Summary
In Edwards v. Donley, 223 Pa. Super. 71, 297 A.2d 149 (1972) (allocatur denied), the defendant stipulated to the admissibility of the plaintiff's medical bills, but objected at the close of the plaintiff's case to their introduction.
Summary of this case from Tyler v. KingOpinion
June 13, 1972.
November 16, 1972.
Evidence — Medical bills — Stipulation that bills were incurred, and right was reserved for defense counsel to question the completeness of the bills and their reasonableness — Relevancy of bills to cause of action not open to question — Mere objection to introduction of bills not exercise of right reserved by defendant to question completeness and reasonableness of bills.
1. In this action in trespass, in which it appeared that a stipulation was entered into with the approval of the court covering certain medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff, in the following terms: "It is stipulated that the bills that are about to be stated were incurred. The right is reserved for the defense counsel to question the completeness of the bills and the reasonableness of the bills;" that plaintiff's counsel placed the medical bills into evidence without proof of reasonableness or relevancy; that defense counsel made no objection at the time of such introduction of the bills; and that at the close of plaintiff's case after the medical witnesses had left the courtroom, defendant objected to the introduction of some of the bills "on the ground that the plaintiff has not proved the reasonableness and fairness of the bills, nor that they were necessary as a result of this accident"; it was Held that the stipulation entered into between the parties was valid and binding on them, and on the basis of that stipulation the court was required to admit the bills into evidence.
2. It was Held that the stipulation meant that the relevancy of the medical bills to the cause of action being tried was not left open to question but that the completeness and reasonableness of the bills were reserved for questioning by defense counsel, and that merely objecting to the introduction of the bills did not constitute an exercise by the defendant's counsel of the right so reserved.
Before WRIGHT, P.J., WATKINS, JACOBS, HOFFMAN, SPAULDING, CERCONE, and PACKEL, JJ.
Appeal, No. 102, Oct. T., 1972, from judgment of Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, Feb. T., 1970, No. 108, in case of Theodore T. Edwards v. George B. Donley. Judgment reversed.
Trespass for personal injuries. Before BROWN, J.
Verdict for plaintiff. Motion by defendant for new trial granted. Plaintiff appealed.
Daniel H. Shertzer, for appellant. Frank Edward Roda, with him Lawrence J. Ruggiano, and Roda, Morgan, Hallgren and Heinly, for appellee.
JACOBS and SPAULDING, JJ., dissented.
Argued: June 13, 1972.
Plaintiff appeals from the granting of a new trial in this case in which the jury returned a verdict in his favor in the sum of $22,500. The trial court granted a new trial on the ground that it had erred in admitting certain medical bills into evidence. We do not agree that a new trial is necessary.
See Burrel v. Philadelphia Electric Company, 438 Pa. 286 (1970); Austin v. Ridge, 435 Pa. 1, 4 (1969) (appellate review of lower court's granting of a new trial).
In the course of the trial, a stipulation was entered into between counsel for the parties with approval of the court. The colloquy relating to the stipulation is as follows: "Q. (by plaintiff's counsel) Have you had certain medical expenses as a result — THE COURT: Can't you stipulate on those? or can't you? (At this time an off the record discussion took place at the side bar.) THE COURT: It is stipulated that the bills that are about to be stated were incurred. The right is reserved for the defense counsel to question the completeness of the bills and the reasonableness of the bills. MR. SHERTZER: (plaintiff's attorney) They are doctor, hospital, allied surgical, and build-up of shoe, totaling $3,143.34." (Emphasis added)
We interpret this stipulation to mean that the relevancy of the medical bills to the cause of action being tried was not left open to question but that the completeness and reasonableness of the bills were reserved for questioning by defense counsel. In other words, by virtue of the stipulation, plaintiff was relieved of his burden of proving relevancy, reasonableness and completeness but defendant could question completeness and reasonableness.
Not only does the content of the stipulation lead to this interpretation, but the action of the parties and of the court clearly reveals such interpretation was the actual intendment of the parties. Plaintiff's counsel placed the medical bills into evidence without proof of reasonableness or relevancy. Defense counsel made no objection at the time of such introduction of the bills. It was not until the close of plaintiff's case, after plaintiff's medical witness had left the courtroom, that defendant raised his objection to the introduction of some of the medical bills "on the ground that the plaintiff has not proved the reasonableness and fairness of the bills, nor that they were necessary as a result of this accident."
In addition to a study of its content, the stipulation must be looked at in the light of the surrounding circumstances and record of the trial: Foote v. Maryland Casualty Company, 409 Pa. 307, 313 (1962); 83 C.J.S. Stipulations, § 11, p. 29.
The trial court overruled this objection and in doing so demonstrated its interpretation of the stipulation as relieving plaintiff from his duty of such proof. The trial court also announced to the jury that in accordance with the stipulation the medical bills had been incurred by plaintiff, the court again demonstrating its understanding that the parties had agreed that the medical bills were for injuries incurred by plaintiff in the accident involved in this case.
We hold the trial court properly overruled defendant's objection to the plaintiff's introduction of the medical bills and that it committed no error requiring the grant of a new trial. The stipulation entered into between the parties was valid and binding on them and on the basis of that stipulation, the court was required to admit the bills into evidence: Starner v. Wirth, 440 Pa. 177 (1970); Commonwealth ex rel. Romanowicz v. Romanowicz, 213 Pa. Super. 382 (1968); Shank Estate, 399 Pa. 656 (1960); Minner v. Pittsburgh, 363 Pa. 199 (1949).
Defendant had reserved the right "to question the completeness of the bills and the reasonableness of the bills" but merely objecting to the introduction of the bills did not constitute an exercise of the right so reserved.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed.
JACOBS and SPAULDING, JJ., dissent.