Opinion
FA124040496S
07-13-2016
Miriam Edelson v. David Dubinsky
July 14, 2016, Filed
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Howard T. Owens, Judge
By memorandum dated June 13, 2016 this Court granted plaintiff's motion to modify the judgment of the Court allowing her to relocate from Fairfield, Connecticut to Katonah, New York. Plaintiff had originally sought New Rochelle but, amended her complaint to make Katonah her destination. Based on plaintiffs' claim the Court was under the impression that it would lose jurisdiction if plaintiff's motion was granted. The Court is now satisfied that its jurisdiction will not be impaired if it grants plaintiff's motion for modification.
This Court shall not decline jurisdiction because it has an interest in the subject matter and based on the turbulent history of this case this Connecticut court is in the best position to decide custody and visitation issues. The continuing jurisdiction of this case shall remain with this Court.
The Court is satisfied that considering the 30-mile relocation plan that whatever rights the defendant has with respect to jurisdiction will not be substantially interfered with or affected. Accordingly the Court finds that the relocation is in the best interest of Jake, the parties' minor child. It should be noted that since the Court has entered a prior order requiring supervised visitation the defendant has taken serious objection to the same and has not exercised supervised visitation rights.
Connecticut will not lose jurisdiction over custody and visitation unless defendant causes same to happen. In Temlock v. Temlock, 95 Conn.App. 505, 520, 898 A.2d 209 (2006), our Appellate Court reviewed a trial court's decision dismissing a motion to modify a parenting plan. It dismissed the case because it found that the children and the parents had relocated to Japan. Initially, the Court observed that " enforcement of a custody modification is made more difficult by the fact that the custodial parent does not live within the court's jurisdiction." However, it went on to hold that " the court does not lose control over custody and visitation matters concerning a minor child simply because the child does not presently reside in the state . . . Rather, [a] trial court's continuing jurisdiction over matters concerning the custody of a child is . . . dependent on those provisions encompassed within the [UCCJEA] . . ." Hurtado v. Hurtado, 14 Conn.App. 296, 303, 541 A.2d 873 (1988). Even though the children lived in Japan, the Appellate Court remanded the case for a full hearing on jurisdiction.
One of the provisions of Connecticut's version of the UCCJEA which the Court referred is Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-115l. That statute reads:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in section 46b-115n, a court of this state which has made a child custody determination pursuant to sections 46b-115k to 46b-115m, inclusive, has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until: (1) A court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child, the child's parents and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state; or (2) a court of this state determines that (A) this state is not the home state of the child, (B) a parent or a person acting as a parent continues to reside in this state but the child no longer has a significant relationship with such parent or person, and (C) substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training and personal relationships.
(b) A court of this state which has made a child custody determination but does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under section 46b-115k.
Connecticut was Jake's " home state" at the time of the parties' divorce. This court " made a child custody determination pursuant to sections 46b-115k to 46b-115m." The statute provides that Connecticut will continue to have exclusive continuing jurisdiction over custody even if Jake was permitted to relocate with his mother to Westchester and New York becomes his " home state." The only way Connecticut loses exclusive continuing jurisdiction over Jake would be if a court determines that:
Jake and each of his parents no longer are Connecticut residents or A Connecticut Court finds that Connecticut is no longer Jake's home state and Jake does not have a significant relationship with the parent who remains in Connecticut and evidence of Jake's child's care, protection, training and personal relationships are move available in a jurisdiction other than in Connecticut.
Connecticut shall retain exclusive continuing jurisdiction over custody and visitation issues. Connecticut can lose jurisdiction only through defendant's intentional conduct. Defendant would have to consciously choose to move out of Connecticut or he would have to consciously destroy his relationship with his son. Defendant's conduct will guarantee that any future custody or visitation issues regarding his son will be heard in Connecticut.
In Lamptey-Mills v. Ward, FA 01 0726826, the court relied on section 46b-115l in denying a motion to dismiss even though the mother of the two children born in Connecticut had been deported to Ghana and the father had moved with the children to Maryland and lived there for two years before the hearing. In McNamara v. McNamara, TTD FA97-00647, the court held that it retained jurisdiction even though the mother and children had relocated to Michigan because the father continued to live in Connecticut and the mother had not proven that there was no relationship between the father and his children.
Connecticut courts have maintained jurisdiction over custody matters when children have moved from across the country to the other side of the world. Plaintiff wishes to move 30 miles and take her son with her. Her reasons for moving are compelling and the evidence presented at the hearing on this matter clearly satisfy Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-56d.