Opinion
1:04-cv-01444-JDT-WTL.
April 28, 2005
ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (Docket No. 12)
This Entry is a matter of public record and may be made available to the public on the court's website, but it is not intended for commercial publication either electronically or in paper form. Although the ruling or rulings in this Entry will govern the case presently before this court, this court does not consider the discussion in this Entry to be sufficiently novel or instructive to justify commercial publication or the subsequent citation of it in other proceedings.
This matter comes before the court on a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Marion County Election Board ("MCEB") and its members in their official capacity (Docket No. 12). After reviewing all pleadings and briefs, the court finds as follows:
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a complaint against MCEB and its members in their official capacity, seeking relief pursuant to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 and the Fourteenth Amendment for alleged submergence, dilution, and degradation of the votes of the City of Lawrence's African-American population. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff requests declaratory and injunctive relief. In response to Plaintiff's allegations, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss claiming that they are the incorrect parties because they do not have the authority to redraw district lines or declare election laws illegal. Defendants claim that MCEB is an administrative body with no power to affect the relief sought and should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), purportedly for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Title 42 section 1973 states:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.Id.
II. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
A. Legal Standard
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not used to test the case on the merits; it merely tests the sufficiency of the complaint. See 5B Charles Alan Wright Author R. Miller Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (3rd ed. 2004) The standard of review for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is that the court views "all facts alleged in the complaint — as well as any inferences reasonably drawn therefrom — in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Mosley v. Klincar, 947 F.2d 1338, 1339 (7th Cir. 1991). Additionally, "[d]ismissal is appropriate only if it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff cannot establish any set of facts which would entitle him to the relief requested." Id.
B. Discussion
Defendants argue that they only have the power to administer elections, and therefore that Plaintiff's requested relief cannot be granted because Defendants do not have the power to make election law or declare election law invalid. In Dickinson v. Indiana State Election Bd., 933 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1991), the plaintiff named the Indiana State Election Board as a defendant but failed to name the legislative body with the power to reapportion the challenged districts. Plaintiff is similarly situated to the plaintiff in Dickinson in the following two respects: (1) she filed a claim under the Voting Rights Act; and (2) she failed to join the legislative body responsible for apportionment of the districts. Initially, the district court in Dickinson determined that the failure to name the legislative body was independent grounds for denial of the plaintiff's requested relief. Dickinson v. Indiana State Election Board, 740 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (S.D. Ind. 1990). Defendants present the same arguments for dismissal as did the defendants in Dickinson. Id. at 1379-82.
In 1990, the Indiana State Election Board had similar powers and duties as compared to the county election boards today under Indiana Code section 3-6-5-14. See Dickinson v. Indiana State Election Bd., 740 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D. Ind. 1990) ("The [Indiana State Election] Board is merely an administrative body created by the legislature and as such has no power either to enact the law or declare a law unconstitutional or unenforceable for any reason."), rev'd on other grounds, 933 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1991). In the present case, the MCEB is an administrative body created by the legislature to conduct elections and administer election laws within Marion County. Ind. Code § 3-6-5-14. Therefore, Defendants, including the MCEB, stand in the same shoes as the Indiana State Election Board in Dickinson.
When addressing the district court's opinion granting dismissal for failure to join the legislative body, the circuit court in Dickinson stated, "Section Two's requirement that federal courts make an affirmative effort to remedy improperly formed districts does not require that the legislature be a party. The determination of whether a Section Two violation has occurred requires no determination of legislative intent . . . and the legislative presence is therefore not needed. . . ." Dickinson, 933 F.2d at 500 (citing McNeil v. Springfield Park District, 851 F.2d 937, 940-41 (7th Cir. 1988)). The court elaborated on its authority: "The federal court's remedial authority under Section Two neither depends on nor necessarily impedes the state legislature's duty to reapportion. There is nothing inherent in a court's determination of liability under Section Two that requires the legislature's presence, even if the legislature has constitutional authority for apportionment." Id. at 501. Accordingly, a court has vast remedial authority if it finds a violation of the Voting Rights Act regardless of the presence of a legislative body.
Defendants are incorrect in asserting that relief cannot be granted unless the City of Lawrence or Lawrence Common Council is a party to this action. Plaintiff requests relief in the form of a declaration that the election plan is unconstitutional and violative of the Voting Rights Act. If a remedy is necessary, declaratory relief should be the first step toward a resolution; therefore, injunctive relief, i.e. ordering reapportionment, is highly unlikely unless the legislative body fails to act with reasonable diligence upon a declaration that the election plan is unconstitutional.
"Election plan" refers to Ind. Code section 36-4-6-3 in combination with the manner in which Lawrence Common Counsel has drawn the district lines. Section 36-4-6-3 requires second class cities to have a common counsel consisting of nine members. Six of the nine members are elected from individual districts; however, three of the members are elected by a city wide at-large vote.
The circuit court in Dickinson recognized that restraint is necessary in apportionment cases. This restraint is accomplished by following a two-step remedial process that initially employs declaratory relief, the least coercive measure, to apprise the legislature of the problem. The circuit court in Dickinson commented on the appropriateness of declaratory relief: "In the context of this case, the district judge could have determined whether the plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief while at the same time denying an injunctive remedy on equitable grounds." Dickinson, 933 F.2d at 503. The circuit court, when explaining why declaratory relief was an important first step, noted that "[a] victory on the merits would provide an important statement of plaintiffs' rights and, assuming the legislature fails to act, could also provide the impetus for further action." Id. at 503.
"A less intrusive remedy than an injunction, a declaratory judgment provides relief when legal or equitable remedies are too intrusive or are otherwise inappropriate." Dickinson, 933 F.2d at 503. (citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466-67(1974); Peterson v. Lindner, 765 F.2d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 1985)).
If declaratory relief fails to remedy the violation, the second step in the remedial process would come into effect, and the legislature would be ordered or allowed to submit a proposed remedy to the court. Id. at 501. This initial deference allows the legislative body to fashion a remedy and limits a court's intrusion into legislative tasks and state policy. Id. However, if the legislature fails to act or remains in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, a court is justified in performing a reapportionment without legislative input. Id.
Furthermore, because the Voting Rights Act creates an affirmative duty with the federal courts to remedy violations, illegal state apportionments cannot be overlooked on account of federalism. "[T]he supremacy clause ensures that the Voting Rights Act takes precedence over illegal state apportionments. . . ." Dickinson v. Indiana State Election Bd., 933 F.2d 497, 502 (7th Cir. 1991). By naming MCEB, Plaintiff seeks to prevent enforcement of allegedly illegal election law and assert her rights under the Voting Rights Act.
Injunctive relief is a most unlikely result the first time an unconstitutional apportionment scheme comes before the court, due to the sequential nature of the available remedies in apportionment cases, the degree of deference given to the legislative body, and judicial restraint.
Defendants cite Hines v. Marion County Election Board, 166 F.R.D. 402 (S.D. Ind. 1995), for the proposition that relief cannot be obtained from MCEB. However, the Hines court relied on Dickinson v. Indiana State Election Bd., 740 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D. Ind. 1990), rev'd, 933 F.2d 497, 502 (7th Cir. 1991), when it stated, "[The Marion County Election Board defendants] were dismissed from the action because this Court found that the relief the Voters sought could not be obtained from them." Hines, 166 F.D.R at 408 (citing Dickinson, 740 F. Supp. at 745). This statement in Hines is clearly contradictory to the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Dickinson. See Dickinson v. Indiana State Election Bd., 933 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1991). Additionally, the court in Hines only determined that the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties against the election board. The court simply did not determine whether or not the board was a proper party.
Defendants also cite Hawkins v. Wayne Twp. Bd., 183 F. Supp. 2d. 1099, 1100 (S.D. Ind. 2002). However, that case actually supports Plaintiff's position. In Hawkins, the township defendants sought to be dismissed from the action claiming that they did nothing wrong. The township-defendant's claim of no error was based on the fact that the alleged violation was caused by the election board distributing the wrong ballots to four precincts. The court recognized that the error occurred in the administration of the election, not the apportionment of voting districts. Although the error was considered purely administrative and solely attributable to the election board, the Hawkins court looked to the relief sought by the plaintiff and how that relief, if granted, would impact the township defendants. After its analysis, the court stated that "[e]ven if the [township] defendants did nothing wrong . . . their argument fails to come to grips with the relief being sought by plaintiffs. . . . There is little doubt that such relief would affect the [township] defendants substantially." Hawkins, 183 F. Supp. 2d. at 1105. The Hawkins court denied the township's motion to dismiss.
In the present case, Defendants claim that they should be dismissed because they did nothing wrong and are not directly responsible for any harm caused by the election plan. However, Plaintiff seeks an injunction forbidding Defendants from conducting elections because, as the Plaintiff claims, the MCEB is the only entity that can lawfully conduct elections for the City of Lawrence. If Plaintiff is granted the declaratory or injunctive relief she requests, Defendants would be substantially impacted because they would be either required to administer an election plan declared unconstitutional or forbidden by the court to administer the election for the City of Lawrence. The present case is thus analogous to Hawkins. Clearly, Defendants are justified to argue that the legislative body of Lawrence is responsible for the alleged harm, but Defendants are the proper parties because they stand to be substantially impacted by the relief sought.
The legislative body for the City of Lawrence does not conduct elections — it merely enacts laws that must be followed by the MCEB. Assuming all allegations are true, Plaintiff is harmed by the elections conducted under the current election plan. Because the MCEB is the only entity capable of carrying out general elections for the City of Lawrence, MCEB is the only entity that can prevent Plaintiff from being harmed. Therefore, the Defendants are the proper parties and Plaintiff states a claim for which relief can be granted. Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED.
Although neither party has requested joinder, equitable considerations demand that this court determine whether additional parties should be joined in this action.
The court notes, however, that Plaintiff comes close to making such a request in her complaint where she states: "Should the Court grant this relief the Plaintiff requests that the City Council of the City of Lawrence, and its members individually, be added as defendants. . . ." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 279.)
III. JOINDER
A. Legal Standard
"The purpose of Rule 19 under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is `to permit joinder of all materially interested parties to a single lawsuit so as to protect interested parties and avoid waste of judicial resources.'" Davis Companies v. Emerald Casino, Inc. 268 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Moore v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 901 F.2d 1445, 1447 (7th Cir. 1990)). Joinder is proper if a "person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may . . . as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest." If a person described in Rule 19(a) has not been joined, "the court shall order that the person be made a party." Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 21 (providing that "[p]arties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms that are just.").
Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a); Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication, Persons to be Joined if Feasible, reads as follows:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and joinder of that party would render the venue of the action improper, that party shall be dismissed from the action.
B. Discussion
Defendants state that Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff requests that the voting district lines be redrawn — a power that is exclusive to Lawrence Common Council. See Ind. Code § 36-4-6-3 However, dismissal of the claim would not resolve this issue. The Seventh Circuit has announced a more equitable proposition: "[I]f the court below believes lawmakers are essential to a just proceeding, the appropriate representative body could be joined when necessary under Rule 19. . . ." Dickinson, 933 F.2d at 501; see also DuShane v. Conlisk, 583 F.2d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 1978) (recognizing power of district court under Fed.R.Civ.P. 21 to add, sua sponte, a party for the purpose of granting complete relief).
The court explained its position on dismissal:
A potential problem could arise if the court believed that the legislature's interests were not adequately represented, a finding that does not appear in the district court's order. However, in view of the options available to the judge discussed below, the proper course would not be to dismiss but to ensure that any unrepresented interests are properly represented through joinder.Dickinson v. Indiana State Election Bd., 933 F.2d 497, 501 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1991). Subsequently, the circuit court explain what it believed to be the proper course of action: "If the court felt, considering the equities involved, that the legislature was necessary, the proper course would have been to require joinder under Rule 19." Id. at 501.
In this case, Plaintiff states the following in her prayer for relief: "Should the Court grant this relief the Plaintiff requests that the City Council of the City of Lawrence, and its member individually, be added as defendants. . . ." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 279.) Thus, by her own admission Plaintiff implicates the legislative interests of Lawrence Common Council. Moreover, MCEB cannot adequately represent the legislative interests of Lawrence Common Council. Plaintiff must claim that the districts were drawn with discriminatory intent or have a disparate impact to state a viable claim under the section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See Baird v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 976 F.2d 357, 360 (7th Cir. 1992). Because Defendants simply administer elections, they have no interest in how the district lines are drawn. However, Lawrence Common Council has a distinct interest in the election plan, and therefore its presence is essential for a just proceeding. This action should not proceed until the legislative interests implicated by Plaintiff's complaint are adequately represented by the lawmakers who have a stake in the litigation.
In sum, Lawrence Common Council is a necessary party located within the Southern District of Indiana, and joinder will not divest this court of jurisdiction. Equity should not allow the legislative interests of the City of Lawrence to be ignored. Lawrence Common Council should therefore be joined as a defendant.
Federal jurisdiction is proper because Plaintiff claims a violation of her right to vote. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3), 1343(4), 1357 grant this court subject matter jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED. Plaintiff is hereby ORDERED to amend her complaint to include the Lawrence Common Council and any other defendants whose interests will be implicated by Plaintiff's amended complaint.