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dismissing plaintiff's claim because it failed to describe the alleged discriminatory acts with any specificity beyond "generalized and conclusory allegations"
Summary of this case from Adams v. Northstar Location Services, LLCOpinion
Docket No. 99-CV-0489E(Sr)
Opinion Filed: June 19, 2000
Pro Se, Lackawanna, NY, ATTORNEYS FOR THE PLAINTIFF.
Melinda G. Disare, Esq. and Judy S. Hernandez, Esq., c/o Damon Morey Buffalo, NY, ATTORNEYS FOR THE DEFENDANT.
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action against defendant Sheehan Memorial Hospital ("Sheehan") claiming discrimination on the basis of race and sex and/or retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 ("Title VII"). Presently before the undersigned is defendant's motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCvP"). For the reasons set forth hereinbelow, such motion will be granted.
The standards which determine whether defendant's motion succeeds are well-settled. Inasmuch as a federal district court is a court of limited jurisdiction, a FRCvP 12(b)(1) motion must be granted when the authority of such court to adjudicate the particular matter is nonexistent. A motion under FRCvP 12(b)(6) must be granted when it appears beyond any doubt "that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In reviewing Sheehan's motion under FRCvP 12(b)(6), this Court accepts as true all factual allegations in the Complaint, considers all documents attached thereto or incorporated by reference and draws therefrom all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff. Cooper v. Parksky, 140 F.3d 433, 440 (2d Cir. 1998); see also FRCvP 10(c) ("A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes."). As is common to all pro se actions, plaintiff is also entitled to a far more generous reading of her pleading than would otherwise be afforded to one who is represented by an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972).
Sheehan maintains that plaintiff cannot pursue the instant matter inasmuch as it is explicitly couched as an "appeal of the decision of the EEOC [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] agreeing with the findings of the New York State Division of Human Rights" — Compl. (unpaginated attachment) — and this Court lacks the authority to review the determinations of either the Commissioner of the New York State Division of Human Rights ("the Commissioner") or the EEOC. Defendant's Mem. at 6. Insofar as the Complaint is characterized as an "appeal," the undersigned agrees. Firstly, the venue by which a plaintiff may review of the Commissioner's seek judicial determination resides "in the supreme court in the county wherein the unlawful discriminatory practice * * * occur[red]" and the jurisdiction of that court over such a proceeding is exclusive. N.Y. Exec. Law § 298. Secondly and insofar as the Complaint seeks judicial review of the EEOC's determination, Title VII grants this Court no such jurisdiction. See Georator Corp. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 592 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1979). In short, FRCvP 12(b)(1) requires dismissal of the present action because this Court is without authority to entertain plaintiff's "appeal."
While it is plain that plaintiff has mistakenly relied upon her belief that this Court possesses such appellate power, to the extent that plaintiff's Complaint can be read to fall within the ambit of Title VII, FRCvP 12(b)(1) represents no obstacle. In this sense, it is of some import that plaintiff filed her action by using a standard "Discrimination Complaint" form and with which the undersigned is familiar. This "check-the-box" complaint form — geared mainly towards pro se litigants — provides a convenient and somewhat guided avenue by which a presumably unskilled plaintiff can satisfy the minimal demands of FRCvP 8(a), use only a token amount of legalese and still properly press her claims in this forum. That said, reading only the Complaint and the sections marked therein leads to no conclusion other than that plaintiff seeks redress for certain allegedly discriminatory and unlawful acts perpetrated by defendants upon her.
Merely checking off boxes, however, does not wholly satisfy plaintiff's burden under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must still provide such facts "showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" — FRCvP 8(a)(2) — and it is here that the Complaint fails. In the Complaint and in her handwritten attachments, plaintiff never actually describes the allegedly discriminatory acts or the individuals involved. The Complaint is devoid of even any mention of pertinent dates and places. In lieu of such basic pleading, plaintiff inserts such generalized and conclusory allegations as "Sheehan Memorial Hospital and its agents subjected me to disparate treatment" and Sheehan "did conspire with [its] employees to harass me." Compl. ¶ 19. Such statements alone do not state a Title VII claim and will fail even the liberal standard of FRCvP 12(b)(6). DeJesus v. Sears, Roebuck Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1996). In short, plaintiff has not stated a prima facie discriminatory case which is actionable under Title VII — see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) — and defendant's FRCvP 12(b)(6) motion must prevail.
This Court's analysis does not, however, end with such conclusion. Tucked deep within plaintiff's unpaginated attachments is an "Inter-Office Memorandum," purportedly from the "State of New York Executive Department, Division of Human Rights," which sets forth, in some detail, what deep could be the basis for plaintiff's claim of race discrimination. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this motion, this Court declines to construe such memorandum, apparently prepared by a third party, to be the factual statement required of plaintiff by FRCvP 8(a) inasmuch as it does not comport with the conclusory "allegations" residing within her actual Complaint and lacks any reference to facts and events indicative of sex discrimination or unlawful retaliation. The presence of such a document, however, does indicate that plaintiff's claims may not be entirely baseless and for this reason this Court shall grant plaintiff thirty days from the date of the filing of this Order in which to serve and file a new pleading — an Amended Complaint — that adequately sets forth the factual basis for all her discrimination claims. Plaintiff is cautioned that a re-filing of the instant "appeal" — or no new filing whatsoever — is certain to result in dismissal without further leave to amend.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss is granted and this action is dismissed without prejudice, however, to the plaintiff's serving and filing within thirty days from the date of the filing of this Order such Amended Complaint.