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Dyson v. Superintendent, S.C.I.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
Sep 13, 2004
Civil Action No. 03-4944 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 13, 2004)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 03-4944.

September 13, 2004


ORDER


AND NOW, this ____ day of September, 2004, upon consideration of petitioner's Application to Toll the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's ("AEDPA") Time Limitation Period for Filing Federal Habeas Corpus, it is hereby ORDERED that petitioner's motion is GRANTED.

On March 10, 1993, petitioner plead guilty before the Honorable Isaac S. Garb of the Court of Common Pleas, to the charges of murder in the first degree and robbery. Petitioner was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment on June 24, 1993. A direct appeal was not filed. On July 6, 1994, the defendant filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), requesting reinstatement of his direct appeal rights. On April 20, 2001, petitioner's direct appeal rights were reinstated. A direct appeal followed. On October 12, 2001, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the sentence imposed. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied petitioner's Allowance for an Appeal on June 12, 2002. Petitioner's conviction became final on or about September 12, 2002 when his deadline to file for U.S. Supreme Court review expired.

On August 12, 2003, petitioner filed an application forhabeas relief alleging multiple grounds for his claim that he was denied effective assistance. Petitioner's application is still pending in state court. Currently pending is petitioner's September 9, 2003 motion requesting that the AEDPA's time limitation period for filing for habeas corpus relief in federal court be tolled. The clerk's record does not show that petitioner filed an application in this court for federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on applications for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), the statute of limitations begins to run from "the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." Id. Section 2244(d)(2) of the AEDPA authorizes the statutory tolling of the one-year period of limitations: The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending should not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

"[A] properly filed application is one submitted according to the state's procedural requirements, such as the rules governing the time and place of filing. A Pennsylvania PCRA petitioner, for instance, must file a motion with the clerk of the court in which he was convicted and sentenced, Pa. R. Crim. P. 1501, generally within one year of the date the judgment becomes final. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9545(b)(1)." Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 148 (3d Cir 1998).

Petitioner filed his petition for habeas relief on August 12, 2003, thirty days prior to expiration of AEDPA's one-limitations period expired. Because this petition was filed in accordance with Pennsylvania's procedural requirements, it is considered a "properly filed application" for post-conviction relief, thereby tolling the one (1) year limitation period.


Summaries of

Dyson v. Superintendent, S.C.I.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
Sep 13, 2004
Civil Action No. 03-4944 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 13, 2004)
Case details for

Dyson v. Superintendent, S.C.I.

Case Details

Full title:JOSEPH DYSON v. SUPERINTENDENT, S.C.I. — Dallas, et. al

Court:United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

Date published: Sep 13, 2004

Citations

Civil Action No. 03-4944 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 13, 2004)

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