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affirming in a summary order the dismissal of a complaint against a judge acting in her judicial capacity
Summary of this case from Nabatov v. MondeOpinion
No. 07-4599-cv.
January 14, 2009.
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
For Plaintiff-Appellant: KENNETH COOPERSTEIN, Centerport, N.Y.
For Defendant-Appellee: RICHARD OWEN JACKSON, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Richard Dearing, Assistant Solicitor General, on the brief) for Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, N.Y.
Present: HON. RALPH K. WINTER, HON. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, HON. REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-appellant Kristin Dupree appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Wexler, J.) dated October 12, 2007, dismissing her complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.
We review a district court's decision granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, "construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The complaint must allege facts sufficient "'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (citation omitted)).
Dupree brought this civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking money damages against defendant-appellee John C. Bivona, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. The complaint alleges that Justice Bivona, who was presiding over Dupree's divorce proceedings, violated Dupree's Fourteenth Amendment rights by entering an order of receivership without requiring the appointed receiver, Dupree's then-husband, to post a bond. Justice Bivona moved to dismiss on the ground that he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity because the order of receivership was a judicial act entered in a matter over which he had jurisdiction.
Judges are "immune from liability for damages under many circumstances." Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 74 (2d Cir. 2005). Judicial immunity, however, does not extend to acts that are "not judicial in nature," viz. not within the judge's judicial capacity, id. at 75, or to judicial acts that are "taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991); see also Tucker v. Outwater, 118 F.3d 930, 936 (2d Cir. 1997) ("A judge will be denied immunity for damages where he (i) acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction; and (ii) knew or must have known that he was acting in such a manner."). In determining whether an act is judicial in nature, we examine whether (1) that act is one normally performed by a judge, and (2) the parties were dealing with the judge in his or her judicial capacity. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978); Huminski, 396 F.3d at 75.
Although there may be cases in which it is difficult to discern whether a judge was acting in his or her judicial capacity, this is not one of them. Here, Justice Bivona plainly acted in a judicial capacity. The purportedly nonjudicial act identified by Dupree is Justice Bivona's entry of an order of receivership in her divorce proceedings. The entry of an order in a case over which a judge is presiding is a quintessential judicial act. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13 ("[W]e look to the particular act's relation to a general function normally performed by a judge. . . ."). Moreover, it is beyond dispute that Justice Bivona performed this act while dealing with Dupree and her then-husband as parties in their matrimonial action.
Dupree's argument that Justice Bivona is not entitled to immunity because he acted "in the clear absence of all jurisdiction" similarly is to no avail. This argument is predicated on Dupree's belief that Justice Bivona had "no power" to enter an order of receivership pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5106. It is of no moment, however, that Justice Bivona might have exceeded his authority when he entered the order of receivership, although we express no view on the merits of this point. Rather, the inquiry for purposes of judicial immunity focuses on whether Justice Bivona "had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him" at the time he entered the order. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356; see also id. at 356-57 n. 7 (discussing the distinction between "lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction"). Justice Bivona had subject-matter jurisdiction over Dupree's matrimonial action as a consequence of the fact that the Supreme Court of the State of New York is a court of general jurisdiction. Consequently, even if Justice Bivona acted in error or exceeded his authority when he entered the receivership order, that error would not be sufficient to deprive him of judicial immunity. See id. at 356; Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12-13 ("If judicial immunity means anything, it means that a judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error . . . or was in excess of his authority.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Tucker, 118 F.3d at 936.
We have considered Dupree's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.