Opinion
1:23-cv-05143-JLR-GRJ
01-17-2024
DONNA M.L., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
GARY R. JONES, United States Magistrate Judge
In August of 2017, Plaintiff Laurice P.applied for Disability Insurance Benefits under the Social Security Act. The Commissioner of Social Security denied the application. Plaintiff, represented by Chermol & Fishman, LLC, Daniel Hersh Fishman, Esq., of counsel, commenced this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of benefits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383 (c)(3).
Plaintiff's name has been partially redacted in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2 (c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
This case was referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation on January 3, 2024. For the following reasons, it is recommended that Plaintiff should be granted judgment on the pleadings and this matter should be remanded for further administrative proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Administrative Proceedings
Plaintiff applied for benefits on August 11, 2017, alleging disability beginning January 1, 2011. (T at 149, 162).Plaintiff's application was denied initially and on reconsideration. She requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). A hearing was held on May 29, 2019, before ALJ Kiernan McCormack. (T at 30-69). On July 3, 2019, ALJ McCormack issued a decision denying the application for benefits. (T at 724). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on January 19, 2021. (T at 1-6).
Citations to “T” refer to the administrative record transcript at Docket No. 12.
Plaintiff commenced an action in this District seeking judicial review of the denial of benefits. On November 29, 2021, judgment was entered remanding the case for further administrative proceedings by stipulation of the parties. (T at 395). The Appeals Council issued a remand order on June 21, 2022. (T at 406-410).
A further administrative hearing was held on February 13, 2023, before the same ALJ. (T at 341-70). Plaintiff appeared with an attorney and testified. (T at 351-62). The ALJ also received testimony from Andrew Vaughn, a vocational expert. (T at 362-68).
B. ALJ's Decision
On February 22, 2023, the ALJ issued a second decision denying the applications for benefits. (T at 312-32). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through March 31, 2019 (the date last insured). (T at 318). The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity between January 1, 2011 (the alleged onset date) and the date last insured. (T at 318).
The ALJ concluded that, as of the date last insured, Plaintiff's degenerative changes of the lumbar spine; osteoarthritis of the cervical spine; asthma; and headaches were severe impairments as defined under the Act. (T at 318).
However, the ALJ found that, as of the date last insured, Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 403, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (T at 321).
At step four of the sequential analysis the ALJ determined that, as of the date last insured, Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work, as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567 (a) and 416.967 (a), with the following limitations: she must avoid concentrated exposure to airborne irritants and excessive noise. (T at 322).
The ALJ concluded that, as of the date last insured, Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as an office manager. (T at 326).
Because the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined under the Social Security Act, as of the date last insured, and was therefore not entitled to benefits. (T at 327). The ALJ's second decision is considered the Commissioner's final decision.
C. Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action, by and through her counsel, by filing a Complaint on June 18, 2023. (Docket No. 1). Plaintiff filed a brief requesting judgment on the pleadings on October 4, 2023. (Docket No. 14). The Commissioner interposed a brief opposing Plaintiff's request and seeking judgment on the pleadings on November 3, 2023. (Docket No. 15). Plaintiff filed a reply brief on November 13, 2023. (Docket No. 16). The matter was assigned to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation on January 3, 2024.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Standard of Review
“It is not the function of a reviewing court to decide de novo whether a claimant was disabled.” Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999). The court's review is limited to “determin[ing] whether there is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner's decision and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standard.” Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
The reviewing court defers to the Commissioner's factual findings, which are considered conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla” and “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Lamay v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 562 F.3d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
“In determining whether the agency's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court is required to examine the entire record, including contradictory evidence and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be drawn.” Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted).
B. Five-Step Sequential Evaluation Process
Under the Social Security Act, a claimant is disabled if he or she lacks the ability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months ....” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
A claimant's eligibility for disability benefits is evaluated pursuant to a five-step sequential analysis:
1. The Commissioner considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity.
2. If not, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” which limits his or her mental or physical ability to do basic work activities.
3. If the claimant has a “severe impairment,” the Commissioner must ask whether, based solely on medical evidence, claimant has an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has one of these enumerated impairments, the Commissioner will automatically consider him disabled, without considering vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience.
4. If the impairment is not “listed” in the regulations, the Commissioner then asks whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he or she has residual functional capacity to perform his or her past work.
5. If the claimant is unable to perform his or her past work, the Commissioner then determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.See Rolon v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 994 F.Supp. 2D 496, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v).
The claimant bears the burden of proof as to the first four steps; the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. See Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2003). At step five, the Commissioner determines whether claimant can perform work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See Butts v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 101, 103 (2d Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(2).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises two primary arguments in support of her challenge to the ALJ's decision. First, she contends that the ALJ failed to adequately account for her mental limitations when determining her RFC and assessing her ability to perform her past relevant work. Second, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in assessing the evidence regarding multiple sclerosis. The Court will address each argument in turn.
A. RFC/Past Relevant Work
A claimant's “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”) is his or her “maximum remaining ability to do sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a continuing basis.” Melville, 198 F.3d at 52 (quoting SSR 96-8p). When assessing a claimant's RFC, an ALJ must consider medical opinions regarding the claimant's functioning and make a determination based on an assessment of the record as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.9527(d)(2) (“Although we consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as ...your residual functional capacity...the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.”).
At step four of the sequential evaluation, a “claimant has the burden to show an inability to return to her previous specific job and an inability to perform her past relevant work generally.” Jasinski v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 182, 185 (2d Cir. 2003)(citing SSR 82-62”). The “inquiry requires separate evaluations of the previous job and the job as it is generally performed.” Id. “The inquiry ... is not whether the claimant is able to perform the duties of her previous job, but whether the claimant is able to perform the duties associated with her previous ‘type' of work.” Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 2004)(quoting Jock v. Harris, 651 F.2d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 1981)).
In the present case, the ALJ identified Plaintiff's adjustment disorder as a medically determinable impairment but concluded that it did not cause more than mild limitation in Plaintiff's ability to perform basic mental work activities. (T at 319).
In particular, the ALJ assessed mild limitation in the domains of mental functioning, i.e., the ability to understand, remember or apply information; the ability to interact with others; the capacity to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and the ability to adapt or manage oneself. (T at 320-21).
The ALJ's RFC determination, however, did not incorporate any limitations with respect to Plaintiff's ability to meet the mental demands of basic work activity. (T at 326).
The ALJ also concluded that, as of the date last insured, Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as an office manager as it is generally performed in the national economy. (T at 326).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by assessing mild limitation in her ability to perform basic mental work activities, but then failing to include any mental limitations in the RFC and by concluding that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work notwithstanding such limitations.
It is well-settled that “[t]he determination of the step three factors of impairment are distinct from the determination of RFC at step four.” Richard B. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-CV-00585-MJR, 2021 WL 4316908, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2021)(citing Whipple v. Astrue, 479 Fed.Appx. 367, 369 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order)(“The regulations make clear that [the step three] factors are only to be applied in determining the severity of a mental impairment ... not a claimant's RFC, which is relevant to the guidelines' fourth and fifth steps”).
“As a result, a finding at steps two or three does not automatically translate to an identical finding at step four.” Chappell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69640, at *18, 2020 WL 1921222 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2020); see also McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014)(“Contrary to McIntyre's assertion, an ALJ's decision is not necessarily internally inconsistent when an impairment found to be severe is ultimately found not disabling: the standard for a finding of severity under Step Two of the sequential analysis is de minimis and is intended only to screen out the very weakest cases.”).
Thus, the Court must determine whether the ALJ at step four adequately considered Plaintiff's mental impairments in formulating the RFC. Compare Edwards v. Kijakazi, No. 21-CV-5985, 2022 WL 4285362, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2022) (“[T]he ALJ ‘clearly considered [plaintiff's] mental impairments as part of his larger RFC analysis.'”)(quoting Michelle B. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:20-CV-332, 2021 WL 3022036, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. July 16, 2021)), with Andrick v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,___F.Supp.3d___, No. CV-21-08051-PCT-DLR, 2023 WL 3022465, *2 (D. Ariz. 2023) (remanding where “[t]he ALJ merely stated that ‘[t]he following [RFC]
10 assessment reflects the degree of limitation the undersigned has found in the “paragraph B” mental function'”); Thomas D. v. Kijakazi, 605 F.Supp.3d 1063, 1067 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (remanding where ALJ provided “no real discussion of these limitations in the RFC other than the broad statements that the ALJ performed ‘careful consideration of the entire record' and that ‘the undersigned has considered all symptoms.'”).
Here, the ALJ did discuss Plaintiff's mental limitations in the context of the RFC determination, including a review and summary of the medical opinion evidence related to Plaintiff's mental impairments. (T at 323, 325).
Dr. Melissa Antiaris performed a consultative psychological evaluation in November of 2017. She diagnosed adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood and opined that Plaintiff had no limitation with respect to understanding, remembering, or applying simple or complex directions; no limitation as to using reason and judgment to make work-related decisions or interacting adequately with others; mild limitation with respect to sustaining concentration, performing a task at a consistent pace, and sustaining an ordinary routine and regular attendance; and mild impairment as to regulating emotions, controlling behavior, and maintaining well-being. (T at 235-36).
In December of 2017, Dr. Y. Burstein, a non-examining State Agency review physician, opined that Plaintiff's mental impairments were non-severe, although she had mild limitation in the domains of mental functioning. (T at 73). In July of 2018, Dr. Kevin Donavon, another State Agency review physician, also found that Plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment. (T at 251).
After reviewing these findings, the ALJ found the opinion of Dr. Antiaris, in conjunction with the opinions of Dr. Burstein and Dr. Donovan, persuasive and “consistent with a lack of significant mental treatment and benign clinical examination findings.” (T at 325).
In addition to the medical opinions and treatment history, the ALJ underscored “the reasonably broad wide range of daily activities [Plaintiff] was able to perform.” (T at 325). Mostly relying on clinical findings from Dr. Antiaris's evaluation, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's “objective mental status examinations prior to the date last insured contain [sic] normal and reflect no more than mild psychiatric clinical abnormalities....[and] [i]t is for this reason, that no cognitive or mental limitation has been included in the claimant's residual functional capacity prior to the last insured.” (T at 326).
This explanation and evidence are sufficient to justify the ALJ's decision to omit work-related mental limitations from the RFC.
Nevertheless, the Court recommends a remand because it is not clear that the ALJ considered Plaintiff's mild mental limitations when concluding that she could meet the demanding requirements of her past relevant work as an office manager.
The occupation of office manager has a specific vocational preparation (SVP) rating of 7. (T at 45, 326). It is therefore considered “skilled work.” See SSR 00-4p (explaining that jobs with an SVP rating of 5 to 9 are skilled work).
Skilled work requires “qualifications in which a person uses judgment to determine the machine and manual operations to be performed in order to obtain the proper form, quality, or quantity of material to be produced.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(c).
Skilled work can “require dealing with people, facts, or figures or abstract ideas at a high level of complexity.” Id. It may require abstract thinking, practical knowledge of machinery and understanding of charts, or exceptional ability “to deal with people, organize various data, and make difficult decisions in several areas of knowledge.” Id.
Plaintiff testified that she had hiring and firing power over other employees as an office manager (T at 43). She worked in direct coordination with the CEO of her corporation (T at 43) and “arm in arm with all the delivery people” (T at 44).
The occupation of office manager has a reasoning level of 4, which requires the employee to “[a]pply principles of rational systems to solve practical problems and deal with a variety of concrete variables in situations where only limited standardization exists.” DOT § 169.167-034 & Appendix C (Components of the Definition Trailer).
The Social Security Administration has taken administrative notice of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), which is published by the Department of Labor and provides detailed descriptions of the requirements for a variety of jobs. See 20 CFR § 416.966 (d)(1).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform her past relevant work, but failed to provide any explanation as to how he reached the conclusion that a person with impaired mental functioning-including impaired concentration, self-regulation, and social skills-could meet the demanding requirements of this occupation on a sustained basis.
Although Plaintiff's impairments are mild, the past relevant work is skilled and demanding. As such, the ALJ was obliged to provide a sufficient explanation and adequate assurance that Plaintiff's limitations were considered at all relevant portions of the sequential evaluation. See Coulterv. Comm'rof Soc. Sec., --F.Supp.3d--, No. 22-CV-1149 (RWL), 2023 WL 3346505 at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2023) (“Adequate consideration of a plaintiff's non-severe mental impairments becomes particularly important where the disability determination turns upon [his or] her ability to perform skilled or highly skilled work.”)(citations omitted)(collecting cases).
Moreover, the ALJ should have addressed the issue with the vocational expert. See Novas v. Kijakazi, No. 22CV1020MKVBCM, 2023 WL 2614362, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2023), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Novas v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-CV-1020 (MKV), 2023 WL 2613550 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2023)(“[W]hen posing hypotheticals to the VE, the ALJ should inquire about even ‘mild' limitations on mental functioning, particularly when the issue is whether the plaintiff can perform skilled past work.”); Rousey v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 285 F.Supp.3d 723, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)(ALJ erred by failing to ask VE to “assume non-severe mental impairments including mild limitations in concentration, persistence or pace,” because plaintiff's “non-severe anxiety and memory impairments may have affected the vocational expert's conclusion that [she] could do her past skilled and semi-skilled sedentary work”); Christopher D. v. Kijakazi, No. 22-CV-0657DGL, 2023 WL 6647558, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2023) (“The ALJ erred in finding that plaintiff was capable of returning to his past relevant work as a logistics manager, a skilled position with a specific vocational preparation (‘SVP') level of 8, despite finding a number of mild mental limitations.”).
Here, the ALJ asked the vocational expert about a claimant limited to low stress work involving simple, routine tasks, simple work-related decisions, and no more than occasional workplace changes. (T at 365). The VE testified that a claimant with those limitations could not perform Plaintiff's past relevant work. (T at 365).
The VE was not asked about a claimant with mild impairment in the domains of mental functioning. And the ALJ's step four analysis provides no insight into the basis for his conclusion that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work notwithstanding recognized limitations in all four domains of mental functioning.
A remand is recommended to ensure an adequate analysis and explanation as to whether and to what extent Plaintiff's limitations, regardless of severity, considered singly and collectively, impact her ability to meet the mental demands of her stressful, skilled past relevant work. See Christopher D., 2023 WL 6647558, at *4; see also Del Priore v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 17-CV-5709, 2019 WL 4415279, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2019).
B. Multiple Sclerosis
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to evaluate adequately the nature and severity of her multiple sclerosis prior to her date last insured.
Following the stipulation and order remanding the matter to the Commissioner, the Appeals Council instructed the ALJ to consider evidence of Plaintiff's MS prior to March 31, 2019 (the date last insured). (T at 408). The Appeals Council suggested that certain medical evidence, including an MRI report and a referral note, raise the possibility that Plaintiff may have been disabled, due to MS, prior to her date last insured. (T at 408). Along with the direction to consider this evidence, the Appeals Council directed the ALJ to “[u]pdate the evidence concerning the claimant's impairments in order to complete the administrative record.” (T at 409).
On remand, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's MS was not a severe impairment prior to her date last insured. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ noted that “all physical and neurological examinations of the claimant since the February 13, 2018, diagnosis through the date last insured were normal and the claimant was negative for tremors and involuntary movements.” (T at 318). The ALJ highlighted the lack of any “objective findings” suggesting Plaintiff suffered from cognitive limitations associated with MS. (T at 318). Finally, the ALJ noted that in her original benefits application, Plaintiff failed to allege MS as a disabling impairment. (T at 319).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to adequately develop the record regarding her MS.
Social Security proceedings are non-adversarial and the ALJ is obliged “to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits.” Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 111, 147 L.Ed.2d 80, 120 S.Ct. 2080 (2000) (citation omitted). This obligation applies even if the claimant is represented by counsel. See, e.g., Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1999)(citing Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1996)). The ALJ's duty to develop the record has been described as a “bedrock principle of Social Security law.” Batista v. Barnhart, 326 F.Supp.2d 345, 353 (E.D.N.Y.2004)(citing Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59 (2d Cir.1999)).
The problem here is that Plaintiff fails to point to any “obvious gaps” in the record. See Rosa, 168 F.3d at 79 n.5 (“[W]here there are no obvious gaps in the administrative record, and where the ALJ already possesses a ‘complete medical history,' the ALJ is under no obligation to seek additional information in advance of rejecting a benefits claim.”).
Moreover, after remand, the ALJ supplemented the previous record with additional medical records. See (T at 548-681)(office treatment records from Dr. Cain Ranjari); (T at 682-729)(emergency department records); (T at 730-740)(office treatment records from Dr. Brijesh Malkani).
Although the ALJ did not order a consultative physical examination, the Appeals Council left this to the discretion of the ALJ (T at 409). This was proper because the decision to obtain such an opinion is squarely within the discretion of the ALJ. See Stephanie M. v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2022 WL 2733441, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2022) (finding that an ALJ did not error in declining to obtain a consultative examination, since the similarly worded Appeals Council directive was “advisory, not mandatory”), adopted by 2022 WL 2733518 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2022).
Because the ALJ was instructed to determine whether Plaintiff was disabled prior to the date last insured, and because Plaintiff has failed to point to any gaps in the record, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not fail to develop the record.
In addition, the ALJ's overall conclusion that Plaintiff's MS did not become disabling prior to the date last insured is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ relied on a reasonable reading of the treatment record, which documented generally unremarkable cognitive and neurological findings prior to the date last insured. (T at 318, 325-26).
For example, Plaintiff had a normal gait, could walk on heels and toes without difficult, required no assistive device, had full strength in the upper extremities, near-to-full strength in the lower extremities, and normal neurologic findings. (T at 242, 269, 566, 571, 574, 577, 714).
In January of 2019, Plaintiff's neurologist, Dr. Agrawal, reported that imaging of Plaintiff brain was “unlikely to be MS, as not a typical age and she has white matter lesion and given she is smoker, migraine, and [hypertension], it could be white matter disease and she [does] not have any episode.” (T at 572). In February of 2019, Dr. Agrawal again noted as follows: “unlikely to be MS, as not a typical age and she has white matter lesion and given she is smoker, migraine and [hypertension], and cocaine use.” Tr. 575.
Plaintiff offers an alternative reading of the record, but this is insufficient under the deferential standard of review to overcome the ALJ's conclusion that the record documents either isolated instances of selfreported symptoms, see Dillon v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 6316422, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2023) (“As with any finding of fact, if the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the court must uphold the ALJ's decision to discount a claimant's subjective complaints.”) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted), or symptoms that relate to a diagnosis of MS, as opposed to a finding that Plaintiff's MS represented a severe impairment, as defined under the Social Security Act. See Colbert v. Commissioner of Social Security, 313 F.Supp.3d 562, 581-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (collecting cases finding that “mere diagnosis” is insufficient to find functional limitations).
Accordingly, for these reasons the ALJ did not err in finding that Plaintiff's MS was not a severe impairment.
C. Remand
“Sentence four of Section 405 (g) provides district courts with the authority to affirm, reverse, or modify a decision of the Commissioner ‘with or without remanding the case for a rehearing.'” Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 385 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g)). Remand for further administrative proceedings is the appropriate remedy “[w]here there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has applied an improper legal standard.” Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Rhone v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-5766 (CM)(RLE), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180514, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2014).
For the reasons discussed above, a remand is recommended to determine whether and to what extent Plaintiff's limitations, regardless of severity, considered singly and collectively, impact her ability to meet the mental demands of her stressful, skilled past relevant work.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff should be granted judgment on the pleadings and this case should be remanded for further proceedings under sentence four of section 405 (g) of the Social Security Act.
PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file any objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (b), (d). A party may respond to any objections within 14 days after being served. Any objections and responses shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. Any request for an extension of time to file objections or responses must be directed to the District Judge. If a party fails to file timely objections, that party will not be permitted to raise any objections to this Report and Recommendation on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010).