Opinion
05-19-01451-CV
06-02-2021
ISABELLE EDWARDS, Appellant v. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF COSMETIC DENTISTRY INC AND ITS GBAS FOUNDATION, Appellees
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-06298-E
Before Justices Myers, Partida-Kipness, and GarciaMEMORANDUM OPINION
DENNISE GARCIA, JUSTICE
This case arises out of Isabelle Edwards's claim that she was entitled to gratuitous, voluntary dental services from a party not named in this litigation based on her application for services in a charitable program (the "Program"). Edwards sued the American Academy of Cosmetic Dentistry Inc. and its GBAS Charitable Foundation (together, "The Foundation") in JP court after a volunteer dentist disqualified her from the Program. The JP court granted the Foundation's request for summary disposition. Edwards appealed to the County Court and the court granted the Foundation's motion for summary judgment. Edwards now appeals from that judgment.
This Court, by letter dated June 23, 2020, notified Edwards that her pro se brief did not comply with the rules of appellate procedure and ordered Edwards to file an amended brief that complied with rule 38.1. Edwards filed an amended brief but the brief does not comply with the rule. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1.
We construe liberally pro se pleadings and briefs; however, we hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978). To do otherwise would give a pro se litigant an unfair advantage over a litigant who is represented by counsel. Shull v. United Parcel Serv., 4 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied). The law is well established that, to present an issue to this Court, a party's brief shall contain, among other things, a concise, nonargumentative statement of the facts of the case, supported by record references, and a clear and concise argument for the contention made with appropriate citations to authorities and the record. Tex.R.App.P. 38.1; McIntyre v. Wilson, 50 S.W.3d 674, 682 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied). Bare assertions of error, without argument or authority, waive error. See Sullivan v. Bickel & Brewer, 943 S.W.2d 477, 486 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied); see also Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994) (appellate court has discretion to waive point of error due to inadequate briefing). When a party fails to adequately brief a complaint, she waives the issue on appeal. Devine v. Dallas County, 130 S.W.3d 512, 514 (Tex. App. -Dallas 2004, no pet.).
Edwards argues that: (i) she should have been permitted to prove breach of contract and conduct discovery, (ii) the trial court erred by conducting a hearing on her use of the indigency affidavit, (iii) there were genuine issues of material fact, and (iv) the trial judge ignored the rules of civil procedure. But Edwards fails to provide a clear and concise argument for these contentions with appropriate citations to authorities and the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1; McIntyre, 50 S.W.3d at 682. Consequently, we conclude she has waived our review of her complaints. Washington v. Bank of New York, 362 S.W.3d 853, 854 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.).
Moreover, even if Edwards's issues were not forfeited, the record reflects no reversible error. The Foundation's summary judgment argued that Edwards's application for services is not an enforceable contract. The summary judgment evidence before the court included, among other things, Edwards's application for services in the Program. One section of the application, which Edwards acknowledged with her initials, states that individuals can be disqualified from the Program for many reasons, including failing to attend an appointment, cancelling appointments, or if the volunteer dentist terminates the dentist-patient relationship for any reason. The application further provides that dental work is not guaranteed, and the volunteer dentist makes the final determinations concerning eligibility and disqualification.
Edwards did not timely respond to the motion, and when she did respond, adduced no evidence to establish breach of contract or raise any genuine issue of material fact. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); City of The Colony v. N. Tex. Mun. Water Dist., 272 S.W.3d 699, 739 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. dism'd) (essential elements of a breach of contract claim are the existence of a valid contract, performance or tendered performance, breach by the defendant and damages resulting from the breach).
Under these circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Foundation on Edwards's claims. See Reagan v. Nationsgas Partners, LLC., No. 05 -18-01085-CV, 2019 WL 3940974, at *4 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 21, 2019, pet. denied) (summary judgment proper where movant established there was no contract). Edwards's issues are overruled, and the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.
Judgment entered June 2, 2021.