Opinion
5:18-cv-1286 (GLS/TWD)
12-07-2018
JASMINE GRACE-LOUISE EDWARDS, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT SIMPSON, DANIELLE SZABO, Defendants.
APPEARANCES: JASMINE GRACE-LOUISE EDWARDS Plaintiff, pro se 505 State Street Syracuse, New York 13202
APPEARANCES: JASMINE GRACE-LOUISE EDWARDS
Plaintiff, pro se
505 State Street
Syracuse, New York 13202 THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
The Clerk has sent to the Court for initial review a complaint, together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP Application"), filed by pro se Plaintiff Jasmine Grace-Louise Edwards against Defendants Robert Simpson and Danielle Szabo, alleged to be the President and Director of Programing, respectively, of 115 West Fayette Street, Syracuse, New York. (Dkt. Nos, 1, 2.)
According to a publically available website, http://www.centerstateceo.com/about-us/staff-directory (last visited Nov. 26, 2018), Robert Simpson is the President & Chief Executive Officer of CenterState Corporation for Economic Opportunity, also known as CenterState CEO, located at 115 West Fayette Street, Syracuse, New York. Danielle Szabo is listed as the Director of Programming, Work Train. Id. CenterState CEO is registered as a domestic not-for-profit corporation. See https://www.dos.ny.gov/corps/bus_entity_search.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
I. IFP APPLICATION
A court may grant in forma pauperis status if a party "is unable to pay" the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (2006). After reviewing Plaintiff's IFP Application (Dkt. No. 2), the Court finds that Plaintiff meets this standard. Therefore, Plaintiff's IFP Application (Dkt. No. 2) is granted.
II. INITIAL SCREENING
Even when a plaintiff meets the financial criteria for in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that when a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
In determining whether an action is frivolous, the court must look to see whether the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). "An action is frivolous when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless such as when the claims are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Although extreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and the parties have had an opportunity to respond, Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983), the court still has a responsibility to determine that a claim is not frivolous before permitting a plaintiff to proceed. See, e.g., Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that a district court has the power to dismiss a complaint sua sponte if the complaint is frivolous).
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim that is "plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets forth the general rules of pleading, "does not require detailed factual allegations, . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation." Id. In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, "the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 836 (1994) (citation omitted). "[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. Similarly, allegations that "are so vague as to fail to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them" are subject to dismissal. Sheehy v. Brown, 335 F. App'x 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009).
Where a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the pleadings must be read liberally and construed to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A pro se complaint should not be dismissed "without giving leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An opportunity to amend is not required where "the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive" such that "better pleading will not cure it." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
III. COMPLAINT
The claims raised by Plaintiff in this action are difficult to discern. Plaintiff claims Danielle Szabo "neglected to inform to fellow employee the level of relatableness of being authority of her employers establishment." (Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) On December 6, 2016, Danielle Szabo "witnessed a department employee assert to Plaintiff that she would be released from Danielle Szabo's Department Organization's training on false claims." Id. at 1-2. During a December 6, 2016, meeting Danielle Szabo told Plaintiff "the claims of the employee about it being his program was false and states that she was the actual employee of the organization offering the training." Id. at 2. Danielle Szabo was a witness when Plaintiff "spoke with the director of student services of her fellow employee when it was discussed and advised that Plaintiff continue with training and receive a completion certification and to have the right to meet with potential employers for an interview." Id. Plaintiff further states Danielle Szabo "is unaware that after following the directions of the director of student services [she] was still harassed by Defendant Danielle Szabo's co-worker." Id. at 2-3.
All text quoted from Plaintiff's complaint is unaltered unless otherwise indicated.
Page references to documents identified by docket number are to the numbers assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system maintained by the Clerk's Office.
Plaintiff thus "decided to inform CenterState CEO employees of the mishaps being pertaining to the expertise of the organizations development ownership." Id. at 3. According to Plaintiff she "was seeking for Defendant Danielle Szabo and employment members to take reasonable responsibility and ownership to help determine what [she] should do as a client who was following a profession for labor." Id.
In March 2017, Danielle Szabo contacted an organization Plaintiff was "involved in stating that she and Defendant Robert Simpson wanted to inform them of [her] behavior, claiming that Plaintiff was sending in emails and letters harassing employers about a training [she] was not a selected candidate for." Id. at 3. Danielle Szabo "also mentioned that [Plaintiff's] behavior was harassing and erratic, and that it was recommended by Defendant Robert Simpson to contact JobsPlus and inform them of [her] behavior about showing up for paid training when she was not selected." Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff "reviewed her completion certificate and further noticed errors on her achievement process certificate." Id. at 4. Copies of the certificate are attached as exhibits to the complaint. Id. at 6, 8-9. She also attaches "case notes" from JobPlus, which references a telephone call received from Danielle Szabo on March 7, 2017. Id. at 6, 8-11.
The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff also attached the "case notes" as an exhibit to a complaint filed October 11, 2018, in the Northern District of New York entitled Jasmine Grace-Louise Edwards v. Conte, et. al., Dkt. No. 5:18-cv-01216 (LEK/ATB), which was dismissed on initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Plaintiff alleges "Defendant Robert Simpson unreasonable efforts to invaid [Plaintiff's] privacy violated [her] to equality." Id. Plaintiff contends "Defendants Robert Simpson and Danielle Szabo method of group libel violated federal laws." Id. Plaintiff claims Danielle Szabo's "unreasonable efforts to slander Plaintiff Jasmine Edwards equal right to education is made by false statements." Id. She alleges Danielle Szabo violated her "moral rights." Id. She argues Defendants "without justification prevented Plaintiff Jasmine Edwards with the continuance of the program, depriving Plaintiff of liberty and freedom and ownership." Id.
Plaintiff states "the bill of rights guarantees right of Plaintiff Jasmine Edwards speech content to CenterState CEO members." Id. Plaintiff "asserts to the court that group libel is prohibited, as well as defamation, false statement, invasion of privacy, deprivation by law, as disclosed by United States code of laws and federal regulation codes." Id. Plaintiff states "the relationship between [Plaintiff and Defendants] can be expressed by Plaintiff Jasmine Edwards due law, article 1 of the constitution and governed by amendments 5 and 14 as well as 10 and the 1st and 9th and statutes of the code of federal regulations and the United States code of laws." Id. Plaintiff requests a jury trial and seeks significant monetary damages, "a warrant of payment without withholding fund," "to be paid in verifiable records," and "a court order for CenterState CEO networth and assets." Id. at 6-7.
IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff brings this action for "controversy of civil rights, rule on legal matters." (Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) However, it is not clear what federal right Plaintiff claims Defendants violated. A review of her civil cover sheet states this case is based on Federal Question Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) She also claims this is a "Contract" action. Id. Plaintiff indicates in a section entitled "Cause of Action," that she is alleging "employee conduct/contract dispute." Id. Under "Brief description of cause," Plaintiff states "civil rights." Id.
To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim under § 1983, the complaint fails to state a claim. Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue a "person" who "under color of state law" deprived the plaintiff of some federally-protected right. It is the duty of the plaintiff to allege state action on the part of the defendants named in the complaint, and a court may dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) where a plaintiff fails to plead such a nexus. Profitt v. Freedman, No. 3:17-CV-0715 (LEK/DEP), 2017 WL 3835867, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2017); see also Humphrey v. Rescue Mission, No. 05-CV-0986 (FJS), 2005 WL 2437031, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2005) (collecting cases); Carollo-Gardner v. Diners Club, 628 F. Supp. 1253, 1256-57 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (dismissing as frivolous pro se complaint where plaintiff failed to allege state action on part of defendants).
Here, as is readily apparent, the only named Defendants are two private individuals. It is well settled, however, "the under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful." Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, while private actors can be liable under § 1983 pursuant to the "joint action" doctrine, under which "a private actor can be found to act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes if the private party is a willful participant in a joint action with the State or its agents," Ciambriello v. Cty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324-325 (2d Cir. 2002), Plaintiff has not alleged any joint action between the State and Defendants.
Because § 1983 liability does not extend to private actors, the Court recommends dismissing Plaintiff's § 1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See e.g., Yuan v. Tops Mkt., LLC, No. 5:10-CV-1251 (NAM/ATB), 2016 WL 164314, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2016) (dismissing § 1983 claim against private party for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Profitt v. Freedman, 2017 WL 3835867, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2017) (dismissing § 1983 action against two individuals and one corporation on initial review); Pierce v. Homecomings Financial, LLC, No. 1:17-CV-882 (BKS/CFH), 2018 WL 2187384, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2018) (same).
A review of the complaint shows that there is no other basis for federal court jurisdiction in this action. Because lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a substantive defect, Deul v. Dalton, No. 1:11-CV-0637 (GTS/RFT), 2012 WL 235523, at *8 n.19 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2012), the Court recommends dismissal without leave to amend. See, e.g., Eason v. Doe, No. 18-CV-1559 (JS)(SIL), 2018 WL 3998024, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2018) (sua sponte dismissing pro se compliant on initial review and denying leave to amend where the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against a private individual).
B. State Law Claims
A federal court may, in its discretion, exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim, but only to the extent it is accompanied by a claim over which the court has original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 ("[E]xcept [in limited circumstances], in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district court shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related[.]"). In light of the above recommendation, the Court also recommends declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims without prejudice and subject to refiling in state court. See Kolari v. New York Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 2006) (district court has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims because all claims over which the federal court has jurisdiction have been dismissed).
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP Application (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED on initial review pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) without leave to amend; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that the District Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims without prejudice and subject to refiling in state court; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation, along with a copy of the unpublished decision cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 6(a). Dated: December 7, 2018
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. 6(a)(1)(C).
Syracuse, New York
/s/_________
Thérèse Wiley Dancks
United States Magistrate Judge