Opinion
CV 23-582-SB(E)
06-12-2024
DONOVAN LAMONTE HALEY, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER B. ANGUIANO, ET AL., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
STANLEY BLUMENFELD, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff, pro se and in forma pauperis, commenced this civil rights action on January 23, 2023. The action arose from the March 29, 2022 arrest, search and detention of Plaintiff by Long Beach police. State criminal charges subsequently were brought against Plaintiff, but those charges eventually were dismissed.
In multiple initial pleadings, Plaintiff attempted to bring official capacity claims against employees of the Long Beach Police Department. Because the law requires that such claims be construed as claims against the municipality, and because Plaintiff's pleadings failed to state a sufficient Monell claim against the municipality of Long Beach, the Court dismissed these earlier pleadings. See “Order, etc.,” filed April 6, 2023; “Order, etc.,” filed July 14, 2023.
See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985).
See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
In the Third Amended Complaint (the operative pleading), Plaintiff alleges individual capacity claims against two Long Beach Police employees: Bobby Anguiano (the officer who arrested Plaintiff) and Elaine Gomez (the detective involved in a post-arrest review of the matter). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights in connection with Plaintiff's arrest, search, detention and prosecution. The deadline for discovery and the deadline for adding parties have expired. See Minute Order, filed November 27, 2023; see also “Order, etc.,” filed September 27, 2023.
Currently pending before the Court are two fully briefed motions: Defendants' motion for summary judgment, filed May 1, 2024, and Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint, filed April 26, 2024. Plaintiff's motion, inter alia, seeks to add the Long Beach Police Department as a Defendant to a Monell claim and seeks to add back an official capacity claim against Defendant Gomez (which, again, would be construed as a Monell claim against the municipality). For the reasons discussed herein, the Court should grant the motion for summary judgment and deny the motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants assert, and Plaintiff denies, that Plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law on the evidence presented.
I. Legal Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of offering proof of the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party's burden is met, the party opposing the motion is required to go beyond the pleadings and, by the party's own affidavits or by other evidence, designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Friedman v. Live Nation Merch., Inc., 833 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2016) (where “a moving party carries its burden of production, the nonmoving party must produce evidence to support its claim or defense”) (citation and quotations omitted); Miller v. Glenn Miller Prod., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff who bears the burden of proof on the plaintiff's claims “‘must produce at least some significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint'” in order to defeat summary judgment. Smolen v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 921 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
The Court must “view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw reasonable inferences in favor of that party.” Scheuring v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 476 F.3d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 2007). Where different ultimate inferences reasonably can be drawn, summary judgment is inappropriate. Miller v. Glenn Miller Prod., Inc., 454 F.3d at 988.
A factual dispute is “genuine” only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is “material” only if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law. Id. “At the summary judgment stage, the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence.” Porter v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
II. Defendants' Evidence
Among the evidence presented in support of the motion for summary judgment are the declarations of Defendants, video recordings taken by Defendant Anguiano on March 29, 2022, and the deposition of Plaintiff.
A. Declaration of Defendant Anguiano
Defendant Anguiano declares:
On March 29, 2022, Defendant Anguiano received a dispatch to respond to a report of a robbery in the City of Long Beach. Near the site of the reported robbery, Defendant Anguiano interviewed Roy Gehres, the person who had made the report, and John Peterson, a person standing nearby. Detective Anguiano observed that both Gehres and Peterson recently had suffered injuries to their faces.
Gehres told Defendant Anguiano that Gehres and Peterson had gone into an alley behind a liquor store because Gehres, who is wheelchair bound, needed to urinate. Gehres said that, while he was urinating, they were confronted by a black male who wore a yellow shirt and a red hat. This male reportedly accused Gehres of
urinating in front of children. Gehres said that this male then punched Gehres three to four times in the face. According to Gehres, after these punches, the male reached into Gehres' t-shirt pocket and took from Gehres a debit card and a pack of cigarettes containing $100.00. The male then reportedly told Gehres and Peterson to “Get the hell out of here!” Gehres said that he and Peterson went across the intersection diagonally and called the police.
When interviewed by Defendant Anguiano, Peterson confirmed that he had taken Gehres into the alley to the rear of the liquor store. According to Peterson, three black males approached Gehres and Peterson in the alley and each of the males punched Peterson in the face.
While Defendant Anguiano was still interviewing Peterson, Gehres advised Defendant Anguiano that Gehres had just spotted the same man who had battered and robbed him minutes before. According to Gehres, this man, still wearing the yellow shirt and the red hat, was walking around in the parking lot of the liquor store on the other side of the intersection.
Defendant Anguiano then went to this liquor store parking lot and saw a black male, wearing a yellow shirt and a red hat, near two other individuals standing around
open alcoholic beverage containers. The black male wearing the yellow shirt and the red hat later was identified as Plaintiff.
After Defendant Anguiano asked to speak to Plaintiff, Plaintiff admitted that he had punched Gehres in the face, claiming he had done so because a woman and her children had been upset by Gehres. Plaintiff admitted he had been wrong to put his hands on Gehres. Plaintiff said he was “guilty.” However, Plaintiff denied having taken anything from Gehres. Defendant Anguiano then conducted a pat down search of Plaintiff, handcuffed him, put him in the backseat of Defendant Anguiano's patrol vehicle and told Plaintiff that he was under arrest.
After arriving at the Long Beach Jail's “booking tunnel,” Defendant Anguiano read Plaintiff his Miranda rights. While in the booking area, Plaintiff continued to say that he had hit Gehres. Defendant Anguiano placed Plaintiff's yellow shirt, red hat and wallet into evidence.
Photographs of Gehres and Peterson taken on March 29, 2022, reflect significant facial injuries (see Exhibits 2 and 3).
B. Declaration of Defendant Gomez
Defendant Gomez declares:
Defendant Gomez is a Long Beach detective who conducts follow-up investigative work. She was assigned to Plaintiff's case two days after Plaintiff's arrest. Defendant Gomez reviewed the call history associated with the arrest, Defendant Anguiano's report and the photographs taken at the scene of the alleged crimes. Defendant Gomez also determined that there were no cameras in the alley behind the liquor store. Defendant Gomez submitted the case file to the district attorney. On March 31, 2022, a felony complaint charged Plaintiff with one count of robbery and two counts of battery.
Defendant Gomez had no involvement in the arrest, search, transportation or booking of Plaintiff. Defendant Gomez has never met Plaintiff, has never seen the personal property of Plaintiff that was booked into evidence, and has never directed, instructed or recommended anyone to move, withhold or conceal Plaintiff's personal property.
C. Video Recordings
Defendants submitted to the Court three video recordings taken by Defendant Anguiano on March 29, 2022. These recordings capture portions of: (a) Defendant Anguiano's interviews of Gehres and Peterson (Exhibit 4); (b) the communications between Defendant Anguiano and Plaintiff in the liquor store parking lot (Exhibit 5); and (c) the communications between Defendant Anguiano and Plaintiff in the Long Beach Jail “booking tunnel,” including the reading of the Miranda warnings (Exhibit 6).
The recorded interviews of Gehres and Peterson generally confirm the accuracy of Defendant Anguiano's declaration regarding what was said and what occurred during those interviews. The faces of Gehres and Peterson showed apparently recent injuries. Gehres said that, while he was with Peterson in the alley behind the liquor store, a black man with a yellow shirt and a red hat hit Gehres three to four times in the face and took from him a “Direct Express Card” and a pack of cigarettes containing $100.00. Peterson said that, during the same incident in the alley, he was hit three times (one each by three black men). During the interview of Peterson, Gehres said that he had spotted the alleged assailant/robber (the man in the yellow shirt and red hat) across the intersection. Gehres said, “That's him.”
In the video recording of Defendant Anguiano's interview of Plaintiff, Plaintiff appeared to admit that he had hit Gehres, that Plaintiff knew he had been wrong, that Plaintiff knew he could be arrested for hitting Gehres, and that Plaintiff was “guilty.” Plaintiff explained that he had been upset because of the presence of a woman and her children while Gehres was urinating. Plaintiff denied having committed a robbery.
The video recording in the Long Beach Jail “booking tunnel” captures little other than Defendant Anguiano's reading of Plaintiff's Miranda rights and Plaintiff's claim that he did not understand those rights.
D. Deposition of Plaintiff
During Plaintiff's deposition, Plaintiff testified he had little memory of the events of March 29, 2022, other than a memory of agreeing to speak to the police and then being arrested.
III. Plaintiff's Evidence
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff asserts, “I never assaulted anyone” (“Plaintiff's Opposition, etc.,” filed May 29, 2024, p. 5). Plaintiff argues alleged inconsistencies in police reports regarding the severity of the alleged victims' injuries (id., p. 4). Plaintiff also asserts that there was “no video, or corroborating evidence of any robbery” (id., p. 2).
IV. Analysis of Constitutional Issues
“In the Fourth Amendment context, an arrest is lawful . . . only if it is accompanied by probable cause to believe that the arrestee has committed, or is committing, an offense.” Conner v. Heiman, 672 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Probable cause exists “if, under the totality of circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability that [the defendant] had committed a crime.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
On undisputed facts, Defendant Anguiano had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff on March 29, 2022. Defendant Anguiano had heard the detailed reports of the two alleged battery victims, one of whom also was an alleged robbery victim. Defendant Anguiano had observed facial injuries to both alleged victims. Defendant Anguiano had heard one of the alleged victims identify Plaintiff as the perpetrator. Finally, as confirmed by a video recording, Defendant Anguiano had even heard Plaintiff admit battering one of the alleged victims.
Plaintiff appears to argue an alleged lack of corroboration. However, for purposes of probable cause, “a detailed eye-witness report of a crime is self-corroborating; it supplies its own indicia of reliability. United States v. Elliott, 893 F.2d 220, 223 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 904 (1990) (citations and quotations omitted). In any event, significant corroboration existed in the present case, including a video recording of Plaintiff admitting he had committed a crime.
Contrary to Plaintiff's apparent argument, under the Fourth Amendment, probable cause to believe that a person committed any criminal offense justifies an arrest, regardless of what offense(s) may have been alleged during or after the time of the arrest. See Davenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153-55 (2004); Edgerly v. San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, probable cause existed to believe Plaintiff was guilty of all of the crimes later charged against him. Gehry's report to Defendant Anguiano and Gehry's identification of Plaintiff sufficed to establish probable cause for the robbery charge. Probable cause also existed to believe Plaintiff had committed a battery against Peterson (in addition to the battery against Gehry). Reportedly, Gehry and Peterson had been battered on the same occasion and in the same place. Gehry identified Plaintiff as a person who had approached Gehry and Peterson in the alley, Plaintiff admitted he had battered Gehry, and Peterson said he had been battered by all the men who had approached Gehry and Peterson in the alley.
Plaintiff's current denials of any battery or any robbery cannot avoid summary judgment. At issue here is whether Defendant Anguiano had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, not whether Plaintiff had in fact committed a crime. On the evidence presented, no reasonable jury could conclude that probable cause to arrest Plaintiff was absent. To the extent Plaintiff argues inconsistencies in police versions of events, such as inconsistencies regarding the extent of the alleged victims' injuries, none of the inconsistencies negate the existence of probable cause. Under the totality of the circumstances, no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.
On undisputed facts, the search of Plaintiff incident to arrest, and the separation of Plaintiff from his property also did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 808 F.3d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 2015) (“a search incident to a lawful arrest is a well-established exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement”); see also United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-03 (1974) (Fourth Amendment permits warrantless searches incident to custodial arrests).
To the extent Plaintiff complains of an allegedly malicious prosecution, his complaint fails as a matter of law, if only because the charges against him were brought with probable cause. See Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995); Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 562 (9th Cir. 1987).
Defendant Gomez also is not liable in connection with Plaintiff's arrest for the additional reason that she had no personal involvement therewith. See Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481 n.12 (9th Cir. 2007) (liability under section 1983 is predicated on the defendant's “integral participation” in the alleged violation, and “integral participation requires ‘some fundamental involvement in the conduct that allegedly caused the violation”). Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant Gomez was an integral participant in the alleged events of March 29, 2022. See id.; see also Hill v. City 13 of Torrance, 2016 WL 3679298, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2016), adopted 2016 WL 3658675 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2016), aff'd 682 Fed. App'x 889 (9th Cir. 2017) (granting summary judgment for officers who are not present during arrest); see generally Moreno v. Penzone, 2020 WL 1047068, at *2 (D. Ariz. March 4, 2020) (“To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant”) (citation omitted).
To the extent Plaintiff complains of his personal property not being returned to him in a timely fashion, Plaintiff cannot maintain any viable constitutional claim against either Defendant therefor. Plaintiff has presented no evidence of these Defendants' integral participation in the disposition of the property booked as evidence. Moreover, even an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state or municipal employee does not constitute a federal constitutional violation if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). “California law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property deprivations.” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994).
V. Qualified Immunity
Alternatively, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The defense of qualified immunity protects government officials from 14 liability for civil damages as long as their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights of which a reasonable official would have known. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” City of Tahlequah, Okla. v. Bond, 142 S.Ct. 9, 11 (2021) (citations and quotations omitted).
In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (“Saucier”), the Supreme Court announced a two-step sequence for determining qualified immunity claims. Under the Saucier formulation, the initial inquiry is whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. at 201. “If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. On the other hand, if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.” Id.
Saucier's two-step sequence is not mandatory. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. at 236. Rather, the Court may exercise its “sound discretion” in deciding which of the two steps to address first, “in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Id. at 236.
A court must not define clearly established law “at too high a level of generality.” Id. (citations omitted). “It is not enough that a rule be suggested by then-existing precedent; the rule's contours must be so well defined that it is clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). “Such specificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted); see also City of Escondido, Cal. v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 42-44 (2019) (in Fourth Amendment excessive force case, appellate court erred by defining, at too high a level of generality, the allegedly “clearly established” right simply as “the right to be free of excessive force”). To show that qualified immunity is unwarranted, a plaintiff must “identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.” D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 64 (2018) (citations, ellipses and quotations omitted). “While there does not have to be a case directly on point, existing precedent must place the lawfulness of the particular [action] beyond debate.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted).
In the present case, Plaintiff has failed to identify any precedent placing “beyond debate” the alleged unlawfulness of any of Defendants' challenged actions. In any event, for the reasons set forth above, the undisputed facts show that reasonable officials in Defendants' position would not have believed that any clearly established law demonstrated the unconstitutionality of their conduct. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
After a plaintiff once has amended a complaint, the plaintiff may amend again only by leave of court or by written consent of the defendant(s). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Leave shall be “freely” given “when justice so requires.” Id. Courts should apply Rule 15(a) with “extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysis West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Rule 15(a) is very liberal”). “Five factors are taken into account to assess the propriety of a motion for leave to amend: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004); see Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2014) (same).
In the present case, all relevant factors militate against granting Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint. Some of the content of the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint suggests bad faith, because the proposed pleading would add back municipal liability claims and official capacity claims of the type previously dismissed twice in this same case. Plaintiff's delay in seeking to file the Fourth Amended Complaint appears undue. Leave to amend would significantly prejudice Defendants, who have demonstrated entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law on all claims in the Third Amended Complaint. Plaintiff previously has amended his complaint multiple times.
In numerous other cases brought by Plaintiff, this Court has advised Plaintiff that official capacity claims against municipal employees must be construed as claims against the municipality. See, e.g., “Order Dismissing Complaint With Leave to Amend,” filed March 30, 2019, in Haley v. Long Beach Police Dep't, CV 19-1648-AG(E), p. 6 (and cases cited therein).
Finally, the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint would be futile. Plaintiff can prove no Monell claim, if only because his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. Quintanilla v. City of Downey, 84 F.3d 353, 356 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1122 (1997) (“Under Heller and general principles of § 1983 liability, an individual may recover only when that individual's federal rights have been violated.”) (citation omitted). Plaintiff appears to claim there exists a Long Beach police policy of not requiring a written or recorded statement from a complaining witness before effecting an arrest and prosecution. If such a policy exists, the policy plainly is not unconstitutional. As discussed herein, the constitutional requirement is the existence of probable cause. Probable cause is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances, and those circumstances are not limited to written or recorded statements from complaining witnesses. (Of course, there were recorded statements from complaining witnesses in the present case). The Fourth Amended Complaint's other Monell-related allegations are entirely conclusory. This Court has advised Plaintiff numerous times, in this case and in other cases brought by Plaintiff, that conclusory allegations cannot state a Monell claim. See “Order, etc.,” filed April 6, 2023; “Order, etc.,” filed July 14, 2023; see also similar orders filed in Haley v. Long Beach Police Dep't, et al., CV 22-6721-SB(E), Haley v. Long Beach Police Dep't, et al., CV 19-1648-AG(E), Haley v. City of Long Beach, et al., CV 18-152-AG(E), Haley v. Vega, et al., CV 12-2869-AG(E) and Haley v. City of Los Angeles, et al., CV 12-1113-AG(E). To the extent the Fourth Amended Complaint also would purport to add another individual claim against Defendant Gomez for alleged “falsification” of the charging complaint, no constitutional claim would be stated. Again, probable cause supported both Plaintiff's arrest and Plaintiff's prosecution.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an order: (1) granting the motion for summary judgment; (2) denying the motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint; and (3) directing that Judgment be entered in favor of Defendants.
NOTICE
Reports and Recommendations are not appealable to the Court of Appeals, but may be subject to the right of any party to file objections as provided in the Local Rules Governing the Duties of Magistrate Judges and review by the District Judge whose initials appear in the docket number. No notice of appeal pursuant to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should be filed until entry of the judgment of the District Court.
ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 636, the Court has reviewed the Third Amended Complaint, all of the records herein and the attached Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge. Further, the Court has engaged in a de novo review of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which any objections have been made. The Court accepts and adopts the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation.
IT IS ORDERED that: (1) the motion for summary judgment is granted; (2) the motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint is denied; and (3) Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendants.
JUDGMENT
Pursuant to the Order Accepting Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of United States Magistrate Judge, IT IS ADJUDGED that Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants.