Opinion
D.D. No. 87-23
Decided April 27, 1988.
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Two-year suspension — Engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude — Dishonesty.
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Bar.
On April 2, 1987, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed a complaint against respondent, Jerome Harrison Hock, alleging nine counts of misconduct. Count I charged that respondent had been convicted of R.C. 2913.02 (grand theft) and had thereby violated DR 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude). Counts II and III alleged that respondent had converted over $16,000 of funds belonging to Mae Dillinger, a one-hundred-one-year-old nursing home resident, and in excess of $10,000 from the estate of Mada Lindemeyer. The complaint charged that this conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(3), 1-102(A)(4) (dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on an attorney's fitness to practice law).
Respondent pled guilty to this offense and was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law on November 26, 1986, pursuant to Gov. Bar R. V(9)(a)(iii).
Count IV alleged that respondent was the attorney for the estate of Scott Reynolds and that, on or about April 8, 1986, respondent withdrew $2,500 from the estate's bank account. He also signed a promissory note as the estate's administrator in the amount of $5,500, pledging the estate account as security for the loan. Respondent did not apply for probate court approval prior to either transaction. Relator charged that respondent's actions in connection with the Reynolds estate violated DR 5-104(A) (entering a business transaction with a client where client's and attorney's interests differ), 7-102(A)(3) (concealing or failing to disclose that which an attorney is required by law to reveal), 1-102(A) (3), 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), and 1-102(A)(6).
Count V alleged that, as guardian of Jody LaVeck, respondent held some $15,000 on LaVeck's behalf. In 1975, respondent obtained a personal loan by pledging as collateral a certificate of deposit for the LaVeck funds. Thereafter, he personally paid guardianship expenses in order to maintain the account pledged as security. In February 1984, however, respondent withdrew over $5,000 from the guardianship funds, only a portion of which he was entitled to as payment of attorney fees. Respondent did not secure probate court approval before withdrawing money from the LaVeck account and did not otherwise inform the court of these transactions in the accountings he filed. Relator charged that this conduct violated DR 7-102(A)(3), 5-104(A), 1-102(A)(3), 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), and 1-102(A)(6).
Count VI alleged that respondent was the attorney for the estate of Marie Clark, his aunt. The complaint charged that respondent withdrew a sum of money from the estate funds that exceeded the amount to which he was entitled as payment for attorney fees. Relator maintained that respondent had thereby violated DR 2-106(A) (collecting an illegal or clearly excessive fee).
Counts VII, VIII, and IX incorporated the previous allegations. Count VII specifically charged that while acting as attorney or fiduciary in the above matters, respondent either filed documents that inaccurately stated the assets under his control or did not file the required documents at all. This conduct, according to Count VII, violated DR 7-102(A)(3) and 1-102(A)(5). Count VIII charged, with respect to the foregoing, that respondent had failed to maintain client funds in an identifiable trust account and to keep appropriate accountings thereof, a violation of DR 9-102(A) and 9-102(B), respectively. Count IX charged respondent with violating DR 1-102(A)(3), 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), and 1-102(A)(6), during the course of the previously identified professional relationships.
A hearing was held before a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Bar on May 27, 1987. Respondent stipulated to having committed all the violations identified. In fact, only evidence of a potentially mitigating nature was presented.
In light of respondent's stipulations, the board concluded that he had violated the Disciplinary Rules as charged. Before making its recommendations, the board considered that he had refunded all misappropriated funds, and that respondent's legal services and career had otherwise earned him the respect and trust of his colleagues and clients. The board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years.
J. Warren Bettis, disciplinary counsel, and Mark H. Aultman, for relator.
Charles W. Kettlewell, for respondent.
This court finds that respondent violated the aforementioned Disciplinary Rules and hereby adopts the board's recommendation. Accordingly, respondent is ordered suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for two years. Costs taxed to respondent.
Judgment accordingly.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT and H. BROWN, JJ., concur.