Opinion
FBTCV175032760S
12-04-2017
John DOE v. Bruce BEMER
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
BELLIS, J.
On August 7, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a three-count complaint against the defendant, Bruce J. Bemer, stemming from allegations of sexual exploitation, sexual racketeering, and sex trafficking of " mentally disabled and/or drug addicted individuals and/or minors" spanning over the course of at least twenty-five years. In counts one, two, and three of the complaint, the plaintiffs assert causes of action for violations of the Connecticut Corrupt Organizations and Racketeering Activity Act (CORA), pursuant to General Statutes § 53-393 et seq., and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), pursuant to General Statutes § 42-110 et seq.; violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a); and assault, respectively.
On October 3, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a request for leave to amend the complaint. The defendant filed an objection to the request, in addition to the present motion to dismiss, on October 18, 2017. Thereafter, on November 9, 2017, the court issued an order (entry # 160) indicating that all other motions will be decided by the court following its ruling on the motion to dismiss. As a result, the court will consider the motion to dismiss as against the complaint filed on August 7, 2017.
In the proposed writ, summons, and complaint filed on April 5, 2017, the plaintiffs also included William Trefzger as a named defendant. The return of service dated April 17, 2017, states that Trefzger was served through his attorney with materials related to an application for prejudgment remedy. Subsequently, on May 19, 2017, the plaintiffs withdrew their application for prejudgment remedy as against Trefzger. The plaintiffs’ August 7, 2017 complaint does not allege any claims against Trefzger. As such, Bemer will be referred to as the defendant throughout this decision.
18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) provides: " An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees."
On October 18, 2017, the defendant filed the present motion to dismiss count two of the plaintiffs’ August 7, 2017 complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The defendant also filed an accompanying memorandum of law in support. On October 27, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an objection. The defendant filed a reply to the plaintiffs’ objection on November 9, 2017. The court heard oral argument on November 9, 2017.
DISCUSSION
" [A] motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). " A court deciding a motion to dismiss must determine not the merits of the claim or even its legal sufficiency, but rather, whether the claim is one that the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., 147 Conn.App. 730, 740-41, 84 A.3d 895 (2014).
In his memorandum of law in support, the defendant argues that count two of the plaintiffs’ complaint should be dismissed because the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over civil claims brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Specifically, the defendant contends that there is an explicit statutory directive granting jurisdiction to federal courts, the relevant legislative history suggests that Congress intended federal courts to have exclusive jurisdiction, and there is a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests such that civil claims brought pursuant to the statute should be adjudicated only in federal courts. In response, the plaintiffs argue that the court has concurrent jurisdiction over civil claims brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). The plaintiffs further claim that the proper procedural vehicle to divest the court of jurisdiction was through a petition for removal, but that the time period in which to file such petition has since passed. In his reply memorandum, the defendant argues that even if the court determines that it has concurrent jurisdiction, the case will automatically be stayed during the pendency of any related state or federal criminal actions in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 1595(b).
" The general principle of state-court jurisdiction over cases arising under federal laws is straightforward: state courts may assume subject-matter jurisdiction over a federal cause of action absent provision by Congress to the contrary or disabling incompatibility between the federal claim and state-court adjudication." Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1981). Nonetheless, " [i]t is black letter law ... that the mere grant of jurisdiction to a federal court does not operate to oust a state court from concurrent jurisdiction over the cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Toole v. Eyelets for Industry, Inc., 148 Conn.App. 367, 372, 86 A.3d 475 (2014). " Thus, [t]o give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over a federal cause of action, Congress must, in an exercise of its powers under the Supremacy Clause, affirmatively divest state courts of their presumptively concurrent jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. See also Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 462, 110 S.Ct. 792, 107 L.Ed.2d 887 (1990) (" to rebut the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction, the question is not whether any intent at all may be divined from legislative silence on the issue, but whether Congress in its deliberations may be said to have affirmatively or unmistakably intended jurisdiction to be exclusively federal").
" Exclusive federal jurisdiction can be created expressly or by implication." O’Toole v. Eyelets for Industry, Inc., supra, 148 Conn.App. 373. " [T]he presumption of concurrent jurisdiction can be rebutted by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests." Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., supra, 453 U.S. 478; accord Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 378, 132 S.Ct. 740, 181 L.Ed.2d 881 (2012). Based on the prevailing law, the court will first examine the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) to determine whether the statute plainly and unambiguously confers exclusive federal jurisdiction, hereby defeating the presumption of concurrent state court jurisdiction.
1
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
" With respect to the construction and application of federal statutes, principles of comity and consistency require us to follow the plain meaning rule for the interpretation of federal statutes because that is the rule of construction utilized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ... If the meaning of the text is not plain, however, we must look to the statute as a whole and construct an interpretation that comports with its primary purpose and does not lead to anomalous or unreasonable results." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 285 Conn. 381, 400-01, 941 A.2d 868 (2008).
" As with any question of statutory interpretation, we begin with the text of the statute to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning ... A particular statute’s plain meaning can best be understood by looking to the statutory scheme as a whole and placing the particular provision within the context of that statute." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Epskamp, 832 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1122, 197 L.Ed.2d 222 (2017). " [W]e attempt to ascertain how a reasonable reader would understand the statutory text, considered as a whole ... If we can ascertain the plain meaning of the statutory text by examining it in the context of the statute as a whole, we need proceed no further. If, however, the plain meaning is ambiguous, we may consult other sources. Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation ... to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 108 (2d Cir. 2012). " We turn to the legislative history only when the plain statutory language is ambiguous or would lead to an absurd result." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., 582 F.3d 422, 427 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 962, 130 S.Ct. 1527, 176 L.Ed.2d 151 (2010).
With respect to 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a), there is no explicit statutory directive that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. Section 1595(a) provides in relevant part that " [a]n individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action against the perpetrator ... in an appropriate district court of the United States ..." The statute contains no language typically found in statutes conferring exclusive federal jurisdiction, such as stating that suits may be brought only in federal court, that the jurisdiction of the federal courts shall be exclusive, or that the jurisdiction of the federal courts shall be exclusive of the courts of the states. See O’Toole v. Eyelets for Industry, Inc., supra, 148 Conn.App. 375, citing Tafflin v. Levitt, supra, 493 U.S. 471 (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) does not plainly and unambiguously confer exclusive federal jurisdiction.
II
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Where there is no explicit statutory directive that a particular statute confers exclusive federal jurisdiction, there must be an " unmistakable implication" from the legislative history, or " clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests, " in order to rebut the presumption in favor of concurrent state jurisdiction. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., supra, 453 U.S. 478. Accordingly, the court next turns to the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 1595.
" The Trafficking Victims Protection Act was enacted in 2000, and the amendment treating its civil cause of action [the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act], codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1595, was enacted only in December of 2003 and amended in December of 2008." Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 324 (2d Cir. 2012). The purposes of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act are " to combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims." 146 Cong. Rec. H2676 (2000). Sex trafficking, for purposes of the act, is defined as " the purchase, sale, securing, recruitment, harboring, transportation, transfer or receipt of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act." 46 Cong. Rec. H2677 (2000).
Upon review of the legislative history, the court does not find there to be an " unmistakable" implication that Congress intended 18 U.S.C. § 1595 to confer exclusive federal jurisdiction. There is no discussion concerning state or federal jurisdiction in general, or that the statute should be adjudicated solely by federal courts in particular. Although the defendant argues that Congress " would logically have granted federal courts exclusive jurisdiction, " the legislative history contains no such indication.
Further, the court is not persuaded that there exists a " clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests, " such that civil claims brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1595 must be adjudicated in federal courts alone. Although the defendant notes that the vast majority of published cases citing 18 U.S.C. § 1595 were disposed of in federal court, that fact is determinative of whether federal courts retain exclusive jurisdiction. State court adjudication of civil claims brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) may be appropriately guided by federal court interpretations, thereby minimizing concerns for inconsistent application of federal law. Tafflin v. Levitt, supra, 493 U.S. 465. The defendant also points to the staying effect of 18 U.S.C. § 1595(b)(1) in support of finding exclusive federal jurisdiction. Nonetheless, " [Although congressional specification of procedural mechanisms applicable only in federal court may tend to suggest that Congress intended exclusive federal jurisdiction, it does not by itself suffice to create a ‘clear incompatibility’ with federal interests." (Emphasis added.) Id., 466-67. In consideration of the lack of an explicit statutory directive or enlightening legislative history, the court does not find there to be a " clear incompatibility" with federal interests such that federal courts retain exclusive jurisdiction over to 18 U.S.C. § 1595.
18 U.S.C. § 1595(b)(1) provides: " Any civil action filed under this section shall be stayed during the pendency of any criminal action arising out of the same occurrence in which the claimant is the victim."
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court properly has subject matter jurisdiction to hear civil claims brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1595. Accordingly, the court denies the defendant’s motion to dismiss count two of the plaintiffs’ August 7, 2017 complaint.