Opinion
FBTCV165032101S
07-20-2017
John Doe v. Villa Marie Education Center et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION TO STRIKE
Richard E. Arnold Judge.
Pursuant to Practice Book § 10-39, the defendants, Villa Marie Education Center, Inc., The Bernadine Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis of Stamford, Conn., Inc, The Bernadine Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis and Carol Ann Nawracaj, have moved to strike Count One and Count Three of the plaintiff's complaint dated October 4, 2016. The defendants maintain that these two counts are insufficient as a matter of law because: (1) the defendants cannot be held vicariously liable for an employee's alleged sexual assault of the plaintiff and; (2) the plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to establish the requisite fraud, self-dealing or conflict of interest on the part of the defendants to support a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
The complaint contains four counts. Count Two alleges negligence. Count Four apparently alleges negligence in that this count claims the defendants breached " special duties owed to the plaintiff" by several defendants by failing " to act affirmatively and proactively to monitor and supervise" their employee to protect the plaintiff. Counts Two and Four are not the subject of the present motion to strike.
In support of their claims, the defendants have submitted a memorandum of law and a reply memorandum of law. The plaintiff has filed his objection and supporting memorandum of law. The court heard oral argument on the motion to strike on March 27, 2017.
This action arises from the alleged sexual abuse of the plaintiff while he was a minor student at the Villa Marie Education Center, Inc. (" Villa Marie") from 1977 to 1983. Villa Marie is a full-time day school for children with learning disabilities. The school is owned and operated by a Catholic " religious community of women" known as the Bernadine Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis (the " Sisters"). The defendant, Sister Carol Ann Nawracaj, was the executive director of the school at some of the relevant times alleged in the complaint. The plaintiff alleges that one of his teachers, Sister Domitian, who is deceased, " sexually abused, sexually assaulted, sexually battered and sexually exploited" him while he was a minor attending the school. He also alleges that Sister Domitian " was acting as a nun" at all relevant times.
The defendants state the precise term for Sister Domitian, is " sister" as the term " nun" is defined in different terms, although in normal discourse the terms are used interchangeably.
I
Standard of Law: Motion to Strike
" A motion to strike attacks the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a pleading." Keane v. Fischetti, 300 Conn. 395, 402, 13 A.3d 1089 (2011). " [I]t is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 116-17, 19 A.3d 640 (2011).
" In reviewing the sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint, courts are to assume the truth of the facts pleaded therein and to determine whether those facts establish a valid cause of action . . . If the pleading fails to establish a valid cause of action, a court shall grant a motion to strike the offending claims." (Citation omitted.) Keane v. Fischetti, supra, 300 Conn. 402. On the other hand, " [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).
II
Count One: Vicarious Liability
The defendants argue that, as a matter of law, they are not vicariously liable for the alleged sexual assault on the plaintiff by Sister Domitian, as any sexual assault was an intentional tort and was not within the scope of Sister Domitian's employment or in the furtherance of her defendant employers' business. " We have long adhered to the principle that in order to hold an employer liable for the intentional torts of his employee, the employee must be acting within the scope of his employment and in furtherance of the employer's business." A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 216 Conn. 200, 208, 579 A.2d 69 (1990); Cardona v. Valentin, 160 Conn. 18, 22, 273 A.2d 697 (1970). " [I]t must be the affairs of the principal, and not solely the affairs of the agent, which are being furthered in order for the doctrine to apply." (Citations omitted.) Id. " A servant acts within the scope of employment while engaged in the service of the master, and it is not synonymous with the phrase 'during the period covered by his employment.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 209-10. " While a servant may be acting within the scope of his employment when his conduct is 'negligent, disobedient and unfaithful' that does not end the inquiry. Rather, 'the vital inquiry in this type of case is whether the servant on the occasion in question was engaged in a disobedient or unfaithful conducting of the master's business, or was engaged in an abandonment of the master's business . . ." (Internal citations omitted.) Id. Therefore, if an employee's actions are not authorized by his employer, and the employee is acting for his own interests and not in furtherance of his employer's business, the employer cannot be held vicariously liable for the employee's actions.
The defendants assert that the actions of Sister Domitian in allegedly sexually assaulting a minor child, such as the plaintiff, is never within the scope of her employment. " [S]exual assaults on the plaintiff were repugnant to his employer's business and in utter contravention of the employer's aims and rules. Unlike a situation in which a servant performs the master's work poorly or misunderstands what the master wants done, the molestation of children is a total abdication of the master's work so that the pedophile priest can satisfy personal lust." Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 49 Conn.Supp. 667, 671, 909 A.2d 983 (2006).
The defendants claim the same is true for a teacher's alleged sexual assault of a minor student. See, Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, No. KNLCV146021601S (Oct. 14, 2015, Cole-Chu, J.), 61 Conn.L.Rptr. 95,; Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury. No. X10UWYCV105015963 (May 9, 2014, Dooley, J.), 58 Conn.L.Rptr. 177, . In Sparano v. Daughters of Wisdom, Inc . Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, No. X08CV030199399 (July 1, 2004, Adams, J.), 37 Conn.L.Rptr. 422, the plaintiff alleged that while she was a minor child attending Waterbury Catholic High School in Waterbury, Connecticut, a defendant Sister, who was acting as a nun and teacher at the high school, sexually abused, assaulted and exploited the plaintiff causing her injury and damage. Id. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant Congregation of Notre Dame of Ridgefield, Inc. was a religious community of women that controlled, supervised and was responsible for all teachers at Waterbury Catholic High School. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant Daughters of Wisdom, Inc. was a religious community of women that controlled, supervised and was responsible for all teachers at the high school. It was alleged that the defendant Sister was an " agent and/or employee of the defendant Congregation and/or the defendant Daughters" during the time the plaintiff attended the high school. Id. Among the counts alleged by the plaintiff were counts seeking to hold the Congregation of Notre Dame of Ridgefield, Inc. and the Daughters of Wisdom, Inc., vicariously liable on a theory of respondeat superior for the defendant Sister's alleged torts. Id. The trial court struck these claims on the grounds that the defendant Sister's alleged conduct was " nothing less than a clear digression from duty and an abandonment of the [employer's] interests." Id.
In summary, the defendants argue that Sister Domitian's alleged sexual assault of the plaintiff was a clear digression from her duties and an abandonment of the interests of the school and the Bernadine Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis. Therefore, because Sister Domitian's conduct was not within the scope of her employment, as a matter of law, the court should strike Count One, the vicarious liability claim.
The plaintiff has filed his objection arguing that there are only " occasional cases" where the employee's digression from duty is so " clear-cut" that the matter can be disposed of as a matter of law. A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., supra, 216 Conn. 207, and this is not one of them. The plaintiff claims that a question of fact exists as to whether Sister Domitian was a " disobedient servant" whose conduct was sufficiently within the scope of her employment, so as to impose vicarious liability. Even a " negligent, disobedient and unfaithful" servant may be acting within the scope of his employment. Id. at 210. " The doctrine of respondeat superior focuses on the employee's conduct rather than on the employer's knowledge or approval of the acts. If the employee acted with apparent authority in furtherance of employer business, the employer's consent or ratification of the misconduct is irrelevant . . . even an innocent employer must compensate an injured party." Belanger v. Village Pub, 26 Conn.App. 509, 603 A.2d 1173 (1992); Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Winters, 22 Conn.App. 640, 646, 579 A.2d 545, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 820, 581 A.2d 1055 (1990). " The doctrine of respondeat superior, which makes the employer liable for actions by an employee, is based on public policy considerations that the employer shall be held responsible for the acts of those whom he employs, done in and about his business, even though such acts are directly in conflict with the orders which he has given him on the subject." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Belanger v. Village Pub, supra, 26 Conn.App. 520, citing Stulginski v. Cizauskas, 125 Conn. 293, 296, 5 A.2d 10 (1939). The plaintiff argues that Sister Domitian's establishment of a nun and teacher relationship with the plaintiff was actuated by a desire to fulfill her pedagogical or teaching methods and mission. A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., supra, 216 Conn. 200. Thus, Sister Domitian's alleged transgressions was the culmination of a series of acts that were actuated " at least in part" by a purpose to serve her employer and furthered the purpose of her mission as a nun. See Wilson v. R.F.K. Corporation, 19 Conn.App. 548, 563 A.2d 738 (1989); Glucksman v. Walters, 38 Conn.App. 140, 659 A.2d 1217, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 914, 665 A.2d 608 (1995).
The plaintiff relies on several cases that do not involve the sexual molestation of a minor child. The alleged criminal assault and sexual molestation of a child is a complete abandonment of any employer's business and is performed, as the defendants argue, only to satisfy the employee's personal and deviant sexual needs. It has no connection to the defendants' business of teaching minor children; especially children with learning disabilities. See Doe ex rel Lemieux v. Talabi, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, No. HHDCV075009974, May 12, 2008, Bentivegna, J.) (bus driver's sexual assault of student was criminal conduct that had no connection to the defendant's business of providing transportation for special education students).
In the context of a sexual abuse case against a member of the clergy, the plaintiff cites Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 989 F.Supp. 110 (D.Conn. 1997). In Martinelli, the plaintiff claimed to have been sexually abused by a priest and alleged the Diocese was responsible for the actions of its employee priest. The court refused to grant summary judgment determining that it was a question of fact as to whether or not the sexual encounters between the plaintiff and the priest were a culmination of transactions related to the priest's duties to administer and promote the sacraments. Id. The plaintiff claims that a trier of fact could reasonably find that Sister Domitian's sexual abuse of the plaintiff was a " misguided effort" at spiritually counseling, teaching and ministering to the plaintiff rather than an abandonment of her duties. It could just be an extreme and clearly unauthorized method of spiritually and emotionally counseling and teaching the plaintiff. See Mullen v. Horton, 46 Conn.App. 759, 767, 700 A.2d 1377 (1997).
However, as the defendants note, the Martinelli court focused on the plaintiff's claim that the priest incorporated his sexual acts into the " administration of sacraments" such as Holy Communion. Id. at 118.There is no such claim here regarding the acts of Sister Domitian. In Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 309 F.Supp.2d, 247 (D.Conn. 2004), the court focused on the claim that the priest committed sexual acts during " counseling sessions" with the plaintiff. Id., 250 and concluded that the case was controlled by our Appellate Court's decision in Mullen v. Horton, supra, 46 Conn.App. 759, 767 (1997). However, the priest in Mullen was a practicing psychologist, and was providing professional care and treatment to the plaintiff in that capacity. Id., 761. The religious order also retained profits from the priest's clinical psychology practice. Id., 765. Finally, the plaintiff in Mullen was an adult who engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with the priest. Id., 765, 770. " A consensual sexual relationship between two adults arising from church sponsored counseling sessions" is distinguishable from a priest criminally, sexually molesting children. Id., 770. The latter situation " represents one of those exceptional cases in which the servant's digression from duty is so clear cut that the disposition of the case is a matter of law." Id., at 770-71. " A majority of courts that have considered the issue have rejected respondeat superior claims in cases alleging sexual abuse by priests. These courts have thus held sexual misconduct by clergy not to be within the scope of employment." Jane Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, No. X07CV085029882S, (Sept. 2, 2010, Berger, J.). " Cases of sexual abuse often represent such a strong deviation from furthering an employer's business." Id. " In most cases of alleged sexual abuse by priests, the courts have held that respondeat superior is not applicable to hold a church or diocese liable, because such acts by the priests are not in furtherance of the church's business." Id., citing Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F.Supp.2d 139, 142 (D.Conn. 2003); accord Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan, 921 F.Supp. 66, 71 (D.Conn. 1995); Sparano v. Daughters of Wisdom, Inc., Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Stamford, Docket No. X08 CV 03 0199399 (July 1, 2004, Adams, J.), 37 Conn.L.Rptr. 422, 424,; Dumais v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocese, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Tolland, Docket No. X07 CV 01 0077631 (July 31, 2002, Sferrazza, J.), 32 Conn.L.Rptr. 693, 693,; Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 45 Conn.Supp. 388, 394-95, 716 A.2d 960, 23 Conn.L.Rptr. 34 (1998).
The court recognizes that " [o]rdinarily it is a question of fact as to whether a wilful tort of the servant has occurred within the scope of the servant's employment and was done to further his master's business." A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., supra, at 207. However, the present case is one of the " occasional cases where a servant's digression from duty is so clear-cut that the disposition of the case becomes a matter of law." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also, Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, No. HHDCV115035749S (Jan. 7, 2014, Peck, J., 58 Conn.L.Rptr. 132, . " [R]espondeat superior is not applicable to hold a church or diocese liable, because such acts by the priests are not in furtherance of the church's business." Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, No. HHDCV115035749S, (Jan. 7, 2014, Peck, J.).
Count One states in conclusory fashion that the sexual abuse of the plaintiff occurred while Sister Domitian was acting in the course and scope of her duties [as a nun and teacher] as an agent, servant and/or employee of the defendants Villa Marie, Bernadine Sisters OSF and Bernadine Franciscan Sisters in supervising and chaperoning minors and concludes these acts were in the scope of her employment for these defendants. Count One, based on the theory of respondeat superior, fails as a matter of law. The motion to strike Count One is granted.
The plaintiff has not specifically alleged that Sister Domitian's actions were in " furtherance" of the defendants' business purposes. However the court construes the complaint liberally in the entire context of the allegations.
III
Count Three: Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Count Three alleging a breach of fiduciary duty incorporates paragraphs 1-19 of Count One, which alleged vicarious liability. The plaintiff additionally alleges that he was raised as a practicing Catholic and was raised to put his faith and trust in the nuns and teachers at Villa Marie, and he did so. He was taught to follow the mandates and guidance of the nuns and teachers of Villa Marie. As a result, the plaintiff alleges he developed a degree of trust and confidence with Sister Domitian and the defendants, all of whom were in a superior position to evaluate the plaintiff to assure his participation in school activities. He was taught to defer to the authority of the defendants and Sister Domitian, and he relied upon and trusted the defendants' superior position, knowledge and expertise. The plaintiff alleges the defendants stood in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff. He claims his injuries and damages were a result of the defendants' breach of this fiduciary relationship in numerous ways.
The plaintiff enumerates six various ways in which the defendants breached the fiduciary relationship.
" The essential elements to pleading a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty under Connecticut case law are: (1) That a fiduciary relationship existed which gave rise to (a) a duty of loyalty on the part of the defendant to the plaintiff, (b) an obligation on the part of the defendant to act in the best interests of the plaintiff, and (c) an obligation on the part of the defendant to act in good faith in any matter relating to the plaintiff; (2) [T]hat the defendant advances his own interests to the detriment of the plaintiff; (3) That the plaintiff sustained damages; (4) That the damages were proximately caused by the fiduciary's breach of his or her fiduciary duty." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) AW Power Holdings, LLC v. FirstLight Waterbury Holdings, LLC, Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford. CV146047836S (Feb. 17, 2015, Peck, J.) [59 Conn.L.Rptr. 889, ]; Ochieke v. Turbine Controls, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-10-5035041-S, (October 8, 2014, Elgo, J.).
" [A] fiduciary or confidential relationship is characterized by a unique degree of trust and confidence between the parties, one of whom has superior knowledge, skill or expertise and is under a duty to represent the interests of the other. The universe of fiduciary relationships is not static. Rather than attempt to define a fiduciary relationship in precise detail and in such a manner to exclude new situations, we have instead chosen to leave the bars down for situations in which there is a justifiable trust confided on one side and a resulting superiority and influence on the other. [A]lthough we have not expressly limited the application of traditional principles of fiduciary duty to cases involving only fraud, self-dealing or conflict of interest, the cases in which we have invoked them have involved such deviations." (Citations omitted.) Di Teresi v. Stamford Health System, Inc., 142 Conn.App. 72, 94, 63 A.3d 1011 (2013).
The defendants argue that " [s]uperior courts have consistently stricken claims for breach of fiduciary duty where plaintiffs merely assert the existence of a fiduciary relationship, but fail to assert factual allegations of some fraud, self-dealing or conflict of interest." Petrillo v. Town of Clinton, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, No. MMXCV136010856 (Feb. 2, 2015, Aurigemma, J.) [59 Conn.L.Rptr. 712, ]; see also, L.F. Pace Const., Inc. v. Simko, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield. (Dec. 7, 2007, Arnold, J.), 44 Conn.L.Rptr. 650, " (the plaintiffs' have not sufficiently alleged facts that would support a claim of fraud, self-dealing, conflict of interest, immoral behavior or the like").
The defendants argue that a breach of fiduciary duty is not the same as a claim of negligence, as negligence alone is insufficient to support a claim of a breach of fiduciary duty. Cammarota v. Guerrera, 148 Conn.App. 743, 759, 87 A.3d 1134, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 944, 89 A.3d 351 (2014). Negligence " implicates a duty of care, while breach of fiduciary duty implicates a duty of loyalty and honesty." Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz, Schatz, Ribicoff & Kotkin, 247 Conn. 48, 56-57, 717 A.2d 724 (1998). The defendants claim that the plaintiff has not alleged any fraud, self-dealing or conflict of interest on the part of the defendants. Instead, the plaintiff has only alleged acts by the defendants that mirror their negligence claims in Count Two, which assert the failures to supervise, evaluate, train, police and prevent Sister Domitian from sexually abusing the plaintiff. Therefore, the defendants argue that Count Three fails to allege a breach of fiduciary duty and fails as a matter of law. Sherwood v. Danbury Hosp., 278 Conn. 163, 896 A.2d 777 (2006).
The plaintiff argues that he has sufficiently pleaded allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, in that a fiduciary or confidential relationship is characterized by a unique degree of trust and confidence between the parties, one of whom has superior knowledge, skill or expertise and is under the duty to represent the interests of the other. Konover Development Corp. v. Zeller, 228 Conn. 206, 219, 635 A.2d 798 (1994). The plaintiff also argues that whether a breach of fiduciary duty exists is a question of fact and is not appropriately addressed by a motion to strike.
The plaintiff cites several superior court cases ruling that a determination of whether a fiduciary duty exists is a question of fact.
In support of his position that he has sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiff directs the court again, to Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409 (2d Cir. Conn. 1999), as well as, Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese Corp., Superior Court, Judicial District of New London, No. CV085005553 (June 18, 2009, Martin, J.), 48 Conn.L.Rptr. 59, . In Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese Corp, supra, No. CV085005553, the court ruled that the plaintiff-parishioner stated a legally sufficient breach of fiduciary duty claim against the Roman Catholic Diocese, since the allegations indicated that the diocese knew of and sponsored her relationship with the Roman Catholic Priest and that she was taught to put her faith and trust in the diocese and the priest. The parishioner had alleged the sexual abuse by her priest started in 1966 when she was eight years old and continued until she was sixteen years old. The parishioner was raised in a devout Catholic family and was told to trust the Church, and she claimed that the diocese knew of other complaints involving sexual abuse of minors by the priest but failed to investigate, warn, or inform parishioners. Id. The plaintiff filed a seven-count complaint against the defendant, bringing claims for " breach of fiduciary duty/fraudulent concealment, " " negligence, " " reckless and wanton conduct, " " common-law fraudulent concealment/negligence, " " common-law fraudulent concealment/reckless and wanton conduct, " " equitable tolling/negligence, " and " equitable tolling/reckless and wanton conduct." Id.
The plaintiff continued to meet with her priest for counseling. Her mother approved of the counseling, trusting the priest because he was a Norwich Diocese priest and a spiritual authority who was qualified and endorsed by the Bishop of Norwich to provide counseling and guidance. During the third or fourth session, [the priest] gave the plaintiff the church wine used at mass for the consecration and proceeded to sexually abuse her by removing her clothing and forcibly engaging in sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral sex, kissing and fondling. Thereafter, the priest continued to meet with and sexually abuse the plaintiff.
Following each sexual assault, the priest directed the plaintiff to ask for God's forgiveness for what she had done, to pray with him " for the lost souls, " and to say " forgive me God for putting [the priest] to the temptation, " and the plaintiff complied. Id. The priest also stated that " as long as you stay on the path you won't burn in hell." Id. The priest " threatened that if the plaintiff told anyone, she and her mother would be 'drummed out of the Church' and 'ruined here on earth, ' and that 'both would go to hell for eternity, invoking the punishment of Satan.'" Id.
In Doe the defendant " knew that there were other complaints involving sexual abuse of minors by [the priest], but it failed to investigate, warn, or inform parishioners and families within the Norwich Diocese, including the plaintiff and her family, of the danger that [the priest] posed to children. Additionally, the defendant fraudulently concealed the existence of the plaintiff's cause of action and allowed the abuse to occur and/or continue, and prevented the plaintiff from receiving counseling to help alleviate the damage caused by the sexual abuse." Id.
The defendant moved to strike various counts, including the first count, which alleged a breach of fiduciary duty, because the first count failed to allege facts showing that " her relationship with the church" was more than " the ordinary parishioner-clergy relationship." Id. In response, the plaintiff argued that she had pled facts " supporting a fiduciary duty and its breach by failure to investigate, warn, or inform, along with the resulting damage due to said failures." Id.
The court in Doe, supra, acknowledged that " Connecticut state courts had yet to address the issue of whether a diocese has a fiduciary duty to prevent its priests from sexually abusing parishioners, " but noted that Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, 196 F.3d 409, was the leading authority on this issue.
" In Martinelli, the court applied Connecticut law and held that a diocese may be liable for breach of a fiduciary duty due to its priest's abuse of a parishioner where the Diocese's relationship with [the parishioner], based on the particulars of his ties to [the priest] and the Diocese's knowledge and sponsorship of that relationship, was of a fiduciary nature." Id.; Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, at 196 F.3d 429.
" The [ Martinelli ] court found the relationship to be fiduciary in nature because the diocese had sponsored and encouraged the abusive priest's contact with the youth of the parish, the plaintiff attended a Catholic high school within the diocese, participated in church sponsored activities, including the liturgical reform group for which the priest served as a mentor and spiritual adviser, and had been taught throughout grade school catechism classes to trust and respect the bishop of the diocese, whom he considered his 'caretaker and moral authority.'" Id., quoting Ahern v. Kappalumakkel, 97 Conn.App. 189, 197, 903 A.2d 266 (2006).
The Doe court then went on to review the specific allegations made by the plaintiff in Doe, which are very similar to the allegations made by the plaintiff in this present case. However, in Doe, the plaintiff additionally alleged the following:
The Norwich Diocese fraudulently concealed the existence of the plaintiff's cause of action in that it knew that there were other complaints involving sexual abuse of minors by James Curry, received either prior to or during the plaintiff's abuse.
After receiving said information, the Norwich Diocese failed to investigate, warn, and inform parishioners and families within the Norwich Diocese, including the plaintiff and her family, of the danger that Curry posed to children.
Said failure allowed the abuse to occur and/or continue and prevented the plaintiff from receiving counseling to help alleviate the damage caused by the sexual abuse.Id.
After a review of all of the allegations pleaded, including the above, the court in Doe, supra, denied the motion to strike the count alleging breach of fiduciary duty.
In Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, at 196 F.3d 409, a former parishioner brought action against diocese, seeking compensation for child sexual abuse by priest. Following a jury finding that the diocese had breached the fiduciary duty it owed to parishioner, the diocese moved for judgment as a matter of law. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, 10 F.Supp.2d 138, denied the motion, and the diocese appealed on several grounds. Id.
Grounds for the appeal included statute of limitations claims for sexual assault and fraudulent concealment; the shifting burden of proof regarding breach of fiduciary duty; actual knowledge of significant facts that were concealed from the plaintiff; the existence of a fiduciary relationship; and the " missing witness" jury charge. Id.
The facts in Martinelli, supra, noted that in June 1962, the subject priest began his Catholic priesthood as assistant to the pastor at St. Cecilia's Parish in Stamford, Connecticut, a church operating within the Bridgeport Diocese. Id., 413-14. Martinelli, then a fourteen-year-old student was attending Stamford Catholic High School, a school affiliated with the Bridgeport Diocese, and was a parishioner at St. Cecilia's. Id.
During the priest's tenure at St. Cecilia's, which lasted a little more than two years, he acted as a mentor and spiritual advisor to a small group of boys, including Martinelli, who were interested in liturgical reforms in the Catholic Church. Id. " The plaintiff, Martinelli claimed that [the priest] abused his position of trust and induced members of the group to engage in sexual relations with him. Martinelli testified to three occasions on which [the priest] sexually assaulted him as a minor." Id.
" On December 1, 1964, the Diocese received a complaint that [the priest] had sexually assaulted a 19-year-old Sacred Heart University student, " T.F., " the month before. A December 2, 1964 report of the incident prepared by Monsignor William A. Genuario, the Diocese's Vice Chancellor, indicated that Diocesan officials confronted [the priest] the day the complaint was lodged and that [the priest] admitted the truth of the student's allegations." Id., 414. This report also indicated the priest admitted involvement with other boys from the University. Id. The priest also admitted that he had been involved in similar conduct in Stamford. Id. The Diocese relieved the priest of his duties and concocted a plan to conceal the reasons for this. Id. The priest was sent to New Mexico by the Diocese for psychiatric treatment and continued its financial support of the priest. Id. The priest upon completion of his psychiatric treatment, served briefly as a parish priest in New Mexico, spent time in California, and eventually relocated to Maryland where, in addition to ecclesiastical appointments that included a summer position at the Parish of St. Patrick, Cumberland, and a stint as Chaplain at Calvert Hall College, Baltimore, he developed a career as a writer and editor. Id., 414-15.
In January 1966, while the priest was still in New Mexico, the Bridgeport Diocese learned of another allegation of misconduct that was said to have occurred in Connecticut prior to the " T.F." episode and the priest's transfer from St. Cecilia's. It involved a teenage boy identified as " M.F." " After meeting with Martinelli's parents, who claimed the Church bore responsibility for the priest's actions, Bishop Walter Curtis " made it clear" to the parents that the Diocese could not accept responsibility for [the priest's] conduct or for " the financial state of this young man for the rest of his life." But Bishop Curtis agreed that a Father Vaughan would remain in contact with the family and that the Diocese would consider providing whatever assistance he suggested was appropriate. Id., 416.
The district court found that there was evidence that the Diocese had fraudulently concealed from Martinelli the existence of his claims. See Martinelli I, 989 F.Supp. at 114-17 (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-595). In reaching that conclusion, the district court said, " The most difficult issue . . . pertains to the Diocese's actual knowledge of plaintiff's cause of action." Martinelli I, 989 F.Supp. at 115. " In other words, the district court took the view that even if the Diocese did not know that Martinelli was a victim of abuse, it could not avoid the tolling statute if its ignorance resulted from the breach of a fiduciary duty the Diocese owed to Martinelli that gave rise to a duty to investigate and warn or inform."
The court held that Martinelli " may demonstrate § 52-595 [the tolling statute] to be applicable notwithstanding the Diocese's ignorance of his cause of action if plaintiff can show that the Diocese's ignorance was the result of a violation of a legal duty to plaintiff to investigate and warn." Id. " In other words, the district court took the view that even if the Diocese did not know that Martinelli was a victim of abuse, it could not avoid the tolling statute if its ignorance resulted from the breach of a fiduciary duty the Diocese owed to Martinelli that gave rise to a duty to investigate and warn or inform." Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, at 196 F.3d 416.
The Second Circuit stated that it agreed with the district court that irrespective of the duties of the Diocese to its parishioners generally, the jury could reasonably have found that the Diocese's relationship with Martinelli, based on the particulars of his ties to the priest and the Diocese's knowledge and sponsorship of that relationship, was of a fiduciary nature. Id., 429.
We agree with the district court that there was thus sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably have found that there existed a special relationship of trust and confidence between Martinelli and not only [the priest], but the Diocese. It is reasonable for the jury to conclude that Martinelli, through the particular activities in which he was involved, including those which the Diocese sponsored, had a particularly close relationship with the Diocese from which a fiduciary duty might arise. The Diocese, in turn, occupied a superior position of influence and authority over Martinelli. It was also reasonable for the jury to conclude, based on evidence as to the specific information that the Diocese received about [the priest's] misconduct, including the existence and location of other likely victims and the ease with which the Diocese might have determined precisely who the likely victims were, that the Diocese owed Martinelli, and youths with a similar relationship with the Diocese, a duty of care including a duty to investigate and warn or inform so as to prevent or alleviate harm to additional victims. We agree with the district court, therefore, that the jury's finding of a fiduciary relationship under Connecticut law was supported by the evidence.Id., 430.
The allegations of the Third Count in the present case are specific and quite similar to the types of allegations alleged in Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, at 196 F.3d 409 and Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese Corp., Superior Court, Judicial District of New London, No. CV085005553 (June 18, 2009, Martin, J.) [48 Conn.L.Rptr. 59, ]. The Third Count sufficiently outlines the plaintiff's alleged relationship with the defendants. What differentiates the present case from Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, and Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese Corp., supra, is that the present case lacks allegations that the defendants had any prior or subsequent knowledge of Sister Domitian's propensities for sexual abuse or in any way concealed it or failed to investigate any claims of sexual abuse.
Under Connecticut law, " a fiduciary or confidential relationship is broadly defined as a relationship that is characterized by a unique degree of trust and confidence between the parties, one of whom has superior knowledge, skill or expertise and is under a duty to represent the interests of the other . . . The superior position of the fiduciary or dominant party affords him great opportunity for abuse of the confidence reposed in him." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ahern v. Kappalumakkel, supra, 97 Conn.App. 194.
" In Ahern, the court opined that while a fiduciary relationship could possibly exist between a priest and a parishioner, " something more" than a general priest-parishioner relationship must be present. Id., at 194-95, 903 A.2d 266. The court examined cases from other jurisdictions where a fiduciary relationship was found, e.g., where a formal pastoral counseling relationship existed; Id. at 195-96, 903 A.2d 266; and where a minor was entrusted to the care of the diocese and it had been caretaker, teacher and moral authority to the minor. Id., at 197, 903 A.2d 266." Seymour Ambulance v. Marcucio, Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Ansonia-Milford, No. CV054002561S (Nov. 23, 2005, Fischer, J.) 40 Conn.L.Rptr. 321, .
In Alaimo v. Royer, 188 Conn. 36, 41, 448 A.2d 207 (1982), the Connecticut Supreme Court " refused to define a fiduciary relationship in precise detail and in such a manner as to exclude new situations, choosing instead to leave the bars down for situations in which there is a justifiable trust confided on one side and a resulting superiority and influence on the other." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) " Consequently, the question of whether a fiduciary duty exists in the present action is a question of fact to be determined by the test set forth in Alaimo [ v. Royer ]." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Esposito v. Connecticut College, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 543055, (February 10, 1999, Mihalakos, J.); see also Seymour Ambulance v. Marcucio, supra, Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Ansonia-Milford, No. CV054002561S. " The existence of a fiduciary duty is largely a factual determination and the extent of the duty and the resulting obligations may vary according to the nature of the relationship: the obligations do not arise as a result of labeling, but rather by analysis of each case." Hoffnagle v. Henderson, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 020813972, (April 17, 2003, Beach, J.).
In determining the merits of a motion to strike, the court is required to interpret the plaintiff's complaint in a manner favorable to the plaintiff. Coe v. Board of Education, supra, 301 Conn. 112, 116-17, 19 A.3d 640 (2011). After reviewing the decisions in Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, at 196 F.3d 409 and Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese Corp., Superior Court, Judicial District of New London, No. CV085005553, (June 18, 2009, Martin, J.), the court finds that the plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts to allege a breach of fiduciary duty by the defendants. The lack of the specific terms " fraud, " " self-dealing" or " conflict of interest" is not, in and of itself, fatal to the Third Count when viewed in context of the specific facts that are alleged. Moreover, whether the fiduciary duty alleged actually existed, and whether or not the defendants breached any such duty is a question of fact. These questions cannot be resolved on a motion to strike. Esposito v. Connecticut College, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 543055, (February 10, 1999, Mihalakos, J.); Seymour Ambulance v. Marcucio, supra, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, No. CV054002561S. The motion to strike the Third Count alleging breach of fiduciary duty is denied.
Orders
The motion to strike the First Count alleging vicarious liability is granted. The motion to strike the Third Count alleging breach of fiduciary duty is denied.