Dorlette v. Warden

Full title: Faroulh Dorlette #306054 v. Warden

Court: Superior Court of Connecticut

Date published: Jun 14, 2017

TSRCV154006924S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jun. 14, 2017)

Opinion

TSRCV154006924S

06-14-2017

Faroulh Dorlette #306054 v. Warden

Vernon D. Oliver, J.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Vernon D. Oliver, J.

The petitioner, Faroulh Dorlette, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming various due process violations in the disciplinary hearing that resulted in his administrative detention and other sanctions, including loss of Risk Reduction Earned Credits (hereinafter " RREC").

The petitioner makes due process claims in his petition challenging, generally and specifically in his circumstance, the respondent's disciplinary procedures, the integrity of the disciplinary reporting and hearing processes, and the notice he received relating to his violation.

The petitioner seeks an order from this court reinstating his previously earned RREC, awarding him additional RREC time and " expunging" the ticket from his disciplinary history.

The respondent denies the claims. The respondent also claims that the petitioner has no liberty interest in RREC. Finally, the respondent asserts the special defense that the relief sought by the petitioner is inappropriate in that the proper remedy for the petitioner is for this court to order a new hearing.

I

DISCUSSION

The court conducted the trial of this matter on May 15, 2017. The petitioner submitted his testimony as evidence. The respondent submitted exhibits and the testimony of three employees of the Department of Correction.

At the outset, this court notes for emphasis that it not the function of a habeas court to decide whether the petitioner committed the offense for which he was disciplined. This court will determine whether the petitioner received the benefit of the constitutional processes due to him.

In order to prevail on his due process claim, the petitioner must prove that: (1) he has been deprived of a property or liberty interest cognizable under the due process clause; and (2) the deprivation of the property or liberty interest has occurred without due process of law. (Citations omitted.) Vandever v. Commissioner of Correction, 315 Conn. 231, 241, 106 A.3d 266 (2014).

In Vandever, our Supreme Court set forth the analysis of due process requirements in the context of prison:

In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), the United States Supreme Court considered the process that is due to a prisoner prior to his placement in administrative segregation. " The requirements imposed by the [due process] [c]lause are, of course, flexible and variable [depending on] the particular situation being examined . . . In determining what is due process in the prison context, we are reminded that one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society . . . to the very different situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state prison . . . Prison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security . . . These considerations convince [the court] that [prison officials are] obligated to engage only in an informal, non-adversary review of the information supporting [an inmate's] administrative confinement, including whatever statement [the inmate] wishe[s] to submit, within a reasonable time after [placement in] administrative segregation." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 472; see also Taylor v. Rodriguez, 238 F.3d 188, 192 (2d Cir. 2001) (" [t]he [United States] Supreme Court requires that, assuming the existence of a liberty interest, a prisoner placed in administrative segregation be provided some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation" [internal quotation marks omitted]).

" In a variety of contexts, [including the prison context] the [United States Supreme] Court has [also] recognized that a governmental decision resulting in the loss of an important liberty interest violates due process if the decision is not supported by any evidence." Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985); see also Taylor v. Rodriguez, supra, 238 F.3d 194 (when inmate has liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more restrictive conditions of confinement, decision to transfer must be supported by " some evidence"). This standard is a lenient one, requiring only " a modicum of evidence" to support the challenged decision. Superintendent v. Hill, supra, 455. " Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Id., 455-56; see also Castro v. Terhune, 712 F.3d 1304, 1314 (9th Cir. 2013) (characterizing test as " minimally stringent").

Vandever v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 244-45. The court went on in addressing the bases upon which the respondent might base his decision when it wrote:

The petitioner provides no authority for the proposition that department officials were not permitted to consider his interest in learning about perimeter security, and the fact that he previously had escaped from Osborn and attempted to escape on two other occasions, in evaluating whether he should be placed in administrative segregation, and our independent research has uncovered no such authority. This is not surprising, because we cannot perceive of any reason why it was improper for department officials to consider this information. To the contrary, it is well established that prison officials, in determining the appropriate security classification for inmates, often and for good reason must rely on an inmate's past conduct as a predictor of his or her future behavior. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) (" [t]ransfers between institutions, for example, are made for a variety of reasons and often involve no more than informed predictions as to what would best serve institutional security or the safety and welfare of the inmate"); Crawford v. Lappin, 446 Fed.Appx. 413, 415 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting inmate's claim that his placement in administrative segregation violated due process because decision was predicated, in part, on conduct for which he already had been disciplined, and explaining that " due process is not violated by placing an inmate in administrative custody based on past conduct when that conduct provides a basis for predicting [future misconduct]"); Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2000) (" [e]ven [if the court] conclude[d] that [the prisoner's] continued confinement in administrative custody [was] based solely on his past crimes, the process he received would nonetheless pass constitutional muster, because predictions of likely future behavior based on a generally volatile criminal character have been upheld by the [United States] Supreme Court").

Id., 246-47. In the instant matter, the petitioner seeks to challenge the process by which his guilt for sending unauthorized items through the mail was determined. Along those lines, the Vandever court further emphasized that:

" [A] prison's internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison administrators. In assessing the seriousness of a threat to institutional security, prison administrators necessarily draw on more than the specific facts surrounding a particular incident; instead, they must consider the character of the inmates confined in the institution, recent and longstanding relations between prisoners and guards, prisoners inter se, and the like. In the volatile atmosphere of a prison, an inmate easily may constitute an unacceptable threat to the safety of other prisoners and guards even if he himself has committed no misconduct; rumor, reputation, and even more imponderable factors may suffice to spark potentially disastrous incidents. The judgment of prison officials in this context, like that of those making parole decisions, turns largely on purely subjective evaluations and on predictions of future behavior . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hewitt v. Helms, supra, 459 U.S. 474. It therefore is not the role of this court to second-guess that decision, especially when, as in the present case, there is ample reason, based on the undisputed evidence, to support it. See, e.g., Superintendent v. Hill, supra, 472 U.S. 455 (" that due process requires some evidentiary basis for a decision . . . does [not] imply that a disciplinary board's . . . decisions . . . are subject to second-guessing upon review"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (" [p]rison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security").

Id., 245-46. Although addressing the issue of administrative segregation, it is clear to this court that the same analysis applies to the respondent's safety concerns surrounding inmates sending unauthorized items through the mail, administrative detention and the RREC issue in the instant matter.

In the instant matter, the petitioner received all of the process to which he was constitutionally entitled. The court examined the entire record as provided by the parties, including additional physical exhibits, testimony of witnesses and the weighing of evidence and credibility. The court finds that the petitioner cannot prevail on his claim that he was denied due process prior to being disciplined. The weight of the evidence supports the position that the general notice regarding sending unauthorized items through the mail was posted in a manner visible to the petitioner, the notice to the petitioner regarding the purpose of the hearing, both verbally and in writing, the notice of the claims against him, the assistance of his advocate, the hearing itself and the findings of the respondent were not violative of due process in that they were based on sufficient evidence and were neither arbitrary nor capricious.

II

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Judgment shall enter for the respondent.