Opinion
NO. 2023 CA 0246
12-14-2023
T DOE, B Doe, D Doe, J Doe v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AND A&M COLLEGE
John S. McLindon, Jill L. Craft, W. Brett Conrad, Jr., Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees, T Doe, B Doe, D Doe, and J Doe David C. Fleshman, Kelsey Clark Luckett, Alexandra C. Hains, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendan/Appellant, Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and A&M College
Appealed from the 19th Judicial District Court, In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana, Docket No. 716442, The Honorable William M. Jorden, Judge Presiding
John S. McLindon, Jill L. Craft, W. Brett Conrad, Jr., Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees, T Doe, B Doe, D Doe, and J Doe
David C. Fleshman, Kelsey Clark Luckett, Alexandra C. Hains, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendan/Appellant, Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and A&M College
BEFORE: McCLENDON, LANIER, AND MILLER, JJ.
MILLER, J.
2This matter is before us on appeal by defendant, the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and A&M College, from a judgment of the district court granting plaintiffs’ petition for a preliminary injunction. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 3, 2022, four students and collegiate athletes attending Louisiana State University filed a petition for a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief against the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and A&M College ("LSU"). The students, anonymously referred to as T Doe, B Doe, D Doe, and J Doe, alleged that on February 15, 2022, they were cited with violations of LSU’s Code of Student Conduct, Section 10.2, "Behavioral Misconduct," for acts or omissions involving alcohol, coercive behavior, complicity, endangerment, and hazing. The alleged violations arose from incidents purported to have occurred on October 31, 2020, at an off-campus apartment and on September 25, 2021, at the private residence of T Doe, B Doe, D Doe, and others.
Plaintiffs alleged that on December 13, 2021, they were required to submit to an interrogation by the LSU Student Advocacy & Accountability Office ("LSU SAA"). The interrogation was conducted by LSU SAA Assistant Director and Senior Case Manager Kyrstie Wyatt. Plaintiffs averred that Ms. Wyatt informed them by a letter dated February 15, 2022, that a decision was reached deeming them responsible for the violations and they were immediately suspended from the university from February 15, 2022, through December 31, 2022. Plaintiffs alleged that, as a result, their transcripts reflected the discipline, they were banned from campus and from further participation in athletics, and a registration hold precluded them from registering for classes in the Spring of 2022. Plaintiffs opted 3to decline the proposed decision and discipline and were thereafter advised they would face a University Hearing Panel ("UHP") appointed by LSU SAA. Plaintiffs alleged that the next day, February 16, 2022, they received an email from LSU’s Associate Athletic Director, John Daniel, requesting that they meet and discuss their options, which included withdrawing their request for a UHP. According to plaintiffs, after refusing to withdraw the UHP request, they were advised by a letter dated February 23, 2022, that they must attend a UHP on March 4, 2022. The following day, plaintiffs retained counsel and ultimately instituted these proceedings.
The version of LSU’s Code of Student Conduct effective August 1, 2018, was applied to the proceedings herein. Section 8.2 of the Code of Student Conduct provided that a University Hearing Panel "hears alleged violations under this Code referred by the Dean of Students or a SAA Official. If a Charged Student declines the SAA Outcome or the SAA Official declines to issue an Outcome, the matter will be referred to a UHP. A UHP is a rehearing, not an appeal of the Outcome."
In support of their request for injunctive relief, plaintiffs alleged that during the course of the underlying disciplinary proceedings they were denied effective assistance of counsel, meaningful opportunity to respond, and due process. Plaintiffs contended that while the UHP is referred to as a "rehearing," they were not afforded a hearing in the first instance. As a result, they claim a deprivation of their education, scholarships, athletic participation, and careers, and lifelong impact on their ability to earn income from their name, likeness, and image. Plaintiffs further contended that LSU’s adherence to the "procedure" set forth in the Code of Student Conduct violated their rights to substantive and procedural due process and their liberty interest in their reputation, in violation of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs alleged that the procedure to which they were subjected provides for an unconstitutional comingling of the functions of investigator, prosecutor, legal advisor, and decisionmaker in violation of Allen v. Louisiana State Board of Dentistry, 543 So. 2d 908 (La. 1989) and 4 Georgia Gulf Corporation v. Board of Ethics for Public Employees, 96-1907 (La. 5/9/97), 694 So. 2d 173. Plaintiffs contended these circumstances subjected them to immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage, which is not compensable in monetary damages. Thus, plaintiffs sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining LSU, its agents, employees, and assigns from proceeding with any further consideration, rehearing, or hearing regarding the petitioners and the allegations against them, and from imposing any discipline of any kind, or suspending, expelling, dismissing, or taking any action against petitioners arising from the alleged incidents, followed by preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs contended that they were college students with no legal training or ability to adequately defend themselves.
The district court issued a temporary restraining order on March 3, 2022, and a preliminary injunction was set for hearing. LSU filed a motion in limine prior to the preliminary injunction hearing seeking to exclude all evidence, testimony, or argument relating to the merits or the correctness of LSU SAA’s initial determination that plaintiffs1 actions constituted hazing in violation of LSU’s Code of Student Conduct.
The parties subsequently agreed to dissolve the TRO, continue the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction without date, and participate in a UHP on May 27, 2022, subject to certain parameters. The parties were unable to 5successfully complete the UHP. Thus, plaintiffs moved to re-set the preliminary injunction for hearing.
The stipulation was recited into the record in open court on May 17, 2022, and a written stipulation was signed by the district court on May 31, 2022. Pursuant to the stipulation the district court ordered that:
1. [T]he Temporary Restraining Order signed by Judge William Jorden on March 3, 2022, in the above captioned matter is hereby dissolved:
2. The hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction is continued without date;
3. The University Hearing Panel ("UHP") will take place on May 27, 2022, with the following conditions:
a. LSU will provide the names of the UHP panel members to Petitioners’ counsel on or before May 20, 2022, so that the individuals may be pre-cleared by Petitioners, and objections may be lodged by Petitioners prior to the UHP taking place;
b. LSU will provide a list of all individuals interviewed by [Ms.] Wyatt during the course of her investigation into Petitioners on or before May 20, 2022;
c. LSU will provide unredacted police reports related to LSUPD’s investigation into the alleged incidents of October 31, 2020, and September 25, 2021, involving Petitioners on or before May 20, 2022;
d. LSU will provide all body can footage depicting interviews conducted by LSUPD related to LSUPD’s investigation into the alleged incidents of October 31, 2020, and September 25, 2021, involving Petitioners on or before May 20, 2022;
e. Petitioners will provide any objections to the panel members serving on the UHP to LSU on or before May 24, 2022, and objections will be resolved pursuant to the Code of Student Conduct;
f. Petitioners will send a list of material observers whom they would like to be instructed by LSU to appear for the UHP on or before May 24, 2022. Upon receiving the list of material observers from Petitioners, LSU will send a letter to those individuals instructing them to appear at the UHP. Petitioners may present other material observers at the UHP not included in the list provided to LSU, but only those disclosed on or before May 24, 2022, will be sent an instruction letter; g. If Petitioners wish to have documentation included in the UHP packet presented to the panel, they shall provide such documents on or before May 24, 2022. Petitioners may present documentation to the UHP that has not been previously disclosed, but must submit any documentation they would like to include in the UHP packet on or before May 24, 2022; h. J Doe shall be permitted to participate in the UHP by Zoom.
In the meantime, the legislature enacted the "Student Due Process and Protection Act," codified as La. R.S. 17:3394, which became effective on August 1, 2022. The act requires public postsecondary education management boards to adopt a policy relative to disciplinary proceedings, right to counsel for students and student organizations, and appeals. See La. Acts 2022, No. 464, §§ 1 & 2.
Thereafter, the preliminary injunction was heard by the district court on August 15, 16, and 17, 2022. As a preliminary matter, the district court granted LSU’s motion in limine prohibiting evidence and testimony concerning the merits of the alleged violations. As such, the focus of the hearing was narrowed to consider only the procedure to be followed by the parties.
At the conclusion of the three-day hearing, the district court granted the preliminary injunction determining that plaintiffs constitutional rights had been violated during the course of the underlying disciplinary proceeding and that LSU 6did not "have a system in place" that met "constitutional muster." Finding that the initial proceedings were tainted by these errors, the district court ordered LSU to "start over … from the complete gathering of information, gathering of evidence, statements, you name it … [with] different parties involved … after [LSU] come[s] up with [a] new code of conduct that has been approved." The district court determined that La. R.S. 17:3394 would have to be applied retroactively, explaining, "this is the only way that we can do it to make sure that you have the proper procedures in place." In so doing, the court tailored an exclusionary rule, akin to the remedy associated with a motion to suppress in the criminal context, and effectively discarded all evidence gathered by LSU.
While finding that "constitutional issues" existed, the district court failed to identify how the Code of Student Conduct impinged on plaintiffs’ rights.
On October 11, 2022, the district court signed a judgment granting plaintiffs’ petition for preliminary injunction and enjoining LSU from proceeding with any disciplinary action against plaintiffs, unless and until: (1) LSU adopts a new code of student conduct; (2) the court lifts the instant injunction upon a motion filed by LSU and after a contradictory hearing in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 3607; (3) LSU "restarts" plaintiffs’ disciplinary process completely "anew from the beginning" with a new investigation, utilizing new investigators and only LSU personnel not in any way involved in plaintiffs’ prior disciplinary process; and (4) LSU conducts the plaintiffs’ disciplinary process in compliance with La. R.S. 17:3394.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3607 provides that an interested person may move for the dissolution or modification of a preliminary injunction, upon two days' notice to the adverse party, or such shorter notice as the court may prescribe. The court shall proceed to hear and determine the motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice may require. The court may also, on its own motion and upon notice to all parties and after hearing, dissolve or modify a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.
LSU now appeals contending that the district court erred in: (1) determining that La. R.S. 17:3394 applied retroactively; (2) granting plaintiffs’ request for 7preliminary injunction where plaintiffs failed to show that there was a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that LSU committed constitutional violations in its disciplinary process; and (3) granting plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunction where plaintiffs failed to show that irreparable harm would result in the absence of the preliminary injunction.
DISCUSSION
Application of the Student Due Process and Protection Act
(Assignment of Error Number One)
[1] The parties agree that La. R.S. 17:3394 applies prospectively to any UHP held after its effective date of August 1, 2022, including any further disciplinary proceedings in this matter. However, LSU argues that the district court erred in ordering it to start the entire disciplinary process over from its inception in accordance with La. R.S. 17:3394, based on its finding that the statute applied retroactively. Thus, on review, we must initially determine whether the district court erred in its determination that the enactment of La. R.S. 17:3394 applied retroactively.
[2, 3] The legislature is free, within constitutional confines, to give its enactments retroactive effect. Louisiana Revised Statute 1:2 provides that "[n]o Section of the Revised Statutes is retroactive unless it is expressly so stated." Louisiana Civil Code article 6 codifies the general rule against retroactive application of legislative enactments and the exceptions jurisprudentially grafted thereupon. See La. C.C. art. 6, Revision Comments - 1987. Louisiana Civil Code article 6 provides as follows:
Louisiana Constitutional Article I, section 23 prohibits ex post facto laws and laws impairing obligations of contracts. Also, no law can be retroactively applied so as to divest a party of a vested right, as this would violate the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions. These constitutional issues arise only when retroactive effect is given to a new law. See Rochelle v. LeBlanc, 2010-1901 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/6/11), 65 So. 3d 240, 242, n.3, citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809, 816 n. 11 (La. 1992).
In the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply pro
spectively only. Procedural and interpretive laws apply 8both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the contrary.
Louisiana Revised Statute 1:2 has been construed as co-extensive with La. C.C. art. 6. See Rochelle v. LeBlanc, 2010-1901 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/6/11), 65 So. 3d 240, 242, citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809, 816 (La. 1992).
[4] In determining whether a newly enacted provision is to be applied prospectively only, or may also be retroactively applied, LSA-C.C. art. 6 requires a two-fold inquiry. First, the court must determine whether the amendment to the statute expresses legislative intent regarding retroactive or prospective application. Second, if no such intent is expressed, the court must determine whether the amendment is substantive, procedural, or interpretive. Rochelle, 65 So. 3d at 243.
[5–7] Generally, the determinative point in time separating prospective from retroactive application of an enactment is the date the cause of action accrues. Church Mutual Insurance Company v. Dardar, 2013-2351 (La. 5/7/14), 145 So. 3d 271, 280. Once a party’s cause of action accrues, it becomes a vested property right. Statutes enacted after the acquisition of such a vested property right cannot be applied so as to divest a party of his or her vested right in the cause of action because such a retroactive application would contravene due process guarantees. Church Mutual Insurance Company, 145 So. 3d at 281.
In the instant case, Act 464 does not expressly provide for retroactive application, nor has the legislature expressly declared that the act is interpretive or provided for an effective date that would be indicative of retroactive application of the amendment. Therefore, this court must determine whether the enactment is substantive, procedural, or interpretive. See Strattman v. LeBlanc, 2019-0105 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/27/19), 289 So. 3d 135, 139, writ denied, 2019-01904 (La. 6/12/20), 307 So. 3d 1033.
[8–12] 9Substantive laws either establish new rules, rights, and duties or change existing ones. Procedural laws prescribe a method for enforcing a previously existing substantive right and relate to the form of the proceeding or the operation of the laws, Landry v. Baton Rouge Police Department, 2008-2289 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/8/09), 17 So. 3d 991, 997. Otherwise stated, a procedural law addresses the methods for enforcing an existing right or relates to how a law operates. Manuel v. Louisiana Sheriff’s Risk Management Fund, 95-0406 (La. 11/27/95), 664 So. 2d 81, 86. Interpretive laws, on the other hand, do not create new rules, but merely establish the meaning that the interpretive statute had from the time of its initial enactment. It is the original statute, not the interpretive one, that establishes the rights and duties. When an existing law is not clear, a subsequent statute clarifying or explaining the law may be regarded as interpretive, and the interpretive statute may be given retroactive effect because it does not change, but merely clarifies, preexisting law. Landry, 17 So. 3d at 997, citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, 609 So. 2d at 817.
With these precepts in mind, we turn to La. R.S. 17:3394, entitled, "Disciplinary proceedings." Louisiana Revised Statute 17:3394, as enacted, codifies the powers and duties of postsecondary education management boards and the respective rights of students and student organizations in disciplinary proceedings. See La. Acts 2022, No. 464, §§ 1 & 2. The statute requires that each postsecondary edu- cation management board adopt a disciplinary hearing process that affords students and student organizations accused of non-academic offenses the right to counsel and for appeals. La. R.S. 17:3394(A). The statute sets forth specific guidelines and procedures required for such proceedings, including provisions concerning notice, affording the student with a presumption of innocence, as well as for maintaining an administrative file, and providing right to access the administrative file. La. R.S. 17.3394(D) & (E).
10In particular, Section (B) provides the student the right to be represented by an attorney who may fully participate during any disciplinary proceeding, as follows:
Any student enrolled at an institution under the jurisdiction of the management board and accused of a violation of the disciplinary or conduct rules that carries a potential penalty of suspension of ten or more days, deferred suspension, or expulsion has the right to be represented, at the student’s expense, by an attorney or a non-attorney advocate who may fully participate during any disciplinary proceeding or during any other procedure adopted and used by that institution to address an alleged violation of the institution’s nonacademic rules or policies. This right applies to both the student who has been accused of the violation and the student who is the alleged victim, if applicable. Prior to scheduling a disciplinary proceeding, the institution shall inform the students in writing of their rights as provided by this Section. [Emphasis added.]
"Fully participate," as defined in Section (H),
includes the opportunity to make opening and closing statements, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to provide the alleged victim or accused with support, guidance, and advice. This Section does not require an institution to use formal rules of evidence in institutional disciplinary proceedings. The institution, however, shall make good faith efforts to include relevant evidence and exclude evidence which is neither relevant nor probative.
To ensure that any potential conflicts of interest are eliminated in the disciplinary proceeding, Section (E)(4) prohibits commingling of administrative or adjudicative roles, requiring that the disciplinary proceedings shall:
Ensure that all disciplinary proceedings are carried out free from conflicts of interest by ensuring that there is no commingling of administrative or adjudicative roles. For purposes of this Paragraph, an institution shall be considered to commingle such roles if any individual carries out more than one of the following roles with respect to any disciplinary proceeding:
(a) Victim counselor and victim advocate.
(b) Investigator.
(c) Institutional prosecutor.
(d) Adjudicator.
(e) Appellate adjudicator.
Moreover, Section (F) provides the student a right to appeal in the event of new evidence, contradictory evidence, and evidence that the student was not 11afforded due process. Upon consideration of the evidence on appeal, the institutional body considering the appeal may grant the appeal, deny the appeal, order a new hearing, or reduce or modify the punishment. La. R.S. 17:3394(G).
Finally, Section (J) creates a private right of action for the student against the institution and its agents for any violations of the rights provided therein. After a finding that the student’s due process rights have been violated, it further provides for an award of damages for mental or emotional distress, loss wages or earning capacity, and costs, as follows:
Any student or student organization that has its rights under this Section violated may bring a private right of action against the institution and its agents acting in their official capacities, with the management board named as a party, to recover actual damages. If the court finds this Section or the student or student organization’s rights to due process have been violated, the court shall award any mental or emotional distress, loss of wages or earning capacity, and costs.
Prior to the enactment of La. R.S. 17:3394, the jurisprudence afforded students subject to postsecondary disciplinary proceedings only the minimum constitutional due process protections of notice of the allegations and an opportunity to be heard. See Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 399 (6th Cir. 2017); Plummer v. University of Houston, 860 F.3d 767, 773 (5th Cir. 2017). Until the 2022 enactment of La. R.S. 17:3394, a student had no statutory right to legal counsel who was permitted to fully participate in all proceedings, there was no prohibition against commingling of administrative or adjudicative roles, nor was there penalty provision providing for a private right of action against the institution upon a finding of a violation of the rights set forth in the act and damages. Thus, La. R.S. 17:3394 clearly established new rights and duties in postsecondary disciplinary proceedings that did not exist prior to its enactment.
After carefully reviewing the legislation, we find La, R.S. 17:3394 cannot be interpretive where there existed no original statute to interpret, nor can it be procedural where it does not prescribe a method for enforcing a previously existing 12substantive right. Instead, we find the enactment of La. R.S. 17:3394 was substantive in that it represents a distinct change in the rights and obligations of the parties. See Landry, 17 So. 3d at 998. Accordingly, we find the district court erred in determining that the new law applied retroactively.
As set forth above, the judgment of the district court granted plaintiffs’ petition for preliminary injunction and prohibited LSU from proceeding with any disciplinary action against plaintiffs until it adopted a new code of student conduct and "restart[ed]" plaintiffs’ disciplinary process "completely anew from the beginning" in compliance with La. R.S. 17:3394. The preliminary injunction was granted and the provisions of the judgment were crafted to facilitate the retroactive application of La. R.S. 17:3394. Considering our determination herein that the district court legally erred in applying La. R.S. 17:3394 retroactively, we must determine what effect this finding has on the life of the injunction.
The Preliminary Injunction
(Assignments of Error Numbers Two and Three)
[13–16] The primary purpose of injunctive relief is to prevent the occurrence of future acts that may result in irreparable injury, loss, or damage to the applicant. Boone Services, LLC v. Ascension Parish Government, 2021-0524 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/30/21), 340 So. 3d 1002, 1005; see La. C.C.P. art. 3601(A). "Irreparable injury" is a loss sustained by an injured party, which cannot be adequately compensated in money damages or for which such damages cannot be measured by a pecuniary standard. Southern Marsh Collection, LLC v. State Traditions, LLC, 2017-0459 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/1/17), 2017 WL 4985217, *3. A showing of irreparable injury is not necessary when the conduct sought to be enjoined is unlawful, or a deprivation of a constitutional right. Jurisich v. Jenkins, 99-0076 (La. 10/19/99), 749 So. 2d 597, 599. Once a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that the conduct to be enjoined is reprobated by law, the petitioner is 13entified to injunctive relief without the necessity of showing that no other adequate legal remedy exists. Jurisich, 749 So. 2d at 599.
[17] Whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction rests within the sound discretion of the district court. Byron E. Talbot Contractor, Inc. v. Lafourche Parish School Board, 2021-0181 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/1/21), 332 So. 3d 699, 702. The district court’s ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government v. Carter, 2019-1390 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/18/20), 313 So. 3d 1016, 1020.
[18] However, if a district court’s decision was based on an erroneous interpretation or application of law, rather than a valid exercise of discretion, such an incorrect decision is not entitled to deference. Singleton v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 2022-0667 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/16/22), 353 So. 3d 164, 177. Considering our finding herein that the district court erred in its application of La. R.S. 17:3394, we owe no deference to its findings on review. See Singleton, 353 So. 3d at 181-182.
[19] The district court granted the preliminary injunction, determining that LSU could not move forward lawfully with the UHP, without depriving plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, unless it restarted its investigation from "scratch." We disagree. The district court further required the parties appear for a contradictory hearing, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3607, before the preliminary injunction would be lifted. We find this requirement unnecessary.
[20–22] Appellate courts do not decide abstract or hypothetical controversies or render advisory opinions about controversies. In re Interdiction of Amoroso, 2019-0987 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/21/20), 298 So. 3d 203, 206. Nor is a court required to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare, for the government of future cases, principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. 14 In re E.W., 2009-1589 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/7/10), 38 So. 3d 1033, 1037. While it is our duty to scrutinize trial court rulings, judgments, and factual findings, we are also mindful that an appellate court must not unduly micromanage those functions. Carter v. Iberia Parish School Board, 2017-594 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 12/13/17), 258 So. 3d 740, 747. The parties agree in their briefs and argument, that any future disciplinary proceedings must be conducted in conformity with La. R.S. 17:3394. If this is the case, there is no need for an injunction to enforce compliance with the statute. And neither should we micro-manage the proceedings.
Thus, we again note that LSU must proceed with the UHP, if it chooses to proceed, in compliance with the provisions of La. R.S. 17:3394. In doing so, we recognize that one might foresee lingering conflicts that make it difficult to present, or proceed with, existing evidence, or to conduct the UHP with staff members who have previously played one or more roles in the process. The granting of the motion in limine by the district court resulted in a record that shed little light on how LSU might present its case at the UHP. Indeed, without directing the parties as to how to proceed, we note that while enactment of the statute demands prospective application, it expressly provides a private right of action for a violation of rights "under this Section." See La. R.S. 17:3394(J). While LSU might have collected evidence or otherwise investigated in a manner that was appropriate under the circumstances existing at the time, presentation of the same evidence must be in compliance with the new law, which may pose a challenge. Be that as it may, we refuse to risk "throwing the baby out with the bathwater," and we thus lift the injunction with the admonition that the parties adhere to La. R.S. 17:3394. The parties may otherwise proceed as they see fit.
15 CONCLUSION
Based on the above and foregoing reasons, the October 11, 2022 judgment of the district court is reversed. The preliminary injunction is set aside. Costs of this appeal in the total amount of $7,134.00 are assessed to plaintiffs.
REVERSED.
McClendon, J. Concurs for reasons assigned.
McClendon, J., concurring.
1I write separately to point out that the trial court correctly determined that LSU is required to adopt a new Code of Student Conduct before any additional disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiffs. Also, any further disciplinary proceedings must be in compliance with LSA-R.S. 17:3394.