Summary
reversing summary judgment in favor of Holmes Regional
Summary of this case from Dumigan v. Holmes Reg'l Med. Ctr.Opinion
Case No. 5D19-1491
03-27-2020
Stephen Joseph Biggie, of Arcadier, Biggie, and Wood, PLLC, Melbourne, for Appellant. Andrew S. Bolin, of Bolin Law Group, Tampa, for Appellee, Holmes Regional Medical Center, Inc. No Appearance for Other Appellees.
Stephen Joseph Biggie, of Arcadier, Biggie, and Wood, PLLC, Melbourne, for Appellant.
Andrew S. Bolin, of Bolin Law Group, Tampa, for Appellee, Holmes Regional Medical Center, Inc.
No Appearance for Other Appellees.
PER CURIAM. Robert Dumigan, individually and as the Executor of the Estate of Edith Dumigan, appeals the final summary judgment entered in favor of Holmes Regional Medical Center, Inc. (HRMC). Mr. Dumigan was admitted to HRMC for cardiac bypass surgery; however, complications required a double amputation. Mr. Dumigan sued HRMC, alleging that HRMC's negligent procedures in removing recalled heparin from its stocks caused the complications. The issue at summary judgment turned on Mr. Dumigan's ability to prove that HRMC administered contaminated heparin to Mr. Dumigan when HRMC did not record the lot numbers of the product that it gave to Mr. Dumigan.
After careful consideration of the record, we conclude that there are disputed issues of fact and there are conflicting expert opinions, making summary judgment improper. See Gonzalez v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 273 So. 3d 1031, 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (explaining that when evaluating expert opinions at the summary judgment stage, "[t]he focus is on whether the affidavits show evidence of a nature that would be admissible at trial; if so, any questions regarding relative credibility or weight of that evidence compared to other evidence cannot be resolved on summary judgment but must be left for the trier of fact"); LeBlanc v. Acevedo, 258 So. 3d 555, 558 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) ("Granting summary judgment is improper ‘based on a finding that the plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence of causation,’ as such a finding ‘improperly shifts the burden to the non-movant to establish causation.’ " (quoting Pitcher v. Zappitell, 160 So. 3d 145, 148 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) )); Petruska v. Smartparks-Silver Springs, Inc., 914 So. 2d 502, 504 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) ("If the evidence raises any issue of material fact, if it is conflicting, if it will permit different reasonable inferences, or if it tends to prove the issues, it should be submitted to the jury as a question of fact to be determined by it."). As such, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
WALLIS and GROSSHANS, JJ., and JOLLEY, M.G., Associate Judge, concur.