Opinion
No. 1:01-CV-0610 (FJS/DRH)
March 12, 2003
AMBROSE W. WOTERSON, ESQ., LAW OFFICES OF AMBROSE WOTERSON, P.C., Brooklyn, New York, Attorneys for Plaintiff
JEANETTE RODRIGUEZ-MORICK, AAG, OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Albany, New York, Attorneys for Defendant
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, John Dolson, brings the instant civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983 against Defendants, the New York State Thruway Authority ("NYSTA"), Gary Francis, William Rinaldi, Robert Pardy and Rafael Morales, alleging race-based and retaliatory termination in violation of the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff's first cause of action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserts that Defendants "violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by denying plaintiff equal protection of the laws on the basis of his race, by retaliating against him when he opposed such discrimination and by judging him guilty of infractions that he had no constitutionally valid notice of." See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 18. Liberally read, Plaintiff's first cause of action appears to actually assert three separate claims: (1) an equal protection claim based on his allegedly race-based termination; (2) a retaliation claim asserting that he was terminated for opposing Defendants' allegedly discriminatory practices; and (3) a procedural due process claim related to allegedly ineffective notice of disciplinary charges. In his second cause of action, Plaintiff asserts a retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, stemming from his "opposition to [Defendants'] discrimination." See id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiff seeks reinstatement, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. See id. at 6.
By Decision and Order dated November 30, 2001, Defendant Morales was dismissed from the action without prejudice for failure to timely serve process. See Dkt. No. 19.
Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to each cause of action.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, John A. Dolson, an African-American male, was employed by Defendant NYSTA in various capacities between 1982 and 1997. The gravamen of Plaintiff's complaint is that he was subjected to racially offensive conduct during his employment with Defendant NYSTA and that the disciplinary charges that ultimately led to his termination were brought against him, at least in part, out of racial animus. Specifically, Plaintiff appears to take issue with his culpability for the charged instances of misconduct, arguing, inter alia, that his conduct should have been excused as a response to racial harassment.
Plaintiff was terminated on December 23, 1997, after a disciplinary hearing in which he was adjudged guilty of several acts of misconduct, including vandalism of NYSTA property, recklessness, tardiness, and insubordination. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between Plaintiff's union, New York State Thruway Employees International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 72, and Defendant NYSTA, the disciplinary charges against Plaintiff were submitted to arbitration. The resulting disciplinary hearing was conducted before an independent hearing officer over six days in 1996 and 1997. Throughout the hearings, Plaintiff was represented by counsel and his union, called witnesses in his defense, and cross-examined the witnesses against him.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The ultimate inquiry is whether a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party based on the evidence presented, the legitimate inferences drawn from that evidence in favor of the non-moving party, and the applicable burden of proof. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
B. Defendant New York State Thruway Authority
The Second Circuit has held that Defendant NYSTA is not an "arm of the state" for the purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Mancuso v. New York State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 296 (2d Cir. 1996). Accordingly, Defendant NYSTA's potential liability under §§ 1981 and 1983 is subject to the same analysis employed for counties, municipal corporations, and other political subdivisions. See id. at 292 (citation omitted).
A municipality may be liable under §§ 1981 and 1983 for unconstitutional acts carried out pursuant to an official policy or custom. See Azon v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 00 Civ. 6031, 2002 WL 959563, *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2002) (quoting Bd. of City Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 502 U.S. 397 (1997)); see generally Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). An unconstitutional policy may be established by showing that "`a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.'" Brogdon v. City of New Rochelle, 200 F. Supp.2d 411, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1300, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)) (other citation omitted). Whether a particular defendant has "final policymaking authority is a question of state law and is an issue to be decided by the court." Frank v. Relin, 1 F.3d 1317, 1327 (2d Cir 1993) (citation omitted).
Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to allege or offer evidence of an explicit or tacit policy or custom of racial discrimination on the part of Defendant NYSTA. Defendants additionally assert that Plaintiff has not established that any Defendant is an official responsible for establishing final policy with respect to decisions to terminate employees. Plaintiff does not directly respond to this argument in his motion papers.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Defendant NYSTA had an official policy or custom of racial discrimination in its decisions to terminate employees. Accordingly, the only other avenue by which Plaintiff can establish the existence of an unconstitutional policy on the part of Defendant NYSTA is if an individual, or individuals, with final policymaking authority had deliberately chosen an unlawful course of conduct with respect to Plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff has identified no such individual, much less presented any argument that such an individual is, in fact, an official with final policymaking authority, as defined by state law. For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to all of Plaintiff's claims against Defendant NYSTA.
C. Individual Defendants
As an initial matter, for liability to attach under either § 1983 or § 1981, Plaintiff must establish that each individual Defendant was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations. See Brogdon, 200 F. Supp.2d at 426 (personal involvement of individual defendants is a prerequisite to liability under § 1983) (quotation omitted); Vasquez v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., No. 01 CIV 2895, 2002 WL 10493, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2002) (a plaintiff must establish personal involvement of individual defendants in claims brought under § 1981) (quoting Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 75 (2d Cir. 2000)) (other citation omitted). In the instant case, it is unclear how any of the individual Defendants can be held liable with respect to Plaintiff's allegedly wrongful termination. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was adjudged guilty of various disciplinary infractions by an independent hearing officer. The hearing officer recommended that Plaintiff's employment be terminated and Defendant NYSTA's Executive Director, John Platt, who is not among the named Defendants, accepted that recommendation. See Affidavit of Deborah Haslun, sworn to October 4, 2002 ("Dkt. No. 31"), at ¶ 18 and Exhibit "21." Moreover, the decision to seek Plaintiff's termination was not made by any of the named Defendants, but rather by the Director of Labor Relations with the consent and approval of the Director of Human Resources Management, neither of whom are named as Defendants. See id. at ¶ 2-3; Affidavit of Thomas Fitzgerald, sworn to October 4, 2002 ("Dkt. No. 32"), at ¶ 8. Finally, there is no indication in the record that the individual Defendants had any involvement in the creation or delivery of the allegedly defective disciplinary charge letters.
Plaintiff offers no evidence or argument to support the conclusion that the individual Defendants were personally involved in either the decision to seek his termination, the ultimate decision to terminate his employment, or the creation and delivery of the allegedly defective disciplinary charge letters. Rather, in his response to Defendants' Statement of Material Facts, Plaintiff cursorily denies Defendants' assertion that the individual Defendants were not personally involved in the decisions at issue. Plaintiff cites his own affidavit in support of this position. See Dkt. No. 36, Exhibit "33" at ¶ 60, 61. However, the paragraphs of his affidavit that Plaintiff cites merely reiterate his general allegations against Defendants Francis, Pardy and Rinaldi, i.e., that each was responsible for various alleged incidents of harassment during his tenure at NYSTA, and shed no light whatsoever on whether they were personally involved in the employment decisions at issue. See Dkt. No. 36, Exhibit "32" at ¶ 5, 9, 11. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to all claims against the individual Defendants on the ground that Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence that the individual Defendants were personally involved in the employment actions of which he complains.
D. The Merits of Plaintiff's Claims
Even if Plaintiff could establish that any of the Defendants were personally involved in his allegedly wrongful termination, Plaintiff's claims fail on the merits.
As set forth above, Plaintiff's claims fall broadly into two categories. First, Plaintiff alleges that his race played a direct role in the decision to terminate his employment. Second, Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated in retaliation for opposing Defendants' racially discriminatory practices.
Employment discrimination claims brought under §§ 1981 and 1983 are analyzed under the burden shifting framework employed in Title VII cases. See Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 27 n. 2 (2d Cir. 1993) (Title VII analysis is "fully applicable to constitutional claims where the issue is whether an improper motive existed") (citations omitted); Taitt v. Chemical Bank, 849 F.2d 775, 777 (2d Cir. 1988) (employing Title VII analysis in § 1981 retaliation case) (citation omitted). Under that framework
a plaintiff must [first] satisfy the minimal burden of making out a prima facie case of discrimination; the burden then shifts to the defendant to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions; and the final burden rests on the plaintiff to prove not only that the proffered nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual but also that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff.
Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 2001) (ADEA context) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)).
Where an independent tribunal adjudges an employee guilty of misconduct and recommends or affirms that employee's termination, such a finding is "highly probative of the absence of discriminatory intent in that termination." Collins v. New York City Transit Auth., 305 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). In such circumstances, the aggrieved employee is not barred from bringing an action in federal court alleging discriminatory termination. See id. (citing Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 45-60, 60 n. 21, 94 S.Ct. 1011). However, to survive summary judgment, the plaintiff "must present strong evidence that the decision [of the independent tribunal] was wrong as a matter of fact — e.g. new evidence not before the tribunal — or that the impartiality of the proceeding was somehow compromised." Id.
Plaintiff does not allege that the impartiality of the hearing was compromised nor does he allege new facts not before the hearing officer. Rather, the gist of Plaintiff's argument is that the various charges against him were motivated in the first instance by racial animus and that his misconduct should have been excused as a response to racial harassment. These very arguments, however, were acknowledged and implicitly rejected by the hearing officer. See Dkt. No. 31, Exhibit "20" at 16-17. The Court thus finds that Plaintiff has introduced no evidence to overcome the probative weight of the decision of the independent arbitrator and, therefore, Plaintiff's claims also fail on the merits.
IV. CONCLUSION
After carefully considering the file in this matter, the parties' submissions, and the applicable law, and for the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in its entirety; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court enter judgment for Defendants and close this case. IT IS SO ORDERED.