Opinion
C. A. 3:22-3884-MGL-PJG
11-22-2022
Anthony S. Ebersole, Plaintiff, v. Lex Co Public Defenders Office et al; Lex Co Solicitors Office et al; Lex Co Sheriffs Dept et al; Scott L. Zylstra; R. F. Barrett; R.J. Wood, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Anthony S. Ebersole, a self-represented state pretrial detainee, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that it should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
I. Procedural Background
Plaintiff is a state pretrial detainee in the Lexington County Detention Center. Plaintiff brings this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages and injunctive relief arising out of his June 2022 arrest in Lexington County for assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature. Police reports Plaintiff attached to the Complaint show that Plaintiff was arrested because the victim and witnesses reported that Plaintiff held a knife to the victim's throat, causing a superficial cut, and threatened the victim. (Compl., ECF No. 1-2 at 1-11.) Plaintiff alleges the purported victim of the crime does not want to press charges and will not testify against him. Expressly raising claims of cruel and unusual punishment, unlawful arrest and imprisonment, and discrimination, Plaintiff seeks damages for his detention and asks to be released. Plaintiff names as defendants a detective, an investigator, and a supervisor from the Lexington County Sheriff's Department, but he does not make any specific allegations about those individual defendants. Plaintiff also names as defendants the Lexington County Sheriff's Department, the Lexington County Public Defender's Office, and the Lexington County Solicitor's Office.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), including 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2009). Section 1915A requires, and § 1915 allows, a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “ ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.' ” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Initially, the court notes that Plaintiff's Complaint does not clearly state which claims are raised against each defendant, and the claims against each defendant are not apparent from the face of the Complaint. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 (requiring that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”'); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it requires more than a plain accusation that the defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff, devoid of factual support). For instance, Plaintiff expressly raises claims of cruel and unusual punishment and discrimination, but he provides no allegations about any of the defendants that would indicate that he has been punished or discriminated against by them. Therefore, the Complaint is generally subject to summary dismissal for failing to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. See North Carolina v. McGuirt, 114 Fed.Appx. 555, 558 (4th Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal of a complaint under Rule 8 where “the complaint . . . does not permit the defendants to figure out what legally sufficient claim the plaintiffs are making and against whom they are making it”). However, even liberally construing the Complaint to assign certain causes of action against the defendants, the case is still subject to summary dismissal for the following reasons.
1. Individual Defendants
Plaintiff names the following individuals from the Lexington County Sheriff's Department as defendants: Scott L. Zylstra, a detective; R.F. Barrett, an investigator; and R.J. Wood, a supervisor. But Plaintiff provides no allegations about these defendants that would explain how they were involved in his arrest. Therefore the defendants are subject to summary dismissal on that basis alone. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. But even liberally construing the Complaint as asserting that these defendants arrested Plaintiff unlawfully, Plaintiff still fails to state a § 1983 claim upon which relief can be granted against them.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government and requires warrants be issued only upon a finding of probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV. To establish a § 1983 claim for false arrest or imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff must show the seizure of his person was unreasonable, i.e., he must show he was arrested without probable cause. See Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that claims for false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”); see also Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff must show he was arrested without probable cause).
A law enforcement officer has probable cause to effect a warrantless arrest where the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest would cause a reasonable officer to believe that a criminal offense has been committed. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152-53 (2004); Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 2017). Probable cause inquiries turn on two factors: the suspect's conduct as known to the officer, and the contours of the offense thought to be committed by that conduct. Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 1992). Probable cause requires more than bare suspicion, but it requires less than evidence necessary to convict. Munday, 848 F.3d at 253.
Here, Plaintiff claims he was arrested unlawfully because the purported victim of the crime does not want to press charges and will not testify against him. However, the victim's refusal to press charges or testify against Plaintiff after his arrest does not change what the officers knew at the time of Plaintiff's arrest-that the victim and witnesses observed Plaintiff hold a knife to the victim's throat and threaten the victim. The victim's lack of cooperation alone does not vitiate probable cause. See, e.g., Hemenway v. One Unknown Officer of Min. Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 924 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding officers did not lack probable cause to make an arrest just because the victim refused to press charges and was afraid to testify in court). Therefore, despite the victim's post-arrest refusal to cooperate with law enforcement, the officers at the time of the arrest had reason to believe that Plaintiff had committed a crime. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a false arrest or imprisonment claim upon which relief can be granted against the individual defendants.
2. Other Defendants
Plaintiff also names the Lexington County Sheriff's Department, the Lexington County Public Defender's Office, and the Lexington County Solicitor's Office as defendants. It is well-settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law; therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (noting that for purposes of § 1983 a “person” includes individuals and “bodies politic and corporate”). The use of the term “staff,” “department,” or the equivalent as a name for alleged defendants, is not adequate to state a claim against a “person” as required in § 1983 actions. See, e.g., Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The medical department of a prison may not be sued, because it is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.”); Shadoan v. Florence Cnty. Det. Ctr. Med. Dep't, No. 8:12-cv-2908 DCN JDA, 2013 WL 6408347, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 6, 2013) (collecting cases). Even liberally construing the Complaint as naming the Lexington County Sheriff as a defendant, the sheriff is also not a “person” amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983 because the sheriff is an arm of the state government. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67-68, 71 (1989) (holding that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983, and finding Congress did not intend to override the State's sovereign immunity by enacting the statute); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-31 (1991); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 48283 (4th Cir. 2005); Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F.Supp. 947, 954-55 (D.S.C. 1988) (concluding that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are agents of the state and cannot be sued in their official capacities), aff'd, 878 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 1989) (table). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim upon which relief can be granted against these defendants.
3. Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff also appears to seek injunctive relief in this case because he asks the court to order that he be released from jail. However, such relief is not available in a § 1983 action. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (stating § 1983 is not the proper vehicle to challenge the validity or duration of confinement). Nor should the court construe this matter as seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Dickerson v. State of La., 816 F.2d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 1987) (providing that, generally, a federal habeas corpus action cannot be used to dismiss an indictment or prevent a prosecution). Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff asks this court to equitably interfere in his state criminal prosecution, the court must abstain. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (stating that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court recommends that this case be dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
If this recommendation is adopted, this action will constitute a “strike” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), based on Plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (“In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”); see also Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez 140 S.Ct. 1721 (2020) (three strikes rule applies to dismissals without prejudice)
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).