Opinion
February 14, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Goldman, J.).
Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that the plaintiffs are awarded one bill of costs.
The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action (see, Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248). The issues raised on appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment as matters which necessarily affected the final determination and which were the subject of contest in the Supreme Court (see, James v. Powell, 19 N.Y.2d 249, 256, n 3; Grande v. Grande, 129 A.D.2d 612; Central Savannah Riv. Area Resource Dev. Agency v. White Eagle Intl., 110 A.D.2d 742; Katz v Katz, 68 A.D.2d 536, 540-541; see also, CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).
The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment (see, Prudential Ins. Co. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer Wood, 80 N.Y.2d 377, 386; Schneidman v. Tollman, 190 A.D.2d 524, 525; Matter of New Haven Plaza Assocs., 134 A.D.2d 596, 597; Koeppel v. Schroder, 122 A.D.2d 780, 783).
The defendant's request for a two-week adjournment of the trial was properly denied. The defendant, in violation of a judicial subpoena, intentionally failed to appear to continue his testimony at trial. Moreover, the defendant had previously been held in contempt for similar conduct (see, Matter of Grottano v Kennedy, 5 N.Y.2d 381, 387-389; Maiello v. Chrysler Corp., 150 A.D.2d 849).
The plaintiff subsequently moved for a default judgment, which was granted. Under the circumstances of this case, an inquest was not required after the Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs' motion (see, Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. NIBA Constr., 195 A.D.2d 425 [Sullivan, J.P., concurring]; Levy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 124 A.D.2d 900, 902). The plaintiffs had already established a prima facie case and an inquest would have duplicated the testimony and other evidence already received by the court.
This case is not an appropriate one for this Court to invoke its inherent power to relieve a party from a judgment in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction (see, McMahon v City of New York, 105 A.D.2d 101, 105-106). The defendant admits that he willfully failed to return to court on the date set for the continuation of his trial. His only excuse was that he was afraid certain outstanding warrants for his arrest would be executed. Not only did he defy the lawful order of the trial court in this case, he violated lawful orders of other courts. To reward him for his willful defiance of court orders would undermine the lawful functioning of the courts.
The defendant's remaining contentions are not reviewable because they were not the subject of contest in the Supreme Court (see, James v. Powell, 19 N.Y.2d 249, 256, n 3, supra; Katz v Katz, 68 A.D.2d, at 540-541, supra; Grande v. Grande, 129 A.D.2d, at 613, supra; Central Savannah Riv. Area Resource Dev. Agency v White Eagle Intl., 110 A.D.2d 742, supra). Thompson, J.P., O'Brien, Joy and Altman, JJ., concur.