Opinion
1635
September 26, 2002.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Leland DeGrasse, J.), entered on or about July 21, 2001, which granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211, unanimously affirmed, with costs.
LAURA M. DILIMETIN, for plaintiff-appellant.
SHARON STEIN, pro se.
Before: Mazzarelli, J.P., Andrias, Buckley, Sullivan, Lerner, JJ.
The complaint, purporting to state causes for tortious interference and conspiracy based upon plaintiff law firm's discharge by its client, allegedly at the instigation of defendants, was properly dismissed. Although a law firm may prevail on a claim that a third party induced a client to cancel a retainer agreement upon a demonstration that the inducement was wrongfully effected (see Lurie v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 270 N.Y. 379), defendants' actions, as alleged, amount to no more than "simple persuasion," and, as such, do not constitute the sort of coercive, maliciously motivated wrong required to support a cause of action for tortious interference with prospective business relations (see Snyder v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., 252 A.D.2d 294, 299-300). Plaintiff's remaining cause for conspiracy was properly dismissed, since defendants' alleged actions bear no discernible connection to an actionable underlying tort (see Alexander Alexander of New York, Inc. v. Fritzen, 68 N.Y.2d 968, 969; Am. Preferred Prescription, Inc. v. Health Mgt., 252 A.D.2d 414, 416).
We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.