Opinion
No. 2-658 / 01-1322
Filed September 25, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Delaware County, Richard R. Gleason, District Associate Judge.
Plaintiff claims the district court acted illegally and exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing a temporary restricted driver's license. WRIT SUSTAINED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Carolyn Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.
Douglas Herman of Strittmatter Herman, Monticello, for defendant.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Miller, JJ.
The Iowa Department of Transportation (Department) was granted certiorari review from a district court ruling ordering the Department to issue a temporary restricted license permitting Kevin Finn to drive for employment and substance abuse treatment purposes. We reverse the district court and sustain the writ.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Finn is a habitual offender under Iowa Code section 321.560 (2001) whose driving privileges are barred until April 25, 2003. The district court initially granted Finn's application for a restricted license under Iowa Code section 321.215(2). The court granted the license for employment purposes and substance abuse treatment. The Department objected on the basis that Finn was only eligible for a temporary restricted license under section 321J.4(9). The court subsequently rescinded the order granting the license without prejudice.
Finn then applied for a restricted license pursuant to section 321J.4(9) and requested that the license allow him to drive to substance abuse treatment as well as work. On July 16, 2001, the court granted the application and ordered the Department to issue Finn a temporary restricted license for the purposes of employment and attending substance abuse treatment. The Department then moved to vacate that portion of the order permitting Finn to drive to substance abuse treatment. The court denied the Department's request.
On August 14, 2001, the Department filed a petition for writ of certiorari and request for stay. On February 12, 2002, the Supreme Court of Iowa granted the petition and stayed Finn's license privileges in regards to driving to substance abuse treatment.
II. Scope of Review.
A writ of certiorari lies where a lower board, tribunal, or court has exceeded its proper jurisdiction or otherwise has acted illegally. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1401; Iowa Dep't of Transp. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 570 N.W.2d 461, 462 (Iowa 1997). Therefore, "we may examine only the jurisdiction of the district court and the legality of its actions." Director of Iowa Dep't of Human Servs. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 621 N.W.2d 189, 191 (Iowa 2001) (quoting Christensen v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 578 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa 1998)). Our review is at law. Amro v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 429 N.W.2d 135, 140 (Iowa 1988).
III. Discussion.
The Department contends the district court did not have authority to order it to issue Finn a temporary restricted license under section 321J.4(9) for the purpose of attending substance abuse treatment. Upon review of the record, we agree.
The ultimate goal of statutory construction is to determine and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Beier Glass Co. v. Brundige, 329 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Iowa 1983). The polestar is legislative intent. Legislative intent can be discerned through omissions as well as inclusions. Barnes v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 385 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Iowa 1986).
The right to a temporary restricted license is statutory. Iowa Dep't of Transp. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 592 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1999). Finn's temporary restricted license was ordered pursuant to Iowa Code section 321J.4(9). It provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A person whose non-commercial driver's license has either been revoked under this chapter, or revoked or suspended under chapter 321 solely for violations of this chapter, or who has been determined to be a habitual offender under chapter 321 based solely on violations of this chapter or on violations listed in section 321.560, subsection 1, paragraph "b" . . . may petition the court . . . for an order to the department to require the department to issue a temporary restricted license to the person notwithstanding section 321.560.
. . . .
(d)The court shall determine if the temporary restricted license is necessary for the person to maintain the person's present employment. . . . If the court determines that the temporary restricted license is necessary for the person to maintain the person's present employment . . . the court shall order the department to issue to the person a temporary restricted license conditioned upon the person's certification to the court of the installation of approved ignition interlock devices in all motor vehicles that it is necessary for the person to operate to maintain the person's present employment.
As both parties note, section 321J.4(9) does not expressly provide for the scope of the privilege. However, the Department contends the temporary restricted license allowed in section 321J.4(9) allows persons to operate motor vehicles only when "necessary for the person to maintain the person's present employment."
The Iowa Supreme Court has examined the language at issue. See Iowa Dep't of Transp. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 458 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1990). In that case, the court determined the breadth of the phrase "necessary for the person to maintain the person's present employment" did not entitle the defendant to drive to Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.
The district court's order reasoned that if the legislature intended to restrict a temporary license for work purposes only, then it would have so said. We reach a different conclusion. Two related statutes, sections 321J.20(1) and 321.215(1), both permit the Department to issue a temporary restricted license for substance abuse treatment. If the legislature intended for substance abuse treatment to be included in section 321J.4(9), then it could have provided for it as it did in sections 321J.20(1) and 321.215(1). Clearly, it did not do so. Attending substance abuse treatment is a laudable goal; however, it does not appear that section 321J.4(9) is designed to provide a means to provide habitual offenders a means to get there.
We conclude the district court erred in authorizing a temporary restricted license under authority of section 321J.4(9) for the purpose of attending substance abuse treatment.