Opinion
No. CV-08-5009763-S
June 30, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
At issue is whether the court should grant the defendants, Travelers Property Casualty Corp. and St. Paul Guardian Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) Travelers is not a proper party in interest to this action and (2) the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to bar the plaintiff's current action as to St. Paul as a result of a prior arbitration award. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to each party.
I FACTS
The court is familiar with this file, having previously ruled on the plaintiff's, motion to strike the defendant's amended answer and special defenses. See Dressel v. Travlers Property Casualty Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 085009763 S (January 22, 2009, Brunetti, J.). The facts of this case can be gleaned from that prior decision. This litigation arises from injuries and losses sustained as a result of an automobile accident involving the plaintiff, Mark Dressel, and an underinsured tortfeasor, Kenton Weller, that occurred on July 5, 2001. At the time of the accident the plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle owned by the town of Wolcott and insured by the defendant, Travelers Property Casualty Corp. (Travelers). The plaintiff commenced an action against Weller on June 24, 2003, and thereafter the matter proceeded to arbitration, where on April 25, 2008, the arbitrator found in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $21,741.38. On May 10, 2008, the plaintiff exhausted Weller's automobile liability insurance coverage receiving $20,000 from GEICO Insurance Company.
Thereafter, on July 16, 2008, the plaintiff filed a single-count complaint against Travelers, wherein he sought to receive underinsured motorist benefits allegedly due to him under the provisions of his policy. On November 13, 2008, Travelers filed an amended answer and special defenses, which included the defense of collateral estoppel. On February 4, 2009, this court granted the plaintiff's November 30, 2008 motion to cite in St. Paul Guardian Insurance Co. (St. Paul) as a party defendant. The plaintiff filed an amended two-count complaint as to Travelers (count one) and St. Paul (count two) on February 9, 2009.
The seventh special defense provides: "The allegations as to the true value of this case were fully litigated before an arbitrator and an arbitrator decision was issued a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. In accordance with the arbitrator's findings and taking into account appropriate credits, Mark Dressel's recovery is limited. The plaintiff has waived his right or is otherwise collaterally stopped from arguing a value in the case in excess of that already found by the arbitration decision."
On April 14, 2009, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, accompanied by a supporting memorandum of law, arguing that judgment should enter in their favor as (1) Travelers is not a proper party in interest to this action and (2) the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to bar the plaintiff's current action as to St. Paul. The plaintiff has submitted a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendants' motion and the defendants have submitted a reply to the plaintiff's opposition. The matter was heard at short calendar on May 26, 2009.
II DISCUSSION
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Provencher v. Enfield, 284 Conn. 772, 790-91, 936 A.2d 625 (2007). "A genuine issue has been variously described as a triable, substantial or real issue of fact . . . and has been defined as one which can be maintained by substantial evidence." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002). "In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts . . . The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy the burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . As the burden of proof is on the movants the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the opponent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318, 901 A.2d 1207 (2006).
The defendants have moved for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) Travelers is not a proper party in interest to this action and (2) the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to bar the plaintiff's current action as to St. Paul.
A Travelers (Count One)
The defendant, Travelers, moves for summary judgment with respect to count one of the plaintiff's amended complaint on the ground that there are no genuine issues of material fact that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as it is not a proper party of interest to this action. In support of its argument, Travelers makes reference to the plaintiff's motion to cite in St. Paul as a party defendant. Travelers contends that the plaintiff has essentially acknowledged that St. Paul, not it, is the proper party in interest in this matter.
The plaintiff has not objected to Travelers's motion for summary judgment in his briefs, nor did he attempt to refute said argument when presented in court. Accordingly, Travelers's motion for summary judgment is granted. Judgment shall enter in Travelers favor as a matter of law.
B St. Paul (Count Two)
The defendant, St. Paul, moves for summary judgment with respect to count two of the plaintiff's amended complaint on the ground that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to bar the plaintiff's current action as a result of a prior arbitration award. St. Paul argues that based on this court's prior ruling on the motion to strike, the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied with respect to the amount of damages in this action. It argues that the arbitrator determined that the fair, just and reasonable compensation for the plaintiff's injuries and losses was $21,741.38 and that plaintiff has already received $20,000 from Weller's insurance. St. Paul further argues that the plaintiff has received an additional $1,500 from workers' compensation and that it is entitled to a set-off in that amount. Accordingly, St. Paul is contending that judgment should enter in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $236.34 as against itself, the proper party in interest in this action.
The plaintiff objects, arguing that the application of collateral estoppel does not apply to this matter. He argues that although the court denied the plaintiff's motion to strike the special defense of collateral estoppel, the decision is not a final judgment. He contends that the court simply allowed the defendant to rely on that particular special defense during the litigation process and that the defendant has the burden to prove that the issues in the underlying claim are identical and that they were fully litigated. He contends that no evidence has been presented to this court as to what was considered by the arbitrator and what injuries were taken into account at the time of the arbitrator's finding. As such, he argues that issues of material fact still exist and summary judgment is inappropriate at the present time. In response St. Paul argues that collateral estoppel is appropriate in the present matter because Connecticut courts have applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel with respect to factual determinations made in arbitration proceedings and that no issues of fact remain.
It is important to note that the plaintiff has not objected to St. Paul's damages calculation if collateral estoppel was to be deemed appropriate.
"[C]ollateral estoppel, or issue preclusion . . . prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action between the same parties or those in privity with them upon a different claim . . . An issue is actually litigated if it is properly raised in the pleadings or otherwise, submitted for determination and in fact determined . . . An issue is necessarily determined if, in the absence of a determination of the issue, the judgment could not have been validly rendered." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Powell v. Infinity Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 594, 600-01, 922 A.2d 1073 (2007). "For an issue to be subject to collateral estoppel, it must have been fully and fairly litigated in the first action. It also must have been actually decided and the decision must have been necessary to judgment." (Citations omitted.) Aetna Casualty Surety Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 296, 596 A.2d 414 (1991).
"[T]he `crowning consideration' in collateral estoppel cases and the basic requirement of privity [is] that the interest of the party to be precluded must have been sufficiently represented in the prior action so that the application of collateral estoppel is not inequitable." Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 240 Conn. 799, 818, 695 A.2d 1010 (1997); see also Willard v. Travelers Ins. Co., 247 Conn. 331, 337, 721 A.2d 894 (1998) ("[t]he requirement of full and fair litigation ensures fairness, which is a `crowning consideration' in collateral estoppel cases."). "While it is commonly recognized that privity is difficult to define, the concept exists to ensure that the interests of the party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted have been adequately represented because of his purported privity with a party at the initial proceeding . . . A key consideration in determining the existence of privity is the sharing of the same legal right by the parties allegedly in privity." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bagoly v. Riccio, 102 Conn.App. 792, 802, 927 A.2d 950, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 931, 934 A.2d 245 (2007).
"An insured who obtains judgment against a tortfeasor is collaterally estopped from taking a `second bite' particularly when the insurer was in privity with the party against whom the prior award had been obtained." Gilchrist v. Allstate Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 040409633 (Oct. 10, 2006, Owens, J.T.R.) (42 Conn. L. Rptr. 149). "In light of the scarcity of judicial time and resources, the repeated litigation of issues that have already been conclusively resolved by a court carries a considerable price tag in both money and time." Aetna Casualty Surety Co. v. Jones, supra, 220 Conn. 302. "To allow a party who has fully and fairly litigated an issue at a prior trial to avoid the force of a ruling against him simply because he later finds himself faced by a different opponent is inappropriate and unnecessary." Id.
In the present action, St. Paul is seeking to prevent the plaintiff from relitigating a matter that has already been tried. It is of no importance that St. Paul was not a party to the initial arbitration, as the party of interest is the party that is to be precluded. The plaintiff is the exact same party against whom the doctrine is being applied and our courts have held, correctly so, that collateral estoppel is correctly interposed against a plaintiff who has previously litigated an issue regardless of whether the party seeking to assert the doctrine was a party to that litigation. The court finds that this matter was fully and fairly litigated in arbitration and as such the plaintiff is collaterally estopped from attempting to relitigate it against St. Paul.
The defendant, St. Paul's motion for summary judgment is granted. Judgment shall enter in favor of the plaintiff as against St. Paul in the amount of $236.34.
III CONCLUSION
The defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety. Judgment shall enter in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $236.34 as against St. Paul, the proper party in interest to this action.