Summary
recognizing that a post-conviction relief applicant "is entitled to a hearing on the application of the statute of limitations if there are any material factual issues"
Summary of this case from Stansberry v. StateOpinion
Court of Appeals No. A-10651.
August 10, 2011.
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Michael Spaan, Judge, Trial Court No. 3AN-08-6203 CI.
David E. George, Attorney at Law, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Diane L. Wendlandt, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and John J. Burns, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Bolger, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Alexander Eckhardt was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced on November 1, 2005. On March 20, 2008, Eckhardt filed an application for post-conviction relief.
The State filed a motion to dismiss the application, arguing that it was filed after the statute of limitations had run. In response, Eckhardt argued that the statute of limitations was tolled because he had "suffered from . . . a mental disease or defect that precluded the timely assertion of the claim.""
See AS 12.72.020(a)(3).
See AS 12.72.020(b)(1)(A).
In support of his response, Eckhardt filed an opinion letter from a psychologist, Dr. Alfred Collins. Dr. Collins had reviewed psychological reports prepared by two mental health professionals, mental health records from the Department of Corrections, and log notes from Eckhardt's sentencing hearing. From these records, Dr. Collins concluded that Eckhardt would have been unable to make a reasoned decision about filing an application for post-conviction relief.
Superior Court Judge Michael Spaan scheduled a hearing "to afford Eckhardt an opportunity to put on evidence to support his assertions that he was suffering from a mental illness that precluded him from filing [an application] for post-conviction relief." But Eckhardt chose not to submit any additional evidence, relying solely on the opinion letter from Dr. Collins.
Judge Spaan granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Dr. Collins's letter did not establish that a mental disease or defect had precluded Eckhardt from filing a timely application.
In this appeal, Eckhardt argues that Judge Spaan applied the wrong burden of proof. Eckhardt contends that the judge should have denied the motion if more than a "scintilla of evidence" supported his claim that the statute of limitations was tolled by his mental illness. In response, the State argues that the post-conviction statute required Eckhardt to prove his claim by "clear and convincing evidence." We review de novo the lower court's decision on the proper burden of proof.
Cikan v. ARCO Alaska, Inc., 125 P.3d 335, 339 (Alaska 2005) (quoting Meyer v. State, Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div., 994 P.2d 365, 368 (Alaska 1999)).
AS 12.72.040.
Harris v. Ahtna, Inc., 193 P.3d 300, 305 (Alaska 2008).
It appears that Eckhardt has confused the burden required to earn an evidentiary hearing with the burden required to win such a hearing. He correctly points out that a civil plaintiff is entitled to a hearing on the application of the statute of limitations if there are any material factual issues. The same standard applies when a trial judge reviews a motion for summary disposition in a post-conviction case.
See Cikan, 125 P.3d at 339.
Alaska R. Crim. P. 35.1(f)(3); Lindeman v. State, 244 P.3d 1151, 1154 (Alaska App. 2011) (indicating that the court may grant summary disposition if "there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" (quoting Alaska R. Crim. P. 35.1(c)(3))).
But after a trial judge concludes that there are factual issues precluding summary judgment on the statute of limitations, the court may resolve such issues "at a preliminary hearing in advance of trial." This procedure is appropriate for a post-conviction application because the post-conviction statute requires the court to determine that the application is timely before considering the applicant's substantive claims. At an evidentiary hearing on the statute of limitations, the trial judge uses the same procedure that the court would use to resolve such issues at trial.
See Williams v. Williams, 129 P.3d 428, 431 (Alaska 2006).
AS 12.72.020(d)(1).
See generally Williams, 129 P.3d at 431 (reviewing trial court findings on statute of limitations issues under the clearly erroneous standard).
As noted above, the State argues that the post-conviction statute requires an applicant to "prove all factual assertions by clear and convincing evidence." We have not previously considered whether this burden applies to a claim for relief from the statute of limitations. But Judge Spaan ruled that Eckhardt had not proven his claim, even if the burden of proof was only a preponderance of evidence. We are not aware of any lower burden that could apply to this claim. Thus Eckhardt has not established that he suffered any prejudice by the judge's application of the burden of proof.
AS 12.72.040.
We therefore AFFIRM the superior court's order dismissing the application for post-conviction relief.