Opinion
No. FST CV 04 4001083
July 25, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This action arises out of a collision on Main Avenue in Norwalk on August 25, 2002, between a motorcycle operated by the plaintiff, Franco Dimarco, and a vehicle leased by New Country Volkswagen of Greenwich, the lease agreement having been assigned to the defendant, Chase Manhattan Auto Finance Corp. (Chase). The vehicle was leased by the owner to Brian Kochol, and was being operated at the time of the accident by the defendant, Matthew Murphy.
The plaintiff alleges that Murphy was driving his vehicle negligently and that he sustained personal injuries as a result. The plaintiff further alleges that Murphy was driving the subject vehicle with the permission of the lessee, Kochol, and that the lease agreement did not preclude operators other than Kochol from insurance coverage. Gina Dimarco, the named plaintiff's wife, filed a claim for loss of consortium.
Chase has filed motion #114 seeking summary judgment as to counts three and four of the complaint which are directed to it as the assignee of the lessor of the vehicle involved in the accident. Chase cites General Statutes § 14-154a as the basis for its motion for summary judgment, claiming that Murphy had no right under the lease to operate said vehicle. Chase argues that a lessor of a motor vehicle is liable only for the actions of an authorized driver and not for those of a non-authorized operator such as the defendant Murphy.
General Statutes § 14-154a provides in pertinent part that: "Any person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner."
The plaintiff maintains that summary judgment is not appropriate in this case because there is an ambiguity in the lease as to the identity of an "authorized driver," thus precluding summary judgment because of the existence of an unresolved genuine issue of material fact. A "motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried." Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989). "Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view, the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Practice Book § 17-46." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barrett v. Montesano, 269 Conn. 787, 791-92, 849 A.2d 839 (2004). "A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002).
The lease from Chase to Kochol did not authorize Murphy to drive the rental vehicle. It provides in section 23 that the lessee "agrees not to use or permit use of the vehicle . . . (d) by anyone other than an authorized driver, which shall be the Lessee(s) to this Lease." Kochol was the lessee and Murphy was not authorized by the lease to drive the subject vehicle. As noted in Fojtik v. Hunter, 265 Conn. 385, 391, 828 A.2d 589 (2003), "a lease agreement could limit § 14-154 liability." Fojtik also noted that coverage is imposed "provided the vehicle, at the time in question, is being operated by one in lawful possession of it pursuant to the terms of the contract of rental." (Internal quotation marks omitted). Id.
The lease between New Country Volkswagen of Greenwich as lessor, which was subsequently assigned to Chase, and Kochel as lessee, is dated October 16, 1999, and involved a 1999 Volkswagen Passat.
A driver is in "lawful possession" when he is an authorized driver under the terms of the lease agreement that limit the identity of the drivers authorized to use the vehicle. In other words, "authorized drivers" means those drivers who are identified expressly or by reference in the lease agreement . . ." Fojtik v. Hunter, supra, 265 Conn. 393.
Based on the clear and unambiguous language of the rental agreement and the sworn affidavit of Chase's assistant vice president, Murphy was not an authorized driver and the vehicle was not lawfully in his possession. Neither the lessor or Chase had control over the identity of the driver of the leased vehicle. Since Kochol did not elect an additional driver or lessee, Murphy was an unauthorized operator of the rental vehicle. The contract further states that the lessee is "you" defined as one who signs the lease and only Kochol signed the lease. Therefore, the evidence provided by Chase shows that material facts with regard to the absence of any authority granted to Murphy to operate the vehicle are not in dispute.
Since Murphy was not an authorized driver, it therefore follows that Chase, as the lessor's assignee, had no liability for the negligence of Murphy. Summary judgment enters in favor of Chase as to the third and fourth counts of the plaintiffs' complaint.