Opinion
No. CV 02-039 00 47 S
January 28, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ( MOTION 110 DATED SEPTEMBER 2, 2004)
Before this court are the defendants FDR Construction Corporation's and Fernando DelRosario's Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. Facts of the Case
The defendant FDR Corporation garaged its vehicles in Woodbridge, Connecticut. The company has been incorporated since 1999. (Exhibits A and E, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.) The defendant Fernando DelRosario was president of that corporation. (Exhibits A and B, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.) The defendant DelRosario allowed employees to leave keys in the ashtrays of corporate vehicles when they were not in use. (Exhibit B, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.) On August 26, 2000 an unknown tortfeasor stole one of the defendant corporation's cars. On that same date the plaintiff was a passenger in a car parked on Boston Post Road in Orange, Connecticut. The unknown tortfeasor struck that car. (Exhibit B, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.)
II. Standard of Review
Connecticut Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is "designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue where there is no real issue to be tried." Wilson v. City of New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989).
Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact, a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact, together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue. Practice Book §§ 17-45, 17-46; Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 455, 472 A.2d 1257 (1984).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 193 Conn. 313, 317, 477 A.2d 1005 (1984). However, "the nonmoving party may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation." Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998). Furthermore, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Company v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, that party must come forward with sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 263 (1986).
In the present case the plaintiff cannot rely on speculation or conjecture. "To establish a genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment must produce specific facts indicating that a genuine factual issue exists . . . If the evidence [produced by the non-moving party] is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted . . . The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Bullock v. City of New York et al., Docket Number 02 CV 7698(DC), District Court for the Southern District of New York. (March 12, 2004, Chin, J.) (internal citations omitted, internal quotations omitted).
III. Legal Analysis A. Liability of the Individual Defendant.
The plaintiff has alleged that the defendant Fernando DelRosario was negligent "in that as president of the defendant FDR Construction Corporation, individually, and as an officer of said corporation, authorized that the keys be left in the motor vehicle for the use of the employees . . ." (Complaint, paragraph 6). There are no further allegations concerning Mr. DelRosario.
"Courts will . . . disregard the fiction of a separate legal entity to pierce the shield of immunity afforded by the corporate structure in a situation in which the corporate entity has been so controlled and dominated that justice requires liability to be imposed on the real actor." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor Construction Paving, Inc., 187 Conn. 544, 552, 447 A.2d 406 (1982). "Ordinarily the corporate veil is pierced only under exceptional circumstances, for example, where the corporation is a mere shell, serving no legitimate purpose, and used primarily as an intermediary to perpetuate fraud or promote injustice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 557.
"No hard and fast rule, however, as to the conditions under which the entity may be disregarded can be stated as they vary according to the circumstances of each case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 555-56. "Although the issue of whether the corporate veil should be pierced presents a question of fact, the complaint, however, must contain sufficient factual allegations for a court to pierce the corporate veil." Mazzella v. Reed, Superior Court, Complex Litigation Docket at Stamford, Docket No. X05 CV 02 0190929 (August 14, 2003, Rogers, J.).
In the present case the plaintiffs have neither pleaded a sufficient factual basis for piercing the corporate veil nor put forth a proper evidentiary foundation. Thus the individual defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
B. Liability of the Corporate Defendant
The plaintiff has alleged that the defendant negligently allowed keys to remain in vehicle ignitions, a situation that proximately caused the injuries she sustained. In most circumstances it is the responsibility of the trier of fact to "determine whether leaving the key in the [car], under the facts and circumstances of [the] case, constituted negligence." Smith v. Leuthner, 156 Conn. 422, 426, 242 A.2d 728 (1968); Shanks v. DeRenzo, No. 364625, Superior Court Judicial District of New Haven (November 19, 1998, Blue, J.) ( 23 Conn. L. Rptr. 411). See generally Zona v. Rivers, No. CV 96-0382344, Superior Court Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven (October 22, 1998, Zoarski, JTR) ( 23 Conn. L. Rptr. 327) (summary of cases involving a defendant's failure to adequately secure a vehicle).
The defendant suggests that there was a superseding cause that exonerated any negligence on its part. That doctrine is limited. "If a defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff's injuries, the defendant would not be relieved from liability for those injuries even though another force concurred to produce them . . . And, where the negligence of the actor creates the risk of a particular harm and is a substantial factor in causing that harm, the fact that the harm is brought about through the intervention of another force does not relieve the actor of liability, except where the harm is intentionally caused by a third person and is not within the scope of the risk created by the actor's conduct." Burns v. Gleason Plant Security, Inc., 10 Conn.App. 480, 484, 523 A.2d 940 (1987). The question of proximate cause is one for the trier of fact.
Similarly, agency is a question of fact to be determined by a jury. Indeed, even where the plaintiff does not present evidence of agency, there still may be a question of fact. The jury may simply disbelieve the defendant's evidence. Izzo v. GMAC, No. CV01-0453550 S (May 28, 2004) Superior Court Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven (May 28, 2004, Corradino, J.) ( 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 181) (defendant-lessor alleged that a houseguest stole a rental vehicle.
Finally, the test for determining legal duty involves a factual analysis of the foreseeability of the harm alleged in a complaint. Siegel v. Howell, No. CV98-04093945 (Oct. 13, 1999) Superior Court Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven (October 13, 1999, Alander, J.) ( 25 Conn. L. Rptr. 484).
The court does not have enough of a factual basis to rule on the motion as it applies to this case. Therefore, the court denies the corporate defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Dewey, J.