Opinion
SA-04-CA-0490-RF.
October 21, 2004
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 2), as well as Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss. After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that while it has personal jurisdiction over the matter and consequently will not dismiss the action under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(2), Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6). Therefore, the action must be DISMISSED based on Rule 12(b)(6).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this claim against Defendant Firearms Training Systems, Inc. ("FATS") for discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against him by not permitting him to fly first-class on round-trip business flights between Georgia and Texas. FATS is a Georgia corporation that hired Plaintiff in Georgia to work out of its Georgia office. Plaintiff alleges he informed FATS before accepting employment that he possessed a 73% disability to his back, which would make it difficult for him to travel extensively. On the particular flights in question, Plaintiff asserts that he was forced to fly coach class and endure a severe amount of pain. After suffering from pain on the flight to Dallas, Plaintiff claims that he unsuccessfully attempted to contact a FATS supervisor to obtain approval to travel first-class on the return flight. Because he endured severe pain on his round-trip flight, Plaintiff claims that FATS refused to accommodate his disability in violation of the ADA. Plaintiff was terminated by FATS on May 23, 2003.
Plaintiff initiated these proceedings by filing his allegation of discrimination with the San Antonio District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The EEOC Intake Questionnaire is signed as of December 12, 2003. The EEOC Charge File, however, specifies that the charge was received on January 5, 2004. In a letter dated February 10, 2004, the San Antonio District Office notified Plaintiff that his charge was forwarded to the Atlanta District Office because the Atlanta office possessed geographical jurisdiction over the matter. The Atlanta District Office then sent Plaintiff a letter dated March 1, 2004 requesting additional information and referring the matter to the Commission's Alternative Dispute Resolution Unit. On March 8, 2004, the Atlanta District Office issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights and stated that the EEOC closed its file on Plaintiff's charge because it was not filed within the time limit required by law. Plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division, on June 7, 2004.
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6). Defendant contends that Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant and because Plaintiff failed to file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC.
DISCUSSION
I. Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal JurisdictionPlaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has brought that jurisdiction into question. In resolving a jurisdictional issue, the court may review pleadings, affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, exhibits, any part of the record, and any combination thereof. The requirement of a prima facie case does not require the court to credit conclusory allegations, even if uncontroverted.
Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 648 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 930 (1994).
Command-Aire Corp. v. Ontario Mech. Sales Serv., Inc., 963 F.2d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1992).
Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power, 253 F.3d 865, 868 (5th Cir. 2001).
Here, because the federal question at issue — discrimination under the ADA — does not provide for service of process, the Court "can use a state long-arm statute only to reach those parties whom a court of the state could also reach under it." The Texas long-arm statute permits service of process to the extent that personal jurisdiction comports with the due process requirements of the U.S. Constitution; therefore, the only question here is whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over FATS would offend the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Burstein v. State Bar of Cal., 693 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1982).
Electrosource, Inc. v. Horizon Battery Tech., Inc., 176 F.3d 867, 871 (5th Cir. 1999).
See Burstein, 693 F.2d at 514 ("In a federal question case in federal court, the relevant constitutional provision is the due process clause of the fifth amendment."); see also Redwing Shoe Company, Inc. v. Hocker-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
This Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant, a nonresident corporation, if the company has had sufficient "minimum contacts" with Texas and the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of substantial justice and fair play. This two-part test embodies the controlling due process principle that a defendant must have "fair warning" that a particular activity may subject it to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign. In making this determination, all undisputed allegations by Plaintiff, who here seeks to assert personal jurisdiction, will be accepted as true and all conflicts between the parties will be resolved in favor of Plaintiff.
See Burstein, 693 F.2d at 517-18; Redwing Shoe, 148 F.3d at 1358.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985).
Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
A nonresident defendant's contacts with Texas may give rise to either general or specific jurisdiction. When the nonresident defendant's contacts are systematic and continuous, then the forum's jurisdiction is general. When the defendant's contacts are less substantial, but the claim arises out of the defendant's more limited contacts with the forum, then the forum enjoys specific jurisdiction. FATS is a Georgia corporation and claims that it is subject to neither general nor specific jurisdiction of this Court. In contrast, Plaintiff argues that this Court maintains personal jurisdiction over FATS under either general or specific jurisdiction theories.
Jackson v. FIE Corp., 302 F.3d 515, 530-31 (5th Cir. 2002).
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
The Court begins with an analysis of the general personal jurisdiction claims. Defendant argues that the Court has no general jurisdiction over it because its principal place of business is in Georgia and it maintains no office, equipment, property, employees, telephones or telephone book listings in Texas. Defendant further maintains that it does not have an agent for service of process in Texas. FATS admits that it generated sales in Texas but states that it do so for a brief period of time after the events at issue occurred.
Plaintiff responds that general jurisdiction is appropriate because FATS pursued business opportunities in Texas. Plaintiff alleges that FATS had contracts and provided products and training services to police departments in Texas, including the San Antonio Police Department, the Harris County Sheriff's Department, and the El Paso Police Department. According to Plaintiff, Defendant asked him to visit Dallas to meet with representatives of the Federal Air Marshall Service at the DFW Airport to discuss developing a regional training center and also hired Tony Wells who relocated to San Antonio so that FATS would have a sales representative in the Texas region. Plaintiff further maintains that these relations were in addition to phone calls, emails, and correspondence exchanged between FATS and the State of Texas. Finally, Plaintiff submits that general jurisdiction is appropriate because a Texas consumer could access FATS products and services on-line at the Defendant's website.
The record from the pleadings is unclear as to whether Defendant's alleged contacts with Texas existed at the time this claim took place or arose subsequent to Plaintiff's termination in May 2003. Accepting Plaintiff's undisputed allegations as true and resolving conflicts between the parties in favor of the Plaintiff, this Court finds that Defendant had systematic or continuous contacts with Texas sufficient to confer general personal jurisdiction. In Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, the 5th Circuit held, "When the cause of action does not arise from or relate to the foreign corporation's purposeful conduct within the forum state, due process require that there be continuous and systematic contacts between the State and the foreign corporation to support an exercise of `general' personal jurisdiction by that forum." The Court finds that FATS possessed continuous and systematic contacts with Texas by entering various contracts with police departments in Texas, by hiring a sales representative in the Texas region, and by pursuing other business relations in the state. Therefore, the Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant and DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2).
See Beverly Hills Fan Co., 21 F.3d at 1564.
See Jackson, 302 F.3d at 530 (there must be evidence of continuous and systematic contacts to support jurisdiction) (citing Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1987).
II. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim upon which Relief can be Granted
For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff, and all the facts plead in the complaint must be taken as true. Dismissal on this basis is a disfavored means of disposing of a case, and district courts should avoid such dismissals "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." "The question therefore is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief."
Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1986).
Kennedy v. Tangipahoa Parish Library Bd. of Control, 224 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 2000).
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102 (1957).
Brown v. Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579, 586 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357, at 601 (1969)).
The parties dispute whether Plaintiff filed his charge of discrimination in compliance with Title VII. Defendant argues that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiff failed to file a timely Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days from the date of the alleged discrimination. In contrast, Plaintiff maintains that he complied with the statutory requirements established for Texas because he filed the charge in Texas within 300 days from the date of the alleged discrimination.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) specifies the EEOC filing requirements for Title VII cases, and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that Congress intended for them to act as a statute of limitations. Generally, the limitations period for filing a charge is 180 days "after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." However, the period is extended to 300 days in states that provide a state or local administrative mechanism to address complaints of employment discrimination. Such states that have a state or local administrative mechanism are referred to as deferral states, and states without the mechanism are referred to as non-deferral states. Georgia is a non-deferral state, and therefore, a plaintiff must bring a claim for employment discrimination in Georgia within 180 days from the alleged unlawful employment action. Texas, in contrast, is a deferral state, and a plaintiff must bring such a claim within 300 days from the alleged discriminatory act.
See Adams v. Cal-Ark International, Inc., 159 F.Supp.2d 402, 406 (E.D.Tex. 2001); see Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982). at 393-94, 102 S.Ct. 1127.
Adams, 159 F.Supp. 2d at 406; see Griffin v. City of Dallas, 26 F.3d 610, 612 (5th Cir. 1994).
Adams at 406; see Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1998).
Liberally construing the pleadings in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the most recent date on which discrimination occurred was May 23, 2003, Plaintiff's final day of employment with FATS. Moreover, the earliest the EEOC received the charge of discrimination was on December 12, 2003, the date on which Plaintiff signed the EEOC Intake Questionnaire. Accordingly, Plaintiff filed the charge 203 days after the discriminatory act occurred, and the issue of whether Plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitations turns on whether Plaintiff was required to meet Georgia's 180-day limitation period or Texas' 300-day limitation period.
Statutory language provides minimal guidance as to whether the claim in question should be reviewed under procedures stipulated for Georgia or Texas. ADA enforcement provisions indicate that the claim should be brought in the "state in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed." This statutory language could be interpreted to support either Texas or Georgia as the appropriate forum, and thus case law addressing this issue provides the Court better direction.
42 C.F.R. § 2000e-5(f)(3) authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
Several courts have addressed this issue. In DePriest v. Seaway Food Town Inc., a plaintiff filed her EEOC claim in Ohio, her home state, despite the fact that all the allegedly discriminatory activity occurred in Michigan. The Court held that DePriest brought the suit in the wrong state because "the case never had any connection with Ohio" and "the alleged act of discrimination clearly occurred in Michigan." According to the Court, "Plaintiff applied for a job in Michigan at a Michigan store while she was living in Michigan." The Court proceeded to emphasize, "A state with no connection to or jurisdiction over an alleged discriminatory act is in no position to settle anything to the satisfaction of anyone."
543 F.Supp. 1355 (E.D.Mich. 1982).
Id.
Id.
In Lyda v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., Plaintiff Lyda resided and worked in Illinois but filed her Title VII claim with the EEOC in New York where Defendant company maintained its headquarters. In rendering summary judgment against Plaintiff, the Court held that Illinois was the proper forum for her claim because "it [represented] her place of residence, the location of her employer and the location of the alleged discriminatory activity." The Court found that New York had only a tangential connection to the case because the dismissal was caused by officials in Chicago and not in New York.
587 F.Supp. 670 (S.D.New York 1984).
Id.
Similarly in Higginbotham v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the Court held that Georgia was the only state that had jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim of discrimination despite Plaintiff's California residency and his filing of the complaint with the Los Angeles office of the EEOC. Plaintiff sought to be employed as a pilot but was denied. The Court found, "Plaintiff sent his application to Georgia; plaintiff was interviewed in Georgia, and took all Delta's tests assessments, and examinations in Georgia. The decisionmakers were all in Georgia, and the decision not to hire was made in Georgia."
1992 WL 470700 (N.D.Cal. 1992) (not reported in F.Supp.).
Id. at 2.
In contrast to the cases above, the Court in Adams v. Cal-Ark Intern, Inc. held that a discrimination claim had been brought in the proper forum. Plaintiff truck driver alleged harassment by fellow drivers and other employees while she worked in Texas and Arkansas. The Court refused to dismiss the matter and applied the 300-day limitation period because it found that the alleged events occurred in Texas and fell within the appropriate statute of limitations.
159 F.Supp.2d 402 (E.D.Tex. 2001).
Id. at 409.
In light of decisions highlighted above, the Court holds that Georgia is the appropriate forum for Plaintiff's claim. The State of Texas possessed only a tenuous connection with the events at issue. Defendant is a Georgia corporation. Plaintiff was hired in Georgia and completed all negotiations with Defendant in Georgia concerning his employment arrangements. Plaintiff worked in Defendant's Georgia office. The decision to deny Plaintiff's request for first class travel had been made by Defendant's employees working in Georgia, and the practice was in place before Plaintiff's flight to Texas. Plaintiff may have been physically present in Texas at the time of the alleged incident, but Defendant did not actively deny his request for first class travel on that occasion because Plaintiff was unable to contact any supervisors. The connection of events to Texas is merely by happenstance and insufficient to warrant Texas jurisdiction over the claims.
Similar to the findings in DePriest, Lyda, and Higginbotham, Plaintiff Elliott in this case failed to file the charge in the proper state. Moreover, Plaintiff is not entitled to benefit from Texas' 300-day filing period for an untimely claim that should have been filed in Georgia within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory acts. The Court finds no justification to excuse Plaintiff's filing in the wrong state or toll the limitation period. Furthermore, Plaintiff did not file his claim in Texas until after the Georgia limitation period had expired. Because Plaintiff cannot meet the requirements of the ADA for filing his claim in a timely manner and in the appropriate state, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
See Lyda, 587 F.Supp. at 673.
DePriest, 543 F.Supp. at 1361.
See Lyda at 673.
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED on the basis of Rule 12(b)(6). This case is dismissed in its entirety.
FINAL JUDGMENT
On this day the Court entered an Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 2) under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6). The Court now enters its Final Judgment in accordance with Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.It is ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
It is ORDERED that Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs.
It is ORDERED that all pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.