D.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.

Full title: D.S., individually and on behalf of K.S., a child with a disability…

Court: United States District Court, S.D. New York

Date published: Apr 29, 2024

22-CV-10641 (GHW) (RFT) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2024)

Opinion

22-CV-10641 (GHW) (RFT)

04-29-2024

D.S., individually and on behalf of K.S., a child with a disability, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

ROBYN F. TARNOFSKY, United States Magistrate Judge.

To the Honorable Gregory H. Woods, United States District Judge:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ROBYN F. TARNOFSKY, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the Court is a motion by D.S. on behalf of K.S. pursuant to the feeshifting provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), for atorneys' fees and costs for work performed by the Cuddy Law Firm (“CLF”) for two administrative proceedings and for this proceeding, plus pre- and post-judgment interest. The New York City Department of Education (“Defendant”) opposes the motion, arguing that (1) Plaintiff is not entitled to recoup atorneys' fees and costs for work performed by CLF for the first proceeding because Plaintiff was not a prevailing party and (2) the requested hourly rates and the number of hours of work performed in connection with the second action and this action are excessive. For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully recommend that the motion be GRANTED IN PART, to the extent that Plaintiff be awarded atorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $31,917.68 plus postjudgment interest.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff D.S. is the parent of K.S., a child with a disability as defined by the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3). (See ECF 18, Declaration of Erin E. Murray in Support of Mot. for Summary Judgment (“Murray Decl.”) Ex. A (Initial Due Process Complaint).) On January 6, 2021, CLF submited an administrative due process complaint (“Initial DPC”) on behalf of Plaintiff, alleging that Defendant had failed to provide K.S. with a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”). (See id.)

In the Initial DPC, Plaintiff requested, among other relief, that Defendant fund an independent neuropsychological evaluation and complete evaluations for a functional behavioral assessment, classroom observation, speech and language, occupational therapy, assistive technology, and a comprehensive level two vocational assessment. (See id.) Plaintiff alleges that after an impartial hearing officer (“IHO”) was appointed, Defendant failed to hold the required resolution meeting within the statutory period (see ECF 1, Compl. ¶¶ 14-16), and on March 30, 2021, the IHO issued an interim order (“First Interim Order”) partially granting the relief requested in Plaintiff's Initial DPC. (See ECF 18, Murray Decl. Ex. B (First Interim Order).) The First Interim Order directed Defendant to fund an independent neuropsychological evaluation and to complete (1) a speech and language evaluation; (2) an occupational therapy evaluation; (3) an assistive technology evaluation; and (4) a functional behavioral assessment. (See id.)

On December 2, 2021, the IHO dismissed the Initial DPC without prejudice, stating that despite multiple requests, no update had been provided on the mater since October 2021. (See ECF 18, Murray Decl. Ex. C (Dismissal Order).)

On April 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed another administrative DPC (the “Second DPC”), alleging that Defendant had failed to provide K.S. with a FAPE and requesting additional evaluations. (See ECF 18, Murray Decl. Ex. D (Second DPC).) On May 27, 2022, the IHO held a Prehearing Conference and Setlement Conference. (See ECF 18, Murray Decl. ¶ 89.) On June 16, 2022, the IHO issued a Statement of Agreement and an interim order (“Second Interim Order”) directing Defendant to fund an independent neuropsychological evaluation and complete (1) a speech and language evaluation; (2) an occupational therapy evaluation; (3) an assistive technology evaluation; and (4) a functional behavioral assessment. (See id. Ex. E (Second Interim Order).)

On August 23, 2022, the IHO held another prehearing conference, and the parties finalized a Statement of Agreement and an Order that included revisions by the IHO. (See ECF 18, Murray Decl. ¶ 111.) On or about July 12, 2022, CLF submited to Defendant a demand for atorneys' fees and expenses in the amount of $23,230.46. (See ECF 27, Declaration of Michael Lawrence (“Lawrence Decl.”) ¶ 11.) On April 6, 2023, the DOE made a writen offer of setlement for $21,000, which was not accepted by Plaintiff. (See ECF 28, Declaration of Thomas Lindeman (“Lindeman Decl.”) Ex. 1. (“Writen Offer”).)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 16, 2022, Plaintiff commenced this action, seeking atorneys' fees, costs, and pre- and post-judgment interest in connection with the two administrative proceedings and this action. (See ECF 1, Compl. ¶¶ 33-45.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant ceased communication after acknowledging receipt of the demand for atorneys' fees for each administrative mater. (See id. ¶¶ 26-31.)

On September 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking atorneys' fees and costs, plus pre- and post-judgment interest. (See ECF 16, Mot. for Summary Judgment; ECF 17, Declaration of Andrew K. Cuddy in Support (“Cuddy Decl.”); ECF 18, Murray Decl.; ECF 19, Declaration of Benjamin Kopp in Support; ECF 20, Declaration of Barbara J. Ebenstein in Support; ECF 21, Declaration of Mathew J. Delforte in Support.) That motion was fully briefed as of October 25, 2023. (See ECF 23, Pl.'s Mem.; ECF 30, Def's Opp.; ECF 32, Pl.'s Reply.) Plaintiff seeks $66,856.43 in atorneys' fees and costs, plus pre- and post-judgment interest. (See ECF 33, Reply Declaration of Andrew K. Cuddy (“Cuddy Reply Decl.”) ¶ 7.)

By Order of Reference dated December 20, 2022, this case was referred to a magistrate judge for general pretrial supervision and dispositive motions. (See ECF 5, Order of Reference.) On November 15, 2023, the reference was reassigned to me.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standards

A. Summary Judgment

“Summary judgment is appropriate where the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows ‘that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'” Karnauskas v. Columbia Sussex Corp., No. 09-CV-7104 (GBD), 2012 WL 234377, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2012) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “A fact is ‘material' only where it will affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Karnauskas, 2012 WL 234377, at *2 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “For there to be a ‘genuine' issue about the fact, the evidence must be such ‘that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Id.

In deciding whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, the Court draws all inferences in favor of Defendant. See Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[I]n assessing the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to a material fact, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.”). Declarations in support of or in opposition to summary judgment “must be based on personal knowledge, must ‘set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence,' and must show ‘that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.'” R.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 21-CV-4054 (JMF), 2022 WL 1239860, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2022) (quoting Patterson v. Cty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 219 (2d Cir. 2004)). In the absence of record evidence “from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the non-moving party on a material issue of fact,” summary judgment is appropriate. Catlin v. Sobol, 93 F.3d 1112, 1116 (2d Cir. 1996).

B. IDEA Fee Awards

Under the IDEA, “the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable atorneys' fees” to a prevailing parent of a child with a disability for any action brought pursuant to the statute. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(3)(B)(i)(I). The award of fees and costs “may cover work performed in connection with the hearing, before the district court, and on appeal from the district court.” R.P., 2022 WL 1239860, at *2.

The IDEA, like other federal statutes with fee-shifting provisions, requires courts to “undertake a two-pronged inquiry” when determining whether to award atorneys' fees. A.B. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 20-CV-03129 (SDA), 2021 WL 951928, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2021). First, the judge “must . . . determine whether the party seeking the award is in fact a prevailing party.” Id. (quoting Mr. L. v. Sloan, 449 F.3d 405, 407 (2d Cir. 2006)). Second, if the judge finds the party to have been a prevailing party, “the court must then determine whether, under the appropriate standard, that party should be awarded atorney's fees.” Id. (quoting same). A parent seeking fees under the IDEA “bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).

1. Prevailing Party

To be considered a prevailing party under the IDEA, a plaintiff must achieve a judicially sanctioned “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties . . . .” O'Shea v. Bd. of Educ. of Poughkeepsie City Sch. Dist., 521 F.Supp.2d 284, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omited). The Supreme Court has found that enforceable “judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees create [a] material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties” that can permit an award of atorneys' fees. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep't of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omited). “[A] combination of administrative imprimatur, the change in the legal relationship of the parties arising from it, and subsequent judicial enforceability, render such a winning party a ‘prevailing party ....'” A.R. ex rel. R.V. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 407 F.3d 65, 76 (2d Cir. 2005).

“‘[T]he prevailing party standard has been interpreted generously by the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit' in terms of the degree of relief required.” B.W. ex rel. K.S. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 716 F.Supp.2d 336, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting D.M. ex rel. G.M. v. Bd. of Educ., Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 296 F.Supp.2d 400, 403-04 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)). A prevailing party does not need to prevail on all issues but needs to “succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit.” Id. (internal citations omited).

2. Award of Atorney Fees

If a plaintiff is determined to be a prevailing party, the court considers whether an award of atorneys' fees is appropriate and if so, in what amount. The IDEA provides that the fees awarded “shall be based on rates prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services furnished.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C). In determining reasonable atorneys' fees, the “court must calculate each atorney's ‘presumptively reasonable fee,' sometimes referred to as the ‘lodestar.'” E.F ex rel. N.R. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 11-CV-5243 (GBD) (FM), 2014 WL 1092847, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2014) (quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2008)). The presumptively reasonable fee may be calculated by multiplying the hours counsel appropriately spent on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. See Millea v. Metro-North R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011).

When determining a reasonable hourly rate, courts consider the factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). See Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 186-87; C.D. v. Minisink Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 17-CV-7632 (PAE), 2018 WL 3769972, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2018). These factors include:

(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the atorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the atorney's customary hourly rate; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved in the case and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 187 n.3 (citing Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19). “A district court need not recite and make separate findings as to all twelve Johnson factors, provided that it takes each into account in seffing the atorneys' fee award.” E.F., 2014 WL 1092847, at *3 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

To determine the number of hours counsel reasonably spent on the litigation, courts consider “not whether hindsight vindicates an atorney's time expenditures, but whether, at the time the work was performed, a reasonable atorney would have engaged in similar time expenditures.” O.R. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 340 F.Supp.3d 357, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omited). The hours reasonably expended should not include hours that are excessive or redundant. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.

II. Analysis

A. Plaintiff Is a Prevailing Party

Defendant contends that Plaintiff was not a prevailing party in the first administrative proceeding because that proceeding ended with an interim order that Defendant maintains is insufficient to confer on Plaintiff prevailing-party status. (See ECF 30, Def.'s Opp. at 8-9.) Defendant supports this position with cases holding that IHO-issued pendency decisions do not make plaintiffs into prevailing parties. (See id.). But the first administrative proceeding did not involve litigating the IDEA's pendency provision, which “ordinarily amounts to no more than preservation of the status quo.” K.R. ex rel. M.R. v. Bd. of Educ. of Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 66 F.Supp.2d 444, 450 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).¹ The First Interim Order from the first administrative proceeding was qualitatively different from an order that a child shall stay in his or her current placement. In the first administrative proceeding, Plaintiff sought and achieved a change to the status quo: Defendant funded independent neuropsychological testing and performed additional evaluations. (See ECF 18, Murray Decl. Ex. B, First Interim Order.) That Defendant agreed to those changes should not, in this case, lead to a conclusion that Plaintiff was not a prevailing party.

1 The IDEA's pendency provision allows children to stay in an existing placement during the pendency of proceedings: “[D]uring the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the child, or, if applying for initial admission to a public school, shall, with the consent of the parents, be placed in the public school program until all such proceedings have been completed.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).

While a setlement without court participation does not make a plaintiff in an IDEA proceeding a prevailing party, when an IHO so orders the setlement, it becomes a court-ordered consent decree; such a setlement agreement materially alters the legal relationship of the parties and can support an award of atorneys' fees. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, 532 U.S. at 604; see also A.R., 407 F.3d at 69-70, 77-78 (holding that an IHO's order requiring the Board of Education to pay for a speech and language therapist on an interim basis was a consent decree sufficient to constitute “administrative imprimatur”). “Even a setlement placed on the record of an administrative proceeding constitutes sufficient judicial imprimatur to qualify.” B.W., 716 F.Supp.2d at 344 (internal citations omited).

Nor does Plaintiff's failure to achieve all of relief sought mean that Plaintiff was not a prevailing party. Plaintiff asked the IHO to find that the Defendant had denied the student a FAPE and to order Defendant to pay for one evaluation and conduct six other evaluations. (See ECF 18, Murray Decl. Ex. A (Initial DPC), at 5-6.) The IHO agreed and Defendant was ordered to perform four of the evaluations and to pay for or reimburse Plaintiff for another evaluation. (See ECF 18, Murray Decl. ¶ 52.) “While it is true that the relief ultimately obtained by Plaintiff was much less than originally sought, it is an overstatement to say that [Plaintiff was] not a prevailing party.” K.E. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 21-CV-2815 (KPF), 2022 WL 4448655, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2022) (finding the plaintiff to be a prevailing party in an administrative proceeding where the State Review Officer found that the defendant had failed to provide the student with a FAPE and ordered the defendant to perform two evaluations). Since the relief granted in the IHO's order constituted a judicially sanctioned material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties and required Defendant to provide some of the requested relief, I recommend finding that Plaintiff is a prevailing party in the first administrative proceeding.²

2 Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff was a prevailing party in the second administrative proceeding. (See ECF 30, Def.'s Opp. at 7.)

“The degree of the plaintiff's success, and whether that ‘level of success . . . makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award'” will be considered in my analysis of reasonable atorneys' fees below. K.L. v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 12-CV-6313 (DLC), 2013 WL 4766339, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2013) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434), aff'd, 584 Fed.Appx. 17 (2d Cir. 2014).

B. Atorneys' Fees

Plaintiff seeks $41,834.18 for the two administrative proceedings and $25,022.25 for this action, for a total of $66,856.43, plus pre- and post-judgment interest. (See ECF 33, Cuddy Reply Decl. ¶ 7.) Defendant responds that Plaintiff should be awarded no more than $12,407.50 in fees and costs. (See ECF 30, Def.'s Opp. at 26.) For the reasons set forth below, I recommend an award to Plaintiff for atorneys' fees and costs of $31,917.68, plus post-judgment interest.

1. Hourly Rate

In recommending a reasonable hourly rate, I consider all Johnson factors and specifically refer to those most relevant in this case. The Second Circuit has held that, while a court is permited to consider hourly rates awarded in similar cases, it should also evaluate the “evidence proffered by the parties,” Farbotko v. Clinton Cnty. of New York, 433 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2005), including the hourly rates for each CLF timekeeper.

a. The Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions

Plaintiff contends that the novelty and complexity of the case warrant higher hourly rates. The only justification Plaintiff provides for a conclusion that this mater raised novel and complex issues is that K.S.'s disabilities are complex, which required CLF atorneys to seek professional neuropsychologist, learning specialist, and behavior analyst recommendations. (See ECF 23, Pl.'s Mem. at 23.) However, “the severity of [the plaintiff's disability] and other intervening behaviors does not, in itself, make [the] case more complex or difficult; such conditions are not unusual in cases brought under the IDEA.” S.A. ex rel. M.A.K. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 12-CV-0435 (RMM) (MDG), 2015 WL 5579690, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2015). Instead, in determining complexity, Courts in this District generally consider factors such as the number of proceedings and the number of hearings. See, e.g., C.D., 2018 WL 3769972, at *5 n.7. This case involved only two administrative proceedings, neither of which proceeded to a hearing on the merits. (See ECF 27, Lawrence Decl. ¶ 14.) On this record, I cannot conclude that this case raised particularly novel and complex issues.

b. The Undesirability of the Case

Plaintiff contends that Defendant's failure to provide Plaintiff and CLF with K.S.'s educational records made the case less desirable, because having to assess legal issues based on partial educational records led to a risk of missing issues. (See ECF 23, Pl.'s Mem. at 23-24.) But CLF had made no showing that it “forewent other far more lucrative work” because it took on this case, and CLF therefore has not demonstrated that the case was undesirable. E.g., N.G.B. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 21-CV-11211 (LJL), 2023 WL 2711753, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2023).

c. The Evidence Proffered by the Parties

In providing the rates prevailing in the market, CLF relies upon four sources: (1) the 2022 Real Rate Report (“RRR”) published by Wolters Kluwer; (2) the Laffey matrix, the original version of which debuted in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F.Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983); (3) the 50^thAnnual Survey of Law Firm Economics (“ASLFE”) nationwide Partner/Shareholder rates; and (4) the National Association of Legal Fee Analysis' December 2022 Litigation Hourly Rate Survey & Report (“NALFA Report”). (See ECF 23, Pl.'s Mem. at 12-14.) However, this Court has previously found each of these sources to be “problematic” and has declined to award substantial weight to any of them in determining reasonable hourly rates in IDEA cases. See J.G. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 23-CV-959 (PAE), 2024 WL 728626, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2024) (explaining that the RRR's methodology is unclear and its “data is not specific to lawyers specializing in IDEA” litigation; that the Laffey matrix is commonly used for litigators in Washington D.C., but the Second Circuit has not approved its use in assessing fees for lawyers working outside the D.C. area; and that both the ASLFE and the NALFA Report do not focus on rates charged by special education litigators).

Additional sources provided by CLF are also unpersuasive, and I do not recommend placing substantial weight on any of them. Specifically, CLF references the artificial intelligence tool “ChatGPT.” (See ECF 19, Declaration of Benjamin Kopp (“Kopp Decl.”) & Ex. A (ChatGPT Report).) CLF relies on ChatGPT's feedback to demonstrate what a client's search may provide when atempting to determine hourly rates for IDEA litigation. (See ECF 19, Kopp Decl. at 1.) Here, CLF's reliance on ChatGPT is inappropriate, because ChatGPT has been shown to be an unreliable resource. See Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F.Supp.3d 443, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (issuing sanctions against atorneys who “submited non-existent judicial opinions with fake quotes and citations created by the artificial intelligence tool ChatGPT”); Park v. Kim, 91 F.4th 610, 615 (2d Cir. 2024) (referring an atorney to the Second Circuit's Grievance Panel for investigation for submiffing a brief that relied on “non-existent” caselaw generated by ChatGPT). In J.G. v. New York City Department of Education, Judge Engelmayer rejected CLF's reliance on ChatGPT's conclusions and advised the firm to remove references to ChatGPT from future fee applications. J.G., 2024 WL 728626, at *7.

d. The Experience of the Attorneys, Their Customary Hourly Rates, and Fees Awarded in Similar Case

I atempt to account for the “reasonable current rates for atorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation, and not just the historical rates at the time the services were performed.” M.H. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 20-CV-1923 (LJL), 2021 WL 4804031, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2021) (emphasis omited), aff'd sub nom. H.C. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 71 F.4th 120, cert. denied, 144 S.Ct. 490 (2023).

i. Andrew Cuddy (“Cuddy”)

Plaintiff requests that the Court award $550 per hour for Cuddy, with an increase to $600 for work performed in 2023. (See ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. ¶¶ 15, 41.) The DOE requests that Cuddy's hourly rate be reduced to $375. (See ECF 30, Def.'s Opp. at 6.)

Cuddy graduated from law school in 1996 and has been practicing special education litigation since 2001. (See ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. ¶ 15 & Ex. B (Resumes of CLF Atorneys (“CLF Resumes”)).) Cuddy charges and has been paid a customary rate of $550 per hour. (Id. ¶ 15.) Courts in this District have recently awarded Cuddy lower rates in similar cases. See, e.g., J.G., 2024 WL 728626, at *8-10 (assigning a rate of $400 per hour for Cuddy); T.A. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 21-CV-7104 (GHW), 2022 WL 3577885, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2022) ($375 per hour); N.G. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 21-CV-8488 (PGG) (JLC), 2024 WL 133615, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2024) ($425 per hour). Considering awards in similar cases, the difficulty of the questions presented in this mater, and that “courts typically award fees at the botom of the customary fee range,” I recommend an hourly rate of $400 as reasonable for Cuddy.

ii. Kevin Mendillo (“Mendillo”)

Plaintiff requests that the Court award $450 per hour for Mendillo, with an increase to $500 for work performed in 2023. (See ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. ¶¶ 16, 41.) Defendant requests that Mendillo's hourly rate be reduced to $300. (See ECF 30, Def.'s Opp. at 6.)

Mendillo graduated law school in 2010 and has been representing parents in impartial due process hearings since 2014 and in federal fee litigation since 2018. (See ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. ¶ 16 & Ex. B (CLF Resumes).) Mendillo charges and has been paid a customary rate of $500 per hour. (See id. ¶ 16.) Courts in this District have recently awarded Mendillo lower rates in similar cases. See, e.g., J.G., 2024 WL 728626, at *9 (assigning a rate of $310 per hour for Mendillo); H.C. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 20-CV-844 (JLC), 2021 WL 2471195, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2021) ($300 per hour), aff'd sub nom. H.C., 71 F.4th 120, cert. denied, 144 S.Ct. 490 (2023); T.H. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 21-CV-10962 (JMF) (JLC), 2022 WL 16945703, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2022) ($300 per hour), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 17991623 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2022). Considering awards in similar cases, the difficulty of the questions presented, and that “courts typically award fees at the botom of the customary fee range,” I recommend an hourly rate of $300 as reasonable for Mendillo.

iii. Justin Corett (“Corett”)

Plaintiff seeks an hourly rate of $425 for Corett, with an increase to $450 for work performed in 2023. (See ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. ¶¶ 17, 41.) Defendant argues that Corett's hourly rate should be reduced to $275. (See ECF 30, Def.'s Opp. at 6.)

Corett graduated from law school in 2012 and has been representing parents in due process hearings since 2016. (See ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. ¶ 17 & Ex. B (CLF Resumes).) Corett charges and has been paid a customary rate of $450 per hour, following an increase from $425 per hour. (See id. ¶ 17.) Courts in this District have recently awarded Corett lower hourly rates similar cases. See, e.g., T.A., 2022 WL 3577885, at *5 (assigning a rate of $275 per hour for Corett); N.G., 2024 WL 133615, at *4 ($300 per hour); T.H., 2022 WL 16945703, at *4 ($300 per hour). Considering awards in similar cases, the difficulty of the questions, and that “courts typically award fees at the botom of the customary fee range,” I recommend an hourly rate of $300 as reasonable for work performed by Coreffi.

iv. Erin Murray (“Murray”)

Plaintiff seeks an hourly rate of $375 per hour for Murray, with an increase to $400 for work performed in 2023. (See ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. ¶¶ 18, 41.) Defendant argues that Murray's hourly rate should be reduced to $200. (See ECF 30, Def.'s Opp. at 6.)

Murray graduated from law school in 2019 and works exclusively with fee-shifting dependent clients in the Southern District. (See ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. ¶ 18 & Ex. B (CLF Resumes).) Prior to law school, Murray gained experience in children's special education services and the development and implementation of lEP's during her time at the Children's Home Society of Florida. (See id. ¶ 18.) Murray has recently been awarded lower fees in similar cases than the rate she is seeking here. See, e.g., S.H. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 21-CV-4967 (LJL), 2022 WL 254070, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2022) (assigning a rate of $225 per hour for Murray), aff'd sub nom. H.C., 71 F.4th 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 144 S.Ct. 490 (2023); L.M. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 21-CV-11175 (AT) (BCM), 2023 WL 2872707, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2023) ($225 per hour), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2495917 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2023); J.G., 2024 WL 728626, at *9 ($250 per hour due to Murray's effective performance in the administrative proceedings). Considering awards in similar cases, the difficulty of the questions at issue, and that “courts typically award fees at the botom of the customary fee range,” I recommend an hourly rate of $225 as reasonable for work performed by Murray.

v. Kenneth Bush (“Bush”)

Plaintiff seeks an hourly rate of $425 for Bush. (See ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. ¶¶ 19, 41.) The DOE does not request a specific rate for Bush.

Bush graduated from law school in 2015 and has been representing parents in due process hearings since 2016. (See ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. ¶ 16 & Ex. B (CLF Resumes).) Bush's requested rate has been recently reduced by Courts in this District in similar cases. See, e.g., N.G.B. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 20-cv-6571 (JGK), 2022 WL 800855, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2022) (assigning a rate of $225 per hour for Bush); J.G., 2024 WL 728626, at *9 ($300 per hour). Considering awards in similar cases, the difficulty of the questions raised, and that “courts typically award fees at the botom of the customary fee range,” I recommend an hourly rate of $275 as reasonable for Bush.

vi. Paralegals

Plaintiff seeks a customary blended paralegal rate of $225 per hour for its paralegals' work. (See ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. ¶¶ 20-23, 41.) Shobna Cuddy is the senior paralegal for all of CLF's offices and has been the administration paralegal since 2012. (See id. ¶ 20.) Caitlin O'Donnell was a paralegal between November 2019 and September 2022. (See id. ¶ 21.) ChinaAnn Reeve has been at CLF since August 2021. (See id. ¶ 22.) Similar cases in this District have approved somewhat lower hourly rates for CLF's paralegals. See, e.g., J.G., 2024 WL 728626, at *10 (assigning a rate of $125 per hour for Shobna Cuddy and a rate of $110 per hour for other paralegal work); H.C., 2021 WL 2471195, at *7 (assigning a rate of $100 per hour for all paralegal work); N.G., 2024 WL 133615, at *4 (assigning a rate of $125 for Shobna Cuddy per hour and a rate of $100 per hour for other paralegals). I recommend a rate of $125 per hour as reasonable for Shobna Cuddy and a rate of $110 per hour as reasonable for all other paralegal work.³

3 CLF also provides an hourly rate of $425 for Benjamin Kopp in its calculations. However, I do not recommend awarding any fees for Kopp's time since CLF does not provide any basis for the proposed hourly rate for Kopp. (See generally ECF 17, Cuddy Decl.) CLF also does not provide a resume for Kopp, as it does for all other atorneys and paralegals. (See ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. Ex. B. (CLF Resumes).) Judge Liman, in N.G.B., refused to award fees for the time of Mendillo for similar reasons. See N.G.B., 2023 WL 2711753, at *5 n.4.

2. Reasonable Hours Expended

CLF atorneys expended a total of 172.33 hours on the mater, including both administrative cases (110.80 hours) and the federal action (61.53 hours). (See ECF 33, Cuddy Reply Decl. ¶ 7.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff's billing records indicate excessive billing for both the federal action and the underlying administrative proceedings. (See ECF 30, Def.'s Opp. at 18-25.) Plaintiff argues that a reduction is not warranted due to the complexity of the mater and Defendant's failure to provide educational records in a timely manner. (See ECF 32, Pl.'s Reply, at 6-7.)

When determining the number of reasonable hours expended, “the district court may exclude hours that are ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.'” H.C., 71 F.4th at 126 (quoting Raja v. Burns, 43 F.4th 80, 87 (2d Cir. 2022)). The “court also ‘has discretion simply to deduct a reasonable percentage of the number of hours claimed as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application.'” Id. (quoting same). However, the fee determination should not lead to a second major litigation and “trial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011).

a. Administrative Proceedings

Plaintiff seeks $23,230.46 in atorneys' fees and costs for 62.1 hours of work performed for the first administrative proceeding after applying a 6.6 hour discretionary reduction. (See ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. Ex. T (“Billing Invoice 205601”).) For the second administrative proceeding, Plaintiff seeks $18,603.72 in atorneys' fees and costs for 48.70 hours of work performed after applying an 18.6-hour discretionary reduction. (See ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. Ex. U (“Billing Invoice 225896”).)

i. First Administrative Proceeding

For the first administrative hearing, CLF's time entries began eight months before Coreffi began drafting the hearing request (the first entry is on April 16, 2019) and 20 months prior to the filing of the request. (See ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. Ex. T (Billing Invoice 205601).) In total, CLF billed 35.3 hours before filing the due process hearing request. (See id.) Plaintiff atributes the filing delay to Defendant's failure to timely provide educational records. (See ECF 32, Pl.'s Reply, at 7.) However, Defendant failed to provide educational records for seven months only, and CLF received the records in February 2020, while the hearing request was not filed until January 2021. (See ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. Ex. T (Billing Invoice 205601).)

Defendant requests that if the Court finds Plaintiff to be a prevailing party in the first administrative proceeding, it should deny all time billed before the filing of the hearing request. (See ECF 30, Def.'s Opp. at 23.) Defendant also contends that CLF's billing 20 months prior to filing the hearing request is unreasonable. (See ECF 31, Declaration of Marina Moraru (“Moraru Decl.”) ¶ 10.) “[S]imply because an initial review of the files occurred a significant time prior to the administrative hearing does not mean it was not necessary work completed for the client's benefit.” N.G., 2024 WL 133615, at *6. Therefore, I do not recommend denying all time billed before the filing of the hearing request.

I do believe, however, that the time taken to draft the due process hearing request was excessive. Corett billed 7.9 hours for drafting and editing the DPC, which consisted of seven pages and constituted a chronological recitation of the student's educational history. (See ECF 31, Moraru Decl. ¶ 16.) “Numerous courts in this district have reduced the time eligible for reimbursement in other fee applications involving the drafting of DPCs of similar length or complexity.” Y.S. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 21-CV-02159 (RA), 2022 WL 4096071, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2022); see also N.G., 2024 WL 133615, at *6 (finding a 25% reduction to be appropriate for 14 hours billed to draft a DPC).

In addition, Shobna Cuddy billed 2.6 hours for preparing, reviewing, and forwarding the billing statement to Andrew Cuddy, who then spent 1.1 hours reviewing the statement. (See ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. Ex. T (Billing Invoice 205601).) “Both of these entries are unreasonable, and the DOE should not have to compensate CLF for administrative clean-up of their own time entries.” M.D. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 21-CV-9180 (LGS) (KHP), 2022 WL 19406557, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2557408 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2023). The time entries for preparing the billing statement should be reduced to 0.

Considering the relatively straightforward nature of these proceedings, I recommend that Your Honor should eliminate all time entries for preparing the billing statement, and then apply an across-the-board 20% reduction to the remaining hours billed for the first administrative proceeding.⁴ See H.A. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 20-CV-10785 (PAE), 2022 WL 580772, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2022) (“A 20% reduction is synchronous with the reductions in the firm's compensable hours that courts in this District have made, including in IDEA cases far more complex than this, in the interest of assuring that the fee award captures only reasonably incurred work.”).

4 To calculate these hours, 2.4 hours billed by Andrew Cuddy were modified to 1.3 hours and 2.6 hours billed by Shobna Cuddy were modified to 0 hours. All other time entries were reduced by 20% (Andrew Cuddy, 1.3 hours to 1.04 hours; Corett, 41 hours to 32.8 hours; Mendillo, .4 hours to .32 hours; Bunnell, 1 hour to .8 hours; Green, 4.7 hours to 3.76 hours; Pinchak, 1.8 hours to 1.44 hours; Meghezzi, .6 hours to .48 hours; O'Donnell, 3.9 hours to 3.12 hours; Reeve, 1.2 hours to .96 hours; Bianco, 2.5 hours to 2 hours).

ii. Second Administrative Proceeding

For the second administrative proceeding, CLF's billing records also demonstrate excessive billing. Corett billed 2.5 hours to draft the DPC, which requested similar relief as the DPC filed in first administrative hearing. (See ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. Ex. U (Billing Invoice 225896).) Corett also billed 4.3 hours to review the student's educational records, which only included an additional year of records beyond what was available for the first administrative proceeding. (See id.) Additionally, CLF billed multiple .2-hour paralegal time entries for preparing email requests for K.S.'s educational records. (See id.) Courts in this District have reduced CLF's hours for excessive time spent on review of educational records. See R.G. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 18-CV-6851 (VEC), 2019 WL 4735050, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2019) (reducing CLF's time spent reviewing educational records from 1.2 hours to .5 hours because the records were not voluminous or particularly complicated).

Shobna Cuddy billed 3.00 hours for preparing, reviewing, and forwarding the billing statement to Andrew Cuddy, who billed 1.10 hours for reviewing the billing statement. (See ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. Ex. U (Billing Invoice 225896).) As in the first proceeding, these time entries are unreasonable and should be reduced to 0. I recommend that all other time entries should be subject to an across-the-board 20% reduction.⁵

5 To calculate these hours, 1.3 hours billed by Andrew Cuddy were modified to .2 hours and 3 hours billed by Shobna Cuddy were modified to 0 hours. All remaining time entries were reduced by 20% (Andrew Cuddy, .2 hours to .14 hours; Murray, 8.8 hours to 7.04 hours; Coreffi, 25.6 hours to 20.48 hours; Mendillo, .4 hours to .32 hours; O'Donnell, 4.1 hours to 3.28 hours; Reeve, 5.5 hours to 4.4 hours).

b. Federal Litigation

Plaintiff seeks $25,022.25 in atorneys' fees and costs for 61.53 hours of work performed for the federal litigation after a 4.7-hour discretionary reduction. (See ECF 33, Cuddy Reply Decl. Ex. W (“Updated Federal Invoice”).)

Bush spent one hour drafting the federal complaint. (See id.) The complaint was then reviewed by Andrew Cuddy for .5 hours and by Mendillo for .3 hours. (See id.) This constitutes 1.8 atorney hours for work. Defendant requests that the hours spent drafting the complaint should be reduced to .7 hours. (See ECF 30, Def. Opp. at 22.) Such a reduction is appropriate considering the boilerplate nature of the complaint. See R.G., 2019 WL 4735050, at *5 (finding a reduction from 1.1 hours of time spent on drafting the complaint to .5 hours to be appropriate).

Excessive billing is also reflected in the drafting of the Memorandum of Law and Declarations in support of Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Murray billed 12.2 hours for drafting the Memorandum of Law and Andrew Cuddy billed 0.8 hours to review and provide feedback. (See ECF 33, Cuddy Reply Decl. Ex. W (Updated Federal Invoice).) The Memorandum of Law is very similar those filed by CLF in other IDEA cases; five pages are nearly identical to those in the Memorandum of Law submited in J.G., No. 23-CV-959 (PAE), ECF 22. Murray billed 10.10 hours in preparing and drafting the numerous declarations submited to support the billing rates asserted by CLF as well as .5 hours for filing the reply papers via ECF.⁶ (See ECF 33, Cuddy Reply Decl. Ex. W (Updated Federal Invoice).) I believe Your Honor should discount CLF's proposed billing rates, and I therefore believe CLF should not be compensated for all the time spent preparing declarations to support those billing rates. I recommend excluding the time Shobna and Andrew Cuddy spent preparing the billing statement (2 and .8 hours, respectively), excluding Kopp's time, and making an across-the-board 20% reduction for all other time billed in the federal action.⁷

6 Murray is a licensed atorney, but CLF applied a discretionary reduction to her billing rate for administrative tasks.

7 To calculate these hours, 3.7 hours billed by Andrew Cuddy were modified to 2.9 hours, 2 hours billed by Shobna Cuddy were modified to 0 hours, and .13 hours billed by Kopp were modified to 0 hours. All remaining time entries were reduced by 20% (Andrew Cuddy, 2.9 hours to 2.32 hours; Murray, 46.5 hours to 37.2 hours; Bush, 1.6 hours to 1.28 hours; Mendillo, 3.9 hours to 3.12 hours; O'Donnell, 2 hours to 1.6 hours; Reeve. 1.7 hours to 1.36 hours).

3. Costs

“A district court may award reasonable costs to the prevailing party in IDEA cases.” C.D., 2018 WL 3769972, at *12 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I)). Plaintiff seeks $187.96 in costs in connection with the first administrative proceeding, $3.72 in costs for the second administrative proceeding, and $402.00 in costs in connection with the federal action. (See ECF 33, Cuddy Reply Decl. ¶ 7.) The amounts requested fall within a reasonable scope of costs deemed compensable. See S.F. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 21-CV-11147 (PAE), 2023 WL 4531187, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2023) (finding $402 in costs consisting of the filing fee to be compensable); J.G., 2024 WL 728626, at *13 (finding $262.12 in costs at the administrative level to be reasonable). Therefore, I recommend that Your Honor should award Plaintiff costs in the amount of $593.68.

4. IDEA Fee Cap

Defendant contends that the IDEA fee cap is applicable in this case as of its setlement offer of $21,000. (See ECF 30, Def.'s Opp. at 9-10.) The IDEA provides that “[a]torneys' fees may not be awarded and related costs may not be reimbursed in any action or proceeding under this section for services performed subsequent to the time of a writen offer of setlement to a parent if . . . the court or administrative hearing officer finds that the relief finally obtained by the parents is not more favorable to the parents than the offer of setlement.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i). Therefore, “a plaintiff may not recover fees or costs for services performed after receipt of a writen offer of setlement that exceeds the relief awarded.” S.F., 2023 WL 4531187, at *13 n.15.

On April 6, 2023, Defendant made a setlement offer to Plaintiff for $21,000. (See ECF 28, Lindeman Decl. Ex. 1. (Writen Offer).) Defendant argues that the fee cap should apply if the Court finds that the Plaintiff was entitled to an award of less than $21,000 as of the date of the setlement offer. (See ECF 30, Def.'s Opp. at 9-11.) I conclude that the fee cap should not apply to Plaintiff's fees, because the “relief obtained for pre-Offer atorneys' fees . . . is more favorable than the amount offered by [Defendant] for the same period ....” J.A. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 22-CV-9454 (VEC), 2023 WL 7273742, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2023).

CLF billed its final time entry for the first administrative proceeding on July 8, 2022 (see ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. Ex. T (Billing Invoice 205601)); and for the second administrative proceeding on January 19, 2023. (See ECF 17, Cuddy Decl. Ex. U (Billing Invoice 225896).) CLF's time entries for work billed for this mater were completed on October 25, 2023. (See ECF 33, Cuddy Reply

Decl. Ex. W (Updated Federal Invoice).) As of April 6, 2023, CLF had already begun working on this action and would have been entitled to $21,736.08⁸ in fees and costs for all work performed for both administrative proceedings and work performed for this action prior to the date of the setlement offer. Because this amount is higher than the setlement offer of $21,000, the fee cap does not apply. Therefore, CLF can recover for fees and costs incurred after the date of the setlement offer.

8 To calculate this total, the 18 entries billed for the federal action prior to April 6, 2023, after excluding .2 hours for Andrew Cuddy's review of billing statements and .6 hours for Shobna Cuddy's preparation of billing statements, were reduced by 20% (Andrew Cuddy, .5 hours to .4 hours billed at a rate of $400 per hour; Murray, .2 hours to .16 hours billed at a rate of $225 per hour; Mendillo, 1.3 hours to 1.04 hours billed at a rate of $300 per hour; O'Donnell, 2 hours to 1.6 hours billed at a rate of $110 per hour, for a total of $684). This amount was then added to the costs for the federal action incurred prior to the date of the Writen Offer ($402), and the fees and costs associated with both administrative proceedings ($20,650.08) for a total of $21,736.08.

5. Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest

Plaintiff seeks pre-judgment interest to account for any delays in payment. (See ECF 23, Pl.'s Mem. at 24.) Plaintiff also seeks post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. (Id.) Plaintiff's request for post-judgment interest should be granted because “[t]he award of postjudgment interest is mandatory on awards in civil cases as of the date judgment is entered.” S.J. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 20-CV-1922 (LGS), 2021 WL 100501, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omited). While “[t]he law is unsetled in the Second Circuit on whether a court may add prejudgment interest to an atorneys' fee award,” M.H., 2021 WL 4804031, at *29, Courts in this District have held that in some circumstances the use of current rates in calculating reasonable atorneys' fees accounts for an y delays in payment and prejudgment interest is not warranted. See id. at *31; see also N.G.B., 2023 WL 2711753, at *19 (finding that the plaintiff was not entitled to an award of pre-judgment interest as the Court used current rates in calculating reasonable atorneys' fees). Since I relied on current rates to calculate atorneys' fees, Plaintiff is not entitled to prejudgment interest.

Accordingly, I recommend that Your Honor decline to grant the request for pre-judgment interest.

6. Summary of Recommended Award for Fees

I set forth in the charts below a summary of the recommended fees to be awarded:

FIRST ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
Attorney/Paralegal	Recommended Hourly Rate	Number of Hours Billed	Number of Non-Excluded Hours	Non-Excluded Hours Reduced by 20%	Total Fees (Non-Excluded Reduced Hours x Hourly Rate)
Andrew Cuddy (attorney)	$400.00	2.4	1.3	1.04	$416.00
Justin Coretti (attorney)	$300.00	41	41	32.8	$9,840.00
Kevin Mendillo (attorney)	$300.00	0.4	0.4	0.32	$96.00
Allison Bunnell (paralegal)	$110.00	1	1	0.8	$88.00
Allyson Green (paralegal)	$110.00	4.7	4.7	3.76	$413.60
Amanda Pinchak (paralegal)	$110.00	1.8	1.8	1.44	$158.40
Burhan Meghezzi (paralegal)	$110.00	0.6	0.6	0.48	$52.80

Cailin O'Donnell (paralegal)	$110.00	3.9	3.9	3.12	$343.20
ChinaAnn Reeve (paralegal)	$110.00	1.2	1.2	0.96	$105.60
Emma Bianco	$110.00	2.5	2.5	2	$220.00
Shobna Cuddy (senior paralegal)	$125.00	2.6	0	0	$0.00
FEES - SUBTOTAL					$11,733.60
SECONDA	DMINIS IRAI IVE PROCEEDING
Attorney/Paralegal	Recommended Hourly Rate	Number of Hours Billed	Number of Non-Excluded Hours	Non-Excluded Hours Reduced by 20%	Total Fees (Non-Excluded Reduced Hours x Hourly Rate)
Andrew Cuddy (attorney)	$400.00	1.3	0.2	0.14	$56.00
Erin Murray (attorney)	$225.00	8.8	8.8	7.04	$1,584.00
Justin Coretti (attorney)	$300.00	25.6	25-6	20.48	$6,144.00
Kevin Mendillo (attorney)	$300.00	0.4	0.4	0.32	$96.00
Cailin O'Donnell (paralegal)	$110.00	4.1	4.1	3.28	$360.80
ChinaAnn Reeve (paralegal)	$110.00	5.5	5.5	4.4	$484.00
Shobna Cuddy (senior paralegal)	$125.00	3	0	0	$0.00
FEES-SUBTOTAL					$8,724.80

FEDERAL ACTION
Attorney/Paralegal	Recommended Hourly Rate	Number of Hours Billed	Number of Non-Exclude d Hours	Non-Excluded Hours Reduced by 20%	Total Fees (Non-Excluded Reduced Hours x Hourly Rate)
Andrew K. Cuddy (attorney)	$400.00	0.5	0	0	$0.00
Andrew K. Cuddy (attorney)(new rate)	$400.00	3.2	2.9	2.32	$928.00
Benjamin Kopp (attorney)(new rate)	$0.00	0.13	0	0	$0.00
Erin Murray (attorney)	$225.00	0.2	0.2	0.16	$36.00
Erin Murray (attorney)(new rate)	$225.00	45.8	45.8	36.64	$8,244.00
Kenneth Bush (attorney)	$275.00	1.6	1.6	1.28	$352.00
Kevin Mendillo (attorney)	$300.00	1	1	0.8	$240.00
Kevin Mendillo (attorney)(new rate)	$300.00	2.9	2.9	2.32	$696.00
Shobna Cuddy (senior paralegal)	$125.00	2	0	0	$0.00
Cailin O'Donnell (paralegal)	$110.00	2	2	1.60	$176.00
ChinaAnn Reeve (paralegal)	$110.00	1.7	1.7	1.36	$149.60
Erin Murray (at paralegal rate)	$110.00	0.5	0.5	0.4	$44.00
FEES - SUBTOTAL					$10,865.60

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully recommend that Plaintiff be awarded a total of $31,917.68 ($11,733.60 for fees in the first administrative action, $8,724.80 for fees in the second administrative action, and $10,865.60 for fees in this action, plus $593.68 in costs), plus post-judgment interest.

PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report to file writen objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6. Such objections, and any responses to such objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of Court. Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Woods.

FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010).