Opinion
No. 34294
Decided October 26, 1955.
Labor unions — Picketing — Employer engaged in interstate commerce — Injunction — Jurisdiction of state courts — Picketing ceased — Moot question.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Belmont County.
Plaintiff filed his petition in the Common Pleas Court of Belmont County for the purpose of securing an injunction against picketing by defendants. In their answer, defendants allege inter alia that the state court was without jurisdiction "for the reason that plaintiff is engaged in interstate commerce." The Common Pleas Court enjoined all picketing. On appeal to the Court of Appeals on questions of law and fact, that court "found * * * that defendants were at all times engaged in lawful, peaceful, picketing; that the Common Pleas Court had jurisdiction of the controversy between the parties, although plaintiff company was engaged in interstate commerce," and its order provided so far as material:
"It is * * * ordered, adjudged and decreed that not more than three pickets shall be stationed at any one time at the junction of the public highway and the railroad crossing leading into the property of the plaintiff company. Such pickets shall conduct themselves in a peaceful and law abiding manner.
"None of the pickets shall threaten, coerce, nor intimidate any person desiring to work at the plaintiff's mine but such pickets shall have the right to display at the junction of the public highway and the railroad crossing leading into the property of the plaintiff company not more than two signs reading as follows:
"`Strike
"`Dudek Coal Co.
"`Unfair to Organized Labor.'
"The pickets are permitted to talk to the plaintiff's employees and are permitted to use peaceful persuasion, but are not allowed to create a disturbance by shouting nor to use loud, profane, nor abusive language. The permanent restraining order heretofore entered by the trial court is dissolved and peaceful picketing is permitted in accordance with the above conditions * * *."
Thereupon, plaintiff filed in this court an appeal as of right from the judgment of the Court of Appeals and a motion to certify. This court overruled the motion to certify but overruled the motion to dismiss the appeal as of right so that the cause is now before this court on an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Messrs. Thornburg Lewis, for appellant.
Mr. George T. Tarbutton, for appellees.
When this court refused to dismiss this appeal, holding that a debatable constitutional question was involved, it recognized that the questions of law involved were similar to those involved in the then pending case of Grimes Hauer, Inc., v. Pollock, 163 Ohio St. 372, 127 N.E.2d 203, and it is unfortunate that the two cases were not assigned for hearing at the same time.
It should be noted that defendants have not appealed from the judgment of the Court of Appeals and therefore cannot complain because the Court of Appeals assumed jurisdiction, even if the Court of Appeals was in error in doing so.
Further, it may be observed that the judgment of the Court of Appeals gave the plaintiff a very large measure of the relief prayed for. The only thing that was not enjoined was peaceful picketing. In view of the findings of the Court of Appeals with respect to the defendants at all times being "engaged in lawful peaceful, picketing," it is necessary in this court for plaintiff to contend that those findings were contrary to law and that the Court of Appeals should have found from the evidence as a matter of law that defendants' picketing had been unlawful.
In view of the fact, conceded by both parties at the hearing of this case before this court, that there has been no picketing at all by the defendants since the judgment of the Court of Appeals, it appears that this whole controversy, so far as plaintiff is concerned, is moot.
There being no apparent controversy between these parties, except perhaps of an academic nature, the appeal is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
WEYGANDT, C.J., MATTHIAS, HART, ZIMMERMAN, STEWART, BELL and TAFT, JJ., concur.