Opinion
No. 3D20-316
04-29-2020
Jules Ducas, in proper person. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee.
Jules Ducas, in proper person.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee.
Before EMAS, C.J., and FERNANDEZ and LINDSEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (to be entitled to relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must allege and establish both the performance and prejudice prongs; in examining trial counsel's performance, courts are required to make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight by evaluating the performance from counsel's perspective at the time, and indulge a strong presumption that counsel rendered constitutionally adequate assistance and exercised professionally reasonable judgment in making the challenged decisions). See also Taylor v. State, 619 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (holding that a defendant convicted as a principal in the first degree (see § 777.011, Fla. Statutes, (1992) ) may properly be assessed victim injury points on the sentencing guidelines scoresheet as if he had himself committed (rather than merely aided and abetted another who committed) the crime); Clifford v. State, 518 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (same).