Summary
regulating zoning and land use and protecting health of citizens and environment are "clear[ly]" state interests "important enough to warrant abstention"
Summary of this case from Novie v. Vill. of MontebelloOpinion
No. 1:03-CV-934.
March 24, 2005
MARK McCARTHY, ESQ. HARRIS BEACH LLP Albany, NY, Attorney for Plaintiffs
MATHEW LERNER, ESQ. GOLDBERG SEGALLA Albany, NY, Attorneys for Defendants.
ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiffs, Angelo J. Rosse and his closely held corporation, Donangelo, Inc., (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Plaintiffs"), commenced this civil rights action against the Town of Northumberland, New York ("the Town"); Edgar A. King, Town Supervisor ("King"); Douglas Ward, Town Attorney ("Ward"); Richard Colozza, current Town Building Inspector ("Colozza"); Christine McNight, Town Planning Board Supervisor ("McNight"); Howard Doster, Town Engineer ("Doster"); Donald Coons, former Town Building Inspector ("Coons"), (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Defendants" or the "Town Defendants"); as well as Anontia Novello ("Novello"), Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health ("DOH"); and Glenn Bruso, senior sanitary engineer for DOH ("Bruso"). Defendants Novello and Bruso have since been dismissed from this action.
This defendant's name is incorrectly spelled on the caption of the Complaint.
Presently before the court is a motion for summary judgment by the Town Defendants. Oral argument was heard in Syracuse, New York on March 16, 2005. At that time, the court recited for the record the factual background of this case, before hearing argument from both parties regarding the contentious issues in this case, specifically whether the court should abstain from hearing Plaintiffs' claims under the abstention doctrine set forth by the Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746 (1971). Decision was reserved pending another hearing before this court, wherein the parties were to discuss the outcome of a meeting with Judge Frank B. Williams, New York State Supreme Court, County of Saratoga (hereinafter, the "State court"), which was to be held in the interim. Plaintiffs have since so advised the court regarding same. For the reasons that follow, the court abstains from hearing the claims before it in this case. However, because the relief sought in this action is discretionary, the court may not dismiss this action on abstention grounds, but instead stays the proceedings here pending resolution of the State court action before Judge Williams.
II. Discussion
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Defendants argue, among other things, that this court should abstain from hearing Plaintiffs' claims in this action pursuant to the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746 (1971). Although Plaintiffs initially opposed same, they have since withdrawn their opposition to the extent they agree that Younger abstention is warranted here. See Letter of Mark J. McCarthy, March 22, 2005, Dkt. No. 64. However, Plaintiffs correctly note that a stay of the proceedings in this court, not a dismissal, is appropriate, pending the issuance of an order from the State court. See Letter of Mark J. McCarthy, March 23, 2005, Dkt. No. 67.
Initially, this court recognizes that it has an "unflagging obligation" to hear constitutional claims properly brought within its jurisdiction, and therefore, abstention from the exercise of jurisdiction over such claims is "the narrow exception, not the rule." Cecos Int'l, Inc. v. Jorling, 895 F.2d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). With this guideline as a backdrop, the court also recognizes, ever mindful of the principles of federalism and comity underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Younger, that a state proceeding provides a sufficient forum for federal constitutional claims. See Schlagler v. Phillips, 166 F.3d 439, 442 (2d Cir. 1999).
Abstention pursuant to Younger "is mandatory when: (1) there is a pending state proceeding, (2) that implicates an important state interest, and (3) the state proceeding affords the federal plaintiff an adequate opportunity for judicial review of his or her federal constitutional claims." Spargo v. New York State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). Because the court finds, after careful consideration of the factual record before it as well as the written and oral arguments of the parties, that all three of the Younger elements exist here, the court must abstain from hearing Plaintiffs' claims in this action.
Although Younger involved intervention in a state criminal proceeding, the Supreme Court has since extended the abstention doctrine to apply to civil proceedings, "so long as the state court has a means of reviewing constitutional claims." Cecos Int'l, Inc. v. Jorling, 895 F.2d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted).
Although Plaintiffs no longer oppose abstention, the court will briefly discuss the rationale for its decision regarding same. Here, there is a proceeding pending in State court before Judge Williams. The underlying subject matter in the State action deals with the propriety of the installation of septic and water systems at a residential subdivision in the Town of Northumberland ("the Town") by the Defendants in that action, who are also the Plaintiffs in this federal civil rights action. The State action is a consolidation of two separate lawsuits: one initially brought by the State of New York, as well as the Commissioner of DOH, and the second brought by the Town, who is a Defendant in this federal action.
It is clear the state interests implicated in the State action, to wit, the ability of the Town and the State to regulate zoning and land use, as well as the interest in protecting the health of its citizens and the environment, are important enough to warrant abstention. See Wandyful Stadium, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 959 F.Supp. 585, 590 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (action by town to enforce zoning ordinances implicates important state interest); Barker v. Ripley, 921 F.Supp. 1213, 1217 (D. Vt. 1996) (important state interest implicated by enforcement of agency order concerning preservation of public health and environment); Sendlewski v. Town of Southampton, 734 F.Supp. 586, 591 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (town has important state interest in enforcement of zoning ordinances and land use regulations). Although, as Plaintiffs correctly note, the Town's action in State court claims public nuisance violations, as well as violations of the New York General Business Law, that action was consolidated with the State's action, which claims, among other things, violations of the New York State Public Health and Environmental Conservation Laws. Therefore, the second Younger element is present here.
Finally, as is further evidenced by Plaintiffs' recent correspondence with the court in this action, it is clear the State court provides a forum for Plaintiffs' constitutional claims. See McCarthy Letter, Dkt. No. 65. Nonetheless, there is an exception to the Younger abstention doctrine. A federal court may intervene in a state proceeding where the federal plaintiff can show "the kind of irreparable injury, above and beyond that associated with the defense of a single prosecution brought in good faith" or upon a showing of "bad faith, harassment, or any other exceptional circumstance that would call for equitable relief." See Cullen v. Fliegner, 18 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 1994), citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 48, 54, 91 S.Ct. at 752, 755. Plaintiffs here argued that Defendants prevented them from litigating all of the issues attendant to the state court action before Judge Williams. Although this argument is ostensibly withdrawn in light of Plaintiffs' recent agreement that abstention is warranted, it nonetheless is without merit. At least one court has held that the bad faith exception does not apply where there is no showing that the state court proceeding was brought without a reasonable expectation of prevailing. See Wandyful Stadium, 959 F.Supp. at 591. Notably, in that case, as here, the plaintiff voluntarily entered into a consent order in the state action. Moreover, Plaintiffs here fail to cite any evidence in the record to support their contention that Defendants prevented them from litigating their civil rights claims in state court.
All three elements mandating Younger abstention are present here. Further, there is no evidence that the exception to the Younger doctrine applies to prevent abstention. Therefore, the court concludes that it must abstain from hearing the constitutional claims before it in this action. Nonetheless, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this ground must be denied. In Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Company, 517 U.S. 706, 116 S.Ct. 1712 (1996), the Supreme Court concluded that "[u]nder our precedents, federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles only where the relief being sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary." Id. at 731, 116 S.Ct. at 1728 (emphasis added). Such a holding "depends on the fact that a court has some discretion whether to grant or deny an equitable remedy while it has no discretion to withhold relief demanded at law." Cathedral of the Incarnation in the Diocese of Long Island v. Garden City Company, Inc., 99 F.3d 66, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1996). Therefore, where, as here, Younger principles warrant abstention in an action at law for monetary damages, as opposed to equitable injunctive relief, the court may not grant summary judgment on that ground, but instead "a stay of the action pending resolution of the state proceeding may be appropriate." Kirschner v. Klemons, 225 F.3d 227, 238 (2d Cir. 2000).
The court acknowledges receipt of Defendants' most recent correspondence regarding this issue. See Letter of Matthew S. Lerner, March 24, 2005, Dkt. No. 68. However, for the reasons heretofore mentioned, the court concludes that a stay of the proceedings in this action is the required result.
For the above reasons, the proceedings before this court are STAYED pending resolution of the claims before the New York State Supreme Court, County of Saratoga. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is hereby DENIED without prejudice to renew same.
IT IS SO ORDERED.