Opinion
A152665
12-28-2017
In re A.Y., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D.Y., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Respondent; CONTRA COSTA CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU, Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J1700030)
D.Y. (Mother), mother of 11-month-old A.Y., seeks review by extraordinary writ, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, of the juvenile court's orders terminating her reunification services and setting the matter for a permanency planning hearing, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends the court erred when it terminated her reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing, pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (e), and further contends the court erred when it reduced her visitation pending the section 366.26 hearing. We shall deny the petition for extraordinary writ.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 9, 2017, the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (Bureau) filed an original petition alleging that then one-week-old A.Y. came within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The petition alleged that Mother had a chronic substance abuse problem that significantly impaired her ability to provide adequate care for A.Y. Specifically, the petition alleged that Mother had used methamphetamine during her pregnancy, most recently in December 2016, and A.Y. had tested positive for methamphetamine at the time of her birth. The petition further alleged that another child of Mother had tested positive for methamphetamine at birth and was now in the custody of that child's father.
In the detention/jurisdiction report filed on January 10, 2017, the social worker reported that she had spoken to the social worker in Mother's prior case, who warned that Mother had tried to alter drug tests of her son by diluting his diaper with water, and further warned that Mother "had very little follow-through and was often not truthful about her actions."
The social worker in the present case also reported that Mother admitted to smoking marijuana, but said she had last used methamphetamine in 2015. Later that same day, after the social worker reported concerns about A.Y potentially testing positive for methamphetamine, Mother reported that she had been struggling with a methamphetamine addiction for two years and had last used methamphetamine a month earlier.
Following the January 10, 2017 detention hearing, the court ordered A.Y. detained and placed her in the custody of the presumed father (Father).
On February 1, 2017, the court ordered A.Y. detained from Father due to his testing positive for drugs.
On February 17, 2017, the Bureau filed an amended petition, which added allegations against Father, specifically that he tested positive for methamphetamine at court on February 1, he left A.Y. at court to purchase urine for his drug test, and he had failed to protect A.Y. from Mother's substance abuse.
On March 1, 2017, both parents pleaded no contest to an amended petition containing allegations that they each had a chronic substance abuse problem, which significantly impaired their ability to provide adequate care for A.Y.
In a disposition report filed on March 23, 2017, the social worker reported that Mother had admitted that she had a history of using marijuana for 11 years and methamphetamine for 6 years, and that she and Father had used methamphetamine together until she found out she was pregnant. Although she and Father agreed to stop using at that point, she continued to use until the end of her pregnancy. On January 11, shortly after A.Y. was detained, Mother had entered an inpatient drug treatment program, and she had been clean and sober since then. Her counselor reported that she participated in groups and was supportive of other women in the program during her prior dependency. The counselor believed that Mother was "digging deep into the work" this time around compared to when she was previously in the program. In addition to twice weekly relapse prevention groups, Mother was participating in weekly therapy and weekly anger management, domestic violence, and parenting classes. She had tested negative for drugs on six occasions in February and March 2017. She was expected to complete the inpatient program on April 11.
Father had admitted to the social worker that he had been abusing drugs for 14 years. He also stated that he and Mother hid their drug use from each other during Mother's pregnancy with A.Y. The Bureau was encouraging him to enter a residential drug treatment program.
A.Y., who was healthy and appeared to be developmentally on target, had been placed with the maternal grandfather's fiancée on February 17, 2017. Both parents participated in weekly supervised visitation with A.Y., and neither one had missed a visit.
The Bureau recommended that reunification services be offered to both parents. The recommended service objectives for Mother included showing her ability and willingness to have custody of her child; obtaining resources to meet the needs of her child and to provide a safe home; complying with all court orders; maintaining a relationship with her child by following the conditions of the visitation plan; staying drug free and showing her ability to live free from drug dependency, including complying with all required drug tests; cooperating with the social worker; being nurturing and supportive during visits with her child; and showing that she accepted responsibility for her actions. Mother's client responsibilities included successful completion of a mental health assessment and individual counseling, with "a positive evaluation from [the] therapist that [Mother] understands the factors contributing to this dependency, has successfully addressed those issues and the child is not at risk at this time." Her responsibilities also included completion of a parenting education program, completion of an inpatient substance abuse treatment program, completion of an outpatient treatment program, participation in random substance abuse testing with all tests being negative for six months, and participation in two to three 12 step program meetings a week.
At the March 23, 2017 disposition hearing, Mother submitted on the disposition recommendations while Father requested a paternity test and a contested hearing. At the June 1 hearing requested by Father, he was found to be the biological father of A.Y. as a result of genetic testing and he submitted to the recommendation of inpatient drug treatment.
In an August 17, 2017 status review report, the social worker reported that Mother had completed her inpatient drug treatment program on April 11, and had moved into sober living housing. She had also entered an outpatient program, in which she remained until she began a fulltime job as a customer service representative in late May. Mother had excelled in drug treatment and had been clean and sober for seven months. Mother had participated in 11 therapy sessions during her inpatient treatment program, which ended when she completed that program. She had an initial appointment with a new therapist at Kaiser Permanente scheduled for August 31.
Mother's weekly visits with A.Y. had progressed to overnight weekend visits at her sober living housing. A.Y. was healthy and developmentally on target. She continued to reside with the maternal grandfather's fiancée, who was committed to caring for her.
A.Y.'s caregiver had expressed concerns about Mother's ability to be truthful. As an example, she reported that Mother had told the maternal grandfather that she currently had her driver's license. When asked to show proof, because the maternal grandfather intended to provide Mother with a vehicle, Mother allegedly texted a photograph of what appeared to be a falsified license. Also of concern, Father had informed the social worker that Mother was drinking and had brought A.Y. to his house three times on weekends during her unsupervised visitation. After receiving this information, Mother's overnight visits with A.Y. were cancelled and her visitation again became supervised. Father subsequently told the social worker that he had lied about Mother and sent the social worker several angry text messages accusing her of lying and trying to keep Mother away from A.Y. The social worker had also received several anonymous reports about Mother's ability to be honest, which concerned the Bureau.
The social worker reported that Father had not participated in his reunification services and admitted that he continued to use drugs. There were concerns about Mother's ability to keep A.Y. away from Father. Although she had consistently told the social worker that she had done no more than occasionally text Father, the social worker had received an anonymous report that Mother and Father were seen riding in a car together. On August 3, 2017, Mother again denied ever taking A.Y. near Father during unsupervised visits, but later said that she and her uncle had given Father a ride after he requested one. The social worker subsequently learned that Mother did not have an uncle. In early August, Mother also forwarded the social worker several text messages from Father, in which he used abusive language. The next day, the social worker met with Mother, and when asked if she had taken A.Y. to see Father during any of her unsupervised visits, Mother responded, " 'no, hell no. . . . I would never do that, and I want nothing to do with him.' " Mother eventually admitted that Father had once picked her, A.Y., and a friend up from a 12 step meeting and taken them to their home. Mother also told the social worker for the first time that Father had harassed her for several years and she was thinking of filing a restraining order against him. Because this was a new issue, the Bureau was considering adding a domestic violence component to Mother's case plan.
The social worker did not believe A.Y. could be safely returned to either parent. Father admitted that he was still using drugs, and the social worker had received information that several individuals were living in Father's home and were also using drugs. Mother had made significant progress with respect to her drug dependency, but had not shown that she could be truthful regarding interactions with Father, and had defied court orders intended to keep A.Y. safe. The Bureau was concerned about Mother's ability to remove herself from Father, his dangerous living environment, and his lifestyle related to drug abuse. The Bureau recommended that Mother be offered an additional six months of reunification services, but that Father's reunification services be terminated.
At the August 17, 2017 review hearing, the court continued the matter for a contested hearing and ordered no further overnight visits for Mother pending that hearing.
In an October 3, 2017 memorandum, the social worker advised the court that it had changed its recommendation for Mother and now recommended that her reunification services be terminated. The social worker reported that Mother had taken A.Y. to see Father, who had admitted that he was still using methamphetamine, and she had repeatedly lied to the social worker about doing so. Mother had finally admitted to taking A.Y. to see Father once, but continued to deny all other contact, despite evidence to the contrary. The social worker had received additional information about instances of Mother's lying, including reports that she was a " 'pathological liar' and often makes up stories and fabricates things just because she can." Although Mother was addressing her substance abuse issues, the Bureau believed that her inability to be honest continued to place A.Y. at great risk and that Mother did "not possess the capacity to protect the child and keep her away from harm."
In one example of Mother's failure to be truthful, she told A.Y.'s caregiver that if Mother did not get the child back, the caregiver would not get to keep her, and the previous foster parents would adopt A.Y.
At the October 6, 2017 contested review hearing, Social Worker Sacha Jacobs testified that Mother had completed her inpatient and outpatient drug treatment programs and continued to live in a sober living environment and to attend weekly support meetings. She also continued to participate in random drug testing, with no positive tests; 12 step meetings; and a domestic violence program. She had completed a parenting program. Mother had also obtained a permanent restraining order against Father after the last review hearing. Mother was supposed to continue with individual therapy after she completed her inpatient treatment program and an appointment had been scheduled in August, but Mother had not attended that appointment. Mother also had not completed a psychological assessment and the social worker did not believe she was participating in individual therapy at present. Mother had been employed in a call center fulltime since May and had received a certificate as employee of the month. She had also regularly visited with A.Y., who was now 10 months old, and the visits went well. Mother was attentive and she and A.Y. appeared to enjoy each other's company.
Mother had initially denied taking A.Y. around Father. She eventually admitted doing so on one occasion, when she called him to ask for a ride home from a 12 step meeting in late July or early August. She promised that it was only one time and she would not do so again. Jacobs was subsequently able to verify that Mother had brought A.Y. to the paternal grandfather's home while Father was there, which Mother had not admitted. Mother had told Jacobs that Father tried to contact her since she had gotten the restraining order and she had called the police.
Jacobs believed Mother had made partial progress on her case plan. She had made progress on her addiction, but her shortcomings included her lack of honesty and lack of full insight, which were necessary to keep A.Y. safe. Jacobs had been concerned about Mother's honesty since the initial jurisdiction report, when a social worker in her prior case had noted that Mother had tried to alter drug tests, including by diluting her baby's diaper with water, and warned that Mother was often not truthful about her actions.
In the present case, when Jacobs talked to Mother about reports that she and Father had been seen together, Mother said she had been in the car with her uncle, who stopped to give Father a ride. Jacobs later learned that Mother did not have an uncle, which was a concern, as was the fact that Mother was with Father while he was actively using methamphetamine and she was in recovery. Jacobs had also received reports that Mother had falsified an identification card to make it appear to be a driver's license. She had sent a copy of the fake license to A.Y.'s caregiver because the maternal grandfather was planning to give her a car, but had asked to see her driver's license first. When Jacobs asked Mother about the license, she denied that it was false.
A copy of the alleged driver's license was admitted into evidence and Jacobs described the ways in which it appeared to be a fake license.
Mother had acknowledged that she relapsed in her prior dependency case after completing inpatient drug treatment, but she believed her recovery this time was different because she believed in a higher power that was not Father and because Father was not going to be in the picture. It was very concerning to Jacobs that after leaving inpatient treatment, Mother, together with A.Y., had continued to spend time with Father, who was "entrenched in addiction." Even though Mother had recently obtained a restraining order against Father, Jacobs was not confident that Mother was not still in a relationship with him.
At the conclusion of Jacobs's testimony, Mother's counsel argued that Mother had complied with and made substantial progress in all services except for the issue that came up regarding her allowing Father to see A.Y. Counsel believed that Mother's relationship with Father was "the only piece really of the puzzle that's missing. If we can address the issue of domestic violence and Mother knowing how to get out of the relationship that she's in with [Father], then all of the other elements of the case plan are complete. . . . She's in a place where the child could safely be placed with her if we can take care of the issue with Father, and that's what needs to be addressed. And we believe that if the court would grant additional services for that part of the case, then Mother can successfully reunify with this child."
A.Y.'s counsel responded that she had been optimistic that Mother would be able to reunify with A.Y. when she completed her inpatient drug treatment program, but that "all of the choice's she's made since then have been a huge disappointment, and it's not fair to A.Y. to be put in that situation where Mother's done a program yet she's going to expose that little girl to people who are entrenched in addiction to meth, which is her drug of choice. So I think the argument fails that all we have left is the domestic violence component to kind of complete and fix, and that [the restraining order] was only filed once this contest date was set. It was kind of that last-ditch thing . . . . But during all of that other time after [inpatient treatment] she was fine exposing A.Y. to Father, who was using meth at that time. I don't know how to overcome that hurdle. More time is not going to solve that problem. I wouldn't even know what to begin to ask her to do to satisfy all of us that A.Y. would be protected." A.Y.'s counsel therefore joined the Bureau in asking the court to terminate Mother's reunification services.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated that it had to make a "tough" decision because Mother had "complied with her case plan as it was written." The court continued, however: "The fact that she . . . brought the child over to [Father] who is using and, obviously, by his emails [sic] is a violent kind of guy, pretty . . . explosive and it didn't bother her before, she could bring him [sic] over. . . . [¶] But I'm kind of in a quagmire here. Do I, just because Mother is a . . . pathological liar, I find her an absolute liar, I think what Father wrote that she's deceptive and manipulative, I think is absolutely true. . . . I would think I would have a hard time believing anything else she tells the court, and yet she is doing her program and she is remaining clean and I don't know that anybody ordered her not to go see him."
After counsel for the Bureau observed that the court had ordered supervised visits for father, the court stated that it was "trying to determine whether lying is enough to say that she shouldn't get services. [¶] I guess I have to come down to what Minor's attorney said, that she's lying about the times she's exposing her child intentionally to danger; and she knows what this guy is like, she knows he's still using, she knows he has supervised visits, and I guess I would never trust her not to keep doing that in another way or form even if I give her more time."
The court therefore terminated both parents' reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.
On October 11, 2017, Mother filed a notice of intent to file writ petition.
DISCUSSION
I. Termination of Mother's Reunification Services
Mother contends the court erred when it terminated her reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing, pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (e).
Court-ordered services for children under age three on the date of initial removal are presumptively limited to six months from when the child entered foster care. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B); M.V. v. Superior Court (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 166, 175-176 (M.V.).) This is because the " ' "unique developmental needs of infants and toddlers" ' [citation] justifies a greater emphasis on establishing permanency and stability earlier in the dependency process ' "in cases with a poor prognosis for family reunification." ' [Citation.]" (M.V., at p. 176; accord, Fabian L. v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1027.)
At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court must order the return of the child to his or her parent unless it finds that doing so "would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child." (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1).) A parent's failure "to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental." (Ibid.) If the child was under age three on the date of the initial removal "and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan, the court may schedule a hearing pursuant to Section 366.26 within 120 days." (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(3).) If, however, the court finds there is a substantial probability that the child "may be returned to his or her parent . . . within six months or that reasonable services have not been provided, the court shall continue the case to the 12-month permanency hearing." (Ibid.)
In M.V., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at page 181, the court explained that the " 'substantial probability' " standard at the six-month review requires "the court to determine whether there is a strong likelihood of a possibility of return (not simply a strong likelihood that return will in fact occur). The word 'may' alters the typically high burden of 'substantial probability.' "
In making its findings, the court may take all of the evidence in the record into consideration, including the three factors set forth in subdivision (g)(1) of section 366.21: whether the parent has consistently and regularly visited the child; whether the parent has made significant progress in resolving the problems leading to the child's removal; and whether the parent has demonstrated the capacity and ability to complete the treatment plan objectives and provide for the child's safety and well-being. (M.V., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 181.)
"We review the juvenile court's findings for substantial evidence, and the juvenile court's decisionmaking process based on those findings for abuse of discretion. [Citation.]" (San Joaquin Human Services Agency v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 215, 223 (San Joaquin Human Services Agency).)
Here, Mother does not argue that A.Y. could have been safely returned to her care at the time of the six-month hearing, but instead argues that the court should have extended her reunification services for six more months because (1) she had made substantive progress in her treatment plan and (2) there was a substantial probability A.Y. could be returned to her custody within six months. (See § 366.21, subd. (e)(3).)
First, Mother argues that she did "make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan" (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(3)) and, in fact, fully complied with the requirements of her case plan.
While compliance with the case plan "is certainly a pertinent consideration at the section 366.22 hearing, . . . it is not the sole concern before the dependency court judge." (Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 704.; see also In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1139-1140.) As this court has explained, "simply complying with the reunification plan . . . is not determinative. The court must also consider the parents' progress and their capacity to meet the objectives of the plan; otherwise the reasons for removing the children out-of-home will not have been ameliorated." (In re Dustin R., at p. 1143.)
In the present case, it is undisputed that at the time of the six-month review hearing, Mother had regularly participated in her case plan and had made great progress in overcoming her substance abuse issues. Nonetheless, the evidence in the record of her chronic dishonesty with the social worker and others demonstrated her inability to keep A.Y. safe. During overnight visits, Mother had taken A.Y. to see Father, who was permitted only supervised visitation; who was admittedly using methamphetamine, which was also Mother's drug of choice; who was living with other drug users; and who, according to Mother, had been harassing her for years. This evidence also showed that Mother lacked full insight into the causes of the dependency, given that it was her and Father's use of methamphetamine that led to A.Y.'s initial removal, and Mother's methamphetamine use that had led to the prior removal of another child.
Mother's conduct thus supported the court's implied finding that she had failed to make sufficient progress in meeting the objectives of her case plan, despite the progress she had made participating in services. (See In re Dustin R., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1143; see also San Joaquin Human Services Agency, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 223.) In particular, Mother's dishonesty and her willingness to endanger A.Y.—and her own sobriety—by continuing to expose A.Y. to Father, demonstrates her failure to achieve the case plan objectives of cooperating with the social worker, showing her ability and willingness to have custody of A.Y. and, in particular, showing that she had accepted responsibility for her actions. Nor had Mother continued with therapy or received an evaluation from her therapist affirming that Mother now understood the factors contributing to the dependency and had successfully addressed those issues such that A.Y. was no longer at risk, as was required by her case plan.
Second, Mother argues that even assuming there was substantial evidence that she had failed to make substantive progress in her case plan, the court erred in terminating her reunification services because there was "a substantial probability" that A.Y. "may be returned" to Mother within six months. (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(3).)
As a preliminary matter, Mother asserts that the court erred when it terminated reunification services based on its adoption of the Bureau's recommendations that had incorrectly stated that "there is not a substantial probability that the child will be returned" to Mother's custody by the end of the 12-month period, rather than "may be returned," which is the proper standard under the applicable statute. (See § 366.21, subd. (e)(3); compare § 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) First, there was no objection to the language of the court's oral ruling or the Bureau's written recommendations at the hearing. (See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) Moreover, in context, it is apparent that the court understood and applied the correct standard when it terminated reunification services. (Cf. In re Corienna G. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 73, 84-85 [affirming order where parents "were not prejudiced by the lack of an express determination" and "determination can be implied on this record"].)
The court, however, found that Mother was a "pathological liar" and described evidence of Mother's chronic dishonesty "about the times she's exposing her child intentionally to danger; and she knows what this guy is like, she knows he's still using, she knows he has supervised visits." In light of this evidence of Mother's dishonesty and lack of insight, the court reasonably concluded it "would never trust her not to keep doing that [i.e., lying and exposing A.Y. to Father] in another way or form even if I give her more time." The court further observed that it had "thought hard" about whether to give Mother "some more time, but I cannot find it a substantial probability that I could trust her again, and I feel like I have to be able to feel there's a possibility of that because she's so deceptive in everything she's doing. I just can't find that . . . substantial probability."
Substantial evidence supports the court's finding that, in light of Mother's dishonesty, lack of insight, and willingness to endanger A.Y. by exposing her to Father, there was not a substantial probability that A.Y. may be returned to Mother's care if she were to receive an additional six months of reunification services. (See § 366.21, subd. (e)(3); M.V., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 181; see also San Joaquin Human Services Agency, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 223.)
Mother maintains that "[i]f the Bureau were to refer [her] to a therapist that could deal with her propensity to lie and she maintained her programs dealing with substance abuse and domestic violence there would be a substantial probability the child may be returned to her by the next reporting period." The Bureau observes, however, that Mother had not continued to participate in individual therapy, a required element of her case plan, after she completed her inpatient drug treatment program. Nor had she completed a mental health assessment or received a positive written evaluation from her therapist, as also required by her case plan. Given A.Y.'s extremely young age and the presumptive six-month limit on reunification services for a child under age three, the totality of the evidence in the record supports the court's determination that there was " ' "a poor prognosis for family reunification." ' " (M.V., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 175; § 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B).)
For all of these reasons, the court did not abuse its discretion when it terminated Mother's reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. (See San Joaquin Human Services Agency, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 223.)
II. Reduction of Mother's Visitation Pending the Section 366 .26 Hearing
Mother contends the court erred when it reduced her visitation to once a month, pending the section 366.26 hearing.
At the conclusion of the October 5, 2017 hearing, after the court terminated the parents' reunification services, Mother's counsel asked that the court maintain Mother's visits at once a week. A.Y.'s counsel stated her belief that it would not be in A.Y.'s best interest at that point to have either weekly or twice monthly visitation, and argued that monthly visits were appropriate since a permanency planning hearing was being set. The court ordered visits reduced to once a month.
"After the termination of reunification services, the parents' interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point 'the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability[.]' [Citation.]" (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) Nonetheless, even after reunification services have been terminated, visitation must continue unless the court finds it would be detrimental to the child. (§ 366.21, subd. (h); see In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1504; In re David D. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 941, 954.)
This case is distinguishable from In re Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at page 1506, a case relied on by Mother, in which the juvenile court had permitted the minor to refuse visitation with his mother over several years, despite the fact that a valid visitation order was in place and the mother had continually objected to the lack of visitation. Here, Mother was never denied visitation. Rather, once reunification services were terminated and a section 366.26 hearing set, the court reasonably followed the recommendations of A.Y.'s counsel, who believed it would be in A.Y.'s best interest to reduce visitation to once a month. (See In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) There was no abuse of discretion. (See In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 317-318.)
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied on the merits. Our decision is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
/s/_________
Kline, P.J. We concur: /s/_________
Stewart, J. /s/_________
Miller, J.