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Dybalski v. Cortright Family Irrevocable Trust Dated July 12, 2007

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.
Nov 10, 2022
210 A.D.3d 1415 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022)

Opinion

725 CA 21-00893

11-10-2022

Christy Lee DYBALSKI, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. The CORTRIGHT FAMILY IRREVOCABLE TRUST DATED JULY 12, 2007, Judith Varga, Individually and as Trustee of the Cortright Family Irrevocable Trust Dated July 12, 2007, Roger Brown, Dianne Brown, Defendants-Appellants, et al., Defendants.

LIPPES MATHIAS LLP, BUFFALO (THOMAS J. GAFFNEY OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. LAW OFFICE OF RALPH C. LORIGO, WEST SENECA (FRANK J. JACOBSON OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.


LIPPES MATHIAS LLP, BUFFALO (THOMAS J. GAFFNEY OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

LAW OFFICE OF RALPH C. LORIGO, WEST SENECA (FRANK J. JACOBSON OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.

PRESENT: PERADOTTO, J.P., LINDLEY, CURRAN, WINSLOW, AND BANNISTER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: In this action seeking, inter alia, a judgment declaring the beneficial interests in The Cortright Family Irrevocable Trust dated July 12, 2007 (Trust), defendants-appellants (defendants) appeal from an order denying their motion to dismiss the complaint against them pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1). We affirm.

Contrary to defendants’ contention, we conclude that Supreme Court properly denied the motion. On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the court must "liberally construe the complaint ..., and accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and any submissions in opposition to the dismissal motion ... [The court must] also accord plaintiff[ ] the benefit of every possible inference ... Dismissal under CPLR 3211 (a) (1) is warranted only if the documentary evidence submitted conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law" ( 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co. , 98 N.Y.2d 144, 152, 746 N.Y.S.2d 131, 773 N.E.2d 496 [2002] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint against them on the grounds that plaintiff violated the in terrorem clause of the Trust Agreement, thereby forfeiting her interest in the Trust property, and that plaintiff's claims are defeated by Section 3.06 of the Trust Agreement. Although "in terrorem clauses are enforceable, they are not favored and [must be] strictly construed" ( Matter of Singer , 13 N.Y.3d 447, 451, 892 N.Y.S.2d 836, 920 N.E.2d 943 [2009], rearg denied 14 N.Y.3d 795, 899 N.Y.S.2d 127, 925 N.E.2d 930 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Neva M. Strom Irrevocable Trust III , 203 A.D.3d 1255, 1256, 164 N.Y.S.3d 293 [3d Dept. 2022] ). "The paramount consideration in construing these types of clauses is to effectuate the intent of the decedent[s] or grantor[s] and the purpose of the trust" ( Neva M. Strom Irrevocable Trust III , 203 A.D.3d at 1256, 164 N.Y.S.3d 293 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Singer , 13 N.Y.3d at 451, 892 N.Y.S.2d 836, 920 N.E.2d 943 ). "[T]he trust instrument is to be construed as written and the [settlors’] intention determined solely from the unambiguous language of the instrument itself" ( Golden Gate Yacht Club v. Société Nautique de Genève , 12 N.Y.3d 248, 255, 879 N.Y.S.2d 363, 907 N.E.2d 276 [2009] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Massey-Hughes v. Massey , 200 A.D.3d 1684, 1686, 161 N.Y.S.3d 589 [4th Dept. 2021] ). Here, defendants have not established that plaintiff violated the in terrorem clause of the Trust Agreement, because, contrary to defendants’ contention, "plaintiff's action does not assert any interest in the [T]rust other than provided by the express terms thereof and does not contest, dispute, or call into question the validity of the [T]rust [A]greement" ( Boles v. Lanham , 55 A.D.3d 647, 647, 865 N.Y.S.2d 360 [2d Dept. 2008] ). To the contrary, plaintiff's action seeks enforcement of paragraph one of Section 3.06 of the Trust Agreement, which limits the grantors’ "power to appoint all or any portion of the principal and undistributed income" to the grantors’ lineal descendants alone. We reject defendants’ contrary interpretation of Section 3.06 (see generally Cece & Co. Ltd. v. U.S. Bank N.A. , 153 A.D.3d 275, 281, 60 N.Y.S.3d 5 [1st Dept. 2017] ). We conclude that defendants failed to conclusively establish that the language of the Trust Agreement was a complete defense to plaintiff's claims as a matter of law.


Summaries of

Dybalski v. Cortright Family Irrevocable Trust Dated July 12, 2007

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.
Nov 10, 2022
210 A.D.3d 1415 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022)
Case details for

Dybalski v. Cortright Family Irrevocable Trust Dated July 12, 2007

Case Details

Full title:Christy Lee DYBALSKI, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. The CORTRIGHT FAMILY…

Court:Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Date published: Nov 10, 2022

Citations

210 A.D.3d 1415 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022)
210 A.D.3d 1415

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