Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:18-140
11-26-2018
D.S., Plaintiff, v. HOLLIDAYSBURG/BLAIR COUNTY, BLAIR COUNTY PRISON, BLAIR COUNTY PRISON BOARD, MICHAEL JOHNSTON, and JOHN DOES 1-4, Defendants.
Judge Kim R. Gibson
Re: ECF No. 21 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff D.S. ("Plaintiff") brings this case against Hollidaysburg/Blair County, Blair County Prison, Blair County Prison Board, Michael Johnston, and John Does 1-4 ("Defendants"). Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in Part filed by Defendants. ECF No. 21. For the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and denied in part.
II. REPORT
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants on May 7, 2018, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. ECF No. 1. Therein, he raised three claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Count I: violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (against Hollidaysburg/Blair County, Blair County Prison and Blair County Prison Board); Count II: violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (against John Does 1-4); and Count III: violation of civil rights (against all Defendants). Id. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 11. On July 5, 2018, the case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. ECF No. 18.
Defendants filed the instant partial Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support on July 20, 2018. On August 9, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition. ECF No. 27. On August 22, 2018, Defendants filed a Reply. ECF No. 30. The Motion to Dismiss is now ripe for consideration.
B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In his Complaint, Plaintiff makes the following allegations. On or about December 18, 2016, Plaintiff was admitted to Blair County Prison while awaiting trial. ECF No. 1 ¶ 10. At all times pertinent to this action, Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee. Id. Plaintiff was 19 years old, 6 feet 4 inches tall, and weighed 197 pounds. Id. ¶ 11. He had never been incarcerated before. Id. ¶ 12. He had spent the majority of his life as a ward of the state due to parental abuse. Id. ¶ 13.
On December 18, 2016, Blair County Prison medically screened\Plaintiff and discovered that he suffered from the bipolar disorder, attention deficit disorder, schizophrenia, autism and post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. ¶ 14. The screening also made note that Plaintiff was at greater risk for suicide because it was his first incarceration. Id. ¶ 15. At the screening, Plaintiff requested a mental health provider and revealed that he had been beaten by his mother and raped by his sister. Id. ¶ 16.
On or about December 20, 2016, Plaintiff requested that he be placed in protective custody after a threat from another inmate in general population. Id. ¶ 17. In response, Plaintiff was moved to Cell No. 7 of the Restrictive Housing Unit on "J Block." Id. ¶ 18. Cell No. 7 had one bunk bed and an additional mattress on the floor. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff's cellmates were Roy Harpster and Ralph Emery, who, as Defendants were aware, were convicted sex offenders. Id. ¶¶ 18, 20. Ralph Emery was 55 years old, 6 feet tall and weighed 260 pounds. Id. ¶ 21.
J Block contained 16 cells, one of which is a dorm that housed approximately 15 inmates. Id. ¶ 22. At minimum, two corrections officers responsible for J Block patrolled all cells at 30-minute intervals. Id. ¶ 23. John Doe corrections officers were stationed in a central location on J Block known as the "bubble" where they could hear and see the inmates' physical actions. Id. ¶ 24. There was a video surveillance camera located in the middle of the unit. Id. ¶ 25.
On December 21, 2016, Ralph Emery assaulted and raped Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 26-28. On December 22, 2016, Emery warned Plaintiff not to report their "secret" and raped Plaintiff again. Id. ¶ 29. On December 24, 2016, Emery again raped Plaintiff and told him not to tell anyone. Id. ¶ 30.
Later on December 24, 2016, Plaintiff awoke to Roy Harpster strangling him. Id. ¶ 31. A fight between Emery, Harpster and Plaintiff ensued. Id. Following the altercation, Plaintiff reported that he had been raped. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff was subsequently transported to the hospital for a sexual assault examination which revealed lacerations on his rectum consistent with rape. Id. ¶ 33. Emery ultimately entered a guilty plea to rape in connection with these events. Id. ¶ 34.
C. STANDARD OF REVIEW
As the United States Supreme Court explained in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), a complaint may properly be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. In assessing the merits of a claim subject to a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all alleged facts as true and draw all inferences gleaned therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Worldcom, Inc. v. Graphnet, Inc., 343 F.3d 651, 653 (3d Cir. 2003)). A pleading party need not establish the elements of a prima facie case at this stage; the party must only "put forth allegations that 'raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s].'" Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Graff v. Subbiah Cardiology Associates, Ltd., 2008 WL 2312671 (W.D. Pa. June 4, 2008)).
D. DISCUSSION
1. Eighth Amendment Claims
In support of their partial Motion to Dismiss, Defendants first assert that, because Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee, the Eighth Amendment, which protects against cruel and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, is not applicable to him. ECF No. 22 at 6. Rather, Defendants assert, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs Plaintiff's claims. Id. In response, Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to rights under both amendments. ECF No. 27 at 17-18.
Plaintiff is incorrect. The Fourteenth Amendment protects against punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Pretrial detainees are not yet at a stage of the criminal process where they can be punished and thus they are not within the ambit of the Eighth Amendment and its prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. 520). Plaintiff's claims are thus governed by the Fourteenth Amendment only. Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the Eighth Amendment be dismissed.
2. Blair County Prison
Defendants next assert that Blair County Prison is not an entity separate from Blair County which is capable of subject to suit. ECF No. 22 at 7-8. In his Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff represents that he previously agreed in writing to stipulate to the dismissal of Blair County Prison. ECF No. 27 at 5 n.5. Accordingly, it is recommended that Blair County Prison be dismissed from this case.
3. Blair County Prison Board
Defendants next assert that the Blair County Prison Board is merely the decision-making body for Blair County and that the claims against it are redundant to the claims against Blair County. ECF No. 22 at 8-9. Defendants cite a single case from this District in support of their argument. Id. at 9 (citing Birckbichler v. Butler County Prison, Civ. A. No. 07-1655, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84949 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2009)). In Birckbichler, this Court held that the Butler County Prison did not have the capacity to be sued and "[i]n like manner, if the [Prison] itself has no capacity to be sued, its governing Board, i.e., the Butler County Prison Board, likewise has no capacity to be sued...." 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84949 at *20.
In response, Plaintiff argues that, with respect to this issue, the relevant holding in Birckbichler is "mere dicta and devoid of any legal reasoning or supporting precedent." ECF No. 27 at 16. Plaintiff principally supports his argument that the Blair County Prison Board is a proper defendant with case law from other District Courts in Pennsylvania. ECF No. 27 at 15-16.
As this Court has acknowledged:
There is a split of authority within the district courts in this Circuit as to whether or not a prison board is a separate corporate entity from a county such that it does not have the capacity to be sued as a "person" under Section 1983. See Goodine v. Lackawanna County Sheriff et al., 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19391, 2010 WL 830956, *5 (M.D. Pa.) (citing cases and ultimately holding "[a] county prison board is a local government unit and a 'person' amenable to suit under § 1983").Langella v. County of McKean, Civ. A. No. 09-311E, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100423, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2010). Given the unsettled nature surrounding this area of the law and the early stage of this case, it is recommended that the Motion to Dismiss the Blair County Prison Board be denied on this basis.
4. Warden Michael Johnston - Official Capacity
Plaintiff's claim against Michael Johnston is asserted in his individual capacity and in his official capacity as Warden of Butler County Prison. ECF No. 1 ¶ 5. Defendants assert that the claim against Johnston in his official capacity should be dismissed as redundant because the governmental entity that employs him, Blair County, has also been sued. ECF No. 22 at 9-11. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument.
Johnston is named as a defendant in Count III only. ECF No. 1 at 9. --------
Defendants are correct. A claim against public officers in their official capacities is duplicative of a claim against the public entity that employs them. Cuvo v. DeBiasi, 169 F. App'x 688, 693 (3d Cir. 2006); Koreny v. Smith, Civ. A. No. 17-371, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34841, at *41-42 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2018). Accordingly, it is recommended that the claim against Defendant Johnston in his official capacity be dismissed.
5. Punitive Damages
Defendants next assert that Plaintiff's claims for punitive/exemplary damages should be dismissed as to Blair County, Blair County Prison, Blair County Prison Board and Michael Johnston acting in his official capacity. ECF No. 22 at 11-12.
In his Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff represents that he previously agreed in writing to stipulate to the dismissal of punitive damages against Blair County and Blair County Prison. ECF No. 27 at 5 n.5. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Motion to Dismiss be granted as to the punitive damages claims against Blair County and the Blair County Prison.
However, Plaintiff offers no response in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss the punitive damages claims against the Blair County Prison Board or Johnston. As set forth above, the claim against Michael Johnston in his official capacity should be dismissed. As to the Blair County Prison Board, it is well-established that municipal entities are immune from punitive damages in a Section 1983 suit. Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). Accordingly, it is recommended that the claim for punitive damages against the Blair County Prison Board be dismissed.
6. Count III - Section 1983 Claims
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff fails to state a plausible basis for relief against any of the Defendants for violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because the claims are insufficient and largely redundant. ECF No. 22 at 12-17. In response, and in an apparent concession to the redundant nature of certain claims and defendants, Plaintiff limits his claim in Count III to one of state-created danger against Johnston and John Does 1-4. ECF No. 27 at 11-15. As to this narrowed claim, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support all of the elements of a claim for state-created danger and that Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support a claim for supervisory liability against Johnston. ECF No. 22 at 14-20.
a. State-created Danger
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has identified four elements for a claim under the "state-created danger" doctrine:
(1) [T]he harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct;Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 171, 176-77 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
(2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience;
(3) a relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant's acts, or a member of a discrete class of persons subjected to the potential harm brought about by the state's actions, as opposed to a member of the public in general; and
(4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that created a danger to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting the fourth element, i.e., facts that show that Johnston and the John Doe corrections officers created an opportunity for danger that otherwise would not have existed. ECF No. 22 at 14-15. In his Response in Opposition to the instant Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff makes clear that Count III is based on the placement of Plaintiff in the cell with two known sex offenders. ECF No. 27 at 13-15. Plaintiff further makes clear that that was "Defendant Warden Johns[t]on [who] intentionally placed [Plaintiff] with two known sex offenders , one of whom outweighed [him] by seventy [70] lbs , despite realizing the likelihood of victimization ." Id. at 13 (emphasis in original); ECF No. 1 ¶ 38 (allegation that "Defendant, Blair County/Hollidaysburg, by and through Warden, Michael Johnston and in conjunction with the Blair County Prison Board, and per policy and custom, intentionally placed [Plaintiff] with two known sex offenders ...").
Because Plaintiff does not allege the John Doe corrections officers are responsible for his placement in the subject cell, insofar as Count III is asserted against John Does 1-4, it is recommended that it be dismissed against them. However, Plaintiff's allegations as to Johnston are sufficient, at this early stage of the case, to support a plausible claim of state-created danger. Thus, it is recommended that Defendants' request to dismiss Count III against Johnston, on this basis, be denied.
b. Johnston's Supervisory Liability
Defendants additionally argue that Count III should be dismissed against Johnston because his liability is based on respondeat superior, which is impermissible in a Section 1983 claim. ECF No. 15-17 (citing, inter alia, Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that supervisory liability under Section 1983 cannot be predicated solely on respondeat superior but requires allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence)). As set forth above, Plaintiff alleges that Johnston intentionally placed Plaintiff in the subject cell. ECF No. 1 ¶ 38. As such, this claim against Johnston, as it has been clarified by Plaintiff, is not based on respondeat superior, but on personal action/direction by Johnston. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Motion to Dismiss as to Defendant Johnston on this basis be denied.
7. Borough of Hollidaysburg
Defendants finally argue that Hollidaysburg should be stricken from both the caption and the Complaint because it has no authority to manage and control the Blair County Prison. ECF No. 22 at 17-19. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument.
The Blair County Prison is located in the Borough of Hollidaysburg. Plaintiff makes no allegations in the Complaint against Hollidaysburg itself. Instead, Plaintiff treats "Hollidaysburg/Blair County" as one entity in the Complaint. The Court takes judicial notice that the Borough of Hollidaysburg and Blair County are distinct entities. It is thus recommended that Hollidaysburg be stricken from the caption and the claims against it be dismissed.
E. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 21, be granted as to: (1) Eighth Amendment claims; (2) Defendant Blair County Prison; (3) Defendant Michael Johnston in his official capacity; (4) all claims for punitive damages; (5) Count III as to Defendants John Does 1-4; and (6) Defendant Hollidaysburg. It is further recommended that the Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 21, be denied as to: (1) Defendant Blair County Prison Board; and (2) Count III as to Defendant Michael Johnston in his individual capacity. It is finally recommended that Hollidaysburg be stricken from the caption.
If the above recommendations are accepted, this case would move forward as to compensatory damages on the following claims: Count I: violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (against Blair County and Blair County Prison Board); Count II: violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (against John Does 1-4); and Count III: violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (state-created danger) (against Michael Johnston in his individual capacity).
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/_________
MAUREEN P. KELLY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Dated: November 26, 2018 cc: The Honorable Kim R. Gibson
United States District Judge
All counsel of record via CM/ECF