Opinion
No. CV 08 4009094 S
April 2, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
The plaintiff, Jane Doe, on behalf of her sixteen-year-old minor child, John Doe, has brought a Complaint and Application for Ex-Parte Temporary Injunction and Proposed Order seeking legal and equitable relief against the superintendent of schools for the city of Meriden, Mary N. Cortright, the assistant principal of Maloney High School, Donald Panciera, the Meriden city clerk, Irene Masse, and the Meriden board of education. The plaintiff also filed an Application for Waiver of Bond and applied for permission to use pseudonyms based on John Doe's eligibility for youthful offender treatment in connection with the alleged misconduct which led to these proceedings.
On February 11, 2008, the court, (Taylor, J.) granted the foregoing applications and issued an Ex-Parte Temporary Injunction enjoining the defendants from suspending or interfering with John Doe's right to attend high school until further order of the court. The court also issued an order summoning the defendants to appear and show cause why the temporary injunction should not be continued.
The court conducted a hearing on February 25, 2008, at which the court heard evidence and thereafter reviewed briefs submitted by the parties.
Facts
The plaintiffs did not appear at the hearing. The only witnesses who testified at the hearing were the defendants or witnesses called by the defendants.
The evidence and testimony at the hearing established the following.
John Doe, a student at Maloney High School, was the subject of a traffic stop by a Meriden police officer shortly before midnight on February 5, 2008. After questioning and a search of his vehicle, John Doe was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana and possession of marijuana with intent to sell, all within 1,500 feet of a school. The search allegedly produced two plastic baggies of marijuana in the seating area and 2.2 ounces of marijuana, two digital scales and ninety-eight baggies in the trunk of the vehicle. The school located within 1,500 feet of the site of the arrest is not Maloney High School.
On the morning of February 6, 2008, the Meriden police department faxed a "School Superintendent Notification Form" to the board of education office. The notification form reported that the arrest stemmed from a motor vehicle stop and search of the vehicle operated by John Doe. That same morning, the board staff faxed the notification form to Maloney High School to inform the administration of the student's arrest.
At the hearing to show cause why the injunction should not be continued, the assistant principal, Donald Panciera, testified as follows:
1. When John Doe reported for school on the morning of February 6, 2008, he was met at the entrance of the school and advised to report to the assistant principal's office.
2. The assistant principal confronted the student with the fact of his arrest and John Doe was asked to explain his version of the incident. While John Doe made various admissions, he denied some of the charges against him.
3. Because he was not able to answer some of the student's questions concerning the legal implications of the arrest, the assistant principal requested that the school resources officer, Officer Herget, join the meeting to respond to John Doe's questions.
4. After responses to John Doe's questions were provided, he requested to meet with Principal Angeli at which time further discussions took place.
5. Following the meeting on February 6, 2007, the decision was made by the administration to suspend John Doe from school for ten days, effective February 7, 2007.
6. The administration notified the student's mother, Jane Doe, of the suspension by telephone on February 6, 2007, and sent a letter dated February 6, 2007, confirming the suspension.
7. Subsequently, the administration recommended that the board commence expulsion proceedings against John Doe pursuant to General Statutes. § 10-233d.
On February 11, 2007, Jane Doe made application for the Ex-Parte Injunction which was granted by the court (Taylor, J.). The board immediately complied with the court's order and the student was permitted to return to school, subject to the outcome of the hearing on the continuation of the injunction.
Standard of Review
"The principal purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be finally determined after a hearing on the merits." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rustici v. Malloy, 60 Conn.App. 47, 56, 758 A.2d 424, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 952, 762 A.2d 906 (2000).
In order to prevail on an application for a temporary injunction, the movant must show (1) irreparable harm or injury; (2) the likelihood of success on the merits; (3) the lack of an adequate remedy at law; and (4) that a balancing of the equities favors granting the injunction. Waterbury Teachers Ass'n. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 230 Conn. 441, 446, 645 A.2d 978 (1994); Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals Health Care, 196 Conn. 451, 457, 493 A.2d 229 (1985).
"A party seeking injunctive relief has the burden of alleging and proving irreparable harm and lack of an adequate remedy at law . . . A prayer for injunctive relief is addressed to the sound discretion of the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lydall, Inc. v. Ruschmeyer, 282 Conn. 209, 236, 919 A.2d 421 (2007).
"A mandatory injunction . . . is a court order commanding a party to perform an act . . . Relief by way of mandatory injunction is an extraordinary remedy granted in the sound discretion of the court and only under compelling circumstances . . . In sum, [m]andatory injunctions are . . . disfavored as a harsh remedy and are used only with caution and in compelling circumstances." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cheryl Terry Enterprises, Ltd. v. Hartford, 270 Conn. 619, 650, 854 A.2d 1066 (2004).
Discussion
The plaintiff's complaint asserts and repeats essentially the same three counts against all four defendants. Count One alleges that John Doe was suspended from school without a proper hearing. Count Two also alleges that John Doe was suspended without an "informal hearing" in violation of General Statutes § 10-233c and further alleges that the student "cannot have a school hearing" without violating his rights under the Connecticut Constitution "until his criminal case is disposed of." In Count Three, the plaintiff claims that General Statutes § 10-233c, which was relied on by the administration to suspend John Doe, is "too broad" and therefore, unconstitutional.
Sec. 10-233c. Provides in pertinent part as follows: "Suspension of pupils. (a) Any local or regional board of education may authorize the administration of the schools under its direction to suspend from school privileges any pupil whose conduct on school grounds or at a school sponsored activity is violative of a publicized policy of such board or is seriously disruptive of the educational process or endangers persons or property or whose conduct off school grounds is violative of such policy and is seriously disruptive of the educational process. In making a determination as to whether conduct is seriously disruptive of the educational process, the administration may consider, but such consideration shall not be limited to: (1) Whether the incident occurred within close proximity of a school; (2) whether other students from the school were involved or whether there was any gang involvement; (3) whether the conduct involved violence, threats of violence or the unlawful use of a weapon, as defined in section 29-38, and whether any injuries occurred; and (4) whether the conduct involved the use of alcohol. Any such board may authorize the administration to suspend transportation services for any pupil whose conduct while awaiting or receiving transportation to and from school endangers persons or property or is violative of a publicized policy of such board. Unless an emergency exists, no pupil shall be suspended without an informal hearing by the administration, at which such pupil shall be informed of the reasons for the disciplinary action and given an opportunity to explain the situation, provided nothing herein shall be construed to prevent a more formal hearing from being held if the circumstances surrounding the incident so require, and further provided no pupil shall be suspended more than ten times or a total of fifty days in one school year, whichever results in fewer days of exclusion, unless such pupil is granted a formal hearing pursuant to sections 4-176e to 4-180a, inclusive, and section 4-181a. If an emergency situation exists, such hearing shall be held as soon after the suspension as possible."
The complaint also alleges violations of General Statutes § 10-233h concerning the procedure for oral and written notification of school administrators by police authorities but the claim was not raised at the hearing nor briefed by the plaintiff and therefore is deemed abandoned.
Irreparable Harm
"A party seeking injunctive relief has the burden of alleging and proving irreparable harm . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lydall, Inc. v. Ruschmeyer, supra, 282 Conn. 236. The defendants argue in their memorandum in opposition to the injunction that the plaintiff is incapable of demonstrating irreparable harm either by his suspension or any later expulsion because both General Statutes § 10-233c(d) and General Statutes § 10-233d, respectively, require that the board provide the opportunity for the student to complete all classwork and examinations during his suspension and an alternative educational opportunity during any expulsion.
"Perhaps the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction is a demonstration that if it is not granted the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm before a decision on the merits can be rendered." Bell Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting 11 C. Wright A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (1973) § 2948, p. 431).
Generally, where an alleged violation of a constitutional right is alleged, no further showing of irreparable harm is necessary. South Lyme Property Owners Ass'n., Inc. v. Old Lyme, 121 F.Sup.2d 195, 204 (D.Conn. 2000). In view of the constitutional claims raised by the plaintiff and the importance of avoiding harm to John Doe's right to receive the full benefits of an in-school classroom education and extracurricular activities, the court finds that, for the purposes of this proceeding, the requirement that irreparable harm be shown has been met.
Likelihood of Success on the Merits
In the plaintiff's brief, the plaintiff acknowledges that "to establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, he must demonstrate that the actions of the defendants at Maloney High School violated his constitutional rights. The plaintiff's claims are that:
(1) Section 10-233c is unconstitutional because it violates: (a) both state and federal constitutional protections against self incrimination, (b) plaintiff's procedural due process rights under the Connecticut constitution, (3) [sic] it is unconstitutionally vague as applied and on its face in violation of the Connecticut constitution;
(2) Section 10-233d is unconstitutionally vague as applied and on its face in violation of the Connecticut constitution; and/or
(3) The suspension hearing lacked due process, therefore, a permanent injunction should be issued prohibiting the use of the plaintiff's prior testimony at his expulsion hearing.
In order to succeed on the merits, the plaintiff must show that General Statutes § 10-233c or General Statutes § 10-233d are either facially unconstitutional or were unconstitutionally applied to John Doe.
A. Self-Incrimination (Miranda Warnings)
The thrust of the plaintiff's first argument is that the defendants' failure to advise John Doe of his right against self-incrimination at the time that he was called to the assistant principal's office, violated state and federal protections against self-incrimination under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
"For Miranda rights to attach, the following two requirements must be met: (1) the defendant must have been in custody; and (2) the defendant must have been subjected to police interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, [ supra, 444]." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 65 Conn.App. 59, 67-68, 782 A.2d 149, cert. denied 258 Conn. 923, 782 A.2d 1251 (2001).
"Our Supreme Court and this court have not extended the application of Miranda warnings beyond what is provided by the United States constitution. Miranda warnings are independently required under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution to the same extent that they are required under the federal constitution . . . Miranda warnings, therefore, are required only for a custodial interrogation." (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Doyle, CT Page 5499 104 Conn.App. 4, 15 n. 4, 931 A.2d 393, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 935, 935 A.2d 152 (2007).
Our Appellate Court was urged in State v. Doyle to adopt an extension of Miranda protection similar to that required by the Oregon constitution which requires that "before questioning, police must give Miranda warnings to a person who is in full custody or in circumstances that create a setting which judges would and officers should recognize to be compelling." The court rejected that view. "We therefore decline, under the Connecticut constitution, to extend the warnings required by Miranda to a noncustodial police interview." State v. Doyle, supra, 104 Conn.App. 15-16, n. 4.
"Numerous appellate courts from other states have concluded that a school principal or other school official who questions a student about a possible violation of law or school regulation does not, absent other circumstances, act as a law enforcement officer or agent of the state with law enforcement authority. See, e.g., In re Navajo County Juvenile Action No. JV91000058, 901 P.2d 1247, 1249 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1995); In re Corey L., 250 Cal.Rptr. 359, 361 (Cal.Ct.App. 1988); S.A. v. State, 654 N.E.2d 791, 797 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (Mass. 1992); State v. Tinkham, 719 A.2d 580, 583-84 (N.H. 1998); State v. Biancamano, 666 A.2d 199, 203 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 1995); In re Harold S., 731 A.2d 265, 268 (R.I. 1999); In re V.P., 55 S.W.3d 25, 33 (Tex.App. 2001)." J.D. v. Commonwealth, 42 Va.App. 329, 335, 591 S.E.2d 721 (2004).
The testimony at the hearing was that John Doe was instructed to report to the principal's office when he arrived at school on the morning of February 6, 2008. At that time he had already been arrested and released from custody. He was questioned the morning following his arrest by assistant principal Panciera as part of an informal hearing conducted pursuant to General Statutes § 10-233c. When Panciera was not able to answer some of John Doe's questions he invited the school resources officer to join them. It was not claimed that the school resources officer participated in the meeting beyond his providing responses to John Doe's questions.
Furthermore, Miranda rights pertain to criminal prosecutions, not school suspension proceedings. "The essence of the holding in Miranda is summarized in that opinion as follows: [T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Miranda v. Arizona, [ 384 U.S. 436], 444 [, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)]." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 65 Conn.App. 59, 67-68, 782 A.2d 149, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 923, 782 A.2d 1251 (2001).
As the Supreme Court of New Hampshire observed in Tinkham, "[a]lthough school principals are `responsible for administration and discipline within the school,' . . . and `must regularly conduct inquiries concerning both violations of school rules and violations of law,' . . .'they are not law enforcement agents . . . They are `neither trained nor equipped to conduct police investigations,' . . . and, unlike law enforcement agents, enforcing the law is not their primary mission . . .' Law enforcement officers are responsible for the investigation of criminal matters and maintenance of general public order,' while school officials, in comparison, `are charged with fostering a safe and healthy educational environment that facilitates learning and promotes responsible citizenship.'" (Citations omitted.) Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 583.
The plaintiff has not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of prevailing on her claim that the questioning of John Doe was a custodial interrogation initiated or conducted by law enforcement officers or persons acting at the direction law enforcement so as to require the protection of a Miranda warning in a school disciplinary hearing.
B. Due Process
The plaintiff next argues that General Statutes § 10-233c is facially unconstitutional and violates John Doe's "procedural due process rights under Article 1, of the Connecticut Constitution because C.G.S. § 10-233c (unlike § 10-233d) contains no notice requirement."
General Statutes § 10-233d(3) which governs expulsion proceedings provides in pertinent part that "Unless an emergency exists, no pupil shall be expelled without a formal hearing held pursuant to sections 4-176e to 4-180a, inclusive, and section 4-181a, provided whenever such pupil is a minor, the notice required by section 4-177 and section 4-180 shall also be given to the parents or guardian of the pupil. If an emergency exists, such hearing shall be held as soon after the expulsion as possible." (Emphasis added.)
"The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution prohibits any state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. Article [first § 8] of our state constitution contains the same prohibition and is given the same effect as the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution." [Internal quotation marks omitted.] Barnett v. Board of Education, 232 Conn. 198, 214, n. 12, 654 A.2d 720 (1995).
High school students attending a public school do so because the opportunity for a high school education is mandated by statute and is compulsory. This state-created entitlement results in a "constitutionally protected property interest" in attending a public high school. Packer v. Board of Education, 246 Conn. 89, 105, 717 A.2d 117 (1998). The court finds that John Doe has a constitutionally protected property right to a free public education which, under Packer, was entitled to due process protection.
"[A court] must determine whether [the defendant] was deprived of a protected interest, and, if so, what process was . . . due." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn.App. 745, 755, 878 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920, 883 A.2d 1252 (2005). In the landmark case of Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975), the Supreme Court set down the standard for minimum due process in school suspension hearings. "At the very minimum, therefore, students facing suspension and the consequent interference with a protected property interest must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing." Goss, supra 579.
"Students facing temporary suspension have interests qualifying for protection of the Due Process Clause, and due process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story. The Clause requires at least these rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from school." Id., 581.
There can be little doubt that, in creating the statutory framework governing school discipline and adopting General Statutes §§ 10-233c and 10-233d the legislature was justified in following the guidance of Goss and contemplated the need for additional due process protection in the more severe case of expulsion but not in the case of a short-term suspension. "A short suspension is, of course, a far milder deprivation than expulsion." Goss at 576.
The plaintiff also claims that John Doe's due process rights were violated in that he was suspended "without any hearing other than a phone call to John Doe's mother notifying her of the suspension." The plaintiff's affidavit in support of her application for temporary injunction states "That at no time was there any type of hearing or meeting to inform me of such suspension other than a phone call."
The issue of the timing of the notice of the hearing was also addressed by Goss. "There need be no delay between the time `notice' is given and the time of the hearing. In the great majority of cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss the alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred. We hold only that, in being given an opportunity to explain his version of the facts at this discussion, the student first be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis of the accusation is . . . Since the hearing may occur almost immediately following the misconduct, it follows that as a general rule notice and hearing should precede removal of the student from school." Goss, supra, 582.
The plaintiff has not shown that there is a substantial likelihood that she will prevail on her claims that General Statutes § 10-233c fails to provide constitutionally required due process protection either on its face or as applied to John Doe.
C. Vagueness
The plaintiff next asserts that General Statutes § 10-233c is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to give a person "adequate notice that his actions were prohibited by the statute" and is also unconstitutional because it fails to define various terms.
The essence of the plaintiff's claims raise the rule of lenity and void for vagueness issues. "As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement . . . Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine — the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement . . . Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections." (Citations omitted, emphasis added, internal quotation marks omitted.) Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983).
Specifically, the plaintiff complains that the phrase "seriously disruptive of the educational process" in the statute "does not provide any meaningful indication that having marijuana in a car off the school grounds after school hours subjects a student to suspension."
The plaintiff overlooks that General Statutes § 10-233c is a statute that governs school discipline, not a criminal statute. As applied to John Doe, the statute prohibited out of school conduct which would violate a publicized school policy and be seriously disruptive of the educational process. The plaintiff has not claimed that the school policy violated by John Doe was not publicized. Moreover, apparently in response to Packer, the statute was amended to give notice of the circumstances or misconduct that a school administration may consider in determining whether misconduct is seriously disruptive of the educational process by listing those factors. General Statutes § 10-233c also provides that in making its determination, a school administration's consideration is not strictly limited to the enumerated misconduct. By its use of the words "including but not limited to" which precede the enumerated misconduct, the legislature expressed its intention that its recital of specific misconduct was intended to be illustrative and not exhaustive. "Indeed, when the legislature intends for a list to be illustrative rather than exhaustive, it knows how to express that intent. See, e.g., . . . General Statutes § 31-275(4) (defining `[c]ompensation' as benefits or payments mandated by the provisions of [the act], including, but not limited to, indemnity, medical and surgical aid." (Emphasis in original, internal quotation marks omitted.) Vincent v. New Haven, 285 Conn. 778, 789 (2008).
Two of the incidents of misconduct specifically referred to in General Statutes § 10-233c which may be considered in making a determination of whether a student's conduct is seriously disruptive of the educational process are: (i) "whether other students from the school were involved" and (ii) "whether the conduct involved the use of alcohol." The defendants claim that another student from John Doe's school was involved in the incident and the plaintiff has not disputed the claim. Furthermore, it is illogical to argue that the legislature would consider an incident involving alcohol to be disruptive but not an incident involving marijuana.
"If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained, a statute will not be void for vagueness since [m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties . . . References to judicial opinions involving the statute, the common law, legal dictionaries, or treatises may be necessary to ascertain a statute's meaning to determine if it gives fair warning." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Scruggs, 279 Conn. 698, 709-10, 905 A.2d 24 (2006), citing Graff v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 277 Conn. 645, 672-73, 894 A.2d 285 (2006).
"A statute is not unconstitutional merely because a person must inquire further as to the precise reach of its prohibitions . . . [nor is it] necessary . . . that a statute list the precise conduct prohibited . . . [T]he constitution requires no more than a reasonableness of certainty." State v. DeFrancesco, 235 Conn. 426, 443-44, 668 A.2d 348 (1995).
"A statute is not void for vagueness unless it clearly and unequivocally is unconstitutional, making every presumption in favor of its validity." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Sweetman v. State Elections Enforcement Commission, 249 Conn. 296, 322, 732 A.2d 144 (1999).
Based on a review of the purpose, context and language of General Statutes § 10-233c, and the case law cited by the plaintiff, the plaintiff has failed to show that there is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on her claim that the statute violates either the rule of lenity or any constitutional safeguards.
D. Constitutional Challenge to Section 10-233d
The plaintiff also argues that "§ 10-233d is unconstitutionally vague as applied and on its face in violation of the Connecticut Constitution."
The plaintiff relies on Packer v. Board of Education, 246 Conn. 89, 105, 717 A.2d 117 (1998), in support of the argument that General Statutes § 10-233d governing expulsions violates the Connecticut Constitution as it applies to John Doe. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the ruling in Packer "that a person of ordinary intelligence could not be reasonably certain whether the possession of marijuana off school grounds after school hours, by itself and without some tangible nexus to school operation" was seriously disruptive of the educational process. Once again, the plaintiff has overlooked that General Statutes § 10-233d was amended by the legislature after Packer to provide guidance as to the nature of the kind of out of school misconduct which would be considered to be so seriously disruptive of the educational process so as to warrant expulsion. Without replicating the portion of this memorandum which deals with the court's analysis of the vagueness argument raised by the plaintiff with respect to General Statutes § 10-233c, the court concludes that the plaintiff has not shown that General Statutes § 10-233d is unconstitutional as applied to John Doe.
Finally, the plaintiff argues that General Statutes § 10-233d is unconstitutional on its face due to its failure to clearly define select terms such as "close proximity of a school," "gang involvement," "threats of violence" and "unlawful use of a weapon" which terms are used in determining whether off school misconduct is seriously disruptive. Of the challenged terms, only "close proximity of a school" is applicable to the present matter. John Doe was charged with possession of a controlled substance within 1,500 feet of a school. The legislative history reveals that the legislature intended the term "a school" as used in General Statutes §§ 10-233c and 10-233d to mean "any school." During the floor debate of the bill to amend General Statutes §§ 10-233c and 10-233d when Representative Green inquired whether the language "a school" could mean "any school," even one that the student didn't attend, Representative Staples, the proponent of the amendment, replied "It refers to any school, not necessarily just the school that particular student is attending." 41 H.R. Proc., Pt. 9, 1998 sess., p. 3007.
The plaintiff has failed to show that there is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the argument that General Statutes § 10-233d is unconstitutional either as applied to John Doe or facially.
Conclusion
Applying the proper legal standard set by our Supreme Court that "[T]he party attacking a validly enacted statute . . . bears the heavy burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt and we indulge in every presumption in favor of the statute's constitutionality," State v. Payne, 240 Conn. 766, 777, 695 A.2d 525 (1997), the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they are likely to succeed on the merits of any of the claims raised. Accordingly, they are not entitled to injunctive relief.
Nonetheless, the court would be remiss if it did not comment with disfavor on the reluctance of the defendants, in a non-emergency suspension situation involving a sixteen-year-old student, to make an effort to notify the parent or guardian of the student before conducting an informal hearing which may result in a ten-day suspension and other consequences. Moreover, the court believes that it would not be onerous to ask school administrators, who are required by the statute to inform the student of the reasons for the disciplinary action and give the student an "opportunity to explain the situation," to also advise a student facing possible prosecution that the student's statements may be used against him or her. As other courts have observed with respect to other statutes, perhaps the legislature would be wise to review and reconsider General Statutes § 10-233c.
For the forgoing reasons, the temporary injunction is dissolved and the application for a permanent injunction is denied, without costs.