Doe v. Uconn Health Center

Full title: John Doe v. UConn Health Center et AL

Court: Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford

Date published: Nov 10, 2004

2004 Ct. Sup. 17138 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004)

Opinion

No. CV 04-0832437

November 10, 2004

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

BOOTH, JUDGE.

This is an action brought by the plaintiff, John Doe, an inmate incarcerated at the MacDougall-Walker correctional institution (institution) in Suffield against the defendants, John Armstrong, in his individual capacity; the University of Connecticut Health Center (health center); and the state of Connecticut (state). On March 2, 2004, the plaintiff filed a seven-count complaint against the defendants. In count one of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges negligence; count two alleges negligent hiring and training; count three alleges negligent supervision; count four alleges negligent retention; count five alleges medical malpractice; count six alleges negligent infliction of emotional distress; and count seven alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff subsequently agreed to withdraw the complaint against Armstrong and the health center, leaving the state as the sole defendant. The plaintiff also agreed to waive the sixth count sounding in negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The plaintiff alleges the following facts. The plaintiff was incarcerated at the institution beginning in December 1998. During the time of his incarceration, he was sexually and physically abused repeatedly by an employee of the health center, Ronald Barrett, who was an HIV substance abuse counselor. Despite the fact that the plaintiff filed a written request to speak with Jose Berrios, a correctional officer employed by the state department of corrections who was "responsible for maintaining the safety and security of inmates" in an effort to make him aware of the situation, Berrios took no action in response to the request. Furthermore, even after the institution was made aware of Barrett's abuse of other inmates and an investigation was initiated, Barrett remained employed at the health center and continued to assault the plaintiff.

On April 26, 2004, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. The defendant's motion was supported by a memorandum of law. The plaintiff filed a memorandum in law in opposition to the defendant's motion on July 22, 2004.¹

1 The plaintiff subsequently filed a request to amend his complaint in order to comply with the requirements set forth in § 4-160. Nevertheless, this court must first address the jurisdictional question. "Once the question of subject matter jurisdiction has been raised, cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before it can move one further step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Harrison, 264 Conn. 829, 839 n. 6, 826 A.2d 1102 (2003).

"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blumenthal v. Barnes, 261 Conn. 434, 442, 804 A.2d 152 (2002). "A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dyous v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, 264 Conn. 766, 773, 826 A.2d 138 (2003). "[I]n ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 432-33, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). "[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case . . . If it becomes apparent to the court that such jurisdiction is lacking, the appeal must be dismissed." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Esposito v. Specyalski, 268 Conn. 336, 348, 844 A.2d 211 (2004). "[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bloom v. Gershon, 271 Conn. 96, 113, 856 A.2d 335 (2004).

The defendant claims that the plaintiff failed to allege exhaustion of administrative remedies by not stating in his complaint that he filed a claim with the claims commissioner, and that therefore the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. In response, the plaintiff asserts that he did in fact file a claim with the claims commissioner, which the defendant submitted with his motion to dismiss, and that he is not required to allege in his complaint that he filed such a claim.

The Connecticut Supreme Court has "long recognized the validity of the common-law principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bloom v. Gershon, 271 Conn. 96, 107, 856 A.2d 335 (2004). "While the principle of sovereign immunity is deeply rooted in our common law, it has, nevertheless, been modified and adapted to the American concept of constitutional government where the source of governmental power and authority is not vested by divine right in a ruler but rests in the people themselves who have adopted constitutions creating governments with defined and limited powers and courts to interpret these basic laws. The source of the sovereign power of the state is now the constitution which created it, and it is now recognized that, as Mr. Justice Holmes wrote: `A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.'" Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 313-14, 828 A.2d 549 (2003).

"[A] plaintiff seeking to circumvent the doctrine of sovereign immunity must show that: (1) the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waived the state's sovereign immunity . . . or (2) in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief, the state officer or officers against whom such relief is sought acted in excess of statutory authority, or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 314. "[I]n the absence of legislative authority . . . [the Supreme Court has] declined to permit any monetary award against the state or its officials [or agents]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bloom v. Gershon, 271 Conn. 96, 107, 856 A.2d 335 (2004). "When sovereign immunity has not been waived, the claims commissioner is authorized by statute to hear monetary claims against the state and determine whether the claimant has a cognizable claim . . . The claims commissioner, if he deems it just and equitable, may sanction suit against the state on any claim which, in his opinion, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable . . . This legislation expressly bars suits upon claims cognizable by the claims commissioner except as he may authorize, an indication of the legislative determination to preserve sovereign immunity as a defense to monetary claims against the state not sanctioned by the commissioner or other statutory provisions." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 107-08. "In other words, a plaintiff must exhaust his or her administrative remedies by proceeding through the claims commissioner. Barde v. Board of Trustees, 207 Conn. 59, 60-61, 539 A.2d 1000 (1998)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) White v. Conte, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, Docket No. CV 03 0081299 (October 6, 2003, Holden, J.); see also Lozada v. Amador, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV 95 0548633 (September 14, 1995, Hale, J.T.R.) ("[t]he state has provided an administrative remedy, a tribunal, the Claims Commissioner, for adjudication of claims against the state where monetary relief is sought"). "Section 4-142 thereof establishes the office of a `claims commissioner who shall hear and determine all claims against the state except . . . (2) claims upon which suit otherwise is authorized by law.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 229, 464 A.2d 45 (1983).

Absent legislative authority, a plaintiff is required to present a monetary claim against the state to the claims commissioner before bringing that claim to Superior Court and therefore must comply with § 4-160. Section 4-160(c) provides in relevant part, that "[i]n each action authorized by the Claims Commissioner pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this section or by the General Assembly pursuant to section 4-159 or 4-159a, the claimant shall allege such authorization and the date on which it was granted." General Statutes § 4-160(c). The Connecticut courts have clearly articulated this pleading requirement. "[I]n an action authorized by the legislature or the claims commissioner, the claimant must allege when authorization to sue was granted . . . because that date triggers the time frame within which the action must be brought." (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Capers v. Lee, 239 Conn. 265, 272, 684 A.2d 696 (1996). "[T]he legislature has provided a specific road map for claimants whose claims properly belong before the claims commissioner . . . the claimant in his complaint must allege the authorization and the date on which it was provided. General Statutes § 4-160(b)." Id., 274. "[W]hen an adequate administrative remedy is provided by law, it must be exhausted . . . [Where] the record does not reflect that the plaintiff exhausted this administrative remedy by obtaining and pleading such authorization to sue . . . immunity has not been waived." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lemoine v. McCann, 40 Conn.App. 460, 467, 673 A.2d 115, cert. denied, 237 Conn. 904, 674 A.2d 1330 (1996); see also Hanna v. Capitol Region Mental Health Center, 74 Conn.App. 264, 270, 812 A.2d 95 (2002) (court lacked subject matter jurisdiction where "plaintiff [had] not alleged that the claims commissioner . . . authorized this action . . . (and] therefore . . . there [had] been no waiver of sovereign immunity"); Dickerson v. Lantz, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 03482531 (April 2, 2004, Jones, J.) (motion to dismiss granted where plaintiff had "failed to allege that he filed his claim with the Claims Commissioner"); Coleman v. Aspiwall, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 02 0464305 (February 3, 2003, Arnold, J.) ("[t]here are no allegations in the complaint, as to whether a claim was ever filed with the Claims Commission, or whether the Claims Commissioner authorized suit pursuant to General Statutes § 4-160. Thus, the case should be dismissed for failure to exhaust this administrative remedy"); Pannoni-Barron v. Connecticut Board of Trustees of Community Technical Colleges, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 00 0157230 (August 30, 2000, Wiese, J.) ( 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 77) (motion to dismiss was granted where "allegations amount[ed] to a straightforward negligence claim over which the claims commissioner has authority. [The] court lacks jurisdiction unless and until the claims commissioner authorizes suit and said authorization is properly pleaded"); Lattanzio v. Connecticut Valley Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 00 0598746 (September 12, 2000, Rittenband, J.T.R.) (court lacked jurisdiction to hear claim where there was "no evidence in the complaint that the plaintiff has sought or received the permission to sue the state by the Claims Commissioner"); Davis v. Malt, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 96 329180 (March 7, 1997, Thim, J.) (where defendant had not "alleged the immunity provided to the defendants, pursuant to General Statutes § 4-165, [had] been waived . . . [nor] alleged that the claims commissioner granted permission to sue" the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction); Sharkany v. Pederson, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford; Docket No. CV 92 0122272 (November 24, 1992, Rush, J.) ( 8 Conn. L. Rptr. 4) ("[p]laintiff [had] not alleged that he . . . filed a claim with the Claims Commissioner . . . [and therefore had] failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies").

The plaintiff in the present case has not alleged in his complaint that he exhausted his administrative remedies by filing a claim with the claims commissioner.² As clearly stated in § 4-160 and emphasized by the Supreme Court in Capers, "the claimant in his complaint must allege the authorization and the date on which it was provided." Capers v. Lee, supra, 239 Conn. 274. Although the defendant has supplied the court with evidence that the plaintiff has in fact filed a claim with the claim commissioner, the court finds that the plaintiff's failure to allege in the complaint the authorization and the date on which it was provided is a jurisdictional defect. The plaintiff cites to § 52-592, Connecticut's accidental failure of suit statute as a means of bringing a subsequent action. However, this court does not have the authority to disregard its lack of subject matter jurisdiction in order to preserve what the plaintiff deems to be the "judicial efficiency and conservation of judicial resources." Based on the foregoing, the sole remaining claim is dismissed.³

2 Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Capers v. Lee, 239 Conn. 265, 684 A.2d 696 (1996), the Connecticut trial courts had on occasion held that as long as "[t]he record indicates that the [plaintiff] filed a claim with the Claims Commissioner pursuant to General Statutes § 4-160 . . . [the plaintiff has] met the requirements of General Statutes § 4-160, thus sovereign immunity has been waived and the court . . . has jurisdiction." Clark v. Dinardo, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 960115994 (May 16, 1996, Karazin, J.); see also UNC, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at Norwich, Docket No. CV 93 102376 (June 24, 1993, Teller, J.) ( 9 Conn. L. Rptr. 334) ([w]hile a plaintiff must prove exhaustion . . . [of remedies, there is] no authority . . . to support the proposition that exhaustion must be specifically pled"). Nevertheless, the Capers decision is controlling and clearly articulates the requirement that the "claimant in his complaint . . . allege the authorization and the date on which it was provided." Capers v. Lee, supra, 239 Conn. 274. As further noted by the Appellate Court in Lemoine, if the authorization to sue is not obtained and pleaded, sovereign immunity has not been waived. Lemoine v. McCann, supra, 40 Conn.App. 467.

3 The plaintiff subsequently filed a request to amend his complaint in order to comply with the requirements set forth in § 4-160. Nevertheless, this court must first address the jurisdictional question. "Once the question of subject matter jurisdiction has been raised, cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before it can move one further step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Harrison, 264 Conn. 829, 839 n. 6, 826 A.2d 1102 (2003); see also LaPorte v. Boston Mutual Life Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. CV-03 0080400 (August 14, 2003, Scholl, J.) ( 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 346) ("[t]he trial court correctly considered the defendants' motion to dismiss before reaching the plaintiff's request to amend and motion to substitute. When a question of jurisdiction is brought to the court's attention, that issue must be resolved before the court can move on to other matters"); Saunders v. Gavin, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 01 0809185 (July 3, 2002, Peck, J.) (court held that it could not "consider the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint, a motion apparently made in an attempt to cure the jurisdictional defect").

BY THE COURT

Booth, J.