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Doe v. Porter

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, at Chattanooga
May 24, 2002
No. 1:01-cv-115 (E.D. Tenn. May. 24, 2002)

Opinion

No. 1:01-cv-115.

May 24, 2002


MEMORANDUM


This case is now before the Court on the plaintiffs' petition [Court File No. 86] for an award of attorney's fees and expenses. This Court has previously granted the plaintiffs the relief that they sought, holding that the defendants have deprived plaintiffs of their civil rights under color of law, and enjoining the defendants from conducting the Bible Education Ministry Program in the Rhea County, Tennessee public schools. Since the plaintiffs are the prevailing parties in this case, this Court in its discretion, may award them reasonable attorney's fees and expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

The over-arching requirement for an attorney fee award is that it must be reasonable. A reasonable fee is one that is adequate enough to attract competent counsel, but does not produce a windfall for lawyers. Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 471 (6th Cir. 1999); Hadix v. Johnson, 65 F.3d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 1995). The methodology for ascertaining a reasonable fee is to determine a "lodestar" amount whereby the Court determines a reasonable rate of compensation for the attorneys and multiplies that rate times the number of hours spent on the litigation. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Adcock-Ladd v. Secretary of Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 2000). This amount may then be adjusted by the factors listed in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989). See Adcock-Ladd, 227 F.3d at 349.

These factors are: "(1) the time and labor required by a given case; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented; (3) the skill needed to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the `undesirability' of the case; (11) the nature of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases." Adcock-Ladd, 227 F.3d at 349 n. 8.

Reasonable Rate

A reasonable hourly rate is determined by the "market rates for the services rendered." Hadix, 65 F.3d at 536. Those market rates are derived from the "[rates] prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Id. (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n. 11 (1984)).

Plaintiffs have submitted affidavits of three Chattanooga attorneys to show that for experienced civil rights litigators in the local market served by this Court a reasonable rate is $200 per hour. Counsel who represented the plaintiffs in this case are from Nashville. Each of them have also submitted affidavits to the effect that $200 is also a reasonable hourly rate for similarly qualified attorneys in Nashville, which can be characterized as a related market. The defendants have not disputed this rate, nor have they disputed the $75 per hour rate asserted for the service of paralegals. This Court concludes that $200 per hour is the prevailing market rate for attorneys with skills and experience comparable to those of plaintiffs' attorneys.

Hours

Plaintiffs have submitted a detailed accounting of a number of hours expended by attorneys and paralegals in this case. The total number of hours is represented to be 483.95; and the total bill for professional services rendered is $88,733.75.

Counsel representing the plaintiffs were based in Nashville. There are counsel in Chattanooga who could have handled this case. Therefore, while recognizing that under appropriate circumstances, courts may award recovery for travel time, in this particular case it is nonetheless appropriate to reduce the claimed fee for time spent by Nashville counsel and paralegals traveling to and from Nashville to Chattanooga and Rhea County. The Court determines, after reviewing the time records, that approximately $9,500 of the time billed for attorneys and paralegals is attributable to such travel. This amount will, therefore, be deducted from the fee award.

Defendants contend that there was a duplication of effort among the three attorneys engaged by the plaintiffs. Examination of the submitted material, together with the Court's knowledge of the progress of this case, leads the Court to conclude that to some extent this probably did occur. However, instead of combing through the statements of the plaintiffs' attorneys for such duplication, the Court will follow the practice identified in Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis City Sch., 611 F.2d 624, 636-637 (6th Cir. 1979), and deduct a percentage of the total hours to eliminate duplication of services. After examining the submitted time records, the Court concludes that five percent (5%) is an appropriate reduction for duplication. Therefore, the Court determines the attorney and paralegal fees as follows:

Claimed Attorney and Paralegal Fees $88,733.75 Less Travel Time — 9,500.00 _________ $79,233.75
Less Five Percent (5%) for Duplication of Services — 3,961.69 _________ TOTAL $75,272.06.

Plaintiffs' counsel seek an enhancement of this fee of twenty-five percent (25%) based on the risk that they might have lost their entire fee if the individual plaintiffs had bowed to public pressure and backed out of the suit. This Court has no means of evaluating this contention, nor is it at all clear that plaintiffs' counsel were working on a contingency fee basis. They represented a non-profit organization as well as individual plaintiffs. Mindful of the Supreme Court's admonition that courts in these cases are not to produce windfalls for attorneys, Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. at 897, the Court respectfully declines to enhance the fee award in this case as requested by the plaintiffs. The "lodestar" award will fully compensate plaintiffs' for all their services in this case at the trial level.

Expenses and Costs

Plaintiffs claim reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses and court costs in the total amount of $8,312.12. Reasonable expenses may be recovered under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Bailey v. Great Lakes Canning, Inc., 908 F.2d 38, 43 (6th Cir. 1990). Court costs are recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

The Court has reviewed the bill of costs, and finds that the claimed costs are allowable as follows:

Fees of the Clerk $ 210.00

Fees for Service of Summons and Subpoena 35.00

Fees for Court Reporter 1,391.00

Fees for Exemplification and Copies of Papers Necessarily Obtained for Use in the Case 1,140.91 ________ TOTAL $2,776.91

Defendants have objected to these and other copying charges. Plaintiffs have represented that many of these copies were incurred in connection with duplicating lesson plans and other materials belonging to Bryan College. This reproduction, in the opinion of this court, was fully warranted. It probably also actually reduced the amount of attorney fees that would have otherwise been required to take depositions of students at Bryan College.

With respect to the remainder of the expenses claimed, those expenses will be awarded as follows:

In-house Photocopying $2,436.86

Facsimile Charges 156.50

Federal Express® Charges 221.93

Long Distance Charges 74.19

Postage 172.50

Rhea County Newspaper Subscription 22.00

Westlaw Research 211.24 ________ TOTAL $3,295.22

The Court has disallowed certain charges for expenses such as courier service, mileage, and parking, since these expenses would not have been required of local counsel. The Court has also disallowed a $15.00 charge for a certificate of good standing which the Court sees as a normal expense of doing business as an attorney.

Summary — Conclusion

The plaintiffs are entitled to recover their reasonable attorney's fees, expenses and costs as follows:

Attorney and Paralegal Fees $75,272.06

Court Costs 2,776.91

Other Expenses 3,295.22 _________ TOTAL $81,344.19

An judgment will enter.

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the accompanying memorandum opinion, this Court in its discretion AWARDS the plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees and expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as follows:

Attorney and Paralegal Fees $75,272.06

Court Costs 2,776.91

Other Expenses 3,295.22 _________ TOTAL $81,344.19

together with interest from February 8, 2002, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 250 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2001).


Summaries of

Doe v. Porter

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, at Chattanooga
May 24, 2002
No. 1:01-cv-115 (E.D. Tenn. May. 24, 2002)
Case details for

Doe v. Porter

Case Details

Full title:JOHN DOE, Individually; MARY ROE, Individually, and FREEDOM FROM RELIGION…

Court:United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, at Chattanooga

Date published: May 24, 2002

Citations

No. 1:01-cv-115 (E.D. Tenn. May. 24, 2002)

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