Opinion
2:20-cv-01579-CMC-MGB
09-30-2021
Emerson Jimel Edwards, Plaintiff, v. The Country of China, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff Emerson Jimel Edwards (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed, without issuance and service of process.
BACKGROUND
The instant case is premised on the bare, cursory allegation that Plaintiff contracted COVID-19 while housed at Broad River Correctional Institution (“Broad River”) and was denied proper medical treatment. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6, 8.) Notably, Plaintiff does not name any officers or employees from Broad River as defendants in this action; rather, he sues China for “spraying [sic] the coronavirus around.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff also alleges in his supplemental filings that he is currently being held beyond his sentence “max-out” date. (Dkt. No. 9 at 2; see also Dkt. No. 14.) Plaintiff concludes his Complaint by seeking well over $1 Billion in damages for his purported injuries. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4, 6.)
After reviewing the Complaint, the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his action was subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Dkt. No. 18.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the undersigned gave him an opportunity to cure the deficiencies identified in the original pleading by filing an amended complaint with the Court. Instead of filing an amended complaint, Plaintiff filed a series of motions to appoint counsel, suggesting that his mental health issues and literacy level warranted legal assistance. (Dkt. Nos. 23, 24.)
Plaintiff's case was not in proper form when he initially filed the Complaint. Accordingly, the undersigned issued instructions to remedy those proper form issues-which Plaintiff substantially did-prior to reviewing the substance of the claims here. (See Dkt. No. 6.)
The undersigned ultimately denied Plaintiff's motions, finding no exceptional circumstances that would otherwise justify the appointment of counsel. (Dkt. No. 29.) The undersigned did, however, grant Plaintiff an additional opportunity to file an amended pleading and extended his deadline to do so. (Id. at 2.) The order warned Plaintiff that failure to file an amended complaint or cure the pleading deficiencies within the prescribed time period would result in summary dismissal with prejudice. (Id.) To date, Plaintiff has not filed any amended pleading or factual allegations, and the time to comply with the undersigned's order has lapsed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Amended Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). This action has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Indeed, a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In order to satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations, ” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390- 91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
As noted above, Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the spread of COVID-19 and the allegedly inadequate medical treatment he received at Broad River after contracting the virus. It is well-established that § 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). In other words, a civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). Thus, “[t]he first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.” Albright, 510 U.S. at 271; see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (explaining that to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law).
Although Plaintiff does not expressly identify which of his constitutional rights were violated in the instant case, the undersigned assumes that he intends to raise a claim under the Eighth Amendment, which protects prisoners from “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, ” including “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102- 05 (1976); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). As explained in the undersigned's proper form order (Dkt. No. 18 at 2), a plaintiff must demonstrate the following two factors to establish a claim based on inadequate medical treatment under § 1983: “objectively assessed, [the plaintiff] had a sufficiently serious medical need to require medical treatment, ” and the prison official was “subjectively aware of the need and of its seriousness” but “nevertheless acted with deliberate indifference to it by declining to secure available medical attention.” See McClain v. Fate, No. 0:15-cv-04516-MBS, 2017 WL 3725317, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 29, 2017) (citing Brice v. Va. Beach Corr. Ctr., 58 F.3d 101, 104 (4th Cir. 1995)); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
While the federal pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, ” it “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 at 678; see also Garner v. Cohen, No. 2:16-cv-561-TLW-MGB, 2016 WL 9175627, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 1, 2016), adopted, 2017 WL 2645754 (D.S.C. June 20, 2017) (finding complaint's “vague references to [pro se] Plaintiff's rights being violated, absent any specific facts or allegations against the Defendants, [were] wholly insufficient to state any sort of plausible claim”). Here, the undersigned explicitly warned Plaintiff that his case would be summarily dismissed if he did not provide some minimal level of factual support regarding his alleged medical needs and Broad River's purportedly indifferent response to the same. (See Dkt. No. 18 at 2.) In particular, the undersigned emphasized that Plaintiff must at the very least name those persons who deprived him of his constitutional right to adequate medical care while acting under color of state law. (Id. at 2- 3.) See Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting that a person acting under color of state law can be liable under § 1983 only if he or she was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff's federal rights). Because Plaintiff did not amend his Complaint to include this basic information, the undersigned finds that he has failed to state an actionable claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Moreover, Plaintiff's claim against China for “spraying” the coronavirus “around the world” is plainly frivolous. See Green v. Sumter Court, No. 3:07-cv-1570-JFA-BM, 2007 WL 2022199, at *2-3 (D.S.C. July 9, 2007) (dismissing pro se suit where allegations were “wholly insubstantial, unintelligible, and frivolous”); Holloway v. Pagan River Dockside Seafood, Inc., 669 F.3d 448, 452-53 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a complaint raising claims “so insubstantial, implausible . . . or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy”) (internal citations omitted). To be sure, absent specific statutory exceptions-none of which appear to be applicable in the instant case-China is immune from the jurisdiction of courts in the United States pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). See Smith v. Obama, No. 3:10-cv-2689-MBS-JRM, 2011 WL 2174014, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 13, 2011), adopted, 2011 WL 2162152 (D.S.C. June 2, 2011) (dismissing pro se claims against foreign nations pursuant to FSIA). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against China are likewise subject to summary dismissal.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff attempts to recover damages for being held past his max-out date, any such claim is premature. As the undersigned previously explained to Plaintiff,
to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
(See Dkt. No. 18 at 3, citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).) In addition,
when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. This is known as the “favorable termination” requirement. See Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2008).
Heck applies to the instant case because a finding for Plaintiff would necessarily imply that he has been held past the legal limit of his sentence. Plaintiff has neither alleged nor shown that the duration of his confinement has been invalidated in one of the manners prescribed by Heck. Therefore, Heck bars any claim for damages based on Plaintiff's max-out date, at least for the time being. See Cokley v. South Carolina, No. 9:12-cv-2261-MGL-BM, 2013 WL 504647, at *4-5 (D.S.C. Jan. 4, 2013), adopted, 2013 WL 504613 (D.S.C. Feb. 8, 2013) (explaining that plaintiff's claim for monetary damages based on “his alleged unlawful imprisonment beyond his correct max-out date” was premature under Heck).
Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff intended to request immediate release from custody, the undersigned notes that any such relief is unavailable under § 1983. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973) (finding that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court dismiss this action with prejudice. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (noting that where the district court has already afforded an opportunity to amend, the district court has the discretion to afford another opportunity to amend or can “dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order”). In light of the undersigned's conclusion, the Clerk of Court shall not issue the summons form or forward this matter to the United States Marshal Service for service of process at this time.
The undersigned recommends, however, that Plaintiff's claim regarding his max-out date be dismissed without prejudice . See, e.g., Russell v. Guilford Cty. Municipality, 599 Fed.Appx. 65 (4th Cir. 2015) (indicating a dismissal based on Heck should be without prejudice).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiffs attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).