currency exchange agency to receive the purchase commissions he would earn for steel sourced by him in Asia. Dkt. #64 ¶ 44. DM introduced Bolivar and Edgar to Nelson Imbert, a citizen of the Dominican Republic and owner of Imbert Corp., a currency exchange agency with offices in the Dominican Republic and Florida. Id. ¶¶ 37-38, 44-45.
Edgar and Bolivar conspired together and initiated a scheme whereby Bolivar's "commission" would be invoiced at inflated rates and split equally by Edgar and Bolivar. Dkt. #64 ¶¶ 47-48. "Agent sales commission memos, initiated and approved by Edgar, demonstrate that Edgar caused Plaintiff to pay Bolivar commission payments of $5 to $8 per ton for various sourced steel products." Dkt. #146-1 at 12. As a result of the scheme, "the cumulative total received by Bolivar far exceeded the $3.00 he would have received merely from [plaintiffs] sale of steel products to [DM]." Dkt. #64 ¶ 49.
In 2015-2016, each time Bolivar sourced steel products from Asia for a sale by plaintiff to one of its customers: (1) Edgar arranged for plaintiff to issue an inflated commission payment to be transmitted to Imbert Corp.'s Florida office; (2) Imbert Corp. distributed the payment via checks payable to Bolivar and Edgar in equal amounts; (3) upon receipt of an Imbert Corp. check payable to him, Edgar deposited the funds into one of his personal accounts. Dkt. #64 ¶ 51. "From October 2015 through March 2016 Elof Hansson delivered to Imbert Corp. $268,392.97 in commission payments for transactions involving Bolivar's work as a sourcing agent." Dkt. #146-1 at 12. From November 11, 2015 to February 5, 2016, Imbert Corp. issued ten checks payable to Edgar totaling $70,000: eight checks in the amount of $5,000 and two checks (both dated February's, 2016) in the amount of$l5, OOO. Id. at 13; Dkt. #64 ¶¶ 52-53. These payments constituted kickbacks from Bolivar to Edgar. Dkt. #146-1 at 21.
In April 2016, plaintiff began to remit Bolivar's commission payments directly to Ilaqonnect, Ltd., a company owned by Bolivar and his wife, via HuaNan Commercial Bank in Hong Kong. Dkt. #146-1 at 13; Dkt. #64 ¶¶ 57-58, From April 2016 through February 2017, plaintiff remitted a total of $675,427.52 to Ilaqonnect for commissions earned by Bolivar, based upon inflated invoices for $5 to $8 per ton of sourced steel products. Dkt. #146-1 at 13. From June 21, 2016 through September 2, 2017, Ilaqonnect initiated sixteen wire transfers into Edgar's personal bank account from Ilaqonnect's account at HuaNan Commercial Bank. Id. at 16. "On November 22, 2017, Edgar received a 17` wire transfer from Bolivar, this time from a Citibank account in Bolivar's name." Id. The seventeen wire transfers totaled $573,684.99. Id. The seventeen wire transfers constituted kickbacks from Bolivar to Edgar. Dkt. #146-1 at 21.
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Default Judgment is Warranted
Plaintiff has satisfied the two-step procedural requirements of FRCP 55: the clerk has entered Bolivar's default (Dkt. #105) and plaintiffs motion for default judgment is before the Court (Dkt. #142). Further, consideration of the relevant factors weighs in favor of entry of default judgment against Bolivar. First, Bolivar's failure to respond to any pleading or to plaintiffs motion for a default judgment, or otherwise appear in this action, is "indicative of willful conduct." See Campos, 2021 WL 3540243, at *4. Second, "[w']here, as here, a defendant fails to answer the complaint, a court is unable to make a determination whether the defendant has a meritorious defense to the plaintiffs claims, and this fact weighs in favor of granting a default judgment." United States v. Thomas, No. 18 Civ, 1104, 2019 WL 121678, at *5 (E.D, N.Y. Jan. 7, 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In any event, the undersigned is unaware of any meritorious defenses Bolivar could assert with respect to the claims in issue. Third, plaintiff would be prejudiced if the motion for default were denied "since there are no additional steps available to secure relief in this Court." Parsons v. Bong Mines Ent. LLC, No. 19 Civ. 0813, 2021 WL 931506, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 930259 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2021).
The above Findings of Fact establish that this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Bolivar pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3O2(a)(3)(ii), which provides that a court "may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who in person or through an agent. . . commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state ... if he . .. expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce."
B. Legal Basis for Bolivar's Liability
Although the relevant factors favor plaintiff, the court must also determine whether plaintiffs allegations establish Bolivar's liability with respect to each cause of action asserted. See Lewis v. Legal Servicing, LLC, No. 19 Civ. 8085, 2021 WL 3500867, at*3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2021). Plaintiff seeks a default judgment against Bolivar on five causes of action: (1) conversion (wrongful taking); (2) conversion (wrongful disposal or use); (3) conversion (wrongful detention); (4) replevin; and (5) unjust enrichment. (Dkt. #177).
1. Conversion claims
"To state a claim for conversion under New York law, a plaintiff must show that 'someone, intentionally and without authority, assume[d] or exercise[d] control over personal property belonging to someone else, interfering with that person's right of possession.'" Amusement Indus., Inc. v. Midland Ave. Assocs., LLC, 820 F.Supp.2d 510, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Colavito v. N.Y.Organ Donor Network, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 43, 49-50, 860 N.E.2d 713, 827 N.Y.S.2d 96 (2006)). "Interference with a plaintiffs right to possession may be by a wrongful: (I) taking; (ii) detention; or (iii) disposal." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the record evidence clearly establishes that Bolivar and Edgar jointly perpetuated a scheme whereby Edgar caused plaintiff to transfer inflated commission payments to Bolivar and Bolivar "kickbacked" a portion of those payments to Edgar. Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that the record evidence provides a sound legal basis for finding Bolivar liable on plaintiffs claims for conversion.
2. Replevin
"To establish a claim for replevin, the plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that plaintiff has a possessory right superior to that of the defendant; and (2) that plaintiff is entitled to the immediate possession of that property." Int`l Bus. Machines Corp. v. BGC Partners, Inc., `No. 10 Civ. 128, 2013 WL 1775367, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, as to Santiago, Your Honor held:
Because I conclude that Edgar is liable for conversion of property belonging to Plaintiff in the form of unlawful kickback - that is, inflated commission payments that should not have been paid, a portion of which were then kicked back to Edgar -1 also conclude Edgar is liable for replevin.Dkt. #146-1 at 34. Accordingly, because the record evidence clearly establishes that Bolivar is liable for conversion stemming from his joint participation in the kickback scheme, I respectfully recommend that Your Honor find him liable on plaintiffs replevin claim.
3, Unjust Enrichment
Under New York law:
"To prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment, a Plaintiff must establish (1) that the defendant benefited; (2) at the Plaintiffs expense; and (3) that equity and good conscience require restitution." Beth Israel Med. Ctr. v. Horizon Blue Cross & Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc., 448 F.3d 573, 586 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Kaye v. Grossman, 202 F.3d 611, 616 (2d Cir. 2000)); accord Anesthesia Assocs. of Mount Kisco, LLP v. N. Westchester Hosp. Center, 59 A.D.3d 473, 481, 873 N.Y.S.2d 679, 686 (2d Dep't 2009). 'The 'essence' of this claim 'is that one party has received money or a benefit at the expense of another.'" Kaye, 202 F.3d at 616 (quoting City of Syracuse v. R.A.C. Holding, Inc., 258 A.D.2d 905, 685 N.Y.S.2d 381, 381 (4th Dep't 1999)).Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc. v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, LLC, 813 F.Supp.2d 489, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), Here, Your Honor found Santiago liable on plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim:
Here, Edgar benefited at Plaintiffs expense by causing Plaintiff to pay inflated commission payments to Bolivar and then receiving a portion of those payments from Bolivar in improper kickbacks. Edgar did this without Plaintiffs knowledge. Therefore, I find that equity and good conscience require restitution of those payments, which total, as I mentioned earlier, $643,684.99.Dkt. #146-1 at 34-35. As to Bolivar, the record evidence demonstrates that he also benefited at plaintiffs expense because, as a result of his joint participation in the kickback scheme, "the cumulative total received by Bolivar far exceeded the $3.00 he would have received merely from [plaintiffs] sale of steel products to [DM]," Dkt, #64 ¶ 49, Equity and good conscience require restitution of the difference between the commission Bolivar should have received ($2.50 to $3.00 per MT) and the amount he actually received (presumably $643,684.99, equal to the kickback amount received by Santiago). Accordingly, 1 respectfully recommend that Your Honor find Bolivar liable for unjust enrichment.
Although plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment of liability against Bolivar on the unjust enrichment claim, I respectfully recommend (for reasons set forth below) that no damages be awarded against Bolivar on this claim.
C. Damages
Plaintiff seeks an award of damages against Bolivar in the amount of $643,684.99, plus prejudgment interest. Dkt. #177 at 10. The record evidence establishes that Santiago received $643,684.99 in kickbacks as a result of defendants' scheme, comprised of $70,000 in payments from Imbert Corp. and $573,684.99 in wire transfers from Ilaqonnect. As to Santiago, Your Honor's damage award in favor of plaintiff included $643,684.99, representing the kickback amount received by Santiago. Dkt. #146-1 at 35-36. Your Honor also awarded prejudgment interest "calculated at the New York statutory rate of 9 percent per annum, beginning June 2, 2017, which was Edgar's final date of employment with Elof Hansson, and which Plaintiff has agreed to consider as the starting date for calculating such pre-judgment interest," Id. at 36. See Dkt. #176 at 16-19 (plaintiff agrees to use June 2, 2017 as start date for calculating prejudgment interest on damages against Bolivar). Accordingly, as to plaintiffs claims against Bolivar for conversion and replevin, I respectfully recommend that Your Honor award plaintiff damages in the amount of $643,684.99, plus prejudgment interest on that amount calculated at the New York statutory rate of 9 percent per annum, beginning June 2, 2017.
As to the unjust enrichment claim, plaintiff argues that Bolivar was unjustly enriched in the amount of $643,684, 99. Id. [disagree. Under defendants' scheme, Bolivar and Edgar agreed to equally split the inflated "commission" payments; thus, it is reasonable to infer that Bolivar received an amount equal to the amount of kickbacks he sent to Santiago ($643,684, 99), Plaintiff submits documentation demonstrating that Bolivar should have been paid $405,113, 62 in commissions at the agreed-upon rate of $2, 50 to $3, 00 per metric ton. Dkt. #181 ¶¶ 32-40; #181-12. Therefore, Bolivar was unjustly enriched in the amount of $238,571.37 ($634,684.99 - $405,113.62). However, plaintiff does not seek a separate, additional damage award against Bolivar for unjust enrichment; rather, plaintiff seeks a total award in the amount of $643,684.99 on the conversion, replevin and unjust enrichment claims (plus prejudgment interest). Dkt. #176 at 10. In other words, it appears plaintiff seeks to hold Bolivar liable under alternate theories of recovery for the monies received by Santiago as kickbacks. Plaintiff is not entitled to recover from Bolivar the $634,684.99 in kickbacks to Santiago based upon a theory of unjust enrichment. "A court has the discretion to decline to award any damages where, on a damages inquest, a plaintiff fails to demonstrate its damages to a reasonable certainty, even though liability has been established through default." NTT Am. Inc. v. Tennessee Data Sys., LLC, No. 17 Civ. 08274, 2018 WL 5493088, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 5447340 (S.D.N.Y. Oct, 29, 2018). Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that plaintiff is not entitled to the damage award he requests against Bolivar on the unjust enrichment claim.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I respectfully recommend that Your Honor:
(1) grant plaintiffs motion for default;
(2) enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against Bolivar on counts five through seven (conversion), count nine (replevin) and count ten (unjust enrichment);
(3) hold Bolivar jointly and severally liable with Santiago on the conversion and replevin claims and award damages against Bolivar on those claims in the amount of $643,684.99, plus prejudgment interest on that amount calculated at the New York statutory rate of 9% per annum, beginning June 2, 2017.
Plaintiffs counsel is directed to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation on Bolivar via email (infantebolivar@gmail.com) and file proof of service promptly.
NOTICE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation to serve and file written objections. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 6(a). Such objections, if any, along with any responses to the objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court with extra copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable Vincent L. Briccetti, at the Honorable Charles L. Brieant Jr. Federal Building and United States Courthouse, 300 Quarropas Street, White Plains, New York 10601, and to the chambers of the undersigned at the same address.
Failure to file timely objections to this Report and Recommendation will preclude later appellate review of any order of judgment that will be entered.
Requests for extensions of time to file objections must be made to Judge Briccetti.