Opinion
5:19-cv-0923 (BKS/TWD)
10-01-2019
JASMINE GRACE-LOUISE EDWARDS, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER MONTGOMERY, Defendant.
JASMINE GRACE-LOUISE EDWARDS, Plaintiff ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
The Clerk has sent to the Court for review a complaint, together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP Application"), filed by pro se Plaintiff Jasmine Grace-Louise Edwards ("Plaintiff" or "Edwards"). (Dkt. Nos. 1, 5.)
I. IFP APPLICATION
A court may grant in forma pauperis status if a party "is unable to pay" the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After reviewing Plaintiff's IFP Application (Dkt. No. 5), the Court finds she meets this standard. Therefore, her IFP Application is granted.
II. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT
Having found Plaintiff meets the financial criteria for commencing this action in forma pauperis, the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in her complaint must be considered in light of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Section 1915(e) directs that when a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
In determining whether an action is frivolous, the court must look to see whether the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). "An action is frivolous when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless such as when the claims are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Although extreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and the parties have had an opportunity to respond, Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983), the court still has a responsibility to determine that a claim is not frivolous before permitting a plaintiff to proceed. See, e.g., Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding a district court has the power to dismiss a complaint sua sponte if the complaint is frivolous).
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim that is "plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets forth the general rules of pleading, "does not require detailed factual allegations, . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation." Id .
In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, "the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 836 (1994) (citation omitted). "[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id . Similarly, allegations that "are so vague as to fail to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them" are subject to dismissal. Sheehy v. Brown, 335 F. App'x 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009).
Where a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the pleadings must be read liberally and construed to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Moreover, a court should not dismiss a pro se complaint "without giving leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, an opportunity to amend is not required where "the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive" such that "better pleading will not cure it." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
III. SUMMARY OF THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff brings this action for "controversies of faulty products" against Defendant Christopher Montgomery ("Defendant" or "Montgomery"). (Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff states Defendant is "a staff assistant/student personnel" at the State University of New York ("SUNY") Educational Opportunity Center ("EOC"), located in Syracuse, New York. Id. According to a publicly available website, SUNY operates EOCs across the state as a free service to adult learners who meet certain eligibility requirements. See http://www.suny.edu/features/eoc (last visited Sept. 26, 2019).
Page references to documents identified by docket number refer to the numbers assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system maintained by the Clerk's Office. Unless noted, excerpts from the record are reproduced exactly as they appear in the original and errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected.
The Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's civil rights action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, captioned Edwards v. Penix, No. 5:18-CV-1287 (DNH/ATB), filed in this District on November 2, 2018. There, Edwards alleged Montgomery and Tim Penix, Vice President of SUNY EOC at Syracuse, violated her rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution while she was enrolled in the clinical health training program in December of 2016. See Edwards v. Penix, No. 5:18-CV-1287 (DNH/ATB) (Dkt. No. 1). On July 24, 2019, the Hon. David N. Hurd, U.S. District Judge, granted the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id ., Dkt. No. 19. Judge Hurd dismissed the complaint without leave to amend because her pleadings failed to give any indication that she could state a plausible § 1983 claim against either Montgomery or Penix. Id. at 13, 15. Consequently, the District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claim that might be found in her pleading, including references to "New York Education Law" and "Public Health Law," as well as more generalized references to "emotional distress," "fraud," and "education disruption." Id . at 14. Accordingly, those claims were dismissed without prejudice to renew in an appropriate state forum. Id. Five days later, on July 29, 2019, Plaintiff commenced the present action. See Edwards v. Montgomery, No. 5:19-cv-00923 (BKS/TWD) (Dkt. No. 1).
Plaintiff attended SUNY EOC Syracuse in December of 2016. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2.) Defendant was Plaintiff's "clinical health training student personell." Id. at 2. "During training Defendant readvised the clinical health training system outlines directly towards Plaintiff stating that [her] training was not legit and that there was no one available to review [her] training after the initial acceptance into the training program." Id . Thereafter, Defendant "advised" Plaintiff that she was "released" from the "program" and "signed a completion certificate as a program coordinator on December 9, 2016." Id . However, Defendant "neglected to have [her] perform the systematic authority relationship for the outlining advised training course." Id .
On December 12, 2016, Defendant "did not refer Plaintiff as a candidate of his class to interview with potential training employers." Id. He had a "security guard remove Plaintiff from the training course and from the building." Id . at 3.
Then, in January of 2018, Plaintiff received a voicemail from Defendant "stating that employers were calling him asking why [Plaintiff] was not on the training list and he informed [Plaintiff] that she needed to stop calling his employers harassing them about training [she] was not qualified for." Id .
Plaintiff "believes that the strain Defendant caused by his accusations made tensions of emotional and mental injuries to her causing damage to the body[.]" Id . She is "seeking fault responsibility of product liability from the producings of the distribution and supplyings of the legal liability of the training course products and the causes of injuries by Defendant's forced authority." Id . "Plaintiff cannot think as clearly as she did when pursing training with the intent to become an affective graduate performing the needs of the outline criteria." Id . "Instead [she] now dwindles the trauma that if the course online were more effective with the guidelines legally the production of Plaintiff's training would have taken more effectively on the agenda of responsibilities." Id . at 4.
Plaintiff "is also suffering a personal injury from the damage of Defendant's illegible signature upon her completion certificate" and because he issued the certificate "before a completion of the full course." Id . She was "strained by Defendant by having to watch all other student receive the completion certificate the following week when the actual course allowed for student to meet protentional employers for interviews for training." Id . at 4-5. Further, her "memory has been devastated with strain." Id . at 5. According to Plaintiff:
When Defendant's actions were confronted by Plaintiff numerous times, the systematic authority of SUNY EOC Syracuse
responsibilities were initiated and the inactions of Department regulation of guidlines and policies were not in effect towards the relationship of the responsibilities of the courses products liabilities putting a strain on Plaintiff's accusations and personal injuries—mental and emotional clarity is withheld from the taken production of services of the relationship.Id . As relief, Plaintiff seeks significant monetary damages and "the right to confront the disagreement of SUNY EOC Syracuse contract obligations performances relationship production of services." Id . at 6. For a complete statement, reference is made to the complaint.
The civil cover sheet states Plaintiff is bringing this action pursuant to "federal question jurisdiction" and has checked "environmental matters" as the nature of the suit. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) Her causes of actions are listed as "human rights" and "negligence." Id .
The Court takes judicial notice of the "Civil Nature of Suit Code Descriptions." See https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/js_044_code_descriptions.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2019). "Code 893" under "Other Statutes" describes "Environmental Matters" as an action "filed under Air Pollution Control Act 42:1857-57L, Clean Air Act 42:1857:57L, Federal Environment Pesticide Control Act, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide & Rodenticide Act 7:135, Federal Water Pollution Control Act 33:1151 et seq., Land & Water Conservation Fund Act 16:4602,460 1-4, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act 42:1857F-1-8, National Environmental Policy Act 42:4321, 4331-35G, 4341-47, River & Harbor Act penalty 3:401-437, 1251." Id .
IV. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may not hear a case absent subject matter jurisdiction. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005); Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azer. Republic, 582 F.3d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 2009); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). The requirement of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002), and its absence may be raised at any time by a party or by the court sua sponte. See Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011) ("[F]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press."). When a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, dismissal is mandatory. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
The basic statutory grants of subject matter jurisdiction are embodied in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Federal question jurisdiction provides a basis for jurisdiction when the plaintiff brings a civil action that arises "under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 513 ("A plaintiff properly invokes § 1331 jurisdiction when she pleads a colorable claim 'arising under' the Constitution or laws of the United States."). Diversity jurisdiction is present when an action is between citizens of different states, and when the amount in controversy is in excess of $75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
Here, even liberally construed, the allegations in the complaint do not suggest any claims "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" and, therefore, the Court does not have federal question jurisdiction over the action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. "And, the Court knows of no legal theory that would provide relief to Plaintiff under any federal law under the circumstances alleged in the complaint." Milgros Castro v. Abhi Realty, 18-CV-7093(JS)(SIL), 2019 WL 2870065, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2109) (sua sponte dismissing the complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
While difficult to discern, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant, if any, arise under state law. See, e.g., Passero v. Schulz, No. 1:17-CV-1296 (TJM/CFH), 2018 WL 2926292, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2018) (identifying the plaintiff's negligence claim as arising under state, not federal, law), report and recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 2926295 (N.D.N.Y. June 7, 2018); Partee v. City of Syracuse, No. 5:19-CV-0417 (TJM/DEP), 2019 WL 2617901, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. May 23, 2019) (identifying the plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action as a New York common law claim), report-recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 2616954 (June 26, 2019); Butler v. Geico General Ins. Co., No. 1:18-CV-1493 (GLS/DJS), 2019 WL 330591, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2019) (stating breach of contract claim arises under state, not federal law), report and recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 652197 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2019); Banks v. Medical Society of New York, No. 14-CV-4789(JG)(VMS), 2014 WL 6788202, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2014) (identifying the plaintiff's products liability claim as a arising under state common law); Steele v. Zhejiang Hushai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., No. 19-CV-4106 (JGK), 2019 W: 2357538, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2019) (same). Thus, despite her assertions in the civil cover sheet, Plaintiff has failed to properly invoke the Court's federal question subject matter jurisdiction.
Given Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court has also considered whether this Court's diversity jurisdiction may be invoked. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. However, this case lacks complete diversity because Defendant is alleged to be a citizen of New York, the same state as Plaintiff. (See Dkt. No. 1-1.)
In light of the foregoing, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff's claims. Although courts hold pro se complaints "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980), pro se litigants still must establish subject matter jurisdiction to avoid dismissal. See, e.g., Rene v. Citibank N.A., 32 F. Supp. 2d 539, 541-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (dismissing pro se complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). Accordingly, the Court recommends dismissing Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Hollander v. Garrett, 710 F. App'x 35, 36 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding dismissal for subject matter jurisdiction must be without prejudice).
Because the Court is recommending dismissal without prejudice, Plaintiff may pursue any state law claims she may have against Defendant in state court. The Court expresses no opinion on whether Plaintiff will be able to successfully commence an action in state court.
V. LEAVE TO AMEND
Ordinarily, given Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court would recommend that she be given an opportunity to amend prior to an outright dismissal. See Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112. However, an opportunity to amend is not required where "the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive" such that "better pleading will not cure it." Id .
Because lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a substantive defect, Deul v. Dalton, No. 1:11-CV-0637, 2012 WL 235523, at *8 n.19 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2012), the Court recommends dismissal without leave to amend. See, e.g., Edwards v. Dunn, No. 5:19-cv-01118 (GTS/ATB) (Dkt. No. 4) (recommending sua sponte dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but without the opportunity for amendment); Scott v. Mullolly, Jeffery, Rooney, & Flynn LLP, No. 8:19-CV-488 (TJM/CFH), 2019 WL 1934419, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. May 1, 2019) (recommending sua sponte dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter without leave to amend), report-recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 3890995 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2019); Milgros Castro, 2019 WL 2870065, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2019) (sua sponte dismissing the complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and without leave to amend "[b]ecuase the defects in [the plaintiff's] claims are substantive and would not be cured if afforded an opportunity to amend); Banks v. Constantine, No. 12-CV-3239 (JG)(RER), 2012 WL 2803616, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2012) ("Because the defects in subject-matter jurisdiction do not appear to be curable, the complaint is dismissed without leave to amend."); see also Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Where it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.").
The Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's other action currently pending in this District captioned Edwards v. Dunn, No. 5:19-cv-01118 (GTS/ATB), filed September 10, 2019. As noted by the Hon. Andrew T. Baxter, United States Magistrate Judge, Plaintiff is a frequent litigator in federal court, whose other cases have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, some, notwithstanding the opportunity for amendment. Edwards v. Dunn, No. 5:19-CV-01118 (GTS/ATB) (Dkt. No. 4 at 9 n.3) (citing Edwards v. Simpson, No. 5:18-CV-1286 (GLS/TWD), Edwards v. Conte, No. 5:18-CV-1216 (LEK/ATB), Edwards v. Walsh, No. 5:18-CV-1155 (GLS/TWD), and Edwards v. Penix, No. 5:18-CV-1287 (DNH/ATB)).
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP Application (Dkt. No. 5) is GRANTED solely for purposes of initial review; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be SUA SPONTE DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation, along with a copy of the unpublished decision cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 6(a). Dated: October 1, 2019
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. 6(a)(1)(C).
Syracuse, New York
/s/_________
Thérèse Wiley Dancks
United States Magistrate Judge