Opinion
23-CV-0483 (LTS)
04-12-2023
YUSUF DIXON, Plaintiff, v. S. STAUMA, et al., Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Laura Taylor Swain Chief United States District Judge
Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action asserting that employees of the Yonkers Public Library have violated his rights. By order dated February 2, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. The Court dismisses the complaint for the reasons set forth below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (holding that “finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”); Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437 (“[A]n action is ‘frivolous' when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . .; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff asserts that the events giving rise to his claims took place at the Yonkers Public Library on “multiple occurrences on multiple dates.” (ECF 2, at 5.) He sues S. Stauma, the Assistant Director of the library, and two John Does, who are clerks at the library. Plaintiff asserts claims of harassment and abuse under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692(d), and defamation of character, citing to the Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act (“SPEECH Act”), 28 U.S.C. § 4101. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges the following as his statement of facts:
Making people think that I like Gay men, and that I come to the Library to See, An individual that works here, which is one of the “John Doe,” list as a Defendant. I Believe Miss. Stauma call said individual with this nonsense. Now this has occurred more ten once, with them People Following me all over the Place, cause they really believe that nonsense that her (Stauma) and the other John/Jane Doe's Actions.
My son gets Mental and Physical stress out.(Id.) Plaintiff seeks a “full investigation” and “$500,000 or 40% of [Defendants'] wages for 20 years.” (Id. at 6.)
The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim, and all spelling, irregular capitalization, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original, unless noted otherwise.
In an attachment to the compliant, which is an email from Plaintiff to contactnewscenter@un.org, he states:
Being the (ONE) that can read minds and talk through the (T.V.), (UNITED STATES) ‘person' and other individual's are utiliZing this to try and control the (UNITED STATES) ‘person' and other individuals in (MY COUNTRY) . . . not only by trying to use my con to control me, So that way they can try to control ‘person' within (UNITED STATES) and also ‘C.I.A.', ‘N.S.A.', ‘F.B.I'[.](Id. at 8.)
DISCUSSION
Even when the complaint is read with the “special solicitude” due pro se pleadings, Triestman, 470 F.3d at 475, the Court concludes that there is no legal theory on which Plaintiff can rely, see Denton, 504 U.S. at 33; Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437. Although Plaintiff refers to the FDCPA and SPEECH Act, he does not plead any facts implicating either federal statute. Plaintiff has pleaded no factual predicate showing that Defendant has violated his rights. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's complaint as frivolous because it lacks a basis in law or fact. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324-25.
The FDCPA prohibits deceptive and misleading practices by “debt collectors” relating to consumer debts. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The statute seeks to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, the SPEECH Act, 28 U.S.C. § 4101, precludes enforcement of certain foreign defamation judgments. See, e.g., Hyman v. Mashantucket Pequot Indian Tribe of Connecticut, No. 3:21-CV-00459 (KAD), 2022 WL 2078187, at *4 (D. Conn. June 9, 2022) (stating that the SPEECH Act “addresses the use of foreign defamation judgments to chill free speech”).
District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Plaintiff's claims are frivolous, and the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend to replead these claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
LITIGATION HISTORY
Since December 27, 2022, Plaintiff has filed six other actions in this court, all of which have been dismissed as frivolous. See Dixon v. Guterres, ECF 1:23-CV-0482, 6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2023) (dismissing complaint invoking the SPEECH Act and federal criminal statutes as frivolous); Dixon v. Bakish, ECF 1:23-CV-0480, 5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2023) (dismissing complaint invoking the FDCPA, the SPEECH Act, and federal criminal statutes as frivolous); Dixon v. Wing, ECF 1:23-CV-0227, 5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2023) (dismissing complaint invoking the SPEECH Act and federal criminal statutes as frivolous); Dixon v. Biden, ECF 1:23-CV-0226, 5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2023) (dismissing complaint invoking the SPEECH Act and federal criminal statutes as frivolous); Dixon v. Jenkins, ECF 1:23-CV-0225, 5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2023) (dismissing complaint invoking the SPEECH Act and federal criminal statutes as frivolous, but without prejudice to repleading any housing claims in a new action); Dixon v. Rymat, ECF 1:22-CV-10910, 6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2023) (dismissing claims on immunity grounds, as frivolous, and on abstention grounds).
Plaintiff also has two other pending actions in this court. See Dixon v. Wing, ECF 1:23-CV-0749, 2 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 26, 2023); Dixon v. Biden, ECF 1:23-CV-0748, 2 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 27, 2023).
By order dated April 23, 2023, the Court warned Plaintiff that if he persists in filing complaints that are determined to be duplicative, frivolous, or otherwise lacking in merit, the court will issue an order under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, barring him from filing new actions IFP unless he receives prior permission to file. See Dixon, ECF 1:23-CV-0482, 6. The Court reiterates that warning.
CONCLUSION
The complaint is dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The Court warns Plaintiff that, should he persist in filing complaints that are determined to be duplicative, frivolous, or otherwise lacking in merit, the Court will order him to show cause why he should not be barred under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 from filing new actions IFP without prior permission from the Court. All other pending matters in this case are terminated.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in this action.
SO ORDERED.