Opinion
23A-JV-2002
05-16-2024
D.L., Appellant-Respondent, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin Casey A. Farrington Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Robert M. Yoke Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, Trial Court Cause No. 49D15-2301-JD-599, The Honorable Danielle P. Gaughan, Judge The Honorable Peter P. Haughan, Magistrate.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin Casey A. Farrington Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Robert M. Yoke Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Senior Judge Robb Judges Riley and Foley concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Robb, Senior Judge.
Statement of the Case
[¶1] D.L. appeals his delinquency adjudication for two counts of Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm, claiming the juvenile court erred in admitting the handguns obtained as a result of the pat-down search of his person during a valid traffic stop. Specifically, D.L. asserts the pat-down search violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Finding no constitutional violation and thus no error in the admission of the evidence, we affirm D.L.'s adjudication as a delinquent.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On January 19, 2023, Officer Brandon Brown initiated a traffic stop on I-65 in Indianapolis due to an unlawful lane change and an outdated registration sticker. He spoke to the driver and determined she was an Uber driver. The Uber driver rolled down the back window so that Officer Brown could speak to the backseat passengers. As the officer spoke to the passengers, he smelled the odor of raw marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Officer Brown obtained identification from the driver and the two backseat passengers and returned to his police vehicle.
[¶3] While Officer Brown was in his vehicle, Officer Frank Gunn arrived at the traffic stop. Officer Gunn approached the Uber vehicle and asked the driver to roll the windows down. Once the windows were down, Officer Gunn also smelled the odor of raw marijuana emanating from the rear passenger area.
[¶4] Officer Brown returned to the Uber vehicle, and the officers asked the occupants to exit. As D.L. exited the vehicle, his "right hand went down low" and "was kind of lagging . . . towards his waistband." Tr. Vol. II, p. 34. Officer Gunn informed D.L. he was going to detain him and handcuffed him. Once D.L. was handcuffed, Officer Gunn performed a pat-down search for weapons and found two handguns on D.L.'s person. Officers found a handgun and cash on the other juvenile, as well as a bag of marijuana, a digital scale, and another handgun in his backpack.
[¶5] The State filed a delinquency petition alleging D.L. had committed two counts of the delinquent act of dangerous possession of a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor. D.L. moved to suppress the handguns found on his person, arguing the pat-down search was unlawful, which the court denied following a hearing. The handgun evidence was admitted at the fact-finding hearing over D.L.'s objection. The juvenile court entered a true finding and adjudicated D.L. a delinquent child. D.L. was sentenced to probation. He now appeals his adjudication.
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] D.L. challenges the pat-down search of his person by Officer Gunn, asserting that the warrantless search violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and that the handguns found on his person should not have been admitted.
[¶7] The juvenile court has broad discretion in ruling on the admission of evidence. J.B. v. State, 205 N.E.3d 244, 247 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023). Generally, we review the juvenile court's ruling for an abuse of discretion, and we reverse only where it is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 982 N.E.2d 417, 421 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), trans. denied). However, when a challenge to the admission of evidence is predicated on constitutional law, we review the claim de novo. C.J. v. State, 141 N.E.3d 830, 835 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020), trans. denied.
1. Fourth Amendment
[¶8] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures by requiring a warrant supported by probable cause. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. However, "it is well-settled Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that police may, without a warrant or probable cause, briefly detain an individual for investigatory purposes if, based on specific and articulable facts, the officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity 'may be afoot.'" Overstreet v. State, 724 N.E.2d 661, 663 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)), trans. denied.
[¶9] D.L. does not challenge the validity of the initial traffic stop and rightly so. See Tinker v. State, 129 N.E.3d 251, 255 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019) (minor traffic violation is sufficient to give officer probable cause to stop vehicle), trans denied. Instead, he claims that even if the smell of raw marijuana created reasonable suspicion to support detaining them, the pat-down search of his person was not justified because there was no evidence that he presented a threat to officer safety.
[¶10] The officers here were justified in detaining D.L. and his companion based upon the odor of raw marijuana. See Moore v. State, 211 N.E.3d 574 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (motorist can be detained beyond purpose of traffic stop if something occurs during stop to cause officer reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring). In such circumstances, after making a Terry stop, an officer may, if he or she reasonably concludes that a suspect is armed and dangerous, frisk the outer clothing of that suspect in an attempt to discover weapons that might be used to assault him or her. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884. The purpose of this protective search is not to discover evidence of a crime, but to permit the officer to pursue his or her investigation without fear of violence. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L .Ed. 2d 612 (1972)).
[¶11] Moreover, "[t]he officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed;" the issue, rather, is whether a reasonably prudent man or woman in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his or her safety or that of others was in danger. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883. To determine whether an officer acted reasonably, we consider the specific, reasonable inferences that the officer, in light of his or her experience, could draw from the circumstances. Johnson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1199, 1205 (Ind. 2020), cert. denied.
[¶12] In the present case, Officers Brown and Gunn smelled raw marijuana emanating from the back seat of the vehicle where D.L. and his companion were seated. "[C]ourts have often considered evidence of drug involvement as part of the totality of the circumstances contributing to an officer's reasonable belief that a subject is armed and dangerous." Patterson v. State, 958 N.E.2d 478, 486 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011). And, more specifically, our courts have acknowledged it is common for firearms to be present in drug transactions. See Johnson, 157 N.E.3d at 1205 (and cases cited therein). Thus, the odor of marijuana suggested to Officer Gunn that D.L. and/or his companion was involved with drugs, an activity for which one or both of them could possibly be armed.
[¶13] In addition to the presence of drugs and the likelihood of the presence of weapons, Officer Gunn testified to D.L.'s furtive movement toward his waistband. However, D.L. contends the footage from Officer Gunn's body camera "indisputably contradicts" Gunn's testimony because it does not show that D.L. made any movement indicating he was not complying with the officer's commands and that any reaching he did was to place his belongings in the vehicle.
[¶14] As a general rule, appellate courts should give "'almost total deference'" to a trial court's factual determinations unless the video evidence "indisputably contradicts" the court's findings. Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 699 (Ind. 2017) (quoting State v. Houghton, 384 S.W.3d 441, 446 (Tex. App. 2012)). Though these instances may be rare, video evidence indisputably contradicts the trial court's findings when "no reasonable person could view the video and conclude otherwise." Love, 73 N.E.3d at 699. In making this determination, we assess the quality of the video, including angle, lighting, graininess, and audio, as well as the completeness of the video. Id. Where the video is not of good quality, not complete, or subject to different interpretations, we must defer to the trial court's interpretation. Id. at 699-700.
[¶15] Here, the video footage falls short of the Love criteria for indisputability. From the angle that Officer Gunn's body cam was able to capture, the viewer is not able to see D.L.'s right hand at all times as he exited the car and was detained. Further, between D.L. exiting the car and being patted down, the video footage captured only a close-up of D.L.'s hoodie as he stood facing the car with his back to Officer Gunn and his body cam. As there were opportunities for D.L. to reach for his waistband without the action being captured in the video footage, it does not indisputably refute Officer Gunn's testimony. Thus, we cannot say that no reasonable person could view the video and come to a different conclusion. Accordingly, we defer to the juvenile court's factual determinations regarding weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses.
[¶16] Thus, Officer Gunn believed, based on the smell of raw marijuana emanating from the backseat of the vehicle, that D.L. and/or his companion were traveling with marijuana, which creates a likelihood they also possessed weapons. Given these facts, in addition to D.L.'s furtive behavior, a reasonably prudent officer in Officer Gunn's position would be justified in his belief that his safety, as well as the safety of the Uber driver, his fellow officers, and all the motorists passing by, was potentially in danger. Indeed, "[t]he United States Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that traffic stops are 'especially fraught with danger to police officers.'" Patterson, 958 N.E.2d at 487 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983)). We therefore conclude the pat-down of D.L. did not violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches.
2. Article 1, section 11
[¶17] D.L. also asserts that the pat-down search violated his rights under article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The State claims D.L. waived this argument by failing to provide argument or authority to the juvenile court. As this assertion is incorrect, we address D.L.'s state constitutional claim. See Tr. Vol. II, pp. 43-45, 58-59.
[¶18] Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
To analyze the legality of a search under article 1, section 11, we evaluate the reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of the circumstances. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). Our Supreme Court has determined that the reasonableness of a search turns on a balance of: (1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred; (2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities; and (3) the extent of law enforcement needs. Id. at 361. It is the State's burden to show the intrusion was reasonable. Baniaga v. State, 891 N.E.2d 615, 618 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008).
[¶19] First, "[i]n evaluating the degree of suspicion, courts consider 'the reasonableness of the officers' assumptions, suspicions, or beliefs based on the information available to them at the time.'" Berry v. State, 121 N.E.3d 633, 638 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019) (quoting Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 18 (Ind. 2010)), trans. denied. Here, the degree of suspicion and concern weighs in favor of the State. As discussed with the federal analysis, the odor of marijuana which suggested the likelihood of the presence of weapons and D.L.'s hand movement all contributed to the reasonableness of the suspicions and concern that led Officer Gunn to perform the pat-down.
[¶20] Second, we evaluate the degree of intrusion from the perspective of the defendant. Berry, 121 N.E.3d at 639. An ordinary pat-down of a suspect's outer clothing is considered only a minimal intrusion for purposes of the Indiana Constitution. Id. And, police are not required to wait until a suspect appears to be reaching for a weapon before ensuring his safety and the safety of others at the scene. Id. In the present case, the intrusion imposed upon D.L. was minimal as it was merely a routine pat-down of his outer clothing.
[¶21] Finally, law enforcement needs were high as Officer Gunn justifiably believed that D.L. and/or his companion-who were in possession of marijuana-were armed. See Triblet v. State, 169 N.E.3d 430, 437 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (concluding law enforcement needs were high because armed person poses risk to officer safety), trans. denied.
[¶22] Therefore, weighing the degree of suspicion, the degree of intrusion, and law enforcement needs, we cannot say the pat-down of D.L. violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches under article 1, section 11.
Conclusion
[¶23] The police pat-down of D.L. following the Terry stop was not an unreasonable search under either the federal or state constitutions. Therefore, the juvenile court did not err in admitting the handguns obtained from D.L.'s person as a result of the pat-down.
[¶24] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Foley, J., concur.