Opinion
Civil No. JFM 08-564.
April 16, 2008
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Lisa Eden has filed this lawsuit against her former employer Arc Developers, Inc. ("Arc") and Arc's principal Nicole A. Halbreiner ("Halbreiner"). The complaint alleges that defendants Arc and Halbreiner violated plaintiff's rights under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., when plaintiff was fired from her job and replaced by a younger worker. Defendant Halbreiner has brought this motion to dismiss on the ground that individuals are not subject to liability for employment discrimination under the ADEA. (Def. Halbreiner's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 2.)
Halbreiner's motion is clearly meritorious under Fourth Circuit precedent. See, e.g., Jiggetts v. Sharpe, 141 Fed. App'x 162, 163 (4th Cir. 2005) ("Individuals cannot be held liable for employment discrimination under the ADEA."); Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510 — 511 (4th Cir. 1994) ("We therefore hold that the ADEA limits civil liability to the employer and that [the individual defendant] is not a proper defendant in this case."); Causey v. Balog, 929 F. Supp. 900, 905 (D. Md. 1996) (noting that Birkbeck held that an "individual supervisory employee [is] not liable as an `employer' under the ADEA").
Plaintiff argues that there is no absolute prohibition on the imposition of ADEA liability on individual defendants. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 3.) This may be true. See Birkbeck, 30 F.3d at 510 n. 1 (declining to rule that employees can never be liable and limiting the holding to "personnel decisions of a delegable character"). However, the imposition of individual liability is clearly the exception rather than the rule. Plaintiff claims unlawful termination, and the complaint includes an allegation that Halbreiner made a negative comment concerning plaintiff's age. ( See Compl. ¶ 9 (alleging that Halbreiner stated: "You can't even get up the stairs. You're just like my mother.").) These allegations do not remove plaintiff's case from the normal universe of age discrimination claims, and provide no basis for the imposition of individual liability.
The footnote in Birkbeck relied upon by plaintiff cited to Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989). Paroline was a Title VII sexual harassment case, not a discriminatory termination one. Id. at 102. The facts that may have justified individual liability in Paroline are wholly dissimilar from the facts of the instant case. See Paroline, 879 F.2d at 104 (observing that the individual defendant allegedly made sexual advances towards the plaintiff, including groping and kissing, on and off the job). Moreover, Birkbeck must be understood as holding that delegable personnel decisions — like termination and unlike sexual harassment — do not give rise to individual liability under the ADEA. Birkbeck, 30 F.3d at 510 n. 1; see also Scannell v. Bel Air Police Dep't, 968 F. Supp. 1059, 1069 (D. Md. 1997) (Davis, J.) (finding that "[p]laintiff's claims — being non-sexual at their core, and not involving any allegation of sexual touching or other grossly offensive conduct — do not involve the kind of `non-delegable' activities recognized by the cases as sufficient to support the imposition of personal liability"); Pardasani v. Rack Room Shoes, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 187, 191 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (finding that "normal personnel decisions are the type of actions" that do not give rise to individual liability under Birkbeck).
Under the ADEA, a plaintiff's remedy is against her employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) ("It shall be unlawful for an employer . . .") (emphasis added). At the very least, the Fourth Circuit has made clear that, absent extraordinary circumstances, the term "employer" does not include individual defendants. See Jiggetts, 141 Fed. App'x at 163; Birkbeck, 30 F.3d at 510 — 511. In this case, plaintiff has pled no such circumstances, and defendant Halbreiner's motion to dismiss is accordingly granted.
Plaintiff appears concerned that this motion to dismiss will dispose of her entire case. ( See Pl.'s Opp'n at 1 — 2.) It will not, as her claim against defendant Arc remains pending.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum, it is, this 16th day of April, 2008ORDERED
1. Defendant Nicole A. Halbreiner's Motion to Dismiss is granted; and
2. This action is dismissed as to Ms. Halbreiner.